Models of corruption: an analysis of the political context

Abstract

Corruption and governance, and their relationship, are becoming increasingly popular topics for analysis. In contrast to the main discussion on corruption, we consider it appropriate to analyze models of corruption in their political context, as corruption is endogenous to the political process.

Models of corruption are determined by the way rent is obtained, which is associated with the relevant political systems. In anarchy, predation usually takes place in a decentralized environment. Thus, there are few issues of corruption in its classical sense. As the number of field commanders in the economy decreases and field commander organizations develop to resemble organized crime institutions, rent-seeking activities will still be called extortion, not corruption.

The culmination of political development can be found in modern democracies, which actively fought against the old structures of patronage in exchange for a democratically legitimized system of law. Predatory behavior of the state is expressed in the maximum increase of chances for re-election by providing financing from interested groups of society. Compared to the standard of political corruption, rent-seeking of interest groups is a constitutionally legitimized form of predatory political activity.

The confusion surrounding the term "corruption" arises in societies that take political legitimacy for granted and liberally transfer the term to a society based on completely different goals and structures. The above analysis argues that while corruption is seen as a predatory activity that symbolizes the premise of a stable dictatorship, the very term "corruption" is misleading because it should be seen in the context of a particular political system.

Civil service reform or the demonopolization of industry is of particular interest, as we argue that in some countries the real purpose of the bureaucracy is to obtain rent and direct part of that rent to the top of the hierarchy. If this assumption is correct, then the failures of reform efforts may in some cases be explained by the logic of predatory kleptocracy. When reforms are consistent with the evolution of the ruler toward benevolence, they serve to strengthen the virtuous process. For example, a comprehensive reform of the civil administration ends when the ruler gains more stability from benevolence than from patronage. On the other hand, when reforms threaten the regime's survival, they can be systematically rejected or, at worst, lead the country back to anarchy.