THE FIRST “NO” TO EUROPE: THE UK’S REACTION TO THE SCHUMAN PLAN AND ITS CONSEQUENCES, 10 MAY – 3 JUNE 1950

Abstract

The study deals with the response of the United Kingdom to the Schuman Plan for a European Coal and Steel Community. It analyzes three key issues: the British attitude towards the French initiative, the London-Paris dialogue in May 1950, and the geopolitical dimensions of the UK’s decision not to participate in the first supranational community. The focus is on the reaction of Clement Attlee's Labour government and the diplomacy led by Ernest Bevin, as well as the solid bipartisan consensus on the issue of Europe. The political dimensions of the reasons and consequences of British actions as a conscious geopolitical choice and an act of self-determination come into the spotlight. After 1945 the United Kingdom was actively involved in the establishment of the first regional organizations in Western Europe: the Western Union, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, and the Council of Europe, consistently advocating their intergovernmental character. Meanwhile, France showed a desire to depart from traditional frameworks and apply a new approach to effectively solve its economic and military security concerns against Germany. Disagreements over the application of the supranational method created an unbridgeable gap, given the intransigence of both sides. The British position was based on the lessons of the Second World War, an understanding of national sovereignty as a supreme value, prioritizing relations with the Commonwealth and the United States, the desire to maintain the status of a global power and a leading position in Europe through expanding intergovernmental cooperation rather than integration. As a result, London missed the unique opportunity to shape the fate of contemporary Europe, which would not be built around the historical Anglo-French Entente but on the union of former longtime foes, France and West Germany.