

Thirdly, calculation of scoring of all indicators gives ideas only about environment for regional democracy. The conclusions about the level of regional democracy should be formulated by taking into account the individual components of some indicators – institutional depth of regional authority; capacity of the regional government to sets the base and rate of taxes, appointment of the regional executive and free and competitive election of regional

assembly. They should account through appropriate factors.

The results of further study of subnational processes in other new democracies of Eastern Europe will be rating of regional democracy in 26 countries, the assessment of its individual elements, and an overall assessment of prospects for regional democracy in the context of European integration. Next publications will be devoted by these issues.

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POWER-SHARING IN THE UKRAINIAN EXECUTIVE AUTHORITIES

The article is considered the main theories of government in plural society. It has been shown that Lijphart’s consociational democracy is the optimal model of democracy for Ukraine. Also the article is analyzed the shortcomings of Ukrainian political system. Democracy’s indexes show that the presence of two main parties inside the Cabinet of Ministers is favorable for democracy.

Key words: majoritarian democracy, consociational democracy, power-sharing, divided society, political system

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СПІЛЬНЕ ЗДІЙСНЕННЯ ВЛАДИ В УКРАЇНСЬКИХ ВИКОНАВЧИХ ІНСТИТУЦІЯХ

Розглянуто основні теорії управління в багатоскладовому суспільстві. Показано, що найбільш оптимальною для України виступає модель консоціальної демократії А. Лейпхарта. Проаналізовано основні вади політичної системи України. На основі індексів демократії показано, що наявність головних політичних партій у складі Кабінету Міністрів є сприятливими для демократії.

Ключові слова: мажоритарна демократія, консоціациона демократія, спільне здійснення влади, розколоте суспільство, політична система

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СОВМЕСТНОЕ ОСУЩЕСТВЛЕНИЕ ВЛАСТИ В УКРАИНСКИХ ИСПОЛНИТЕЛЬНЫХ ИНСТИТАХ

Рассмотрены основные теории управления в многосоставном обществе. Показано, что наиболее оптимальной для Украины выступает модель консоциальной демократии А. Лейпхарта. Проанализированы основные недостатки политической системы Украины. На основе индексов демократии показано, что наличие главных политических партий в составе Кабинета Министров является благоприятным для демократии.

Ключевые слова: мажоритарная демократия, консоциальная демократия, совместное осуществление власти, расколотое общество, политическая система

Nowadays Ukraine faces a lot of the institutional problems. There are a lot of attempts to reform the Ukrainian political system, and all of them were unsuccessful. These institutional arrangements are basing on a majoritarian democracy. And the case of Ukraine shows the failure of this model in term of political system. This is because Ukraine is a plural society. Several researches offer different approaches how to incorporate all significant segments into government and which combination of institutes would work well in such societies. The prominent scholars in these studies are Lijphart, Horowitz and Roeder. This article is considering the main features of their theories, and how we could apply them to Ukrainian political system.

First of all we should define what plural society is. So, plural society or divided society is a society where politics settles according to ethnicity and where two or more segments of society compete for power in the center of political system [1, p. 102].

The scholars argue that plural society needs some kind of power sharing between significant segments. The key idea of any power-sharing structure is that two or more ethno-national groups have to jointly rule the common polity and take decisions in consensus. No single group can decide important matters without the consent of the other. On the basis of informal or formal rules, all groups have access to political power and other resources. This concept of conflict regulation was prominently shaped during the 1970s by the work of Arend Lijphart, Eric Nordlinger, Gerhard Lehmbruch and others; it is also often called consociational democracy, consensus democracy, corporatism or proportional democracy. Despite the fact that these terms were often used in a synonymous way, they should be treated separately. Lijphart's ideal-type distinction between majority and consensus democracy could be used as a starting point, the first being characterized by elite competition and changing

majorities, the second by elite cooperation and joint governance. In a broad sense, the term consensus democracy applies to each polity where the main parties de facto rule together, be it a national or a multinational environment. Consociationalism would be a specific form of consensus democracy, linked to ethnically segmented societies or, rather, to multinational polities, i.e. states or regions in which two or more ethno-national groups live. This definition seems to be more precise than the notions of 'deeply divided societies' (Nordlinger) or 'plural societies' (Lijphart). In other words, not every form of institutionalized, longstanding cross-party cooperation within a nation-state should be called consociationalism. This kind of consensus politics is better labelled as corporatism or proportional democracy. The difference can be illustrated by Belgium and Austria. Both are considered as classical examples of Western consensus democracy, but both obviously represent two different types of society. Whereas in Belgium power-sharing rules proved necessary to keep two distinct ethno-national groups (Flemings and Walloons) in one polity, in post-1945 Austria two political movements (Catholic conservatism and socialism) of one and the same national group developed a system of power-sharing. According to Lijphart, consociationalism implies both the existence of 'segmental cleavages' and elite cooperation, while corporatism just refers to the latter. Consociationalism therefore is more comprehensive, since it describes not only a way of government, but also a specific type of society [2, p. 203-204].

Therefore, consociationalism is related to cleavages and different types of society's segmentation. Also it associates with elite's behavior [3, p. 38]. Consociationalism is connected with political tradition and the previous model of cooperation between elites, i.e. cooperation between elites that has existed

early forms and encourages the establishment of the consociationalism [3, p. 39].

Power-sharing can be based on formalized rules or informal practices. The former is done on the basis of a written constitution, a peace accord or special laws, the latter on the basis of oral agreements or unwritten customs. Switzerland serves as a prime case for informal rules. The composition of the government („magic formula”), the representation of linguistic groups in politics and administrations and the de facto veto opportunities and mechanisms for conflict settlement are not strictly formalized [2, p. 218]. However, in Belgium, the parity rule at the Council of Ministers received an official constitutional status only in 1970 after having been practised informally since 1950. In particular, the composition of power-sharing governments, the representation of all groups in parliaments, proportional systems for public administration, the division of power between different levels (e.g. regions in Belgium) as well as procedures for veto rights are highly formalized. Only in the field of arbitration measures are informal ways also occasionally used – often in the form of ad hoc round tables with major party leaders in order to solve concrete problems. In general, informal arrangements are merely a supplement to already established formal rules. They could be seen as an indication of growing mutual trust, since both sides apparently believe that unwritten agreements will be kept [2, p. 219].

There is a debate between advocates of communal approaches (where consociationalism is the best option) and those who argue about more integrative approach. In this context there is a debate in which ones propose electoral systems where ethnic parties could strengthen their positions and promote power-sharing on the ethnicity's basis and those who want to create incentives for parties or candidates to form cross-ethnic cleavages or to minimize the importance of ethnicity as a basis of communal sources' dividing.

Donald Horowitz is the best known critic of consociationalism. He points out that consociational mechanisms is enhancing the splitting on ethnic or religious principle, and the elites have no incentive to cooperate [1, p. 108]. Unlike A. Lijphart for whom the essential thing is a compromise's achieving between the groups after the election, Horowitz focuses on the topic of coalitions before and after the elections, he argues about necessity to form coalitions before the elections that would attract voters from different groups and thus promote the compromise on ethnic basis [4, p. 23]. He

puts forward arguments in favor of the integration approach that helps to solve ethnic conflicts by overcoming of the ethnic differences between the groups [1, p. 109]. D. Horowitz determines the best way to reduce the destructive characteristics of plural society is not to encourage the formation of ethnic parties, but rather to use the electoral system in a way that would encourage cooperation and accommodation among competing groups [5, p. 157].

Roeder also criticizes the Lijphart's power-sharing theory. He has written that power-sharing institutions typically seek to create a stable cartel among the elites of ethnic groups [6, p. 36]. Many institutions of inclusive decision-making, such as mutual vetoes, can be used to begin a game of brinkmanship in which each side threatens to force a deadlock in governmental decision-making until the other side grants further concessions.

Power sharing institutions shape the agenda of politics and privilege issues of interethnic allocation of power and resources. Consequently, the issues that divide ethnic groups from one another come to occupy a central place in politics under power sharing, sustain interethnic conflict at high levels, and keep alive fundamental issues of renegotiating the rules of power sharing [6, p. 37].

Power-sharing institutions are designed to expand the representativeness of the state, but this representativeness often comes at the cost of greater governmental inefficiency. Inclusive decision-making – particularly by guaranteeing ethnic representation and granting vetoes to ethnic spokesmen and women – makes policymaking slower and more likely to end in deadlock [6, p. 39].

Power-dividing institutions stress the importance of civil liberties that limit government, separation of powers that create multiple majorities and checks and balances that limit each majority. Power dividing institutions ensure the rights of ethnic and other groups though universalistics, individual liberties.

Power-dividing institutions do not abandon majoritarianism in governmental decision-making – the fundamental principle of democracy that popular majorities should decide the course of government. Power-dividing institutions empower multiple majorities, each construing the public interest somewhat differently, in separate, independent organs of government [6, p. 52]. The simple and obvious institutional obstacle to majority encroachment on minority rights in power dividing is the requirement that any change in

the allocation of decision rights must be ratified by the different majorities in separate governmental organs [6, p. 64].

Power dividing disperses political power among a variety of political institutions at the national and subnational levels and empowers different majorities within each. Thus, power dividing encourages fencing off the executive from the legislative branch and separating legislative chamber one from another. From this perspective, where presidentialism leads to concentration of power in a superpresidency, it is less desirable than the fused powers of parliamentarism; however, where, in ethnically divided societies, presidentialism leads to real separation of powers and significant checks and balances, it is preferable to parliamentarism. Rather than looking for one optimal set of rules for elections, advocates of power dividing argue that a stable regime should have distinct electoral rules for each representative organ that create institutions that represent alternative majorities. In the division of power between national and subnational governments, the power dividing strategy advises against concentrating local powers in single jurisdictions; for this reason federalism can lead to destructive outcomes in ethnically divided societies. Instead, power dividing advocates call for the creation of multiple overlapping jurisdictions at the subnational level with governing boards elected by distinctive majorities [6, p. 343].

The reformation of political system in Ukraine was based on majoritarian democracy. This model of democracy means the government-versus-opposition pattern. This majority rules works well in relatively homogeneous societies. That's why this principle does not work in Ukrainian political system.

Kuzio is against the zero-game politics across Post-Soviet countries; he argues that for Post-Soviet countries it is impossible to apply „non-liberal” politics of creation the single nation. This politics creates the interethnic tension that impedes national integration [7, p. 235]. He says that the great degree of diversity makes more difficult transition to democracy. Ukraine is plural society, that's why an application of classical model of democracy (which is characterized by nation-state) is impossible [8, p. 297]. Stepan has formulated the general theoretical principle is that the aggressive policy of nation-state if the more than one mobilized national group exists is dangerous for social stability and prospective for democratic development [9].

The division inside the society influences on reforms' failure, and Matsiyevsky argues that the main factor is deep elite's fragmentation. The main political actors have given their preferences to „zero-sum game” instead of compromise and cooperation, and this game ended mutual losing [10, c.25].

The changing of consolidation democracy's model is the way to overcome the crisis of political system. The divided elites inhibit the reforms that cause the social instability. At the same time we could not demand to consolidate the elites on the totalitarian basis. Therefore the stable democratic development could be only if there is a voluntary consolidation and coordination of positions and goals.

The reform 2004 year was accepted because no one group had a majority. Hale argues that Ukraine has got the democratic progress not because Yuschenko has won the presidency in the end of 2004 year but because he has not won. That election has created a stalemate in the country, which managed to get out only when Yuschenko had agreed to make more weaker the presidential power (through constitutional reform) in exchange that Yanukovych would refused the presidency and would consented for a third round. In a new system a parliament appoints a prime minister. A head of a cabinet has got broad power that could be used as a counterweight to the current presidential power in political conflicts. Such separation of power deprived the president to become a major force that determines the direction of collective elites' action because elites that would be dissatisfied with a president may shift to a parliament and a prime minister [11]. The political reform (transition from president-parliament system to premier-president system) introduced the new institution in Ukraine: government's political accountability before parliament. The presidency in premier-president systems gives to president some power to nominate premier minister, and sometimes ministers, but only parliament majority can dismiss the cabinet [12, c. 80]. But one of the political system's problems in Ukraine (dual accountability of Cabinet of Ministers to both President and Parliament) is remaining.

According to G. Hale in post-communist patronage society both parliamentarism and presidentialism lead to the rise of a single patron where there is a president in a presidential system and there is a prime-minister in a parliamentary system. It is necessary to create different bases of legitimacy for president and prime-minister (i.e. president is elected by popular election, and prime

minister is appointed by parliament exclusively) according to Lijphart’s recommendations and semi-presidential republics’ political practice (simultaneous cabinet’s accountability to a president and a parliament has a negative impact on stability of political system). This could reduce the conflict between a president and a parliament in an appointing of a prime minister, and create the competitive groups that would help to avoid the authoritarian tendencies.

According to Lijphart „grand coalition” can take different institutional forms. In the context of Ukrainian political system such arrangement

could implement into the Cabinet of Ministers. So, the presence of the second largest party’s principle is the one of the required elements of political system’s reforming. It avoids the winner-takes-all system and introduces the power-sharing to the government. Political practice of dividing cabinets in Ukraine has shown positive tendency of democracy’s promotion. The most dividing cabinets were in 2006-2010. They have been formed by opposing parties in parliament (Party of Regions and Our Ukraine) or by political forces in conflict (BUT and NU-NS) (see Table 1) [13].

Table 1

Prime minister	Durability	Prime minister’s party	Party composition of Cabinet
Yanukovuch	21.11.2002 – 05.01.2005	PR	PR + TU + APU + NDPU + SDPU(o)
Tymoshenko	04.02.2005 – 08.09.2005	B (BYT)	B + PPPU + NU + SPU
Yehanurov	22.09.2005 – 26.03.2006	NU	PPPU + NU + SPU
Yanukovuch	04.08.2006 – 17.10.2006	PR	PR + NU + SPU + KPU
Yanukovuch	17.10.2006 – 18.12.2007	PR	PR + SPU + KPU
Tymoshenko	18.12.2007 – 03.03.2010	B (BYT)	BYT + NU-NS
Azarov	11.03.2010 – 09.12.2010	PR	PR + BL + KPU
Azarov	09.12.2010 – 03.12.2012	PR	PR + BL + YC + SU

The democracy’s indexes present that in 2006-2010 Ukraine have had the best indicators

compare to period from 2003 to 2012 (see Table 2) [14, 15, 16, 17].

	Polity IV	The Economist Intelligence Unit	Bertelsmann Transformation Index	Freedom House
2003	6	-	3,2	4,71
2004	6	-	-	4,88
2005	6	-	-	4,5
2006	6	6,94	7,10	4,21
2007	7	-	-	4,25
2008	7	6,94	7,35	4,25
2009	7	-	-	4,39
2010	7	6,30	7,00	4,39
2011	6	5,94	-	4,61
2012	6	5,91	6,10	4,82
2013	6	-	-	4,86

Therefore, the consensus between main political actors provides democratization. Also such power sharing does not allow building a single pyramid (according to Hale).

To conclude democratization is taking place only where there are institutional changes and effective system of checks and balances which could destroy the patronage presidentialism and

„winner-take-all” system [18]. The proposed changes would reduce the strength of patron-client networks in the political system through various instruments: the institutional separation of president and prime minister’ powers, and the establishment of mechanisms for compromises and cooperation.

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ХВИЛІ АВТОРИТАРИЗМУ/ДЕМОКРАТІЇ В КОНЦЕПЦІЯХ ДЕМОКРАТИЗАЦІЇ

Проаналізовано напрямки досліджень недемократичних режимів в політології. Новий етап вивчення таких режимів пов'язаний із певним завершенням третьої хвилі демократизації. Основна увага приділяється новим типологізаціям авторитарних режимів. Підкреслюється необхідність використання головних новацій при дослідженні країн „нових демократій”.

Ключові слова: реверсні хвилі, авторитаризм, політичні режими, політичні інститути, політичний транзит