The evolution of strategies communities in the presence of sources
Keywords:
evolution, population, strategy, complexity, cooperation
Abstract
The evolution of population of the strategies, limited only by the memory depth, in the presence of the sources of strategies of different memory depths has been considered. It has been shown that the memory depth and the complexity of strategies are evolutionarily beneficial. The properties of the strategies which form the stationary state have been established. It has been shown that the aggressiveness of the strategies falls in all cases and at the stationary stage all strategies have zero aggressiveness in relation to each other. This property can be used as the strategy selection principle. The relation between the aggressiveness and the number of points for a strategy move has been shown. The higher the aggressiveness, the fewer points of evolutionary advantage the strategy has.
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References
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Perc M. Evolution of cooperation on scale-free networks subject to error and attack //New Journal of Physics. – 2009. – Т. 11. – №. 3. – С. 033027.
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Nowak M., Highfield R. Supercooperators: Altruism, evolution, and why we need each other to succeed. – Simon and Schuster, 2011.
Szabó G., Hauert C. Evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma games with voluntary participation //Physical Review E. – 2002. – Т. 66. – №. 6. – С. 062903.
Hauert C. et al. Via freedom to coercion: the emergence of costly punishment //science. – 2007. – Т. 316. – №. 5833. – С. 1905-1907.
Traulsen A., Claussen J. C. Similarity-based cooperation and spatial segregation //Physical Review E. – 2004. – Т. 70. – №. 4. – С. 046128.
Szolnoki A., Szabó G. Cooperation enhanced by inhomogeneous activity of teaching for evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma games //EPL (Europhysics Letters). – 2007. – Т. 77. – №. 3. – С. 30004.
Perc M., Szolnoki A. Social diversity and promotion of cooperation in the spatial prisoner’s dilemma game //Phys. Review E. – 2008. – Т. 77. – №. 1. – С. 011904.
Yang H. X. et al. Diversity-optimized cooperation on complex networks //Physical Review E. – 2009. – Т. 79. – №. 5. – С. 056107.
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Fu F., Nowak M. A. Global migration can lead to stronger spatial selection than local migration //Jour. of stat. physics. – 2013. – Т. 151. – №. 3-4. – С. 637-653.
Fu F. et al. Evolution of in-group favoritism //Sc. reports. – 2012. – Т. 2. – С. 460.
Wang Z., Szolnoki A., Perc M. Optimal interdependence between networks for the evolution of cooperation //Scientific reports. – 2013. – Т. 3.
В.М.Куклин, А.В.Приймак, В.В.Яновский. Влияние памяти на эволюцию популяций // Вісник Харківського національного університету імені В. Н. Каразіна, серія «Математичне моделювання. Інформаційні технології. Автоматизовані системи управління». - Т. 29. – 2016. - С.41-66.
Захаров В. Е. Колмогоровские спектры в задачах слабой турбулентности //Основы физики плазмы. – 1984. – Т. 2. – С. 48-79.
Кадомцев Б. Б., Конторович В. М. Теория турбулентности в гидродинамике и плазме //Изв. вузов. Радиофизика. – 1974. – Т. 17. – С. 509-540.
Published
2017-12-22
How to Cite
Приймак, А. В., & Яновский, В. В. (2017). The evolution of strategies communities in the presence of sources. Bulletin of V.N. Karazin Kharkiv National University, Series «Mathematical Modeling. Information Technology. Automated Control Systems», 36, 68-84. Retrieved from https://periodicals.karazin.ua/mia/article/view/10098
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