(IN)STABILITY OF CAUSALITY-REPRESENTATION IN THE SPACE OF MULTIPLE MENTAL REPRESENTATIONS OF TIME FLOW
Abstract
The article examines the interconnection between time and causality. It describes an instability in causality-representation when causal relata are projected on the space of the multiple cognitive representations of time flow. Traditionally the manipulability theories of causation are taken for cases when all elements of the causal chain are given within conventional linear time flow. Within the manipulability approach to causality, the article examines how far human cognitive system contributes to variability of mental representations of cause, effect and their temporal connectedness. The paper answers the question whether and how the different time-representations affect the human ability to model causality. This makes the novelty of the proposed approach. To do so one follows the minds ability to produce the multiple representations of time flow. So, we went beyond the traditional assumption about singularity of mental time flow and introduced the notion of the multiple time representations (Polunin, 2011, 2015, 2016, 2021). As each single time-representation is described by distinct functional features, it specifically impacts the mental representations of an event happening in its time, and consequently, the representation of causal relata. Therefore, we argue for essential variability of mental representation of causality in the space of the multiple cognitive representations of time flow. This variability can be demonstrated without any real change in the world events involved in the causal relationship, thus describing the mind’s contribution to causality. The proposed approach allows for its empirical examination. It makes possible to manipulate individually the representations of cause and that of effect, examining more deeply the contribution of the human mind to their relationship. This stresses the mental nature of causality, its subjective judgment and it points to the possible deviations in judgment outcomes regarding availability vs absence of causal relationship.
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