UKRAINE IN CONTEMPORARY GEOPOLITICS

Abstract

The role of Ukraine on the world geopolitical arena from 1991 to 2025 is analyzed. Based on the works of H. Mackinder and Zb. Brzezinski, the geostrategic importance of Ukraine for the balance of power in Eurasia is emphasized. Three options for geostrategy that were possible for Ukraine since 1991 are distinguished: neutrality, Ukraine gaining the status of a regional leader, joining the integration projects of external «centers of power». The extent and success of Ukraine’s use of these geostrategies are investigated.

The role played by Ukraine in geopolitics since 1991 is analyzed: from 1991 until approximately the «orange events» of 2004, the Ukrainian elite positioned Ukraine mainly as a sovereign «neutral player». There were unsuccessful attempts to become a «regional leader» (GUUAM); - after 2004, the team of President V. Yushchenko first declared a change in the geopolitical vector to a pro-Western one. A complex process of geopolitical choice began inside Ukraine, which finally ended after the start of Russian aggression in 2014.

The causes and consequences of the erroneous decisions of the 1990s, as well as the specifics of European integration efforts within Ukraine, the West's unwillingness to accept Ukraine at the cost of a conflict with the Russian Federation, the real importance of Ukraine gradually degraded to the role of a «buffer zone» between the West and the Russian Federation, as a result of which external influences on Ukrainian politics grew and over time it became a convenient «victim of aggression». The stage after 2014 (and especially after 2022) is highlighted, which was marked by the fact that the Ukrainian political nation wanted to see Ukraine as an «outpost» for the USA and European countries, the purpose of which is to deter the Kremlin's revanchist intentions. It is emphasized that the resources for transforming Ukraine into an «outpost» should be provided by the West, and accordingly, real preparations for full-scale combat operations with the Russian Armed Forces, relying mainly on domestic Ukrainian resources, were not carried out. It is concluded that the consequence of this was Ukraine's unpreparedness for a full-scale war. After 02/24/2022, Ukraine received quite significant assistance from Western countries, but not enough to repel the aggressor. The current geopolitical state of Ukraine is defined as a «battlefield».

Three conclusions are drawn. The first - under the condition of the continuation of a full-scale war of attrition, the absence (or limitation) of foreign assistance, the failure to implement effective systemic changes in the Ukrainian state itself - Ukrainian geopolitical subjectivity is conditional, and the survival of Ukraine as an independent sovereign state is not guaranteed. The second - Ukraine needs to move from the state of the «battlefield» to a less destructive and more subjective one for Ukraine. The third - options for further development of events are identified: continuation of the state of the «battlefield»; spread of hostilities to European countries; Ukraine's exit from the hot phase of the current war and beyond: either «buffering» Ukraine with the subsequent risk of losing statehood, or «outposting» Ukraine  (thanks to its own resources and European assistance) or turning to non-Western «centers of power» for security assistance (for example, to Turkey or India).