Gestalt psychology in a cognitive-evolutionary light and the expediency of using Gestalt psychological terms “figure” and “ground” in linguistic research

Abstract

The present article is dedicated to discussing Gestalt psychology in a cognitive-evolutionary light, including determining the expediency of using Gestalt psychological terms “figure” and “ground” in linguistic research, as suggested by Leonard Talmy. First, it is demonstrated that such a school of psychology as Gestalt psychology has focused only on one, right-hemisphere side of human cognition, absolutizing it despite the existence of its other left-hemisphere side, which during the civilizational history of humanity has enabled its scientific progress. It is shown that, in accordance with the cognitive-evolutionary theory of language, in onto- and phylogenesis, right-hemisphere syncretic (Gestalt) perception is replaced by superficial perception, during which the categorization of studied objects according to certain traits is already present, but only according to the first trait that happens to catch attention. Over time, superficial perception is to be replaced by left-hemisphere alternative perception, during which categorization occurs in accordance with a trait chosen deliberately from several other traits, meaning that a person simultaneously perceives all the traits of a studied phenomenon. In general, there has been little attention from Gestalt psychology towards perception that is higher than syncretic (Gestalt) perception (the only exception is the law of Prӓgnanz, the essence of which is close to the understanding of superficial perception). Second, the following is proven in the article: 1) Gestalt psychological terms “figure” and “ground,” which Leonard Talmy suggests using in linguistic research, do not possess in linguistics the traits that they possess in Gestalt psychology, which results in an absence of grounds to claim that these terms have been taken from Gestalt psychology; 2) figure and ground, as Talmy understands them, have only partial realization, while the notions of movable and immovable, which L. Talmy uses as synonymous to the notions of figure and ground, are realized much more often, since they depend not on the position of “being behind”, which the notion of ground depends on, but on a more universal position of “closeness”; 3) in language, both figure and ground can be movable and immovable, which contradicts Talmy’s idea that the figure is always movable and the ground is always immovable; 4) in language, there exist syntagmatic restrictions, which are due not only to the oppositions between figure and ground or mobility and immobility.