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CARE OF THE SELF AS LIMIT-EXPERIENCE

In the article there was made the analysis of Foucault's concept of experience within contemporary anthropological crisis. It was emphasised that European humankind and culture have got hazardously growing distance between knowledge (truth) and human's life (experience), and this situation necessitates searching for life practices based only on knowledge which is really required for the human one. Foucault uses experience in multi-dimensional mode referring to knowledge, experiment, attempt, practice, etc. Experience is considered to be something human that comes out of the changed, and such comprehension of experience is asserted to be the core one. There assesses experience as a crucial fundamental condition for human one to be the self, to be fulfilled, and also there validates the limit-experience as the required one. This kind of experience transgresses the limits of coherent subjectivity as it functions in everyday life, indeed threatens the very possibility of individual's life itself, and tears the subject from itself. Both experience and limit-experience are aimed at personal self-transformation which obviously questions current conceptions of the boundaries of possible experience, and they are the only condition for the one to attain truth and live according to it.

Since life and truth compose indivisible unity, there emerges obviously the problem of those mechanisms and techniques which could be the route for achieving harmonic human being. Antique care of the self is considered to be the most suitable and productive form of human experience and the most essential kind of limit-experience yet. All the technics which form care of the self eventually aimed at teaching humans to find themselves via the refutation of everything which is not its own. All these laborious efforts of self building are focused on working out human's ability to choose what is close and to deny what is alien, and it is the most challenging point in care of self implementation. For the moment there is no uncrossable boundary between subject and object, self and the world. Human becomes the only relevant boundary and the only reachable limit for oneself. One is doomed to the continuous process of getting each time new experience, to the endless conducting of new limits not out but inside the self. So human has come to real marginalisation – not via social or cultural prohibitions but via paving limit, margin though the subject and by itself only.

Keywords: human, experience, limit-experience, subject, subjectivity, care of the self, marginalisation

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ТУРБОТА ПРО СЕБЕ ЯК ГРАНИЧНИЙ ДОСВІД

У статті проведено аналіз фукольдівського поняття «досвід» в межах антропологічної кризи. Підкреслюється, що європейське людство та культура отримали загрозово зростаючий розрив між знанням (істиною) та життям людини (досвідом), і ця ситуація викликає необхідність пошуку життєвих практик, які базувалися б лише на знанні, що їх людина дійсно потребує. Фуко використовує поняття «досвід» у багатовимірному сенсі, посилаючись на знання, експеримент, спробу, практику тощо. Досвід розглядається як щось таке, з чого людина виходить зміненою, й таке розуміння досвіду затверджується як ключове. Досвід оцінюється як принципова фундаментальна умова для людини бути собою, відбутися, крім того, граничний досвід також обґрунтовується як необхідний. Цей тип досвіду порушує межі цілісної суб'єктивності як вона функціонує у щоденному житті та дійсно погрожує самій можливості життя індивіду як окремого себе, відриває суб'єкт від себе. Досвід та граничний досвід разом спрямовано на особистісну

самотрансформацію, що вочевидь викликає питання щодо наявних понять про межі можливого досвіду, і вони є єдиною умовою для людини віднайти істину та жити згідно із нею.

Оскільки життя та істина складають нерозривну єдність, виникає вочевидь проблема тих механізмів та технік, які могли б стати способом досягнення гармонії людського буття. Антична турбота про себе розглядається як найбільш придатна та продуктивна форма людського досвіду, а також як найсуттєвіший тип граничного досвіду. Усі техніки, які складають турботу про себе, із необхідністю спрямовані на навчання людини знаходити себе через відмову від усього того, що не є нею самою. Усі ці кропіткі зусилля побудови себе фокусуються на напрацювання людиною здібності обирати те, що є близьким, та відкидати те, що є чужим, і це є найбільшим викликом у впровадженні турботи про себе. Наразі не існує чітких меж між суб'єктом та об'єктом, собою та світом, які неможливо було б перетнути. Людина стає єдиною актуальною та досяжною межею для себе. Вона приречена на постійний процес отримання кожного разу нового досвіду, на безкінечне проведення нових меж не ззовні, а всередині себе. Отже людина прийшла до справжньої маргіналізації – не через соціальні або культурні заборони, але через прокладання меж, границь через власний суб'єкт та лише самостійно.

Ключові слова: людина, досвід, граничний досвід, суб'єкт, суб'єктивність, турбота про себе, маргіналізація

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ЗАБОТА О СЕБЕ КАК ОПЫТ-ГРАНИЦА

В статье проведен анализ фукольдиданского понятия «опыт» в условиях антропологического кризиса современности. Подчеркивается, что европейское человечество и культура получили угрожающе растущий разрыв между знанием (истина) и жизнью человека (опытом), и эта ситуация вызывает необходимость поиска жизненных практик, которые основывались бы лишь на знаниях, в которых человек нуждается. Фуко использует понятие «опыт» как многомерное, ссылаясь на знания, эксперимент, попытку, практику и тому подобное. Опыт рассматривается как нечто, из чего человек выходит измененным, и такое понимание опыта утверждается как ключевое. Опыт оценивается как принципиальное фундаментальное условие для человека быть собой, состояться, кроме того, опыт-граница также обосновывается как необходимый. Этот тип опыта нарушает границы целостной субъективности, как она функционирует в обыденной жизни, и действительно угрожает самой возможности жизни индивида как такового, отрывает субъект от себя. Оба, опыт и опыт-граница, нацелены на личностную самотрансформацию, что, очевидно, вызывает вопросы о наличии понятий о границах возможного опыта, и они являются единственным условием для человека обрести истину и жить согласно ей.

Поскольку жизнь и истина составляют неразрывное единство, очевидно, возникает вопрос о тех механизмах и техниках, которые могли бы стать способом достижения гармонии человеческой жизни. Античная забота о себе рассматривается как наиболее подходящая и продуктивная форма человеческого опыта, а также как существеннейший тип опыта-границы. Все техники, которые составляют заботу о себе, с необходимостью нацелены на научение человека находить себя через отказ от всего того, что им не является. Все эти скрупулезные усилия построения себя фокусируются на выработке человеком способности выбирать то, что является близким, и отбрасывать то, что является чужим, и это является наибольшим вызовом в применении заботы о себе. Сегодня не существует таких границ между субъектом и объектом, человеком и миром, которые невозможно было бы перейти. Человек становится единственной актуальной и достижимой границей для себя. Он обречен на постоянный процесс получения каждый раз нового опыта, на бесконечное проведение новых границ не снаружи, а внутри себя. Таким образом, человек пришел к истинной маргинализации – не через социальные или культурные запреты, а через прокладывание пределов, границ через собственный субъект и только самостоятельно.

Ключевые слова: человек, опыт, опыт-граница, субъект, субъективность, забота о себе, маргинализация.

The world today is too complicated and enough multileveled for human one to accept it immediately and truly. It makes certain problems in human's relations not only with the world but with

oneself as well. Moreover human ones continue building his/her lives using values, knowledge, practices, forms of social activity which are external, not similar, and even alien to the person. The former anthropological basis is broken and there is no new one for the moment. Talking about the reasons of this situation is not the purpose of the research nevertheless there will be some reflexions about it in the following presentation. The research is *aimed at* investigating the possible ways for human one to define and to form the sustainable basis for human's future, for new anthropology if there will be such an area of knowledge.

It is essential to emphasise that the former worldview in which human has been really detached from truth producing is not relevant for now. It's reflected first of all in the idea that what gives access to the truth, the condition for the subject's access to the truth, is knowledge and knowledge alone. Michel Foucault evaluated this as a result of so called "Cartesian moment" which philosophically requalified the antique *gnothi seauton* (know yourself), and correspondently discredited the *epimeleia heautou* (care of the self). As a consequence European humankind and culture have got hazardously growing distance between knowledge and human's life. Knowledge progresses more and more, and human one in any area of life for now doesn't manage to overtake it. It means that "access to truth, whose sole condition is henceforth knowledge, will find reward and fulfilment in nothing else but the indefinite development of knowledge" [Foucault, 2005, p. 18]. Taking into account the gap between truth (knowledge) and human life (practice, experience) there might be worthwhile to work out life practice based only on the knowledge which is really individually true, personally required for human one. So it's useful to return to the life experience as the only basis of human existence.

Inasmuch as we assert practical, experience philosophy the "experience" concept becomes one of the key, and for further research it's necessary to consider it thoroughly. It's worth no doubt applying Michel Foucault's ideas since he was one of a few thinkers who defended the experience philosophy of human as the only true one. In an interview from 1968, Foucault suggested that "if scientific socialism emerged from the utopias of the nineteenth century, it is possible that a real socialization will emerge in the 20th century from *experiences*" [Kimball, 2020]. Foucault refers to experience throughout his work, especially in his early texts on psychiatry and psychology from the 1950s and 1960s and in his late work from the 1980s. Foucault uses *experience* in multi-dimensional mode referring to knowledge, expertise, experiment, attempt, practice, and even to taste. Moreover "he uses many different concepts of experience, such as "lived experience", "background experience", "contradictory experience", "transformative experience", "forms of experience", "fields of experience", "limit-experience" and "experience of the self". These different concepts include intersubjective and personal, societal and political, spatial, abstract, and very concrete features depending on their meanings and contexts of usage" [Tirkkonen, 2019, p. 448].

Personally Michel Foucault emphasised that "an experience is something you come out of changed" [Foucault, 1991, p. 27], and such comprehension of experience seems to be the core one. This statement is based on Foucault's affinity to the specific philosophical area represented by Nietzsche, Bataille, and Blanchot who had significantly influenced Foucault. As he pointed out these three thinkers "try through experience to reach that point of life which lies as close as possible to the impossibility of living, which lies at the limit or extreme. They attempt to gather the maximum amount of intensity and impossibility at the same time" [Foucault, 1991, p. 31]. Furthermore "experience according to Nietzsche, Blanchot, and Bataille has rather the task of "tearing" the subject from itself in such a way that it is no longer the subject as such, or that it is completely "other" than itself so that it may arrive at its annihilation, its dissociation" [Foucault, 1991, p. 31], and by Foucault it distinguishes their position from phenomenologist's interpretation of experience concept. As he defines it, "the phenomenologist's experience is basically a way of organizing the conscious perception... of any aspect of daily, lived experience in its transitory form, in order to grasp its meaning" [Foucault, 1991, p. 30-31]. In opposite to this and following his predecessors Foucault claims only the actual experience as a true one. He even considers his writing as an integral part of the personal experience because it also works as something that changes a person: "When I write, I do it above all to change myself and not to think the same thing as before" [Foucault, 1991, p. 27]. This position is definitely an adopted of the ancient care of the self which will be considered later.

Obviously Foucault assesses experience as a crucial fundamental condition for human one to be the self, to occur actually, to be fulfilled. It deals closely as we noticed with the personal searching for truth and with living according to this truth. Consequently there emerge two next already mentioned phenomena – limit-experience and care of the self. It's *relevant* to investigate both of these experience

modi which take place and manifest themselves no doubt on the edge of daily, stiffen human life, and their principal affinity, even coincidence will be researched here.

Limit-experience is one of the most important and often-used concept in practical, experience type of philosophy which is presented by Nietzsche, Bataille, Blanchot and Foucault himself as well. By this reason there exist a number of definitions, refinements and interpretations of this experience form. "Such a notion of an experience that undermines the subject, Foucault called a "limit-experience," because it transgresses the limits of coherent subjectivity as it functions in everyday life, indeed threatens the very possibility of life – or rather the life of the individual – itself" [Jay, 1995, p. 158]. Shortly by Foucault limit-experiences mean strong, almost unlivable personal experiences, or as he himself interprets it: "It is this de-subjectifying undertaking, the idea of a "limit-experience" that tears the subject from itself" [Foucault, 1991, p. 31]. But it should be emphasised that generally the terms of "experience" and "limit-experience" are not distinguished too much because both of these practices converge in the background human's need to pass through some boundary either it is out conditions or inner human state. Experience and limit-experience are aimed at personal self-transformation which obviously questions the current conceptions of the boundaries of possible experience, "where perceptual, cognitive, or emotional borderlines sway, break, or waver: an experience that momentarily disrupts the boundary between subject and object or subject and subject" [Nutters, 2017]. Foucault no doubt widely provided a vigorous defence of experience, "but as he further developed its meaning, it revealed certain paradoxical implications. For not only did he affirm a proactive notion of experience – the "task of "tearing" the subject from itself" – but he also endorsed a reactive one: experience as a post facto reconstruction of that action" [Jay, 1995, p. 158]. In personal human existence it may be realised in the idea that "an experience is neither true nor false: it is always a fiction, something constructed, which exists only after it has been made, not before; it isn't something that is "true", but it has been a reality" [Foucault, 1991, p. 36]. Foucault even insists on the significance of such fictional character of human experience because it is the only way for human one to aware him/herself and to construct the experience as real being. In separate, self-reality no general ontological system has the priority but the personal human's choice and living according to this choice. That's why Foucault calls his books the way to constitute his experience for him though they are fictions, but there is no experience without them.

Every individual experience and limit-experience particularly is always enough complicated by social connections and interrelations, and it causes more certain peculiarities in providing of human experience. Living in the community presupposes the adherence to the definite rules, conditions, values etc. which usually serve the limits human one tries to keep. At the same time not all of those limits are really related to the individual as the own ones, and even in phenomenologist's interpretation of experience all the values, rules, authorities etc. should be thoroughly reconciled and tried on human personally. Here is obviously the coincidence with Bataille's comprehension of experience (actually including the limit-experience mode). He calls experience a voyage to the end of the possible of man: "Anyone may not embark on this voyage, but if he does embark on it, this supposes the negation of the authorities, the existing values which limit the possible. By virtue of the fact that it is negation of other values, other authorities, experience, having a positive existence, becomes itself positively value and authority" [Bataille, 1988, p. 7]. Then he notices the paradox in the authority of experience – "based on challenge, it is the challenging of authority; positive challenge, man's authority defined as the challenging of himself" [Ibid.]. But there is one more paradox. If experience may be construed as its own authority, based on no exterior criteria such as theology or reason, "it is nonetheless an authority that is always undermining itself" [Jay, 1995, p. 165], so human one is doomed to the continuous process of getting each time new experience, to the permanent state of challenging of oneself, to the endless conducting of new limits not out but inside the self. Moreover "limit-experience means that there is no uncrossable boundary between subject and object, ego and alter, self and world" [Ibid.]. Human becomes the only relevant boundary and the only reachable limit for oneself. Hence experience in any form based on knowledge about oneself becomes the only true way of human being, existence. Human's path is "to go deeper, to transform oneself and to revolutionize relationships to be completely "other"" [Foucault, 1991, p. 48]. So Foucault describes human's life as "an experience that might permit an alteration, a transformation, of the relationship we have with ourselves and our cultural universe: in a word, with our knowledge... Thus this game of truth and fiction... will permit us to see clearly what links us to our modernity and at the same time will make it appear modified to us" [Foucault, 1991, p. 37].

As we see the focus of philosophical interest here moves from out world to individual reality, and personal experience becomes the only condition of getting truth and consequently living according to this

truth. Since life and truth compose indivisible unity there emerges obviously the problem of all those mechanisms and techniques which could be the route for achieving the harmonic human being. Michel Foucault had already singled out the most suitable and productive form of human experience originated in ancient world but again demanded in contemporaneity. It's about antiquity *care of the self* phenomenon. It's worth considering care of the self widely as the "technology of the self" or "technique of the self" aimed at subjectivation irreducible to the symbolic activity. It's really the only path for human one to get purely individual true knowledge about the self and to live according to this truth. Moreover care of the self appears as the optimal form of individual life experience and even limit-experience inasmuch as we evaluate human ones to be the only relevant boundary and the only reachable limit for themselves. Destructing of the stiffen notion about the self in order to construct the new vision of the own truth and life is the leading aim of the care of the self. In other words it aimed at transformation for the further transformation, and that's why it may be called as the limit-experience as the "technology of the self". Foucault defines the last one as "reflected and voluntary practices by which men not only fix rules of conduct for themselves but seek to transform themselves, to change themselves in their particular being, and to make their life an oeuvre" [Foucault, 1994, p. 545]. So there might be emphasised that for human one the existential issue, even trouble is to discover the real boundary, limit inside oneself. Natural human's mode of living is self-realisation in frame of social and cultural conditions and requirements, and for the individual it means usually the mere subordination to the already existing actuality. But as it was already noticed during the history of European civilisation human has been individually detached from truth producing, and all those social and cultural conditions and requirements are often alien to the individual. It should be better to refuse of the existing position then to accept it as the individual truth of life.

Searching for the self naturally leads to the necessity of the so called "present-day man" oblivion. Bataille analysing Nietzsche's ideas presupposed the vanishing of true limit-experience and limit existence as well. "In experience, there is no longer a limited existence. There a man is not distinguished in any way from others: in him what is torrential is lost within others. The so simple commandment: "Be that ocean," linked to the *extreme limit*, at the same time makes of a man, a multitude, a desert. It is an expression which resumes and makes precise the sense of a community. I know how to respond to the desire of Nietzsche speaking of a community having no object other than that of experience (but designating this community, I speak of a "desert")" [Bataille, 1988, p. 27]. Bataille obviously relies on the interpretation of the "present-day man" as the one "with the thousand cacophonous idiocies (almost scientific, ideology, blissful joking, progress, touching sentimentality, belief in machines, in big words and, to conclude, discordance and total ignorance of the unknown)..." [Bataille, 1988, p. 28]. Also he links such human with the "desert-like" truth and devastation, and for the one there is no return to the past, to the "ancient man" as a bacchant philosopher with the happiness of being, of affirming, the refusal to be everything, natural cruelty, fecundity, – with all that could be evaluated as the unique inner, individual experience.

It should be particularly highlighted here that all these negative "cacophonous idiocies" were the results of the out, mostly social reality circumstances which take human one far from him/her as a subject, far from the inner experience and cause the experience not always healthy for the individual. For this issue Foucault even proposes the concept of "contradictory experience" to draw attention to social conflicts that affect mental well-being. Such experience extends on the various human practices, and it is naturally gone through by individuals. But the contradictory experiences "can be recognized as phenomena of social injustice, including economic exploitation, imposed competition, colonialism, imperialist wars and class struggles... [they] disturb the subject's affective life and stability from the outside" [Tirkkonen, 2019, p. 450]. Though it sounds weird the outside is sufficient for itself, it doesn't need to be proved or substantiated, but for human one as for subject mere subordination to the external world as we noticed could be devastating. Surely sometimes human social, collective practice may serve the sui generis cut-off point in searching for the self but at the same time it presupposes the hazard of individual experience revaluation both as in negative as in positive dimensions. As Foucault asserts "an experience is, of course, something one has alone; but it cannot have its full impact unless the individual manages to escape from pure subjectivity in such a way that others can – I won't say re-experience it exactly – but at least cross paths with it or retrace it" [Foucault, 1991, p. 40].

One of the most useful collective practice and limit-experience closely connected with it is acknowledging the finitude of others. Death is for now may be the only experience really unreachable for the subject inasmuch as human cannot present the own fiction as a result of the one's awareness. So the

death experience is available for the individual only as acknowledging the finitude of others which is the obligatory condition for human to aware the own finitude, mortality. Moreover it becomes for the individual the mean to focus on the self: “Experiencing the death of the alter, even from the “outside,” compels us to experience the alterity within ourselves” [Jay, 1995, p. 167]. As we see such social experience whatever contradictory it could be reinforces human’s need in the care of the self that is in focussing on the inner experience, the own limits, the unique individual vision tune with personal truth. Bataille claimed to reject external means, and ancient care of the self regained by Foucault for the moment becomes the extremely relevant human (limit-) experience.

Concerning limit-experience care of the self looks like the most essential its kind. As human becomes the only relevant boundary and the only available limit for oneself, and it happens on the truth basis– truth of human him/herself not the externally produced one, there is a crucial question – what is care of the self as an experience? There must be definitely clear that talking about the subject (subjectivity) as the source and the aim of care of the self we speak about subject as “the “subject of” a certain number of things: the subject of instrumental action, of relationships with other people, of behaviour and attitudes in general, and the subject also of relationships to oneself” [Foucault, 2005, p. 57]. Initially Plato employs the notion of *khresis* in order to seek the self one must take care of, and it refers not to the soul-substance he discovers, but rather to the soul-subject. It means taking care of oneself as subject of the *khresis* (with all the word’s polysemy: subject of actions, behaviour, relationships, attitudes, etc.). Foucault emphasises that *khresis* deals with the certain mode of activity – doing what one should with something, using it properly and in accordance with the rules as well as construing certain attitude towards oneself. Here the subject’s (subjectivity) position is asserted. Therefore it is useful first and foremost to learn the paths and means of taking care of the self in order to find out the congruity between oneself and everything.

In the *History of sexuality* Foucault describes the particularity of care of the self experience. As he said here we touch on “one of the most important aspects of this activity devoted to oneself: it constituted, not an exercise in solitude, but a true social practice...” [Foucault, 1986, p. 51]. It means that care of the self could be realised only within social conditions and positions, and it’s one of the care of the self key peculiarities. Moreover providing care of the self presupposes active social (and cultural) interactivity though such connections are problematically widespread in society yet. It deals closely with the task of tutoring the others, and this is one of the basic conditions of the successful care of the self implementation.

All the attention to the self Foucault emphasises does not depend solely on the existence of schools, lectures, and professionals of spiritual direction for its social base; it finds a ready support in the whole bundle of customary relations of kinship, friendship, and obligation. It is clear when “in the practice of the care of the self, one appealed to another person in whom one recognized an aptitude for guidance and counseling, one was exercising a right. And it was a duty that one was performing when one lavished one’s assistance on another, or when one gratefully received the lessons the other might give” [Foucault, 1986, p. 52-53]. Writing also becomes the inherent element of care of the self. As Foucault points out “one of the tasks that defines the care of the self is that of taking notes on oneself to be reread, writing treatises and letters to friends to help them, and keeping notebooks in order to reactivate for oneself the truths one needed. Seneca’s letters are an example of this self-exercise” [Foucault, 1997, p. 232]. No doubt all these forms of social and cultural interrelations eventually aimed at teaching humans to find themselves via the refutation of everything which is not the individual, not one’s own. All these laborious efforts of oneself building are focused on working out the human’s ability to choose what is close and to deny what is alien, and this is the most challenging point in care of the self implementation.

The limit-experiences described by Foucault in his outstanding works look as the clearest historical and cultural limit forms doomed for a long time to maximal exclusion of social reality, and they can’t be something where human ones want to participate in. But such initial obvious marginalisation of madness, imprisonment, etc. doesn’t guarantee for now the exclusion of the one from the limit-experience forms because care of the self built on the one’s own truth presupposes for the “subject of” trying of any possible and even impossible truth and experiences in order to find and realise oneself. It’s the experience “that permits us to single out certain mechanisms (for example, imprisonment, penalisation, etc.) and at the same time to separate ourselves from them by perceiving them in a totally different form, must be one and the same experience” [Foucault, 1991, p. 37-38]. It means that “as limit-experiences are excluded, they embody cultural values that support the very gestures of exclusion” [Tirkkonen, 2019, p. 452], and this intensifies human’s need in trying oneself even in the prohibited field of experience. There is no

consequently another path for human to find who is oneself besides care of the self experience. Not coincidentally Foucault asserts that Socrates upholding care of the self asks not about human's nature, he asks "a much more precise, interesting, and difficult question, which is: You must take care of yourself; but what is this "oneself" (auto to auto), since it is your self you must take care of? Consequently the question does not concern the nature of man but what we – that is us today, since the word is not in the Greek text – will call the question of the subject. What is this subject, what is this point towards which this reflexive activity, this reflected activity, which turns the individual back to himself, must be directed?" [Foucault, 2005, p. 38]. Following Bataille's idea that there is no more uncrossable boundary between subject and object, ego and alter, self and world we have come here to real marginalisation – not via the social or cultural prohibitions but via paving limit, margin though the subject and by oneself only. Possibly "those experiences that were once marginalised must now be recognised and validated by the dominant culture... Maybe the margin must, in fact, be realised or made visceral in some way?" [Nutters, 2017].

In drawing *conclusions* it's pertinent to remember how Michel Foucault understands his own experiences he has passed through. Foucault's life experience looks a bright sample not only of limit-experience but care of the self as well. His "technology of the self" fixed and reflected in his works helps to understand the mechanism of searching for the truth and realisation of oneself based on the truth which should be the source and the purpose of human, subjectivity, "subject of" life. Foucault compares his experience field with labyrinth as he says "into which I can venture, in which I can move my discourse, opening up underground passages, forcing it to go far from itself, finding overhangs that reduce and deform its itinerary, in which I can lose myself and appear at last to eyes that I will never have to meet again. I am no doubt not the only one who writes in order to have no face. Do not ask who I am and do not ask me to remain the same: leave it to our bureaucrats and our police to see that our papers are in order. At least spare us their morality when we write" [Foucault, 1972, p. 17]. Though Michel Foucault's life is not an example of living suitable for anyone his ideas really propose the possible way of anthropological crisis overcoming. Individual experience as the only sufficient basis of the one, extremely clear conveyed in limit-experience and care of the self practices, should become the widely implemented and working instrument of human's life in order not to lose but to attain oneself.

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