VIKTOR ORBÁN’S HUNGARY DEMOCRATIC BACKSLIDING AND EU REACTION
Abstract
The article analyses the main features of Hungarian democratic backsliding since 2010 when Viktor Orbán’s rule was started ruling the country again and examines the reaction of the EU institutional system.
The completeness of Europeanization and the post-communist democratic development was questioned due to the gradual autocratic transformation of the political regime, the strengthening of authority’s control and the permanent disputes with other EU countries regarding security and foreign affairs. The EU’s institutions have mostly had limited opportunities to prevent anti-democratic actions by the Hungarian government since the existing judicial procedures, such as Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union, have not been effective. Considering the reactions of numerous European authorities to Hungarian democratic backsliding, it is possible to assume that the European Commission, due to various systemic reasons, has preferred a strategy of political dialogue with Budapest, avoiding stronger institutional responses such as sanctions. Despite being the most critical EU body of power toward the Hungarian premier and his political party since 2010, the European Parliament also restrained its reaction for a long time. The key reason for that behaviour was that FIDESZ helped to build the government coalition as a part of the European People’s Party from 2010 to 2020, allowing it to hold leading positions in the EU institutional system. The European Council stepped away from the problem because other countries favoured not to criticize the Hungarian government and were reluctant to give the European Commission additional power in the dispute between EU authorities and the national government. At the time, the Court of Justice of the European Union had limited competence in those areas. And, as a result, the mechanism of Article 7 of the TEU was activated against Hungary only in 2018 and wasn’t finished properly. Another EU instrument, such as the financial conditionality of EU funds, was adopted in 2020. However, its final result also hasn’t been successful, and despite financial restrictions from the EU budget on Hungary, it has not stopped Viktor Orbán.
So, the EU has used numerous strategies, such as rhetorical tension, political dialogue with Budapest, institutional responses, and their combinations, but the last ones have not prevented Hungary’s democratic backsliding. Now, the EU should update its institutional efficiency to correct the situation in Hungary and to lead to an end similar situation in the future.
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References
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