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## THE SECOND NAVIGATION: NOBODY RETURNS HOME

This article is devoted to a philosophical reflection on the "second navigation" (δεύτερος πλοῦς) as a borderline regime of the subject's existential movement under conditions of a total loss of metaphysical and institutional guarantees. In a situation where homecoming is no longer synonymous with restoration, and "home" has ceased to be a space of harmonious coincidence, navigation is transformed from a technique of achieving a goal into a strategy of enduring the rupture. In contrast to classical teleological readings of the Odyssey, where Ithaca appears as a triumphant finale, this study conceptualizes homecoming as an aporia: a situation of fundamental non-recognition, radical vulnerability, and the disintegration of biographical integrity.

The central analytical figure of the article is Calypso and her island, Ogygia, interpreted not as a topos of external coercion or deficit, but as the ultimate temptation of "ontological desertion". Calypso's offer is an invitation to abolish the very need for return through a radical replacement of identity. The immortality she grants appears as a form of "high amnesia": a peace without loss and an existence without the burden of biography. It is a perfect space of incorporeal presence where the subject is relieved of the necessity to testify to who they once were. In this light, Odysseus's refusal is seen not as a moral act, but as a fundamental choice of mortality as the sole condition for preserving the "Self". An immortal body is a body without scars, and thus an empty archive; gods possess an immutable status, while mortals possess a living, wounded biography.

The metaphor of the hand-built raft is revealed as a symbol of "manual", non-delegated agency: a movement through the void, deprived of the fair wind of institutional support or guarantees of social recognition. The second navigation is an ethics in spite of circumstances – the ability to hold a course when the horizon promises neither acceptance nor salvation.

The final part of the research deconstructs the act of returning to Ithaca as a series of ontological thresholds of non-recognition. The transformation of the king into a beggar is interpreted not as a clever disguise, but as the attainment of the status of "Nobody" (Οὐτις) – the only possible form of presence in a home that has become foreign. The slaughter of the suitors, in this context, appears not as an act of restoring justice, but as a sacrificial mechanism of the pharmakos: a bloody procedure that does not restore the lost order but creates a fleeting moment of intense, tragic coincidence of the subject with their own fate.

The article argues that the second navigation is an endurance between two impossibilities: a sterile paradise without a path (Calypso) and a sacrificial path without the hope of paradise (Ithaca). Home, in this perspective, is not a period at the end of a sentence, but merely a momentary flash of recognition that cannot be sustained. No one returns home in the literal sense, but within this knowledge, a new polytropic subjectivity is born, capable of rowing even through a total fog.

**Keywords:** *second navigation, homecoming, immortality, pharmakos, rhetoric, polytropy.*

Navigation begins where there is a goal. Return – where there is a home. But what begins where the goal no longer guarantees arrival, and the home no longer guarantees recognition?

Odysseus returns. Formally – successfully. He has passed through everything that was to be passed through. He has survived monsters that devour not the body, but the very possibility of continuation [Girard, 1986]. He has descended into the archive of the dead, where truth exists without action. He has endured the temptations of knowledge that turns movement into stasis [Blanchot, 1995]. He has accepted the guaranteed sacrifice at Scylla [Vernant & Vidal-Naquet, 1988]. He has passed through Thrinacia – the place where tragic choice is delegated and thus ceases to be choice [Nussbaum, 2001]. He has lost everyone who traveled with him. He has done everything right – so far as one can speak of "rightness" after catastrophe [Arendt, 1963].

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And yet it is precisely here, at the end of the Odyssey, that it becomes clear: the main journey begins afterward. After the path has been traversed. After the goal has been reached. After return no longer coincides with completion [Frame, 1978/2009].

The home is found – but not opened. The shore is reached – but not recognized. And the one who has returned no longer coincides with the one who departed [Ricoeur, 2004]. Between “I have returned” and “I have been received” lies an abyss in which all previous forms of navigation collapse. And it is precisely within this abyss that what may be called the second navigation emerges [Plato, 1995, pp. 99e – 100a; Ferber, 2020].

Second navigation is movement without a favorable wind. Without institutional support. Without status, name, or the guarantee that the path has meaning at all [Agamben, 1998; Butler, 2004]. It is movement not toward a goal, but toward a home that may no longer exist. Or exists – but not for you [Heidegger, 1995]. Or exists – but requires that you enter it as “no one” [Frame, 1978/2009].

It is here that Calypso appears. She is not a monster. Not a threat. Not an archive. She is perfection. Ogygia does not hold by force and does not seduce by deception. It consoles. It offers. Love without aging. Rest without loss. Immortality without scars [Nussbaum, 2001]. A life in which there is no need to remember what hurts, no need to return to where you may not be recognized, no need to prove who you are – because you can simply become someone else. Forever [Assmann, 2011].

Calypso does not offer the death of the path – she offers its cancellation. Why return if one can remain? Why remember if one can forget and begin anew? [Ricoeur, 2004]. Why be mortal – vulnerable, aging, condemned – if one can be a god? This is an offer that cannot be rationally refused [Blanchot, 1995].

And this is precisely why Odysseus’s refusal of Calypso becomes philosophically scandalous [Benardete, 1992]. He leaves not because Ogygia is bad. Not because Calypso is cruel. And not because immortality is evil. He leaves because immortality is life without biography [Arendt, 1958]. The gods have status. Mortals have history. The gods are. Mortals become [Agamben, 1998]. Becoming requires time, loss, scars – traces that cannot be erased without erasing the self along with them [Butler, 2004].

Calypso offers a perfect identity without a past: a clean profile, zero transactions, not a single wound that would require explanation [Virilio, 2006]. It is a safe space in which the subject no longer needs to return – because there is nothing left to return to. In the terms of contemporary culture, this sounds like grace. Like a second chance. Like care [Norris, 2023]. “Abandon your past. Become new. We will accept you – but not as you were”. This is the cancellation of return [Assmann, 2011].

Odysseus’s refusal is a refusal of identity substitution. A refusal of perfection purchased at the price of rupture with oneself [Žižek, 2008]. A refusal of a life in which there is no longer any need to go home [Heidegger, 1995]. It is from this refusal that second navigation begins.

It begins not with a ship and not with a fleet. It begins with a raft. Fragile. Temporary. Built by hand. Calypso provides the tools – but does not build for him. There are no longer institutions, missions, or delegation. There is only the body, the oars, and the horizon. The subject becomes at once captain, engine, and cargo [Bourdieu, 1991].

The favorable wind disappears. The sails no longer function. One must row. Poseidon destroys the raft. Odysseus clings to the wreckage. But navigation does not cease [Virilio, 2006]. Because second navigation is not a technique and not a route. It is a form of stubbornness [Žižek, 2008].

A way of continuing movement even when there is no guarantee that one will be awaited, recognized, or accepted [Butler, 2004].

The Phaeacians bring Odysseus to Ithaca while he sleeps. He awakens – and does not recognize his homeland. Athena has veiled it in mist. Return begins not with triumph, but with non-recognition [Frame, 1978/2009]. With beggary. With the loss of a name. “No one” is no longer a trick here. It is an ontological status [Agamben, 1998].

It is impossible to return as the same. It is impossible to enter the former form [Ricoeur, 2004]. No one returns home – in the literal, Homeric, and existential sense. But some continue walking, knowing this [Heidegger, 1995].

The problem addressed in this article is the philosophical analysis of second navigation – as a form of movement after the refusal of perfection, after the loss of guarantees, after the collapse of the illusion that home coincides with harmony and return with restoration [Benardete, 1992; Nails & Tarrant, 2015].

It is a question of the navigation of mortals. Of a movement in which one chooses the scar over purity, memory over oblivion, the stubbornness of the path over rest without history [Arendt, 1958; Ricoeur, 2004].

Of a navigation that promises no finality – yet preserves the possibility of being oneself [Butler, 2004].

The relevance of addressing the problem of second navigation is determined not so much by interest in the ancient narrative as by the transformation of the very experience of return in contemporary culture [Ricoeur, 2004]. Increasingly, existential, political, and medial situations demonstrate that return no longer means restoration, and home no longer guarantees repose [Arendt, 1958]. Goals are reached but not recognized; paths are traversed but not completed; subjects return – only to discover that there is nowhere left to return to [Agamben, 1998].

Contemporary publicity increasingly offers not a path back, but a substitution of identity [Butler, 2004]. Instead of return – profile update. Instead of recognition of continuity – resetting the past. Instead of the difficult, vulnerable “I have returned” – the comfortable “I have become someone else” [Virilio, 2006]. This logic manifests in various forms: from cancel culture and practices of the “second chance” to media and digital regimes in which memory is replaced by updating and biography by status [Norris, 2023; Assmann, 2011].

In this context, the figure of Calypso acquires particular philosophical sharpness [Benardete, 1992]. Unlike catastrophe, violence, or exclusion, Ogygia neither threatens nor compels. It offers care, safety, and perfection [Nussbaum, 2001]. For this reason, the refusal of it becomes crucial for the analysis of contemporary subjectivity: it points to a situation in which the subject refuses not life, but life without history; not happiness, but happiness that does not require return [Arendt, 1958].

The relevance of second navigation lies in the fact that it describes a mode of movement after the loss of guarantees: when institutions no longer provide a favorable wind, when status no longer ensures recognition, when return becomes possible only as a risk [Agamben, 1998; Butler, 2004]. It is a mode in which the subject continues the journey not because they are confident in the outcome, but because refusal to move would amount to a refusal of the self [Heidegger, 1995].

In conditions where culture increasingly offers rest instead of the path, substitution instead of return, and amnesia instead of memory [Assmann, 2011], a philosophical analysis of second navigation makes it possible to clarify why the refusal of perfection may be not a defeat but a form of resistance [Žižek, 2008]; why mortality proves to be a condition of subjectivity [Butler, 2004]; and why return, deprived of harmony, may still remain the only authentic direction of movement [Ricoeur, 2004].

The motif of second navigation has a deep philosophical tradition tracing back to antiquity. In the Platonic context, *δεύτερος πλοῦς* designates a situation in which the direct route proves impossible, and thought is compelled to shift from favorable wind to oars – from effortless movement to difficult but conscious exertion [Plato, 1995, pp. 99e – 100a; Ferber, 2020]. Subsequently, this image was repeatedly employed to describe philosophical thinking as movement after the loss of certainties and guarantees [Nails & Tarrant, 2015].

The figure of Odysseus has traditionally been interpreted as a model of successful return, restoration of order, and the triumph of cunning over chaos [Detienne & Vernant, 1978]. In classical philological and mythological scholarship, emphasis has been placed on heroism, ingenuity, and the hero's capacity to overcome obstacles. The return to Ithaca was understood as

the conclusion of the journey, where the tension of wandering is resolved and lost harmony restored [Vernant & Vidal-Naquet, 1988].

At the same time, in twentieth-century philosophical, existential, and literary interpretations, the problematic character of this ending has increasingly been emphasized: the motif of non-recognition, deferred acknowledgment, the violence of return, and the impossibility of fully restoring what has been lost [Ricoeur, 2004; Blanchot, 1995]. Yet even in these approaches, second navigation has generally remained a secondary motif – a consequence of the journey, rather than an autonomous structure of movement [Frame, 1978/2009].

Far less frequently is the episode with Calypso analyzed as a key point of philosophical decision [Benardete, 1992]. Ogygia is usually treated either as a pause in the journey or as a temptation that delays the hero on the way home. Her offer of immortality and Odysseus's refusal are often interpreted in moral or mythopoetic terms, but not as a radical gesture of refusing the substitution of identity [Nussbaum, 2001].

Equally underdeveloped is the question of the connection between second navigation and contemporary cultural and medial practices, in which the subject is increasingly offered not return but reformatting; not the continuation of biography but its reset; not the acknowledgment of scars but their erasure [Virilio, 2006; Norris, 2023]. In this perspective, Calypso ceases to be an episodic figure of myth and becomes a model of temptation structurally reproduced in contemporary publicity [Assmann, 2011].

The present study addresses this lacuna. It proposes to consider second navigation not as a particular motif of an ancient text and not as a metaphor of philosophical method, but as a stable form of movement of the subject after the refusal of perfection and the loss of guarantees [Nails & Tarrant, 2015; Butler, 2004]. Such an approach makes it possible to connect the ancient narrative with the analysis of contemporary identity, cancel culture, practices of subject substitution, and the loss of return as an existential possibility [Agamben, 1998; Ricoeur, 2004].

The aim of this article is to provide a philosophical clarification of second navigation as a specific mode of movement of the subject after the loss of guarantees, in which return no longer coincides with restoration, and home no longer coincides with harmony. It concerns a navigation that begins not with catastrophe, but with the refusal of perfection; not with coercion, but with temptation; not with violence, but with a voluntary departure from secure repose.

The study seeks to analyze how Odysseus's refusal of Ogygia establishes a fundamentally different type of movement – movement without a favorable wind, without institutional support, and without certainty of recognition. In this mode, return is conceived not as a result but as a direction; not as the end of the journey but as a form of stubborn continuation that preserves subjectivity at the cost of mortality, vulnerability, and the loss of status.

To achieve this aim, the article addresses the following analytical tasks: to distinguish between navigation oriented toward goal and arrival and second navigation as movement after the collapse of teleological expectations; to analyze the figure of Calypso as the ultimate temptation of canceling return through identity substitution, perfection, and amnesia; to demonstrate how the refusal of immortality is linked to the choice of biography over status, scar over purity, history over an eternal present; to consider Odysseus's raft as a model of manual, non-delegable subjectivity under conditions of shattered institutions; to trace the transformation of the figure of “No one” from a rhetorical device into an ontological condition of a subject who has returned to a world that existed without him; to clarify the role of bodily and intimate markers of recognition (the scar, the bed) as alternatives to public recognition and status; and to articulate second navigation as a form of life in which movement continues not despite the absence of a final destination, but precisely because of it.

The methodology of the article is constructed not as linear deduction, but as navigation in the philosophical sense of the term – a movement between texts, images, and concepts that maintains a course without the illusion of final arrival [Heidegger, 1995; Ricoeur, 2004]. The study deliberately refuses to reduce mythological material to an illustrative function and treats Homeric episodes as analytical models of existential and cultural structures [Detienne & Vernant, 1978].

Hermeneutic analysis is employed to approach the *Odyssey* as a text in which return does not function as a closed ending, but unfolds as a series of thresholds, trials, and refusals [Frame, 1978/2009]. Particular attention is given to those episodes in which movement continues not because of success, but in spite of its absence [Blanchot, 1995].

An existential perspective makes it possible to consider second navigation as a form of subjectivity that emerges after the loss of favorable wind – in a situation where the subject can no longer rely on status, institution, or guaranteed recognition [Agamben, 1998; Butler, 2004]. Here, motifs of nostalgia, becoming, bodily memory, and the refusal of perfection are employed as conditions for the preservation of the self [Nussbaum, 2001; Ricœur, 2004].

Rhetorical analysis is applied to identify the ways in which refusal, return, and non-recognition are articulated and structured within the text [Bourdieu, 1991]. Particular attention is paid to the distinction between public recognition and intimate recognition, between the name as status and the body as the bearer of history [Arendt, 1958].

A media-cultural perspective is used to compare the mythological narrative with contemporary practices of identity substitution, cancel culture, and the logics of the “second chance”, in which the subject is offered not the continuation of biography but its reset [Norris, 2023; Assmann, 2011]. In this context, Calypso is treated not as a mythological exception, but as a structural figure of contemporary temptation [Benardete, 1992].

Such a methodological combination makes it possible to consider second navigation not as a metaphor or a literary motif, but as a philosophical structure of movement in a world where home has ceased to be a guarantee and return has ceased to be a conclusion [Nails & Tarrant, 2015]. It is a navigation in which the path continues not because there is hope for harmony, but because refusal to move would mean refusal of the self [Heidegger, 1995].

Ogygia does not resemble a trap. This is its perfection. There are no walls, no locks, no threats. There is no need to escape, to hide, to be cunning. Ogygia requires no effort and imposes no decisions. It does not test – it accepts. More precisely, it abolishes the very necessity of trials [Nussbaum, 2001].

Calypso is neither a monster nor a warden. She is an interface of perfect repose [Virilio, 2006]. Love without aging. A body without vulnerability. Time without wear. Memory without pain [Assmann, 2011]. It is a space where everything has already happened – and therefore nothing more is required. One may remain here. It is logical to remain here. Ogygia is a paradise in which one need not be anyone in particular [Agamben, 1998].

Here, no one asks where you came from or what trails behind you. There is no past as obligation and no future as threat. There is only a smooth, gentle “now”, stretched into infinity [Blanchot, 1995].

In contemporary terms, Ogygia is the ideal Safe Space [Norris, 2023]. A clean profile. Zero transactions. No history that can be used against you. No scars that require explanation [Virilio, 2006]. Calypso offers Odysseus not the death of the path – she offers its cancellation [Benardete, 1992].

Why return if one can remain? Why remember if one can begin anew – forever? [Ricœur, 2004]. Why be mortal if one can be a god? This is an offer that cannot be rationally refused [Nussbaum, 2001]. There is no violence in it. No deception. No lack.

This is not Circe, who transforms men into swine through pleasure. This is not the Sirens, who hold through the sweetness of recognition [Vernant & Vidal-Naquet, 1988]. Calypso takes nothing away. She offers everything.

That is precisely why her offer is philosophically scandalous [Benardete, 1992]. Odysseus weeps on the shore. Not because he suffers. But because he is too well off – so well that there is no longer any place for himself within this goodness [Blanchot, 1995].

The immortality Calypso offers is a life without biography [Arendt, 1958].

The gods have status, but no history. They do not age – and therefore do not change. Their being requires no trace [Agamben, 1998]. They have no scars, because there is no time that could leave them. Mortals, by contrast, exist as becoming [Heidegger, 1995]. Their “self” is composed of losses, errors, wounds, returns, and non-recognitions [Ricœur, 2004].

Mortality is not a defect, but a condition of biography [Butler, 2004]. Only for mortals is the past inseparable from themselves – it cannot be erased without erasing the self along with it [Assmann, 2011]. Calypso offers Odysseus a perfect identity – clean, safe, without a trace. Identity as substitution, not as continuation [Virilio, 2006]. Not “remain the same through change”, but “become someone else – and forget who you were”.

In this sense, Ogygia is not a mythological exoticism, but a thoroughly contemporary structure [Norris, 2023]. It reproduces the logic of soft cancellation: “Renounce your past. Become new. We will accept you – but not as you were” [Assmann, 2011]. It sounds like care. Like a second chance. Like therapy.

But this is the cancellation of return. Because return presupposes the continuity of the subject [Ricoeur, 2004]. The one who returns must be the same as the one who departed – wounded, aged, transformed, perhaps, but recognizable through a trace [Arendt, 1958]. Calypso offers liberation from the trace. And thus – liberation from return itself [Agamben, 1998].

And Odysseus refuses. Not because Ogygia is bad. Not because Calypso is cruel. Not because immortality is evil. He leaves because immortality is a calm without a wake [Arendt, 1958]. And to live means to leave a trace, even if it hurts [Ricoeur, 2004]. He chooses aging over eternity. Vulnerability over perfection. The risk of non-recognition over guaranteed repose [Butler, 2004].

And it is precisely this refusal – quiet, illogical, almost absurd – that becomes the first act of second navigation. Not an escape. Not a protest. But a decision to continue the path where the path no longer promises reward. Ogygia takes nothing away. That is precisely why everything is lost within it [Agamben, 1998].

Calypso demands no sacrifice. She does not ask one to renounce name, memory, or path. She imposes no conditions. She simply renders them unnecessary. And in this lies her radicality [Nussbaum, 2001].

The first and primary loss that Ogygia offers is the loss of the necessity to return [Ricoeur, 2004]. And with it – the loss of the tension between “what was” and “what will be”, the loss of that subtle pain from which the subject emerges at all [Butler, 2004]. In paradise there is no debt. No obligation to the past. No addressee to whom one must return [Arendt, 1958].

Return is always a risk. It presupposes the possibility of non-recognition, rejection, the collapse of one’s image [Frame, 1978/2009]. Paradise removes this risk. But along with it, it removes the very form of relating to oneself as one who returns from somewhere to somewhere [Agamben, 1998]. In Ogygia one cannot be late. One cannot fail to arrive. One cannot miss one’s chance. And thus – one cannot choose. Because choice is possible only where loss is possible [Nussbaum, 2001]. Paradise, by contrast, is a space in which loss is structurally excluded. Everything is already preserved. Everything is compensated in advance. Everything is safe – even you yourself [Virilio, 2006].

The second, more subtle loss is the loss of biographical time [Ricoeur, 2004]. Time in Ogygia flows, but it does not accumulate. It leaves no trace. It does not form a history. One day does not differ from another, one year from the next. This is not the cessation of time, but its neutralization. Such time cannot be narrated. It cannot be remembered as a path. It cannot be presented as “I was there because...” It is time without narrative. And therefore – without a subject [Arendt, 1958].

The third loss – the most painful – is the loss of the scar as a form of memory [Butler, 2004]. A scar is not merely the trace of a wound. It is the point at which the body remembers what consciousness might forget [Ricoeur, 2004]. It is an archive of pain that cannot be edited, rewritten, or erased [Derrida, 1995]. An immortal body is a body without scars. And therefore – a body without history [Agamben, 1998].

Calypso offers Odysseus a body that will never again be wounded. But with it – a body that will never again be able to bear witness. Neither to the path traversed, nor to the price at which it was purchased [Butler, 2004]. Penelope later recognizes Odysseus not by his face – the face has been erased by time. She recognizes him by the scar [Vernant & Vidal-Naquet, 1988]. By

the pain that remained and became a form of identity. Calypso offers to erase the pain. And thus – to erase Odysseus himself [Assmann, 2011].

There is yet another loss, the most difficult to translate: the loss of non-coincidence with oneself [Heidegger, 1995]. In paradise everything coincides. You coincide with your form, with your status, with your life. But it is precisely this coincidence that abolishes movement [Blanchot, 1995].

A mortal is never identical to oneself. One is more than one is now, and less than one was. One is stretched between past and future, never fully coinciding with the present [Ricoeur, 2004]. This is the condition of the path. Ogygia offers coincidence. Perfect, smooth, final [Agamben, 1998]. And by this coincidence, it abolishes the very possibility of being on the way [Virilio, 2006].

This is why Odysseus weeps. Not out of longing for Ithaca as a place. But out of longing for himself – as one who can still go on [Blanchot, 1995]. He senses: if he stays, he will not die. But he will not live either [Arendt, 1958]. And so he chooses loss. Consciously. Without any guarantee that it will be redeemed. From this moment on, paradise remains behind him. Ahead lies not a path, but labor.

Second navigation does not begin with a ship. And this is crucial. A ship is an institution. It is a collective, a mission, a resource, a guarantee. It is always “we” [Agamben, 1998]. A raft is “I”. Odysseus builds the raft himself. Calypso provides the tools – but does not do it for him. She could – but she does not. Because a raft cannot be delegated. It cannot be received ready-made. It is assembled by hands, by the body, by time [Heidegger, 1995]. This is no longer a state project or a heroic enterprise. It is the manual labor of subjectivity [Butler, 2004].

Everything that existed before – fleet, crew, status, name – is gone. Only wood, ropes, oars, and a body still capable of movement remain [Nussbaum, 2001].

It is here that second navigation acquires its philosophical meaning. When sails no longer work, one must take up the oars. Not because this is more efficient. But because otherwise movement would cease altogether [Plato, 1995, pp. 99e – 100a; Ferber, 2020].

The raft is fragile. It promises no safety. It is not built for storms. It is temporary – as is the subject in this mode of navigation [Blanchot, 1995]. But it is real. It is made. It holds...

Poseidon destroys the raft. But navigation does not cease. Odysseus clings to the wreckage – and continues to swim [Virilio, 2006]. Because second navigation is no longer a technique and no longer a route. There is no promise that home will be home. No certainty that you will be recognized. No guarantee that you will arrive at all [Ricoeur, 2004].

There is only direction. And the refusal of a paradise in which direction is no longer needed [Agamben, 1998].

The raft is not a means of salvation. It is a form of statement. A ship speaks in the name of the state, an era, a mission. A raft speaks only in the name of the one who bound it together. A raft has no flag. No hold of provisions. No pre-approved route. It does not promise to endure. It simply exists – because it has been assembled [Heidegger, 1995].

This is how a philosophical text is written after the loss of all guarantees. Not as a system. Not as a doctrine. Not as a school [Blanchot, 1995]. But as a binding of fragments, held together by the effort of the hand and the stubbornness of thought [Žižek, 2008].

This series of texts is also a raft. Not a corpus. Not a canon. Not a ship with a reader's cabin and a peer-reviewed route [Bourdieu, 1991]. It is assembled from what remained after catastrophe: myth, memory, the junction of philosophy and pain, scars that could not be erased [Assmann, 2011].

To write in the mode of second navigation is to write without a favorable wind. Without certainty that one will be read. Without hope of recognition. Without guarantee that what is said will not break against the very first wave [Blanchot, 1995]. But not to write is to consent to Ogygia [Agamben, 1998]. To perfection without trace. To silence without risk.

The raft is not beautiful. It does not aspire to eternity. It is not made for museums. It is made for one thing only: to stay afloat while you row [Heidegger, 1995].

That is why philosophy here is not an explanation of the world, but a continuation of movement. Not “what is truth”, but “why do I still go on” [Ricoeur, 2004].

The Phaeacians bring Odysseus to Ithaca while he sleeps. This is not a narrative detail. It is a gesture [Frame, 1978/2009]. He arrives without consciousness – as one who cannot bear witness to his own arrival [Arendt, 1958]. Like a newborn who does not remember birth. Like a text detached from its author [Blanchot, 1995].

When he awakens, he does not recognize his homeland. Ithaca does not confirm him. The landscape does not say: “you are home”. The land is silent. Return after second navigation brings no answer. You arrive – and receive no confirmation [Agamben, 1998].

Home no longer coincides with the image of home. And return no longer coincides with restoration [Arendt, 1958].

Here emerges the most painful form of loss – the loss of testimony [Derrida, 1995]. You were. You passed through. You survived. You returned. But nothing confirms it.

Athena makes Odysseus old, exhausted, a beggar. This is not merely a disguise. It is an ontology [Heidegger, 1995]. He becomes “No one” – not as a trick, but as a status [Agamben, 1998]. Not “I have concealed myself”, but “I can no longer be recognized by former markers”. The name no longer works. The past is not recognized. Merits do not convert [Bourdieu, 1991].

In this sense, “No one” is not zero. It is a minus-identity [Žižek, 2008]. A form of presence without validation. An existence deprived of testimony [Derrida, 1995]. And it is precisely in this state that the most difficult part of return begins: not the path – but proof [Ricoeur, 2004].

Telemachus has grown up. And this is tragedy, not consolation [Nussbaum, 2001]. He has grown up without Odysseus. Without his voice. Without his gestures. Without his daily presence [Arendt, 1958]. The father returns – but returns to a person who does not know what to do with this father. Between them lies not merely time. Between them lies a rupture of experience [Ricoeur, 2004].

Return does not heal loss. It exposes it [Blanchot, 1995]. It is precisely at this moment – when the name no longer works, when the son does not recognize, when the house no longer responds – that it becomes clear: the suitors have long been here [Vernant & Vidal-Naquet, 1988]. They did not invade or seize – they settled in. The house was not taken by force. It was dismantled by habit [Agamben, 1998]. According to the principle: if no one has returned, then it is permitted.

The suitors are not Odysseus’s enemies. They are users of his absence [Virilio, 2006]. They eat, drink, speak, dispose, as if the absence of the master were sufficient legal ground for appropriation [Bourdieu, 1991]. They do not need Penelope. Penelope is a path to the goal. They need Ithaca as a resource. Each of them lives as if the past has not merely ended, but has no right to return [Arendt, 1958]. They do not await a decision. They do not fear return. They act according to the logic: “if he is not here, then he will not be” [Agamben, 1998].

The suitors are the collective “already too late”. They are power without origin. Violence without gesture [Žižek, 2008]. They are not villains. They are a function of the void produced by the disappearance of the subject [Virilio, 2006]. The suitors are a collective substitute for the absent one. They did not invade by force – they filled a vacuum [Agamben, 1998].

And therefore their killing has no private meaning. It is not about revenge. Not about jealousy. Not about justice. It is ritual [Girard, 1986]. Odysseus sacrifices them not because they are guilty, but because otherwise the path will not close [Girard, 1986]. The house cannot be returned without expelling those who have become Odysseus’s surrogate.

Here operates the logic that René Girard would describe as the sacrificial mechanism: the elimination not of the worst, but of the sufficient [Girard, 1986]. The suitors become *pharmakoi* – not in an individual, but in a collective sense [Derrida, 1995]. This is not a single scapegoat, but a multiple sacrifice onto which the tension of absence, disintegration, and indeterminacy is transferred.

Their death does not explain the past and does not justify the present, but it makes possible the restoration of distinctions: between home and occupation, between master and users, between return and the exploitation of another’s absence [Vernant & Vidal-Naquet, 1988]. Violence here functions as *pharmakon*: it both destroys and purifies [Derrida, 1995]. It does not heal – but without it, the house remains no one’s [Agamben, 1998]. Ithaca is restored at the cost of blood. Not because it was desired, but because otherwise return would not take place [Girard, 1986].

But even here there is no harmony. The slaughter does not complete the path. It merely makes possible a moment of coincidence – brief, fragile, mortal [Arendt, 1958].

In some versions of the myth, Odysseus is killed by another son – born during that very journey home. A son left behind. A son not returned. It is an almost unbearable thought: the past not integrated into return does not disappear. It waits [Ricoeur, 2004]. And one day it catches up. Not as revenge. As structure.

What has not been returned cannot simply be forgotten [Assmann, 2011].

This is why “no one returns home” is not pessimism. It is a diagnosis [Ricoeur, 2004]. And perhaps the only form of honesty that remains to us.

Home is possible only as a moment. As a brief coincidence. As a recognition that cannot be held [Arendt, 1958]. Calypso offered eternity without a path. Ithaca offers a path without eternity.

Second navigation is life between these two impossibilities.

You know that there is no harmony. Neither in paradise. Nor at home. And yet you continue to row [Butler, 2004]. Because to row is to be [Heidegger, 1995]. Because the raft, as long as you work upon it, still holds. Because the text, as long as you write it, has not yet sunk [Blanchot, 1995].

And perhaps this is it – not happiness, not salvation, but the only honest form of subjectivity that remains to us [Ricoeur, 2004].

**CONCLUSION** (*quietly*) Philosophy, Heidegger said, is nostalgia. Not a recollection of home, and not longing for lost safety, but a pull – a constant, unappeasable pull – to be at home [Heidegger, 1995]. But home is not a place. Nor a state. Nor an outcome. Home is a moment of coincidence that cannot be sustained.

Odysseus knows this. He knew it already on Ogygia, when he chose mortality over eternity. He knew it when he built the raft, not knowing whether it would withstand the first wave. He knew it when he stepped onto Ithaca and did not recognize it. He knew it when he entered his own house as No one.

Second navigation does not promise return. It does not lead to harmony. It does not complete the path. It only prevents it from disappearing.

Calypso offered rest without time. Ithaca offers time without rest. Between them – the raft. Fragile. Hastily assembled. Holding together as long as you row.

The gods do not age – and therefore do not change. They have no scars. They have no biography. They have no need to return. Mortals return – knowing that they will not return. And yet they go on. Not because they hope for an ending. But because refusing to move would mean refusing themselves.

Home is not a point. Home is a pause. A brief breath between waves. And perhaps that is precisely why it is so dear.

Second navigation does not end. It simply continues – as long as there is strength to hold the oar and to look toward a shore that may no longer be the same – but there is no other, and there will not be....

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### **ДРУГА НАВІГАЦІЯ: НІХТО НЕ ПОВЕРТАЄТЬСЯ ДОДОМУ**

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### АНОТАЦІЯ

Стаття присвячена філософській рефлексії «другої навігації» (δεύτερος πλοῦς) як граничного режиму екзистенційного руху суб'єкта в умовах тотальної втрати метафізичних і інституційних гарантій. У ситуації, де повернення більше не тотожне відновленню, а дім перестав бути простором гармонійного збігу, навігація трансформується з техніки досягнення мети на стратегію витримування розриву. На відміну від класичних телеологічних прочитань «Одіссеї», де Ітака постає тріумфальним фіналом, у цьому дослідженні повернення осмислюється як апорія: ситуація засадничого невпізнання, радикальної вразливості й розпаду біографічної цілісності.

Центральною аналітичною постаттю статті стає Каліпсо та її острів Огігія, що інтерпретуються не як топос зовнішнього примусу чи дефіциту, а як гранична спокуса «онтологічного дезертирства». Пропозиція Каліпсо – це пропозиція скасування самої потреби у поверненні через радикальну заміну ідентичності. Безсмертя, яке вона дарує, постає формою «високої амнезії»: спокоєм без утрат і існуванням без тягара біографії. Це досконалий простір безтілесної присутності, де суб'єкт позбавлений необхідності свідчити про те, ким він був. Відмова Одіссея в цій опції постає не моральним актом, а фундаментальним вибором смертності як єдиної умови збереження «Я». Безсмертне тіло – це тіло без шрамів, а отже, порожній архів; боги володіють незмінним статусом, тоді як смертні – живою, пораненою біографією.

Метафора плота, збудованого власноруч, розкривається як символ «ручної», недеlegatesної суб'єктності. Це рух у порожнечі, позбавлений попутного вітру інституційної підтримки чи гарантій суспільного визнання. Друга навігація – це етика всупереч обставинам, здатність тримати курс тоді, коли горизонт не обіцяє ані прийняття, ані спасіння.

Фінальна частина дослідження деконструє акт повернення на Ітаку як низку онтологічних порогів невпізнання. Трансформація царя на жебрака тлумачиться не як хитромудре маскування, а як набуття статусу «Ніхто» (Οὐτις) – єдино можливої форми присутності в домі, що став чужим. Вбивство женихів постає не актом відновлення справедливості, а жертвним механізмом pharmakos: кривавою процедурою, що не повертає втрачений лад, але створює коротку мить інтенсивного, трагічного збігу суб'єкта з власною долею.

Стаття стверджує, що друга навігація – це тривання між двома неможливостями: стерильним раєм без шляху (Каліпсо) та жертвним шляхом без надії на рай (Ітака). Дім у цій перспективі є не крапкою в кінці речення, а лише миттєвим спалахом впізнання, який неможливо зафіксувати. Ніхто не повертається додому, але в цьому знанні народжується нова політропна суб'єктність, здатна до греблі навіть у суцільному тумані.

**Ключові слова:** друга навігація; повернення; безсмертя; pharmakos; риторика, політропність.

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