ONTOLOGICAL GRAMMAR OF LANGUAGE AS A FOUNDATION FOR LIFE CREATIVITY IN THE AGE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
Abstract
This article analyzes the role of language as an ontological space for human life-creation amidst the growing influence of artificial intelligence (AI). It substantiates the concept of ontological grammar, which emerges as a conceptual tool for exploring the interrelationship between linguistic being, cognitive strategy, and cultural self-realization. The authors consider the possibility of a unified ontological grammar common to classical, non-classical, and post-classical philosophical approaches. Particular attention is paid to the holistic dimension of communicative space, where language functions as a carrier of life-creating meanings. It's noted that the ontological grammar of holism can offer a discursive solution for a "natural" worldview strategy, especially in the new technological era. The research reveals that AI poses significant challenges to ontological grammar. It functions as a high-tech tool for speech simulation, rather than a subject of thought. This means that while AI models generate texts, they do not create meaning in the sense of an intentional act. Artificial intelligence can be a useful tool for philosophical exploration, testing concepts, and comparing ideas, but it isn't a full participant in life-creation or the philosophical understanding of being. The article points out that post-structuralist semiotics critiqued the structuralist idea of seeking a meta-structure or universal meta-code. Conversely, in the era of high-tech AI, the explication of the concept of code shifts from metaphysical and ontological dimensions into the broader context of human life-creation, with extensive opportunities for information access and internet communication. However, a problem of decontextualization arises, as AI can process texts without discerning the depth of situational relevance. For AI, context is merely linear memory, not a multidimensional situational structure. Furthermore, semantic inversion can occur, where a model might generate contradictory phrases or exhibit "empty coherence" due to the absence of semantic verification mechanisms. A significant issue is the discrepancy between intention and utterance, as AI lacks intentions, and its speech is never an act of communicative will. These limitations demonstrate a fundamental disconnect between AI's speech and human language: where humans infuse meaning-as-being through life-creation, AI merely models a semblance of meaning. It's proven that the digital era organizes the space for life-creation through language, but simultaneously creates threats to its authenticity.
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