

вірною інформацією про нашу країну, та впровадження новітніх технологій в інфо-сферу;

2) забезпечення інформаційного суверенітету нашої країни (Відповідно до Закону України «Про Національну програму інформатизації» [9], інформаційний суверенітет держави – це її здатність контролювати і регулювати потоки інформації з-поза меж держави з метою додержання законів України, прав і свобод громадян, гарантування національної безпеки України.);

3) забезпечення права громадян на свободу слова та неухильного його дотримання, ні в якому разі недопущення неправомірного втручання органів місцевого самоврядування чи державної влади, їй посадових осіб, у діяльність ЗМІ, переслідування журналістів за політичні погляди та позиції, дискримінації в інформаційному середовищі;

4) застосування цілого комплексу заходів стосовно захисту національного інформаційного простору;

5) протидія монополізації інформаційної сфери України;

6) активне залучення засобів масової інформації до боротьби зі зловживаннями службовим становищем, з корупцією та іншими явищами, що можуть викликати загрозу національній безпеці нашої країни [10].

На підставі вищенаведеного робимо можемо зробити висновок: національна безпека є результатом управління потенційними чи реальними загрозами, небезпеками, яка має на меті задоволення національних інтересів держави, суспільства, людини. Національний інтерес, у свою чергу, є сукупністю потреб держави, суспільства, людини. Реалізація цих потреб забезпечує їх існування та розвиток шляхом відповідних державно-правових інституцій, їх створення та належного функціонування. При цьому маємо зазначити, що Україна переживає процес подальшої демократизації,

який відбувається в інформаційну епоху. Це у свою чергу збільшує кількість загроз, однією з яких є «відсутність уявлень про те, що є демократія» [11, с. 284].

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ГЛОБАЛЬНІ ПРОБЛЕМИ СУЧАСНОСТІ

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NATIONAL SECURITY AND DISCOURSE FRAMING IN POST-SOVIET SPACE

The paper is dedicated to the factors that influence discourse framing in Post-Soviet space, that makes information be presented in a particular way. The national security question depends on how citizens estimate and reproduce nominations created by the governments in order to integrate and to mobilize masses to the particular actions. The perspectives of discourse framing are presented.

Keywords: *discourse, framing, democracy, Post-Soviet space, national security, power of nomination, media.*

РАБОТЯГОВА І.В. НАЦІОНАЛЬНА БЕЗПЕКА ТА ФРЕЙМІНГ ДИСКУРСУ НА ПОСТРАДЯНСЬКОМУ ПРОСТОРІ

Розглядаються фактори, що впливають на фреймінг дискурсу на пострадянському просторі, що дозволяє представити інформацію у певному вигляді. Питання національної безпеки залежить від того, як громадяни оцінюють та відтворюють номінації, створені урядами задля інтеграції та мобілізації мас до відповідних дій. Представлено перспективи фреймінгу дискурсу.

Ключові слова: *дискурс, фреймінг, демократія, пострадянський простір, національна безпека, влада номінації, медіа.*

РАБОТЯГОВА И.В. НАЦИОНАЛЬНАЯ БЕЗОПАСНОСТЬ И ФРЕЙМИНГ ДИСКУРСА НА ПОСТСОВЕТСКОМ ПРОСТРАНСТВЕ

Рассматриваются факторы, влияющие на фрейминг дискурса на постсоветском пространстве, позволяющий представить информацию в том или ином виде. Вопрос национальной безопасности зависит от того, как граждане оценивают и воспроизводят номинации, создаваемые правительствами с целью интеграции и мобилизации масс к определенным действиям. Представлены перспективы фрейминга дискурса.

Ключевые слова: *дискурс, фрейминг, демократия, постсоветское пространство, национальная безопасность, власть номинации, медиа.*

It's impossible to underestimate the importance of being accessed to the locations where the information is produced. Corporations are using different methods of information gathering in order to produce faster, cheaper etc. But information by itself is not that valuable as the potential to form and shape information, to produce nominations of «good» and «bad»,

«fair», «guilty» or «victim». In this case the priority of political actors is not only to get the proper information as soon as possible but also to become a core of information and meanings production. The paper examines the processes of nominating and framing in Post-Soviet space (Ukrainian case) in conditions of having no responsible and consolidated elites, being the border state with a frozen conflict, lacking independent media and characterized by proto-political bargaining domination. In the modern political order the question of discourse framing

is an important issue of state making as it goes parallelly with policy-making, legitimizing it and ensuring the proper inclusion of citizens into the political process. The same events and processes can be shown as positive reformation, potential danger, accidental mistake or the measure provided by external/internal enemy. Regarding to the importance of discourse framing question the paper examines its phenomenon to find out how balanced it should be in policymaking, and what are the perspectives of this phenomenon.

The main target of the paper is to apply the new concept of discourse framing to Post-Soviet policymaking, thus trying to show why masses understand events and processes in the particular way.

So framing means the production (defining) of the borders in understanding of categories, events or processes (available facts) in order to make a particular effect on the recipient, stimulating distinct feedbacks, evaluations, reactions and even political (social, economic, violent etc) actions. Discourse framing being more wider means shaping complex (political) world views of masses, forming identities, patterns of values, system of political actions etc. Generally discourse framing serves state integration, internal safety, but also can serve as a measure to control masses, to stimulate particular voting behavior, to support some candidates/ political parties etc. Gameson and Modigliani defined frame as «central organizing idea or story» [3], that means framing can be an artificial composition or story, formed from available facts put together in a convenient, «appropriate» for the reader way.

In liberal understanding framing should serve an instrument of masses to control the political process. In this case the indicators of radical political thinking and behaviour of citizens can show the public will to frame the political discourse. The social trend applicable to any society is: more people active but radical, or less people active but more close to centrists. In this case discourse framing provided by masses can be dangerous for internal safety and integrity of the state. In contradiction, the lack of discourse framing provided by citizens, can make the state to get a shift to the power concentration in hands of the political elites.

The question of reproduction of power to nominate is a key one in discourse framing. The diverse elites (or in case of post-soviet space - heterogenic elite with diverse interests in it) are clashing to gain the unique «right» to produce and reproduce the game rules of the political market thus achieving the right to produce the

obligatory nominations, but also the obligation to reproduce and legitimise them. The last role is much more important as it needs not only participation in the elites bargaining, but also monitoring the mass attitudes, problems and even motives of participation.

The trick of the phenomenon of discourse formation is that every person has an unequal position in the access to officially nominate. And the citizen can be tricked or can make wrong decision more as far is the symbolic, positional distance from him to the place where decision-making in sense of rule formation takes place [1]. It comes that an ordinary citizen has no opportunity to influence the process of defining the key values of the society as «liberty», «equality», «fairness» etc. Due to such an hierarchy it comes out there's no equality in nominating what's «equality».

The question of the discourse framing correlates with national security. As the pluralist democracy model assumes there should be diversity of group actors that are framing the discourse, media, political parties, civil organisations should be the group interests providers, responsible for their realisation. But what about framing? How can diverse interests equally frame the discourse not stimulating internal social conflicts? From one side discourse needs to be based on the wide social discussion and to be the result of at least compromising social decision. But from the other hand, wide social discussion can cause constant rethinking of the political market rules thus destabilizing it and making stable legislative process impossible. Prohibition of censure in democratic states causes obstacles to the discourse framing as well. In this dilemma situation the question political actors are pointing on is do we need variety of media or we should frame them to avoid panic and instability? The policy making even in democratic states demonstrates the priority of the second path, for the sake of keeping society integrated and potentially mobilized to some kind of political actions (particular voting patterns or specific event estimation).

«Power of nomination» expertise is an institution that makes citizens act or think in the particular way regarding the situation. Usually citizens rely on special bureaucrats in fixing the collective problems, estimating them as authority holders. The documental forms citizens need to fill in to get their interests realized are indisputable and show how state shapes mass behaviour. Masses agree with such form of shaping thus agreeing with state's power to decide in what way they have to

behave and think. Such order makes state framing more possible and consumable for the citizens.

The Habermasian doctrine suggests the main role of the state should be in providing the platform for the civil discussion to achieve particular situational consensus [4, p.307]. In case of searching the way out of the pat situation online discussion can connect people, especially when everyone understands the necessity of the political system working properly. But in divided societies, where there are different segments divided by religious, ethnic, language, cultural or historic (different generations supporting either democratic or authoritarian political patterns, that could be seen the first years after collapse of USSR in Post-Soviet space) diversities, open discussion can also polarise people, when the question discussed is about key differences in society and which one should be dominant in the political market rules. The moderate state framing of the social discussion is needed to avoid potential conflicts and society divisions. Politicians often use framing in divided societies to form clashes in order to remove mass attention from important policy problems to the hot questions of existing diversities. This is a case of opening the question of official language in Ukraine (Ukrainian or Russian) before elections.

Media is another key actor of the discourse shaping. It can be considered both as a mediator between civil society and government, but in political reality of Post-Soviet space they are instruments of framing used by stakeholders being their owners. So the question is can media be considered as a mean to share diverse information or it's sabotage of getting this information by citizens? Generally media channels in Post-Soviet space are owned by stakeholders that are providing their personal interests through their media resources like socially important ones. But even in this case masses can decide what kind of framing they prefer, depending on their expectations, leadership preferences etc.

What are the obstacles to the total non-disputable framing? Jean-Francois Lyotard thinks that society is unified totality, but the structure of knowledge requires oppositions, controversies, that is the base for critical thinking [5, p.12-13]. It means that today every oppositional movement makes state framing less universal. The most important problem of Post-Soviet space in this case is that opposition is not institutionalized, so in political low-concurrent environment it tends to act like an

enemy towards the existing government. Trying to benefit in political contest the opposition is trying to make points on «discovering» facts about current government thus delegitimizing it. In reality it can cause general delegitimization of political authority non-regarding which party holds the majority. Moreover, the information connected to national security and internal safety can be discovered and published, making it publicly available and thus stimulating risks for these spheres of policy.

Stewart Brand discovers another characteristic of information that can cause danger to the national security issues: it wants to be free and at the same time expensive [2, p.80]. It means today's trends of framing are almost controversial. From one point of view, globalization makes information flows much more faster, information spreads through nation-states' borders as soon as it emerges, Wikileaks phenomenon demonstrates the impossibility to decisively hide turning point information and weakness of the state in front of well-framed information flows. From the other side, information became capitalized: information holders gain finances from selling it, media get beneficials by framing information in the way the more interested (well-paying) stakeholder needs to. Information about stakeholders framed in particular way serves as a capital to the information agencies, that can be converted into real capital or political power. Both hiding and publishing such information can be harmful for integrity and tranquility of society. In Post-Soviet space the first mechanism prevails, as it founds out to be more beneficial for the investigators.

The perspectives of framing seem to look very fruitful. Still social trends of the contemporary Post-Soviet states' (and even global) discourses show the ongoing transformation of framing instruments and forms.

Corporatization of media is a global trend, still on the Post-Soviet space it is presented in more deformed state, when media are concentrated in property of stakeholders thus representing their private interests and framing information regarding to them. In this case social demands are not articulated by media that leads to increasing of the social divisions. The competition of political actors become the competition of their media companies.

The next trend is that knowledge replaces actions. It means framing starts to be the instrument of competition, no more need in mass manifestation while the «picture evidence» of public activity can be created by

3D animators and published to convince masses in something important for a stakeholder.

Freedom of speech is becoming difficult to define. The question can be reformulated «is framing becoming a part of free social problems expressions?». If we assume that public opinion is not framed then comes an antagonism between public opinion and social media companies. In the other case if we consider public opinion biased there is no checks and balances between civil society and state, just the masses depending on the last one.

Concluding, framing nowadays is an important part of information consuming by Post-Soviet citizens. Stakeholders, framing discourse are shaping masses' identity, dividing them, forming official restrictions to make civil society dependant on the state. Framing discourse they are trying to achieve their own interest realisation. Such an order causes destabilisation thus making a threat to the national security system.

At the same time framing is becoming the capacity of everyone today. The mechanisms of information presentation are becoming more

well-known and used not only by elites, but also by public activists and bloggers. Although «framing» is considered a new, non-researched concept, it influences both social sphere of Post-Soviet Space and national security policymaking.

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CULTURAL APPROACH TO ANALYZING STATE BUILDING IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The article examines the characteristics of the cultural approach to describing Middle East politics and the process of state building. Both – advantages and disadvantages of this approach are analyzed. The author states that religion itself cannot be a major factor, which determines the development and internal structure of political institutions as well as the probability of democratization of the Middle Eastern regimes.

Keywords: Middle East, Islam, political culture, democratization, state building.

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ПОЛІТИКО-КУЛЬТУРНИЙ ПІДХІД ДО АНАЛІЗУ ДЕРЖАВОТВОРЕННЯ НА БЛИЗЬКОМУ СХОДІ

Проаналізовано риси політико-культурного підходу до описання політичного життя та процесу державотворення на Близькому Сході. Описано переваги та недоліки цього аналітичного напрямку. Обґрунтовано неможливість використання релігії як головного аналітичного інструмента під час вивчення розвитку та структури політичних інститутів держав цього регіону. Висловлено сумнів у тому, що іслам є головною перешкодою до демократизації режимів на Близькому Сході.

Ключові слова: Близький Схід, іслам, політична культура, демократизація, державотворення.