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**THE QUESTION OF ALIENATION: THE PROBLEM OF ONTOLOGICAL RECONSTRUCTION OF
A FRAGMENTED CONCEPT**

The proposed work is devoted to the problem of philosophical reconstruction of alienation as a fundamental phenomenon of human existence. The main attention is focused on an attempt to understand alienation not only as a socio-cultural or psychological phenomenon, but as an ontological category that should reveal the essential structures of human being. The main complexity of the problem of alienation lies in its ontic immediacy – with the simultaneous extreme complexity of its identification and explication in a strict conceptual representation. Alienation is not just an object of thought, but also a way of revealing the essence. The question of the possibility of reconstructing a holistic vision of the phenomenon of alienation on the basis of existing interpretations, their integration into a single conceptual representation is relevant. To answer this question, the key stages of the evolution of the concept of alienation in philosophical thought of the last two centuries are retrospectively traced. It is shown that, despite their number, most of them consider the problem of alienation not as such, but as a derivative of other problems of human existence by reducing the problem of alienation to specific negative manifestations of the economic, political, social, cultural, and psychological fields of human practice. A general model is proposed to clarify the reasons for such reductionism. The only solution may be the ontological reconstruction of alienation as a universal and essential aspect of Dasein. It is shown that the ideas of Hegel, Marx, and Heidegger are of fundamental importance for such a conceptualization of the problem of alienation. Despite the fundamental ontological and methodological differences, they not only proceed from the understanding of alienation as a key problem of human existence, but also reconstruct its ontological necessity. The similarity of the views of Marx and Heidegger in this context seems particularly productive, especially considering the fundamental differences in their theoretical dispositions. Both thinkers, although in different ways, come to the conclusion that the fundamental determination of alienation is the very way in which a person reveals his essence - despite the obvious divergence in the understanding of both this essence and the ways of its disclosure. Understanding the extreme incompatibility of historical materialism and phenomenological ontology only emphasizes the interesting paradox of this coincidence, which clearly indicates the fundamental nature of alienation. The main goal of the article is to demonstrate the potential of the philosophical interpretation of alienation in the context of the dialogue between these two traditions.

Keywords: **alienation, essence, human being, attitude, dialectics, Marx, Heidegger.**

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Formulation The question of alienation occupies a distinct place within contemporary philosophical discourse. This distinctiveness is multifaceted. The very phenomenon of alienation is connected to the essential dimension of human being, and the corresponding category – originating in the transition from classical to non-classical philosophy – has not lost its semantic depth in the postmodern context and retains its heuristic potential. The evident relevance of studying the phenomenon of alienation is rooted in its implicit relation to the very existence of the human being; it constitutes a necessary form of any Dasein-implementation. At the same time, the urgency of the problem of alienation does not allow it to be postponed for a while, because this problem is precisely *timely*. However, this timeliness and fundamental importance, characteristic of the problem of

alienation, are complemented by its fundamental complexity. The difficulty here lies not only in the insolubility inherent to all fundamental philosophical problems in a scientific sense, but also in the specific multidimensionality of the subject, and in the incomplete conceptual explication even within a formal-logical context – let alone a full phenomenological representation.

In the case of alienation, we are dealing with a situation that, if not unique, is at least paradigmatic for the problems of human existence: it is not merely a theoretical difficulty or formal contradiction – of which there have been many in the history of philosophy. The problem of alienation is an immediately lived reality of human existence, one that has been uncovered with difficulty and is equally difficult to capture in conceptual form. And in this status, it is characterized by all the complexities of a theoretical description of what concerns the existence of an individual in a socio-cultural space. The apparent self-evidence and intuitive clarity of this being, nevertheless, have long eluded theoretical grasp.

It is evident that all philosophical problems – to varying degrees and mediations – are born of the human desire to understand its own existence under specific conditions. Interpreting Kant, one may claim that no matter what question we attempt to answer, we are ultimately responding to the question of ourselves. The difference lies in the ways in which we ask about ourselves – and the contexts in which we do so. Within this effort at self-understanding, the question of alienation holds a special position. Alienation is not only thought about but also immediately experienced; it is what occurs and what results from every attempt at human self-actualization [Jaeggi R., Neuhaus F., 2014]. The entire history of theoretical comprehension of the phenomenon of alienation, carried out by outstanding and, at the same time, diverse thinkers of the last two centuries – points to this fundamental interpretation of the phenomenon. Regardless of philosophical positioning, many have explicitly or implicitly come to the fundamental importance and even the ontic and ontological necessity of alienation as a phenomenon and concept, and discovered its fundamental nature for human existence [Henning C. 2024].

At the current stage of research on alienation, the fundamental question is whether it is possible to reconstruct a holistic vision of the phenomenon on the basis of the available diverse versions and interpretations of alienation, to integrate its various theoretical interpretations into a unified conceptual representation. To what extent has contemporary philosophical thought actually clarified for itself the essence, dynamics, and forms of alienation? The answer to these questions can hardly be affirmative. Or rather, it can be affirmative only within the framework of specific approaches, to which each of these versions of the answer belongs. It is more appropriate to speak of a comprehensive identification of the problem, of its theoretical recognition and marking [Geyer R.F., Schweitzer D.R., 2013].

The main circumstance that might explain such a strange combination of obvious interest in the problem and the simultaneous absence of an integral, comprehensive theoretical representation of the phenomenon lies in the fact that most authors have come to the problem of alienation – have «discovered» it – from theoretical standpoints that emerged in the consideration of other problems, in the context of which alienation appeared merely as a partial form or a side effect, a secondary consequence, whose necessity could be quite conditional or at least surmountable. Most frequently, this tendency manifests in the reduction of alienation to the consequences of specific socio-cultural practices and the forms of their organization, which is most characteristic of sociologically and culturally oriented studies. And although most often alienation as the main object of research is singled out precisely within the framework of the socio-philosophical approach, the general narrowness of this approach precludes seeing the anthropological completeness of the phenomenon, to say nothing of its ontological depth.

This secondary nature, the subordination of the problem of alienation to other problems that are considered as its root causes, fundamentally limits the possibility of comprehending the essential dimension of the phenomenon and severely hampers any essential understanding of alienation. Any reduction of alienation to socio-cultural or psychological factors – despite the obvious critical productivity of such an approach – is fundamentally limited and lacks an ontological foundation. This approach reduces alienation to absolute negativity, essentially ignoring the dialectical nature of any process in its development. Such a limitation was not avoided, for example, by Herbert Marcuse, who failed to overcome the psychoanalytical reduction of the human being to biosocial and cultural factors and interpreted alienation in the context of repressive sublimation [Oskay F., Ballard W.W., 2025], leaving without due attention those ontological foundations of social practice that had already been demonstrated by Marx [Honneth A., Reitz Ch. 2013].

The overcoming of such fragmentation can only be achieved through the maximum

conceptualization of the approach and the consideration of alienation in its ontological primacy. That is, alienation must be regarded not as the result of certain deformations of being, not as the subjective lived experience of these deformations, but as an ontological condition, the essential dimension of which cannot be reduced even to the source of those deformations and lived experiences. Alienation is not simply a dysfunction, otherwise it would mean that alienation is secondary to certain determining circumstances.

A starting point for a fundamental view of alienation may be the hypothetical – at first glance – position, according to which the problem of alienation has been the key axis for the development of philosophical thought in the last two centuries. This hypothesis is entirely acceptable as a first approximation, if we proceed from the history of the formation and development of philosophical conceptions of the human being, which – in their modern form – emerged precisely from attempts to comprehend the problem of the divided human being, his estrangement, subordination, and opposition to the very structures of activity, power, social relations, and culture produced him. These themes have obviously been key for the philosophy of the last two centuries. And these themes undoubtedly and directly concern the problem of alienation, point toward it, and often explicitly address it.

Therefore, it is quite reasonable to assume that the progressive development of modern philosophical thought – and not only anthropological or social – took place precisely around the problem of alienation – but not from it. How, in this case, can we explain the coexistence of the ontic fundamentality of the phenomenon of alienation and, simultaneously, the ontological secondary nature, derivativeness and fragmentariness of the corresponding concept? The problem is not that alienation lacks sufficient depth and therefore did not require conceptual investigation. The reason lies precisely in the essential complexity of the phenomenon, which fundamentally complicates any attempts at theoretical fixation of the problem of alienation.

Alienation in its individual aspects was revealed in certain contextual frameworks, and its manifested concrete forms were tied to these circumstances as primary conditions and causes. Each time, alienation was reduced to these particular manifestations within specific fields of socio-cultural practice and their individual interpretations within the framework of special theories – socio-cultural, politico-economic, anthropological, psychological. However, these fields of practice and the theories that describe them are not the primary ontic and ontological domains for alienation; rather, they are the domains of its manifestation and unfolding – but not of its origin.

Thus, we may conclude that the reason for the aforementioned fragmentary disunity of the concept of alienation is like a forced violation of cause-and-effect logic and the impossibility, from the outset, of establishing the fundamental primacy of alienation's ontological status – both of which are conditioned by the fundamental complexity and theoretical elusiveness of the phenomenon. Overcoming this circumstance is possible in the process of phenomenological reconstruction of alienation in its ontological primacy. Such reconstruction is capable of enabling a productive reverse integration of numerous scattered interpretations of alienation into a conceptually holistic system of representations – a restoration of ontological hierarchy.

Are there any preconditions for such conceptualization? Undoubtedly. And not only preconditions, but also theoretical tools. Hegel already considers alienation precisely as an essential process, in which alone any formation in self-development can occur [Stewart J., 2021]. Hegel uncovered the general mechanism of alienation in its essential – ontological and logical – dimension. What is fundamental in Hegel's thought is that he considered alienation as the key mechanism for the becoming of spirit and, in particular, self-consciousness, rather than merely as some negative condition. Self-negation, self-alienation is revealed by Hegel as a necessary stage in the development of any essence in the course of its self-unfolding – as a loss of identity followed by the emergence of a new form through the overcoming of fragmentation [Feenberg A., 1981].

What is of primary importance here is the understanding of alienation not as a malfunction caused by external circumstances, but as an immanent form of any becoming. Over time, the idealist form of Hegel's analysis came to be seen as somewhat outdated, but the stated problem of alienation received comprehensive development and, without a doubt, retains its heuristic potential even today. Transferred into the anthropological plane, the comprehension of the problem of alienation as an objective necessity and condition of both collective and individual existence had critical significance for the further deepening of our understanding of the human being. However, one consequence of this anthropologization of the problem of alienation was the draining of its ontological depth.

Thus, Feuerbach, in his critique of religion, infused Hegel's doctrine of self-alienation with concrete anthropological content, but focused primarily on the negative aspects of alienation as the loss of wholeness, while also indicating a hypothetical way of returning what was lost [Musto M.,

2021]. A more elaborate and profound interpretation of Hegel's teaching on alienation was given by Marx, who completely inverted the general schema, demonstrating alienation as a process conditioned by objective socio-economic circumstances, in which the formation and development of the human being is accompanied by a rupture with their species-being. In Marx, alienation becomes an inevitable consequence (and form) of human and societal development, determined by the objective logic of socio-historical progress [Feenberg A., 1981].

If in Hegel alienation is conditioned by the objective architecture of the process of becoming – as its key form – and the logic is implicit in the subject itself, then in Marx alienation acquires concreteness through the coercive impact of external for an individual contours of social practice in the form of dominant social relations, which are, in turn, the result of the objective development of the means of production. But if we take into account that any development of the means of production – like any social practice in general – is a consequence of human activity, then the obligatory human feedback with alienation becomes obvious, even if not always explicit. But this feedback is in any case fixed by external objective circumstances, which act as the key factors of alienation and to which the human is forced to adapt.

In the historical process, therefore, the human carries out self-alienation through collective forms of existence, but in the process of which he ascends to more advanced forms of it. But it is the objectively established conditions of existence that determine alienation – independent of the individual's will, since his consciousness (and not only the “false” one) is determined by objective socio-economic conditions – by social being as a stable system of social relations and the socio-cultural system founded by them.

The further development of Hegel's and Marx's ideas produced a certain split in the understanding of alienation, which largely reflected the fundamental opposition between the objective-materialistic and subjective-idealistic positions in ontology. The materialist direction – associated with Marx, as is evident – focused on the objective socio-economic, and more broadly, cultural-historical factors of human existence, which determine the actual dynamics of social being, and through it – that of the individual. This approach, among other things, was generally quite successfully aligned with the scientific method in its non-classical version and, in particular, formed the foundation of classical sociology of Durkheim and Weber – with its obvious reduction [Amini, B., 2023]. However, precisely the scientifically oriented objectivist approach – responsible for major breakthroughs in the scientifically oriented (objectivist) study of the human and society – pushed into the background the properly philosophical, ontological foundations of the Marxist understanding of the human being and, specifically, of the phenomenon of alienation, since Marx understands alienation as the ontological disconnection of the individual from his practically active species-being – as a historical contradiction.

The opposite approach to the understanding of alienation was formed within the framework of the subjective-idealistic direction of non-classical philosophy, which – one way or another – from the very beginning was compelled to state the fundamental inner discontinuity, the rupture of human being from its essence and the external world. For some time, this approach continued to reproduce the classical philosophical idea of the existence of some original wholeness of being (truth), which had been lost by the human, but could potentially be returned – with a certain individual positioning. It is precisely this loss of wholeness, of primary identity, that is interpreted in the concept of alienation – in its spiritual aspect.

Specific to this approach is the idea that overcoming this inner fragmentation, the separation between the particular and the universal, is a matter of interpreting subjective experience and making a spiritual effort. This idea is explicitly present already in Kierkegaard. And although he affirms the radical openness of existential choice, the path he finds to overcome the despair of isolated subjectivity (alienation) through the acceptance of the transcendent clearly indicates the fundamental teleological orientation of his thought.

A fundamental unlocking of the subjective-idealistic position occurs in Nietzsche, who sought to overcome the idea of the predetermination of truth and, accordingly, the existence of an originally (and only) correct form of the wholeness of being. Nietzsche declares this idea an illusion and asserts, in essence, that the human is a creature whose essence is not predetermined but is constituted in the process of self-realization. In this context, alienation can be understood as a disconnection of the human from the fullness of his own life, nature, and meaning. The overcoming of this disconnection is possible through the abolition of the teleological orientation and the acceptance of the fundamental openness of human existence, the processuality of truth. That is, alienation is also considered as rupture, incompleteness, estrangement – conditions that must be overcome not through

circumstances, but through the transformation of the subject who experiences his own existence as a problem.

In a similar vein, one may consider the views of Max Scheler, in whose conception alienation can be interpreted as the individual's loss (inversion) of the objective order of being (of values), in which spirit loses its autonomy, alienating itself from its own essence. Spirit ceases to be the highest form of being (that which exists) and is transformed into a mere "instrument of life," alongside technology, political, and economic machinery [Schneck, S., 2002]. Spirit (Geist) as essence becomes a function of the life-process (Lebensdrang), losing its original autonomy, its superstructure over existence. The human as a person becomes lost within his functional social roles, leveling his freedom with social connections. It is obvious that Scheler speaks precisely about alienation, which is understood as the loss of autonomy and wholeness as a result of the qualitative degeneration of the mode of human existence in the conditions of a formally technicized society with its total rationalization of all spheres of life, as Max Weber also pointed out. Scheler draws particular attention to alienation between the "I" and the "Thou," which is profoundly tragic both in its consequences and as a vivid demonstration of the depth of the ongoing crisis.

The fundamental openness of human being, as discovered in existentialism and philosophical anthropology, in its most radical subjectivist interpretation, leads to the assertion that freedom is the very essence of the human; that the human is entirely free, "condemned" to freedom. Alienation in this case is the loss of freedom as essence. But herein lies a fundamental contradiction: for in its most radical subjectivist form, this position is reduced to the absence of any predetermined essence – and thus alienation becomes either a meaningless construct or a universal mode of human being. In this way, even this often-one-sided approach ultimately reveals what Hegel began with in his understanding of alienation – with its essential, not formal, meaning. But the subjectivist position in its existentialist version no longer had the ontological foundation on which Hegel's understanding of alienation was built. This internal contradiction is evident in Sartre.

The ideas of Martin Heidegger undoubtedly had fundamental significance for the development of the concept of alienation. His fundamental ontologization of the problem of human being imparted a new content to the problem of alienation. It was Heidegger who, in a certain sense, returned to the primary understanding of alienation formulated by Hegel and implies it in an ontological sense – as something conditioned by the very essence of human being. At the very least, Heidegger's thought appears to move in this direction when he attempts to show inauthenticity not as an externally conditioned state, but as a distorted mode of disclosure by human not even of his "own essence", but of something that forms this essence. Within Heidegger's conceptual framework, self-alienation acquires a new interpretation as a mode of being, rather than merely as an externally negative determination by circumstances, which, although of essential significance, only actualize a primary essential intention.

In one form or another, the influence of Marx's and Heidegger's ideas regarding alienation can be found in Herbert Marcuse, Erich Fromm, Jacques Ellul, Jacques Lacan, and even in Slavoj Žižek [Žizek S., 2009]. But the proposed interpretations – particularly those developed within the framework of postmodernist approaches – have failed to deepen the essential content of the concept, concentrating either on individual fields of practice or on opposing the human to the modes of his existence [Musto M. 2021]. For instance, Lacan seeks to demonstrate the structural mechanisms of alienation of being-in-itself as a necessary form of the subject's becoming, which is always-already-alienated to the extent that it is inscribed into the order of symbolic structures – that is, into consciousness. But in Lacan, these mechanisms are conditioned by the external environment, which imposes on the individual the forms and methods of integration; they are objective in the most direct sense. Such an opposition of being to its forms loses the dialectical essence of alienation as understood by Hegel, even as it attempts to elucidate precisely that understanding. This reflects the postmodern version of Adorno and Horkheimer's "negative dialectics," for whom any predetermination is totalitarian, and its critical deconstruction exhausts the scope of philosophical inquiry [Feenberg A., 2014].

This tendency goes back to Sartre, who develops the idea of the fundamental fragmentation of being-for-itself, stemming from the implicit non-identity of existence – as a necessary condition of its freedom [Sartre J.-P., 2003]. The human is alienated from his own essence, but in a specific way – since he does not possess such an essence. Any attempt to overcome this non-essence necessarily results in structural determination, in "hardening." Any "realization" of oneself generates a new non-correspondence – between actual being and possibility as a fundamental non-identity. Here, Sartre returns to the ambivalence of freedom as choice, originally formulated by Kierkegaard, where the realization of a choice leads to the elimination of alternatives: the determinacy of choice destroys the

indeterminacy of freedom. A secondary contour of alienation thus emerges – as an escape from existential authenticity.

Therefore, despite the use of identical terminology, the fundamental divergence between Sartre's and Heidegger's positions is evident – a point which Heidegger himself emphasized. Sartre, without doubt, stands within the tradition of existential anthropologism, which prevents him from resolving the limitation inherent in the idea that existence precedes essence. This very limitation compelled him to turn to Marxism, where the species-essence of the human is ontologically grounded and understood as the totality of relations that constitute the objective dimension of individual being. The evolution of Sartre's thought thus clearly illustrates the general logic of philosophical reflection on the problem of alienation.

Such a broadly generalized reconstruction may serve as a foundation for identifying key stages in the development of the concept of alienation: Hegel, Marx, Heidegger. It is this disposition that explains the recurring return of other thinkers to their conceptual frameworks. It is evident that each of these conceptions retains – and demonstrates – its validity, reveals specific essential facets of the problem of alienation, and communicates something fundamentally important for deepening its understanding. At the same time, each of them proceeds from its own specific foundations, which allows each to be interpreted as a kind of antithesis to the other two – with the possibility of overcoming their respective limitations.

Marx develops an objectively oriented understanding of the human, characteristic of materialism, enriching Hegelian dialectics as a form of thought with ontic content and revealing Hegel's general logic of development within concrete socio-historical processes. The antithesis to Marx's conception is logically to be sought at the opposite pole of philosophical thought – in idealism – but not in its objective form, where Hegel's position lies and to which Marxism was itself an antithesis, but rather in Heidegger's radical position. What is fundamentally important here is that Heidegger makes such an opportunity by distancing himself from the idealistic-subjectivist conception of the human being and attempting to find the ontological not in the metaphysical or transcendental, but in the ontic.

In this context, it is particularly significant – and even symbolic – that Heidegger, in his search for the foundations and forms of human being, discovers the phenomenon of enframing (*Gestell*) [Heidegger M., 1977]. And although Heidegger articulates this in a specific conceptual language, one can confidently assert that his doctrine of *Gestell* lends itself to a productive interpretation within the framework of the concept of alienation. This discovery by Marx and Heidegger – from two fundamentally opposite positions – of the same fundamental phenomenon of human being is not a mere coincidence, but a philosophical grasp of the essential problem around which – one way or another – philosophical thought revolves.

What is common to both Marx and Heidegger is their understanding of alienation (or Enframing) as a process of the imposition of certain types of practice (modes of revealing being), to which the human is not even forced, but rather positioned as necessary – independent of his will and consciousness – but which determine him by objectifying his essence. Of course, this similarity is contradictory in a certain sense, which is obvious given the fundamental difference in their philosophical positions. But this makes all the more intriguing the convergence of key problematics in the reasoning of two such different thinkers. From different directions, they come to something that – of course, with certain reservations – can be interpreted within the conceptual space of the hypothetical opponent, namely, the problem of the loss of some original wholeness, ontic autonomy, or one's species-essence. Moreover, both thinkers identify the source of this tragic collision with notable clarity: it lies not in the forms but in the very nature of human being – with an understanding of its deepest mechanisms and forms [Jaeggi, R. 2014]. Both strive to demonstrate the implicitness of this process to human being, its essential character. And both point to the fundamentally ambivalent role of technology.

The technogenic orientation of social development (and of unveiling of concealedness) is identified by both Marx and Heidegger as a necessary form of organizing existence and a challenge that cannot be evaded. In this sense, both thinkers, in essence, speak of a certain fatefulness of technology, which acquires the status of a determinant of human being, which, in fact, is the essential characteristic of technogenicity. But originally, technology is merely a form. Technology is not imposed and does not impose; it is an instrument for disclosing the species-essence (for the unveiling of concealedness), total in its instrumental necessity. This instrumentality initially transforms from means into end, and then becomes essence – «is not born, but gives birth» (N.A. Berdyaev [Trimble W., 2023]).

Marx demonstrates the objective side of alienation as a process of the development of social forms of differentiation and integration of labor, and of the development of the means of production – with their subsequent autonomization and alienation of means from their ends, the human as a part – from the whole, and ultimately, – from himself. The human loses his species-essence, acquires false consciousness, becomes a function, is objectified within alienated social relations within alienated social institutions – generally designated by Jaspers as the apparatus for the maintenance of existence [Jaspers, K. 1955]. Yet Heidegger, in essence, describes the same thing: in Gestell, there occurs a forgetting of being as essence, its reduction to technical functioning.

It is also important, conversely, that Heidegger's conception of Gestell can likewise be interpreted in Marx's terms, for the key to Marx's understanding of the problem of alienation lies precisely in the alienation of essence, and the human is a creature that is not only socio-economic, but also spiritual. And if there is false consciousness, then it is possible only as a distorted form of some primary authentic consciousness. And this authenticity is defined not by the specific content of that consciousness – as a reflection or interpretation of actual reality – but by its forms and ability to manifest its species-essence nature.

In any case, this means that the human is not simply a function of objective material and social conditions. Or rather, the human is not only such a function. This is merely a form of his Dasein. The human is potentially a fully-fledged subject both in the socio-cultural and in the spiritual-practical dimensions of his being. And if there exists something capable of distorting the representation of objective reality – and at the same time belongs to that reality, then the possibility of such distortion – as well as of its overcoming – must nevertheless be rooted not in the external reality, but in the very nature of the human being and in the way of its disclosure. This is the self-affirming freedom as the essence of the human being – that which had to be lost, and which must be regained in a new form at the next turn of the ascending spiral of historical process.

Undoubtedly, Marxism is significantly limited by its methodology and primarily considers alienation as a consequence of objective socio-economic conditions external to the individual. At the same time, it is posited that the development of the social system follows a lawful, objectively historical trajectory. This calls into question the significance of the efforts not only of the individual subject but of society as such. Yes, the unfolding objective historical process is, according to Marx, determined not by the logic of Absolute Spirit, but by the laws of social development – but the crucial point is that it is objectively determined: the position of the individual is defined from the outside, objectively, and the individual is only capable of reactive behavior.

However, although the subject is objectively determined by social practice, he can nonetheless rebel against it – and this rebellion cannot be conditioned solely by these objective circumstances. The decisive role here must, evidently, be played by ideas – that is, by manifestations of processes that unfold in the realm of spirit and are capable of a dynamic independent of objective conditions. At the same time, the only real producer of historical circumstances is the human himself, in his collective forms of activity.

It is this specific recursiveness that ensures the Marxist understanding of the human and, in particular, the problem of alienation – a fundamental openness to interpretation: alienation is always, to one degree or another, a process of dialectical self-alienation, self-negation. It cannot be otherwise, for the human being is the sole actual source of social reality. If this is so, then the potential for its overcoming is also embedded within the human himself – in the realm of his spirit. This aspect of Marxist theory – despite attempts by neo-Marxists, including H. Marcuse – remains the least developed [Honneth A., Reitz, Ch. 2013]. But it is precisely in this “blind spot” of neo-Marxism that Heidegger's thought unfolds.

Heidegger's position, on the other hand, while being in a certain sense one-sided, also provides an opportunity for creative interpretation. This position is very similar to the subjectivist one, which is why it is persistently associated with existentialism. Yet Heidegger himself just as persistently denied the existentialist character of his teaching. But, at the same time, Heidegger speaks precisely about existentials, though for him existence as presence (Vorhandenheit) is only the form in which being is manifested. It is in this ontological aspect that one can glimpse a possible way out of the extreme subjectivism characteristic of existentialism. The human is not transcendent to being, nor is identical with being – he is a mode of being, that is, a way of revealing something which is not originally part of him, but which may become so – in the very form in which it is revealed.

Ultimately, thrownness (Geworfenheit) is always thrownness-into – meaning the discovery of oneself in circumstances that function as an objectively necessary reality, positioning the thrown being in a certain way – both in relation to those circumstances and to themselves within the space of those

circumstances. But such positioning does not determine – it presupposes. And is not openness to truth (authenticity) itself a certain form of the human's positioning of himself as a mode of the disclosure of being? Is this not what Marx speaking of in his analysis of the social essence of the human as a relationship? Then the meaning of Gestell must be far more fundamental than merely a deviation from the truth in particular historical conditions.

Heidegger reveals and explicates the “ontologico-anthropological” component of the phenomenon of alienation. Marx uncovers the socio-economic aspects and forms of alienation. But the concepts of both thinkers certainly still have significant heuristic potential and provide space for further interpretation. The above-mentioned points of fundamental convergence in their fields of concern – with an understanding of the oppositional nature of their positions – may serve as prerequisites for the productive expansion of the understanding of alienation at a new level of theoretical generalization. This possibility can be realized through a consistent phenomenological reconstruction of the ontological status of alienation as the relation of the human to the derivatives of his own being.

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ПИТАННЯ ВІДЧУЖЕННЯ: ПРОБЛЕМА ОНТОЛОГІЧНОЇ РЕКОНСТРУКЦІЇ

Пропонована робота присвячена проблемі філософської реконструкції відчуження як фундаментального феномену людського існування. Основна увага зосереджена на спробі зрозуміти відчуження не лише як соціокультурне чи психологічне явище, а як онтологічну категорію, яка повинна розкривати сутнісні структури буття людини. Основна складність проблеми відчуження полягає в її онтичній безпосередності – з одночасною надзвичайною складністю її ідентифікації та експлікації в строгому концептуальному поданні. Відчуження – це не просто об'єкт мислення, а й спосіб розкриття сутності. Актуальним є питання про можливість реконструкції цілісного бачення феномену відчуження на основі існуючих інтерпретацій, їх інтеграції в єдине концептуальне подання. Для відповіді на це питання ретроспективно простежуються ключові етапи еволюції концепції відчуження у філософській думці останніх двох століть. Показано, що, незважаючи на їх чисельність, більшість з них розглядають проблему відчуження не як таку, а як похідну від інших проблем людського існування шляхом редукції проблеми відчуження до конкретних негативних проявів економічного, політичного, соціального, культурного, психологічного полів людської практики. Запропоновано загальну модель, яка має прояснити причини такого редукціонізму. Єдиним рішенням може бути онтологічна реконструкція відчуження як універсального та сутнісного аспекту Dasein. Показано, що для такої концептуалізації проблеми відчуження фундаментальне значення мають ідеї Гегеля, Маркса та Гайдеггера. Незважаючи на принципові онтологічні та методологічні відмінності, вони не лише виходять з розуміння відчуження як ключової проблеми людського існування, а й реконструюють його онтологічну необхідність. Схожість поглядів Маркса та Гайдеггера в цьому контексті видається особливо продуктивною, тим більше із урахуванням принципових розбіжностей їх теоретичних диспозицій. Обидва мислителі, хоча й різними шляхами, доходять висновку про фундаментальну детермінацію відчуження самим способом, яким людина розкриває свою сутність – незважаючи на очевидну розбіжність у розумінні як цієї сутності, так і способів її розкриття. Розуміння крайньої несумісності історичного матеріалізму та феноменологічної онтології лише підкреслює цікаву парадоксальність цього збігу, який чітко вказує на фундаментальну природу відчуження. Головною метою статті є демонстрація потенціалу філософської інтерпретації відчуження в контексті діалогу між цими двома традиціями.

Ключові слова: **відчуження, сутність, буття людини, ставлення, діалектика, Маркс, Гайдеггер.**

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