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WHO ARE THE SPOILERS OF THE PEACE? THE CASE OF CIVIL CONFLICT IN ANGOLA

The paper deals with the topic of spoilers identified as the specific type of the actors of civil conflict by Steven John Stedman. This concept describes spoilers as actors who by using violence spoil an ongoing peace process in a country. However, by this operationalization it is possible to identify the spoiler only after he started to act and this is one of the core critiques of this concept. The goal of the text is to analyze the characteristics of spoilers with the aim to identify whether this type of actors of civil conflict differ in some important characteristics from the other actors active in civil conflicts. My analysis suggests, there is no important difference between the identified spoiler and other actors fighting in civil war and thus there is no possibility to identify who will become the spoiler of the peace process.

Key words: spoiler, peace, civil conflict, Angola.

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ХТО Є СПОЙЛЕРОМ МИРНОГО ПРОЦЕСУ? ГРОМАДЯНСЬКИЙ КОНФЛІКТ В АНГОЛІ

Описується тема спойлера як певного типу акторів громадянського конфлікту по Стівену Джону Стедману. Ця концепція описує, як спойлери із застосуванням насильства псують постійний мирний процес в країні. Проте, з цим визначенням можна визначити спойлера тільки після того, як він почав діяти, і це є однією з головних причин критики цієї концепції. Мета тексту - аналіз характеристик спойлерів з метою визначити, чи є цей тип суб'єкта громадянського конфлікту відмінним від інших акторів в активних громадянських конфліктах. Мій аналіз показує, що немає важливої відмінності між ідентифікованим спойлером і іншими суб'єктами, що борються в громадянській війні і, таким чином, немає ніякої можливості визначити, хто стане спойлером мирного процесу.

Ключові слова: спойлер, мир, громадянський конфлікт, Ангола.

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КТО ЯВЛЯЕТСЯ СПОЙЛЕРОМ МИРНОГО ПРОЦЕССА? ГРАЖДАНСКИЙ КОНФЛИКТ В АНГОЛЕ

Описывается тема спойлера как определенного типа актеров гражданского конфликта по Стивену Джону Стедману. Эта концепция описывает, как спойлеры с применением насилия портят постоянный мирный процесс в стране. Однако, с этой операционализацией можно определить спойлера только после того, как он начал действовать, и это является одним из основных причин критики этой концепции. Цель текста - анализ характеристик спойлеров с целью определить, является ли этот тип субъекта гражданского конфликта отличным от других актеров в активных гражданских конфликтах. Мой анализ показывает, что нет важного различия между идентифицированным спойлером и другими субъектами, борющимися в гражданской войне и, таким образом, нет никакой возможности определить, кто станет спойлером мирного процесса.

Ключевые слова: спойлер, мир, гражданский конфликт, Ангола.

The concept of spoilers was introduced by Steven John Stedman in 1997 in his work Spoilers Problems in Peace Processes. This concept was able to gain a lot of attention among the theorists of conflict resolution and peace studies in a short time. However, this concept, even considered interesting and original has faced huge critique [1].

One of main critiques towards this concept was the impossibility to identify spoilers ex-ante which means before they start to act and violate the ongoing peace process. In my analysis, of the case of peace processes taking place in Angola, I will look closer at the actors of these peace processes and try to identify common/different characteristics of those actors who were identified by Stedman as spoilers and those actors who were not identified as spoilers. Through this analysis I will be able to find out whether spoilers have some special characteristics by which they could be identified before they start to act.

In the first part of the text I will introduce in short the concept of spoilers of Steven J. Stedman and also the debate between the greed and grievance explanations of the civil conflict. Then I will introduce the research framework of the analysis and methods used in it. In the next part of the text I will present an analysis of the actors of civil conflicts analyzing two main sets of characteristics - those connected with the greed explanations of civil conflicts and those connected with grievance explanations of civil conflicts. In the last part of the text I will introduce the results and conclusions of the analysis.

Spoiler Concept

As Newman and Richmond stated in their study from 2006, the 1990s were very rich in peace processes taking place in different parts of the world, however only a small portion of

them were successful and ended by full implementation of the agreed and signed peace treaties [2]. This led to a huge discussion about the conditions of the stability of peace. This discussion was very often focused on the different environmental factors which surrounded the actors of the peace process and could influence their behavior and commitment to the peace. For example, Hoddie and Hartzell [3] argued that the texts of the peace treaties and power-sharing provisions written in them can positively influence the stability of peace process. Zartman introduced the concept of mutually hurting stalemate as the optimal situation for signing the peace [4]. Steven John Stedman joined this discussion with his focus on the internal actors and their influence on the stability of peace.

Steven John Stedman emphasized that „the biggest source of the risk (to the peace process) comes from spoilers – leaders and parties who are convinced that the peace coming from the peace process will endanger their power, worldview and their interests and they use violence to spoil (the peace)” [5]. From this definition, the spoiler is an actor who wants to spoil the peace by violent behavior. Stedman also stressed that spoilers are connected with the peace process thus they can be identified only where a peace process is organized. Stedman also claims that this type of actor is so dangerous for the peace process that often mentioned techniques of the management of peace processes (for example power-sharing) do not work as the peace process is not in the interest of this type of actor [5].

As Stedman stated in each peace process three characteristics of spoilers need to be taken into consideration: the position of spoiler in the peace process, the number of spoilers in the peace process and the type of these actors [5].

Firstly, the position of the spoilers in the peace process should be considered. Spoilers can be among the actors who are so called outsiders, actors who have not been invited to take part in the peace process and are not part of the discussion leading to the peace treaty [5]. On the other hand spoilers can be found also among those actors who take active part in the peace process and can fully influence the content of the peace treaty. The position of the actors can significantly influence their behavior. Those actors who do not take part in the peace process and were not invited to the negotiations try by violent actions to raise the attention and become the members of the „elite“ club negotiating about the future institutional framework of the country. The motivation for „inside“ spoilers who are an incremental part of the peace process is not so clear. The basic tactic of these spoilers is not violence but stealth – they need to convince the other actors and mediators about their commitment to the peace but not to an extent which could endanger their position in the civil conflict. Peace process is for them only a temporary period which they can use for the rearmament and purchase of new weapons [5].

The number of this type of actors is also important when analyzing the peace process. The higher the number of the spoilers in the peace process the more difficult is to manage its stability [5].

The third characteristic which needs to be taken into consideration when analyzing spoilers is the type of these actors. Stedman identified three main types. First is the so called limited spoiler. This type of spoiler has only limited goals for example the equal political rights for all ethnic/religious groups living in the respective society [5]. The second type of spoiler are total spoilers which are the direct opposite of the limited type. This type of spoiler is very often a very strong personality who wants to have the political/economic power and does not want to share it with anybody. These spoilers are very rarely pragmatic and are not open to any compromise. As Stedman stated „total spoilers are very often supporters of radical ideologies, total power is for them the mean how to reach their goals and a radical change of the society“[5]. The third type of spoiler is so called greedy spoiler and are placed somewhere in the middle of total and limited spoiler. The behavior of this actor is connected with the calculation of gain and costs coming from the peace processes. When the costs of the peace process are higher than the gains, the

spoiler will spoil the peace process and the on-going peace process will not be successful [5].

By this concept, Stedman suggests that we can identify different types of actors in the peace processes and one of them, spoilers, are especially dangerous for the stability and success of the peace processes. He also stated that even among the spoilers, we can identify their different kinds based on their goals and strategies.

Critique of S.J.Stedman

Even though theorists of the peace studies do not doubt the important insight of S.J. Stedman to the analysis of the stability of peace, this concept is considered very elusive. The critique of this concept can be divided into three main areas.

The first part of the critique stresses that the definition who can and who cannot be considered a spoiler is very elusive. Stedman said that a spoiler can be only an actor who acts violently, however, in his later paper, Stedman said that a spoiler can be basically everyone with the intention to use the violence [5]. By this amendment to the former definition Stedman caused the uncertainty, lack of transparency in the definition of a spoiler and the fragmentation of the works of scholars. For example, Greenhill and Major [6] in their work identify spoilers strictly according to their violent behavior, but for example Zahar [7] claims, that also non-violent opposition of the peace treaty should be analyzed as spoiling behavior. This has led to the situation when in different works different operationalization of spoilers is used and the comparison of the results is not possible [1].

The second type of criticism stresses the normativity of the concept. The concept is integrally connected with the liberal paradigm of peace and when the actor does not follow the rules of this paradigm, he is automatically considered as a spoiler of peace [1].

The third group of critique is focused on the problem of the ex-post identification of spoilers and practical usefulness of the concept. This type of critique stresses that as the operationalization of the spoiler is based only on his behavior, mediators can identify that the spoiler is present in the peace process only when the spoiler decided to act and the peace is being spoiled [6].

Research framework and methodology

The aim of this paper is to critically access the spoiler concept and based on the closer analysis of internal actors of the civil conflict suggest the clarified operationalization of spoilers of peace processes.

I suggest that analysis of characteristics of actors of peace processes can reveal the existing/non existing differences between the actors of peace process and thus clarify its operationalization and bring the potential to identify this type of actors before they start to act and spoil the ongoing peace process. This analysis therefore reacts to two important critiques towards the concept and outlines the potential of its reconceptualization. The research question of this text therefore is: Do the spoilers of peace processes share common characteristics, and if yes, what are the characteristics of spoilers of peace processes? Can be the spoiling behavior be explained by the greed or grievance theory of civil conflicts?

The basic framework of the analysis is based on the comparison between the characteristics of those actors which were by Steven John Stedman identified as spoilers and other internal actors of the civil conflicts who also have the potential to spoil the peace process (as they are active actors in the ongoing civil conflict) but for different reasons have not become spoilers. I will focus on all relevant actors fighting in the respective civil conflict. The relevancy will be defined according to the number of references on the actor in the analysis and reports from the conflict from various sources.

I analyze the factors connected with spoiling in the situation when the peace treaty was signed. Stedman stated that the spoiling of the peace process is necessarily connected with the peace process, without the peace process there is no spoiling. The peace process starts after the ceasefire, by the negotiations between the parties of the conflict invited to the peace talks and mediators which are closed by signing the peace agreement. The peace process ends by the implementation of the provisions written and agreed in the peace treaty. Therefore, my research provides the picture of the characteristics of actors of the civil conflict in the time between the negotiations about the peace treaty and the time when the peace treaty was signed.

I will focus on the same set of characteristics when analyzing the two types of actors (spoilers/non-spoilers of peace processes). Analysis of the same characteristics on the different groups of actors will allow me to clearly identify differences between the actors and also potential specific characteristics of those who decide to spoil the ongoing peace process. In the first set of characteristics I will focus on the ethnic composition of the internal actors of the civil conflict and power-sharing

provisions coming from the peace treaty for the respective group. In the second set of characteristics I will focus on the economic and military power of the internal actors.

The characteristics I am focused on in the analysis were selected based on the theoretical debate between the greed and grievance explanations of civil conflicts. One of the main protagonists of this debate is Peter Collier [8] who suggests that this theoretical division between the greed and grievance explanation of the emergence of civil conflict is a good framework for their analysis [9]. The debate between the protagonists of greed or grievance explanations of civil conflicts started in the 90ties. In the beginning of 90ties a new generation of analysts of civil conflicts challenged the explanations of the emergence of civil conflict based on the social injustice and historical grievance which were very frequent in the previous generation of academics. This new generation of analysts, in which P. Collier is one of the most important protagonists proposed, that the injustice is not a sufficient explanatory factor of civil conflict as the injustice is present also in those societies which do not have any experience with the civil conflict. Therefore it is inevitable to look for other, possibly more important factors which could explain the emergence of the civil war [8]. However, factors which were analyzed by Peter Collier and other representatives of this debate [8] were applied on the level of national states – authors analyzed whether the potential of the state to the civil conflict is connected with the greed or grievance explanations. In this text I am applying their proposition and factors, however, I shift the focus from the national level to subnational level and I analyze groups active in the civil conflicts.

As it was mentioned above, I analyze two sets of factors. In the first set I am focused on the ethnic composition of the actor/group fighting in the civil war and on the power-sharing provisions stated in the peace treaty signed in the studied period. Ethnic composition of the group is a factor which was applied by P. Collier in his analysis from 1999 [8]. However, since Collier analyzed the level of national states, he was focused on the ethnic/religious composition of the society of the respective state. I am applying this factor on the level of individual actors with the assumption that if participation of the studied group in the civil conflict is based on the defense of the interests of one specific group of the society the composition of the group will be predominantly mono ethnic (religious). If the group consists of

many diverse ethnic groups how could it defend the rights of one group? The factor of power-sharing was not used by the P. Collier in his analysis. However, I have decided to use it based on the arguments of Hoddie and Hartzell who in their work stated that the stability of peace is positively correlated with the power-sharing provision stated in the peace treaty ending the civil conflict [3]. This explanation can be placed among the grievance explanations of the civil conflicts as it expects that when the grievance of the groups is replaced by the sharing of power in political, military, economic and territorial area, the peace will be stable [3]. Therefore in my paper I will analyze whether the analyzed group did receive its share of power in the peace treaty and whether it received it in all important areas (political, military, economic, territorial).

In the second set of factors I focus on two factors - economic power of the group and military power of the group. Economic factors create an important part of the factors analyzed by P. Collier. In his analysis Collier analyzed the portion of primary commodities on GDP of state, portion of young men in the society and the level of education. As my analysis is conducted on the sub-national level, GDP of the country is not a suitable factor. I replaced it by the economic power of the group. In this factor I am analyzing whether the group has important sources of economic income and whether these sources come from the primary commodities [8]. Other two factors used by P. Collier are not suitable for my research design as they can be applied only on national level of the analysis (data for the subnational level do not exist). However, I decide to add to the analyses the factor of military power of the group. This factor can tell us whether the military power of the group influence the decision of the group to continue in fight.

Based on the abovementioned factors my analysis will be able to show whether the group fights because it can (has economic and military sources to continue in fighting - greed explanations) or it fight till the moment when basic needs/inequalities are resolved (power-sharing provisions – grievance explanations).

Angola, as the case for the analysis was chosen because it is very often mentioned as a typical case of the spoiled peace. In Angola, where the civil conflict lasted over the 30 years, three main peace agreements were signed however only last one was successful. The civil conflict started with the independence struggle of this former Portuguese colony. The independence struggle was fought by three main

groups which played also an important role in latter stages of civil conflict – FNLA (National Liberation Front of Angola), UNITA (The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) and MPLA (Popular Movement for the National Independence of Angola). Each of the group tried to gain the support from different ethnic groups living in Angola, however, as it will be seen further in the analysis, this doesn't apply for the latter stages of the civil war [10]. Because of the differences between the groups, the project of power-sharing proposed by the Portugal as the way how to manage the independence process fell short time after the independence of Angola. From the beginning of the struggle for independence, MPLA militias „systematically harassed anyone who was not sympathetic to MPLA”[10]. This is the reason why MPLA was able to maintain control of the capital city and also gain the support of the international actors as a legitimate political actor and establish one-party regime. The civil war in the country was to a large extent influenced by the ongoing Cold War. MPLA was supported by the USSR and UNITA was during the whole war supported by the USA. The situation and also the potential to end the war opened after the end of Cold War. After two unsuccessful peace processes the civil war ended in 2002 when Luena Memorandum of Understanding between the MPLA and UNITA was signed [11].

We can identify two important actors of the civil conflict in Angola. The first one, with a long tradition in Angolan political history is MPLA. This group was established in 1956 by two communist parties operating abroad due to the colonization regime in Angola. These parties were Angolan Communist party established in 1953 and Angolan Africans Party of United Struggle established in 1956 [12]. The second important actor in the Angolan conflict which I analyze in this paper is UNITA. This group was created by the separation from FNLA. FNLA was created as a party representing one ethnic group living in Angola - Bakongo ethnic group [11]. However, soon after its establishment the leader of the group Holden Roberto was accused of the corruption. After this affair in 1964 [11] Jonas Savimbi, former Minister for Foreign Affairs of the exile government of Angola and member of FNLA decided to create his own group – UNITA, which became one of the most important actors in the civil war. In my analysis, UNITA represents the spoiler of the peace processes taking place in Angola. In both peace processes

it was UNITA who restored the conflict by violent activities [11].

Angola provides a great opportunity to study the actors of the civil conflict in two different situations when two different peace treaties were signed and compare the results. In the text I am providing the analysis and comparison of the aforementioned characteristics of relevant actors of civil conflict (ethnic composition of the group, power-sharing provisions, economic power of the group, military power of the group) in two different situations – Bicesse Accords from 1991 and Lusaka protocol from 1994. I am not analyzing the last peace process in 2002 as this peace process was not spoiled by any of the present actors.

Analysis

In this part of the paper I am presenting the analysis conducted according the described research framework. I am analyzing two internal actors of the civil conflict in Angola – UNITA (The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) and MPLA. I focus on two sets of factors. In the first set, which is connected with the grievance explanation of spoiling, I focus on the ethnic composition of the group and power-sharing arrangements in the peace treaty. In the second set, which is connected with the greed explanations of spoiling, I am analyzing the economic and military power of the fighting group. I am analyzing these characteristics in two different peace processes taking place in Angola – the peace process after Bicesse Accords in 1991 and the peace process after Lusaka Protocol in 1994.

Bicesse Accords 1991 – analysis of actors

Ethnic composition of the group

As it was mentioned earlier, FNLA from which UNITA was created in the beginning of the war, abandoned a mono ethnic composition and tried to gain support from various ethnic groups of the society [11]. The exact ethnic composition of UNITA is not known however, the party in the very early stages of the conflict decided to leave mono-ethnic representation, and it did not return to it in the latter stages of the conflict. Therefore ethnicity did not play an important role in the composition of UNITA.

In the begging of the conflict MPLA could be identified as a group of the Mbubdu ethnic group with the dominant support from the Methodist and Catholic religion [13]. However, with the evolution of the conflict, the MLPA was identified mostly as the governmental force against the opposition UNITA force and the ethnic identity of the party was significantly

diminished [14]. The identification of the group as a governmental force against the rebels was more important than its ethnic composition.

Power-sharing arrangements

Concerning the power sharing arrangements, Bicesse Accords recognized the group as the legitimate political actor and called for the multiparty elections in which UNITA could compete to have its share of political power. Bicesse also called for one unified army in which also members of UNITA would be incorporated. Territorial power-sharing was secured when control over the local assemblies in the transition period were equally divided between MPLA and UNITA [15]. Economic resources (either oil or diamonds) remained in the hands of the groups and were to be transferred as state resources after the elections [15]. By this, all power-sharing provisions identified by Hoddie and Hartzell were fulfilled by Bicesse Accords.

Economic power

UNITA was, mostly during and after Bicesse Accords, economically the strongest since its establishment - „Bicesse Accords in 1991 legitimized UNITA’s diamond resource base as far as UNITA was a contender in the national elections scheduled for November 1992“[16]. The importance of diamond black trade as the main financial source of UNITA’s military operations is mentioned also in the text of Billon [17]. Diamonds were traded mostly through a net of smugglers in Democratic Republic of Congo [14].

MPLA throughout almost the entire civil conflict financed its activities from the revenues from oil reserves of Angola. Angola had its own state owned oil company Sonangol. As Reno stated, „Sonangol served a useful purpose for channeling revenues into off-shore accounts free of immediate patronage pressures“[18]. The importance of oil for MPLA to finance the war and also its patronage system in the country is supported also by Le Billon [17] who stated that the group was able to buy most of the weaponry thanks to control over the country’s oil trade.

Military power

In the analyzed stage of the conflict UNITA was very strong compared to its situation during the Cold War. In this phase it did not control only the southern part, the traditional stronghold of this party in Angola [13], but also some areas of the northern part of the country, mostly diamond-rich areas [14]. The exact number of fighters or any other concrete information concerning the military power of the group is not known from this period of conflict however,

as the group controlled an important part of the country, I assume it had enough military power. It is also known that in this stage of the conflict South Africa provided its aircraft to help UNITA to fight against the government [13].

The exact number of fighters of MPLA party is also not known. However, we know that MPLA was for a long time supported by the Soviet bloc which provided MPLA also with weaponry. The Bicesse agreement was signed after the Cold war, however, most of the arms remained in the country [13]. Another important source of the military power was weaponry bought on the black market through private companies [17].

Lusaka protocol 1994 – analysis of actors

Ethnic composition of the group

Ethnic composition did not change compared to the situation during Bicesse Accords from 1991. Mercenaries from diverse groups, and very often also foreign states, fought for the groups. As the report of the Amnesty International assumes, ethnicity and political rights for a specific ethnic group as a political program were not important in this stage of the conflict [17].

In the latter stages of the conflict, MPLA was increasingly identified as the governmental force in the civil conflict and tried to gain the image of the legitimate political actor in Angola. The group did not stress any ethnic affiliation, but tried to present itself as the political party for all Angolans [14].

Power-sharing arrangements

The power-sharing provisions included in Lusaka protocol were even more generous to UNITA than in the Bicesse Accords from 1991. In this new peace accord UNITA was granted a series of post of ministers, deputy ministers, ambassadors, provincial governors etc. MPLA was granted a similar share of the same positions [19]. Military provisions of the treaty were almost the same as in the previous peace accord. UNITA's members were granted places in a new national army which should consist of members of both groups. UNITA was also granted places among the army generals. The same provisions were proposed also for the police and other security forces of the state. Concerning the economic power-sharing, the treaty is not very specific. It is stated on the page 13 that UNITA members participate adequately ...in the various institutions of political, administrative and economic activity". Concerning territorial power-sharing, Lusaka Protocol specified that UNITA was granted all political positions which it was able to gain in the elections in 1992. From the perspective of

power-sharing provisions it seems that power-sharing was secured in all four important areas [19].

Economic power

The economic power of UNITA did not change in the new situation. As it was mentioned above, UNITA in this stage of the conflict intensively traded diamonds with the regional actors [17]. The group controlled much of the diamond mines in the country and even though the government pushed the group and regained the large areas, UNITA held on mostly to those areas where diamond mines were concentrated [14].

MPLA still had enough opportunities to sell the oil through the regional, but also international channels [18]. Overall at the time the protocols were negotiated the government was able to gain control also over some of the diamond mines in the country and diamonds became an important trading commodity on the black market also for MPLA [17].

Military power

Military power of UNITA at this stage of the conflict is not clear, as it was also in the previous stage. However, we know that the negotiations about the conditions of peace were held because UNITA lost many of the strategic areas which were retaken by the government forces [1].

After Bicesse Accords were signed and during the negotiations leading to Lusaka Protocol, MPLA was a stronger actor in the conflict which is proved by the fact that it was able to gain control over important territories held by UNITA [1]. MPLA still controlled the oil reserves of the country and was able to finance the fighters and weaponry [18].

Conclusions

In this text I provided the analysis of the characteristics of internal actors of the civil conflict in Angola. The aim of the text was to find out whether spoilers of peace processes, identified by the Steven John Stedman as specific actors of civil conflicts, do have specific characteristics which would distinguish them from the rest of the actors fighting in the civil conflict.

In my analysis I analyzed two sets of factors based on the greed and grievance explanations of the civil conflicts. In the first set, connected with the grievance explanations I analyzed ethnic composition of the group and power-sharing arrangements of the peace treaty. In the second set of factors, connected with the greed explanations of civil conflicts I analyzed economic and military power of the groups fighting in the civil conflict.

My analyses showed that there is no significant difference between the UNITA as the identified spoiler of the peace processes and MPLA the other important actor in the civil conflict in Angola. During the peace process after Bicesse Accords in 1991 both of the groups could not be identified as mono ethnic groups and ethnicity was not an important motivation of the fight. Power-sharing provisions were part of the peace treaty and both of the groups were granted almost equal political, but also economic power. Also both of the groups had approximately the same

militarily and economic strength. The same can be seen also in the second stage of conflict after the Lusaka Protocol was signed in 1994. The ethnic composition of the groups did not change, power-sharing was even more proportional than in Bicesse Accords and economic and military power of group was again almost the same. The results of the analysis can be seen in the table 1. My analysis thus suggests that spoilers do not significantly differ from other actors operating in civil conflicts.

Table 1 – Results of the analysis

	MPLA	UNITA
Bicesse Accords 1991		
Ethnic composition of the group	Ethnicity not important, no mono composition	Ethnicity not important, no mono composition
Power-sharing provisions	All four areas of power-sharing stated in the agreement; agreed share of power in all four MPLA recognized UNITA as political actor, MPLA was granted the control over the oil reserves of the country; it was granted the positions in the local administration	All four areas of power-sharing stated in the peace agreement; UNITA gained the political recognition; was incorporated into the army; was granted places in local administration; was granted the control over the part of the natural resources
Economic power of the group	Strong economic power (oil reserves under control)	Strong economic power (control of diamond mines in the state)
Military power of the group	Strong military power (control of the central and northern part of the state; control of the capital)	Strong military power (control of the southern part of the country)
Lusaka Protocol 1994		
Ethnic composition of the group	Ethnicity not important, no mono ethnic composition	Ethnicity not important, no mono ethnic composition
Power-sharing provisions	All four areas of power-sharing stated in the agreement; agreed share of power in all four areas (agreement very often referred to previous Bicesse Accords)	All four areas of power-sharing stated in the peace agreement; agreed share of power in all four areas (agreement very often referred to previous Bicesse Accords)
Economic power of the group	Strong economic power (control of oil reserves, support from international and regional actors)	Strong economic power (control of diamond mines in the country)
Military power of the group	Strong military power (MPLA able to retake important strategic areas from UNITA)	Not strong military power (UNITA not able to hold or retake the lost areas of land; mostly localized guerrilla war)

Source: author

The analysis has also shown that based on the selected analyzed factors the greed and grievance explanation of the civil conflict cannot explain why some of the actors become spoilers and repeatedly spoil the peace process. This means that further analysis is needed which would include other factors coming from different explanations influencing the stability of peace.

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THE ENERGY UNION AND VISEGRAD FOUR COOPERATION

The following article argues that energy security is an extremely important challenge for the countries of the European Union. Economically and democratically weakly-developed countries hold a constant fight, both open and hidden, for preserving and enforcing their energy influence in the world. Russia is the most vivid of such examples. Considering the events in the East of Ukraine, its closest European neighbours – countries of the Visegrad Four Group - should unite their efforts together and re-think their energy policies in terms of security and diversification. Establishing the EU Energy Union might be a solution.

Key words: the European Union, the Visegrad countries, energy, Russia, diversification.