Impact of violation of democratic strategies with memory on population evolution

Abstract

Relevance. The lack of trust in modern society often hinders the development of humanity and sometimes calls into question the future of the human population as a whole. Throughout the history of societal development, there has been an observed phenomenon where a particular idea captures the minds of people, leading them to adopt similar (or very similar) behavioral strategies. To improve understanding of internal processes in a society where the uniform distribution of strategies among the population is disrupted, detailed research is necessary, which is impossible without appropriate software.

Objective. The aim of the study is to investigate the influence of the number of agents of a particular strategy on the outcome of population evolution as a whole. The study explores the nature of changes in evolution under the conditions of gradual, monotonous increase in agents of a specific strategy from 1 agent to 10% of the democratic population. The research also aims to identify strategies that are evolutionarily viable only under the condition of increasing their carriers in the population.

Research Methods. The evolution of the population with a full set of behavioral strategies, limited only by a memory depth of 2, was considered with an increased number of agents of a specific strategy. Each agent interacts with every other, including itself, according to the iterative model of the prisoner's dilemma. Rewards are determined by payoff matrices. Each subsequent generation of the population sequentially loses agents of the most disadvantageous behavioral strategy from the previous generation. Agents  that bear the chosen strategy interact with each other and with another population according to standard laws. Several strategies were considered, the number of agents of which was increased. Among them were strategies with complexity lower than the average complexity of the population and higher than the average complexity of the population. A variant was also considered where the number of agents of the strategy that won in a democratic society increased.

Results. The study demonstrates how the presence of a highlighted strategy with an increased number of carriers affects the dynamics of the population. An increase in the final average earnings of the population was observed. It was found that increasing the number of agents does not lead to the victory of a strategy that did not win in the democratic population.

Conclusions. The results of the study identify the main consequences of the influence of the number of agents of a particular strategy on population evolution.