THE WORK OF BEING AND THE NEUROSIS OF PHILOSOPHY

Abstract

Against the background of the so-called obsessive optimism in various areas of humanitarian knowledge and human sciences in general, projects of being appear even more utopian than a century ago, due to the lack of substantive criteria in their favor, but this is only at first, rather mediocre glance. The work of being in the very title of the article appears as an unambiguous analogy and at the same time a philosophical continuation of the theme of the work of the negative, formulated by A. Green in parallel with the work of mourning by S. Freud. Both of them, according to the psychoanalytic approach, defined work as something dynamic in nature, while the philosophical foundations of this concept have a much wider range of connotations, which is why they require a more detailed conceptualization. For its part, the neurosis of philosophy appears as a development of the problem of the negativity of being-copula, established by the author earlier in a separate study. Moreover, philosophical thinking as such is defined by the author according to the necessary requirement of the negative, but by no means one of the arbitrary possibilities on the path of its formation. According to the author, if being requires an ἀλήθεια-oriented phenomenology in order to reveal its nature, initiated by M. Heidegger, then in the matter of thinking about being, nothing other than E. Husserl's eidetic phenomenology, which originates from descriptive psychology and does not ultimately break with it, appears to be the most appropriate in solving this problem. That is why the goal chosen by the author and at the same time represented in the title of the synthesis of psychoanalytic language about the essential negativity of neurosis and truly philosophical thinking about being, the work of which is permeated with negativity already at the level of the first of the judgments about being that is not (as an existence or beings only), and therefore its copula, is justified. Hence, the history of philosophical thinking appears to be a collection of surplus narratives about being in the sense of plus ultra, for which there is no need, but which by the very fact of existence requires trans-phenomenal grounds.