ANOMALY IN THE SPHERE OF STATE FINANCIAL CONTROL
Abstract
The article attempts to deepen the knowledge of the control function of finance and the associated expansion of the understanding of the sphere of state financial control. Based on the statement that the implementation of the control function of finance, by creating conditions for preventing abuse of public financial resources, is obviously a process programmed to obtain a positive result, the study began with establishing the process of disclosing the control functionality of finance. Based on the visualization of which, evidentiary markers of the norm were constructed. The norm was defined as the development of the practice of state financial control as a derivative of the control function of finance. Due to this, it became possible to check the sphere of state financial control for compliance with the control function of finance. At all levels of practice: national, regional and supranational.
Compliance audit skills were chosen as a tool. That is, the product developed by it was used to check the sphere of control: ISSAI-400 and ISSAI-4000.
When encountering or relying on the sphere of state financial control in public life, one must be sure whether the varieties of existing practices in it are built according to the norm. In the absence of such confidence, it is advisable to additionally make sure where exactly the practice of control is created according to the norm and where not. Why does this concern us? Because the implementation of the control function of finance is a positive process, respectively, if it is not related to this function, then we do not know: a) positive or negative intentions/meaning underlying such a practice of state financial control; b) whose budgets become the subject of control; c) who is the beneficiary of the control results.
During the study, we found an anomaly in the sphere of state financial control. we observe. At the supranational level of practice, we encountered a control practice built without a control function of finance. That is, there is a control entity that is not directly related to the implementation of control actions with finances (excluding control over finances belonging to this entity), but which is directly related to the organization of control actions with finances - we are talking about INTOSAI. Establishing an anomaly in the field of control, regardless of achieving the goal, required continuing the study in order to obtain additional results. Such unexpected and anomalous findings in the practice of financial control posed new questions to the study, without answers to which the study would be incomplete, in particular: What does the fact of the existence of INTOSAI indicate to us?; What is the reason for the emergence of INTOSAI?; How did INTOSAI appear?; Is this situation still related to the control function of finances, and if so, whose finances?; Can INTOSAI be considered an element of the institutional infrastructure of public finances? Does INTOSAI have budgets in the subject of control? Positive or negative intentions/meaning underlie the purpose of the establishment of INTOSAI?.
During, additional research caused by the search for answers to questions related to the specified anomaly, allowed us to observe certain transformations of both INTOSAI, in particular, and the sphere of public financial control, in general, namely: - the institution, recognizing itself as an umbrella organization ("umbrella organization"), is transforming from a "forum for public audit" to a "bureaucracy"; - transformation of the concept of "transparency and accountability", according to INTOSAI-P20, into the concept of "controller by controller". And even more, the beneficiaries of the concept of "transparency and accountability", thanks to information technologies (AI, OSINT, etc.) can be other entities that do not belong to the sphere of public financial control and the public of a separate subject of international law. Almost anyone, for any purpose.
Concluding the abstract of the study, we note that the presented study indicates the possibility of a negative scenario in the further development of the sphere of state financial control.
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