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TOO CLOSE TO RETURN

This article offers a philosophical analysis of the loss of navigation as a specific regime of contemporary public violence, in which exclusion occurs not through open conflict or rupture, but within a zone of illusory proximity to a goal, consensus, or completion. Publicity increasingly functions not as a route – structured by distances, corrections, and the possibility of return – but as acceleration, where the path appears almost completed, the outcome guaranteed, and the need for orientation rendered excessive. In this regime, language loses its navigational function and becomes a signal of momentum: it compresses the distance between perception and decision, movement and halt, trust and the abdication of responsibility. Violence no longer appears as an event nor requires recognition; it emerges as a side effect of inertia, premature certainty, and the voluntary delegation of navigational freedom.

Cancel culture is examined as one symptom of this broader disorientation. Exclusion here is enacted not through argumentation or moral judgment, but through the declaration of deliberation itself as redundant. Responsibility is dispersed across procedures, collective reactions, and algorithmic amplification; navigational freedom is handed over “for safekeeping”, not under coercion, but within a horizon of apparent clarity and safety. In this zone, public violence arises not despite the feeling of proximity, but precisely because of it: stopping is perceived as disruption, and return as increasingly unlikely.

The theoretical framework brings together analyses of symbolic violence and linguistic power, performativity and discursive normalization, the sacrificial mechanism, critiques of acceleration and the loss of horizon, algorithmic publicity, and practices of space and movement. Within this framework, the article traces a transformation of public experience through three mythological figures: delegated freedom (Aeolus, where the “right” wind allows the map to be set aside), instantaneous absorption (the Laestrygonians, where a safe harbor collapses into a trap without interval), and the voluntary abandonment of return (Circe, where transformation appears as comfortable normalization and logos is replaced by function).

The central analytical concept is the zone of being “too close to return” – a space in which proximity to the goal dulls vigilance and inertial movement becomes more dangerous than the storm itself. Odysseus’s polytropic capacity is opposed to this logic as the ability not to mistake the first island for Ithaca and to preserve the possibility of turning where safety seems self-evident. The conclusion argues that a philosophical analysis of lost navigation functions as a form of critical resistance, restoring distinctions between movement and acceleration, proximity and return, trust and the abdication of responsibility.

Keywords: *cancel culture, delegated freedom, disorientation, rhetoric, polytropy, digital acceleration.*

The danger of public violence is not always associated with distance, hostility, or open conflict. In a number of cases, what proves decisive is, on the contrary, a moment of apparent proximity – to the goal, to agreement, to completion. Where the outcome appears almost achieved and return seems guaranteed, the very necessity of navigation is lost. The path begins to be perceived as completed before it has actually been traversed [Virilio, 2006; Han, 2015].

Contemporary publicity increasingly operates in precisely this mode. Exclusion here is carried out not as a sharp rupture or a violent leap, but as a consequence of premature certainty: “everything is already clear”, “there is no longer any need to distinguish”, “it remains only to fix”. Under such conditions, public speech ceases to be a space of orientation and becomes a signal of movement – an indication of direction without the possibility of stopping or correction [Bourdieu, 1991; Butler, 1997]. Violence is not framed here as an act and is not recognized as an event; it arises as a byproduct of the loss of distance [Arendt, 1970].

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Cancel culture reproduces this structure of dangerous proximity with particular clarity. It functions not as a moral sanction and not as a conscious decision, but as a regime of premature completion. Exclusion takes place not because a path of reasoning has been traversed, but because the path itself is declared superfluous [Norris, 2023]. Responsibility is delegated to the environment, to procedure, or to the algorithm; the freedom of navigation is entrusted “for safekeeping” – not under pressure, but in a situation of trust and apparent clarity [Chun, 2016; Zuboff, 2019].

The philosophical problem lies not in the fact that movement is interrupted, but in the fact that it is interrupted too close to the goal. This proximity eliminates the need to distinguish, makes violence possible without coercion, and renders return an unlikely, though not impossible, event [Brown, 1995]. Publicity here is neither blind nor enclosed in a circle – it is disoriented: it sees enough to lose its direction [Jay, 1993].

The present study turns to these failures of orientation. It concerns not the mistakes of characters or moral failings, but regimes of lost navigation – those moments in which the sense of path, distance, and return becomes distorted. The analysis is structured around three figures, each of which captures a particular mode of this loss: the delegation of freedom, instantaneous engulfment, and the voluntary refusal of return [Detienne & Vernant, 1978; Montiglio, 2005]. It is precisely in these borderline zones – too close to return – that the subsequent argument unfolds.

Publicity most often loses its course gradually – not through catastrophe, but through habit. The habit of moving without pauses, of taking proximity to the goal for its achievement, and speed for direction [Virilio, 2006]. Under such conditions, navigation ceases to be necessary: the path appears completed before it has truly been traversed.

The contemporary public sphere is increasingly less structured as a route – with distances, adjustments, and the possibility of stopping – and increasingly functions as acceleration. Speech here no longer leads or maintains a course. It does not open a space between perception and decision, but compresses it into immediacy [Dean, 2010]. Rhetoric loses its navigational function and becomes a technique of acceleration, in which doubt, delay, and return are perceived as superfluous [Ellul, 1964; Han, 2017].

This loss becomes particularly acute under conditions of digital publicity. Algorithmic regimes do not register distance – they register only intensity. Movement is easily perceived as nearly complete, even when it has barely begun. The visibility of the shore dulls vigilance, and the sense of proximity renders the art of orientation unnecessary [Chun, 2016; Virilio, 2006]. It is precisely at this moment – when return appears guaranteed – that the possibility of abrupt reversal emerges, a reversal experienced not as error, but as surprise [Zuboff, 2019].

In this context, cancel culture appears not as a moral anomaly or an isolated excess, but as a symptom of the loss of navigational capacity as such. Exclusion here is carried out neither through decision nor through open conflict, but as a byproduct of movement that does not stop [Dean, 2010]. Violence is not articulated – it occurs because no one reduces speed. Responsibility is not denied – it is dispersed within the inertia of acceleration [Arendt, 1970; Brown, 1995].

It is crucial that such forms of exclusion arise not in a zone of threat, but in a zone of trust. The freedom of orientation is not taken by force – it is delegated “for safekeeping”: to procedure, to collective reaction, to the algorithm. This delegation appears rational and safe, yet it is precisely what makes return problematic [Han, 2017]. Where movement continues by inertia, stopping begins to be perceived as a disruption [Ellul, 1964].

Philosophical analysis of the loss of navigation thus becomes necessary not in order to moralize the public sphere or to identify culprits, but to restore distinctions lost under conditions of acceleration: between movement and acceleration, between proximity and return, between trust and the abdication of responsibility [de Certeau, 1984]. It seeks to identify those moments in which publicity loses its course precisely because it assumes itself to be already almost home.

It is precisely this zone – too close to return – that constitutes the problem field of the present study.

The problematics of public violence, exclusion, and the loss of subjectivity have a long and complex history of philosophical reflection. Across various theoretical perspectives, they have been examined through analyses of symbolic violence, discursive power, the performative force of language, mechanisms of sacrifice, and processes of social normalization [Bourdieu, 1991; Butler, 1997; Girard, 1977]. These studies have convincingly demonstrated that violence can be enacted without direct coercion – through language, regimes of visibility, repetition, and the distribution of roles within public space [Foucault, 1977].

At the same time, in most existing studies attention is focused either on institutional forms of exclusion or on the ideological, legal, and media structures that sustain it. Much more rarely does analysis take as its object the very capacity of publicity to orient itself: to maintain distance, to distinguish stages, to preserve the possibility of return. The loss of navigation is typically registered as a consequence – of radicalization, polarization, acceleration – but is seldom examined as an independent structure of public experience [Jay, 1993].

Research on digital publicity and algorithmic media has made it possible to describe regimes of repetition, intensity, and attention capture; however, the question of how, within these regimes, a sense of dangerous proximity is formed – to the goal, to agreement, to finality – remains insufficiently conceptualized [Chun, 2016; Lazzarato, 2014]. Yet it is precisely in this zone of “almost return” that violence arises not as rupture or conflict, but as a byproduct of trust, inertia, and premature confidence in the completion of the path.

It is precisely this gap – between the analysis of exclusion as an event and the analysis of publicity as a regime of movement – that defines the trajectory of the present study.

The aim of the article is a philosophical analysis of the loss of navigation as a specific condition of contemporary public violence, in which exclusion is carried out not through direct conflict or ritualized action, but in a situation of apparent proximity to completion, agreement, or return [Virilio, 2006; Han, 2017]. The study focuses on identifying those forms of publicity in which movement is replaced by acceleration, and the path by the sensation of “almost arrival” [Chun, 2016]; on clarifying the rhetorical mechanisms that enable the delegation of orientation and responsibility under conditions of digital acceleration [Dean, 2010; Zuboff, 2019]; and on conceptualizing cancel culture as one of the regimes of the loss of navigation, in which exclusion arises not despite a sense of safety, but precisely because of it [Brown, 1995; Butler, 2009]. Particular attention is given to mythological figures through which different modes of disorientation can be articulated without reducing them to moral errors or individual failures [Detienne & Vernant, 1978; Montiglio, 2005].

The methodology of the study is constructed not as a linear movement toward a predetermined conclusion, but as navigation – taking into account shifting currents, winds, and stretches of the route [de Certeau, 1984]. It combines several analytical regimes that function not as interchangeable tools, but as different ways of holding a course.

Hermeneutic analysis is employed to work with philosophical and mythological texts in which extreme situations of lost orientation, trust, and the possibility of return are articulated [Homer, 1996; Vernant & Vidal-Naquet, 1988]. Discursive analysis makes it possible to trace how the rhetoric of acceleration, self-evidence, and “near completion” operates in contemporary public speech [Bourdieu, 1991; Butler, 1997]. Phenomenologically oriented description is used to register changes in the structure of public experience – above all, the disappearance of delay, distance, and the moment of course correction [Merleau-Ponty, 1964; Jay, 1993].

The recourse to mythological figures in the subsequent analysis is not illustrative, but methodological in character. They are used as models of different types of disorientation, allowing public violence to be understood not as a set of errors of subjects, but as failures of the very navigational capacity of publicity [Agamben, 1998; Girard, 1977].

The danger of losing navigation rarely comes from afar. More often, it arises at the very moment when the path appears nearly complete. When the goal is already discernible, when the shore begins to emerge from the fog, when return ceases to be perceived as a risk and begins to appear as a guarantee. It is precisely at this point that vigilance weakens, and the need to

distinguish – directions, roles, degrees of responsibility – begins to seem superfluous [Virilio, 2006; Han, 2015].

Publicity, like a ship, is most vulnerable not in the storm, but in the zone of apparent safety – where movement is experienced as already successful and the course as self-evident [Virilio, 2006; Han, 2015]. Here, navigation is neither taken away by force nor destroyed by conflict. It is relinquished voluntarily – “for a while”, “until arrival”, “as long as everything is clear”. The freedom to hold the course is entrusted to the wind, to procedure, to the environment, to the algorithm [Chun, 2016; Zuboff, 2019].

In this sense, what follows concerns neither the errors of heroes nor the moral failures of individual figures. Odysseus and his companions are not opposed to one another as more or less virtuous or far-sighted. The analysis is focused elsewhere: on failures of orientation that arise precisely where the path appears reliable and return close at hand [Montiglio, 2005]. What is at stake is not actions, but regimes of movement; not catastrophes, but those barely perceptible shifts in which navigation is lost without resistance [de Certeau, 1984].

The subsequent analysis is structured around three such shifts. They do not form a linear sequence of “trials” and do not amount to a moral narrative, but rather mark different modes of the loss of orientation: delegated freedom, instantaneous engulfment, and the voluntary refusal of return [Detienne & Vernant, 1978]. Each of these figures describes not an event, but a state – a moment in which movement continues, yet direction is no longer maintained.

The first of these states is the episode with Aeolus – a moment when the wind blows in the right direction, the shore is already visible, and precisely for this reason it seems that the map can be set aside [Homer, 1996].

The episode with Aeolus captures a specific type of loss of navigation that is not associated with violence or conflict. There is no confrontation here, no threat. On the contrary, almost ideal conditions of movement are established: the wind is favorable, the path is clear, the goal visible. Control over the elements is not taken away – it is carefully packaged and entrusted “for safekeeping”. Navigation is preserved, yet ceases to function as an active practice [Ellul, 1964].

It is at this point that a shift occurs. As long as the path is experienced as incomplete, orientation requires constant maintenance: attention, verification, distinction. But at the moment when return appears guaranteed, the need for navigation begins to seem superfluous [Han, 2017]. The freedom to maintain the course is not destroyed – it is temporarily relinquished, out of trust in the situation. The wind blows correctly, and thus the map can be put aside.

The catastrophe here is not the result of malicious intent or miscalculation. The bag of winds is opened not in order to alter the course, but because the course seems already secured. This is not a gesture of resistance, but of premature certainty. Navigation collapses not despite the sense of proximity to the goal, but because of it [Virilio, 2006].

On the rhetorical level, this moment is significant because speech changes its function. It ceases to operate as a means of distinction and warning, and begins to function as a form of confirmation: “everything is proceeding as it should”, “only a little remains”, “there is no need to intervene” [Bourdieu, 1991]. Speech no longer maintains the distance between movement and decision – it reduces it [Butler, 1997].

Aeolus, in this sense, is not a figure of external force, but a structure of delegated freedom. He designates a situation in which control is transferred not because the subject is weak, but because the path appears reliable. Return remains possible, movement continues, yet orientation is no longer maintained as a task. It is precisely this type of loss of navigation – voluntary, almost imperceptible, arising within a zone of apparent safety – that establishes the logic of the analysis that follows.

The issue is not catastrophes, but those moments after which movement continues, while direction is no longer checked.

The episode with the Laestrygonians captures a radically different form of the loss of navigation. If in the case of Aeolus movement continued through delegated freedom, here

movement is cut off instantaneously. Space is not gradually distorted and does not lull through trust – it collapses. The harbor, perceived as a refuge, turns out to be a trap in which the very possibility of maneuver disappears [Homer, 1996; Vernant & Vidal-Naquet, 1988].

The Laestrygonians do not exclude and do not accuse. They do not produce a victim in a symbolic or ritual sense. Their violence requires neither repetition, nor justification, nor the stabilization of an image. It acts instantaneously and totally. Ships are destroyed not as bearers of guilt, but as bodies that have found themselves in the wrong place [Girard, 1977]. There is no figure of the cancelled here – there is immediate expulsion beyond the limits.

In this configuration, not only perspective disappears, but the horizon itself. Navigation becomes impossible not because the path is lost, but because space no longer permits movement [Virilio, 2006]. Where Odysseus still retains distance, his companions no longer do: between entering the harbor and destruction, no interval remains. Exclusion is carried out without time.

Philosophically, this is a limiting case of publicity in which violence does not require articulation. It does not become speech, does not require a name, and leaves no trace to be discussed [Arendt, 1970]. Unlike cancel culture, where the figure of the victim must be fixed and reproduced, here the subject is not retained even in this capacity. They disappear entirely, without remainder and without narrative.

The Laestrygonian logic is fundamentally anti-rhetorical. It does not require self-evidence, because it does not appeal to the gaze of another. There is no collective agreement and no distributed responsibility [Bourdieu, 1991]. There is a closed community within which external presence is not recognized as other, but immediately absorbed. Publicity collapses into territory.

In this sense, the Laestrygonians mark the limit beyond which cancel culture no longer operates. Where exclusion becomes instantaneous destruction, the very necessity of the victim as a figure of stabilization disappears [Girard, 1986]. Violence ceases to be a regime – it becomes a fact. Navigation is impossible not because vigilance has been lost, but because there is no longer a space in which vigilance could have meaning.

If with Aeolus freedom is entrusted “for a time”, with the Laestrygonians it is taken away without alternative. This is not a deviation from course, but a rupture of the route. Not an error of orientation, but the disappearance of the map itself.

The Laestrygonian episode allows us to identify the limiting form of closed publicity. It is a space that does not merely exclude, but does not admit the very fact of external presence. There is no threshold, no procedure of entry, and no time for recognition. The external is not interpreted – it is absorbed. For this reason, the harbor proves deadly: it simulates safety, yet structurally presupposes no exit [Vernant & Vidal-Naquet, 1988].

Philosophically, this is a model of a totalized community in which violence does not require legitimation because it encounters no other gaze [Foucault, 1977]. The Laestrygonians do not act in the name of law, morality, or norm. Their world knows no distinction between “one’s own” and “the other” as an object of discussion. The foreign is not designated – it is eliminated. In this sense, the Laestrygonian logic anticipates forms of publicity in which exclusion operates not as a sanction, but as an automatic reaction of a closed environment.

In contrast to cancel culture, where the victim must be retained within the field of visibility and reproduction, here the victim is not required. Destruction does not stabilize order – it is itself a terrible order. For this reason, the Laestrygonians leave no traces, produce no archives, and require no repetition. Their violence is instantaneous and final. It is not cyclical – it is ruptural.

Yet it is precisely at this point that the limit of total destruction as a sustainable regime becomes apparent. A space that absorbs everything external is incapable of reproduction. It either closes completely or collapses from within [Arendt, 1958]. For this reason, the Laestrygonian model cannot serve as a universal form of publicity – it marks its extreme, beyond which the very stage disappears.

It is here that the next, far more dangerous turn emerges. Where destruction proves too crude and uneconomical, another form of the loss of navigation comes to the fore – one in

which exclusion is no longer necessary, because the subject abandons the path on their own [Foucault, 1977].

The figure of Circe captures this transition – the shift from violence that takes away to violence that gives [Han, 2017].

If with the Laestrygonians navigation is violently cut off, with Circe it dissolves. There is no hostility here. No closed space. No sudden blow. On the contrary: the space is open, safe, hospitable. Movement is not forbidden – it simply becomes unnecessary. The path is not blocked – it is forgotten. Return is not abolished – it is postponed. First for a day. Then for a year. Then forever. Transformation into swine is not a punishment. It does not function as exclusion in the classical sense. It does not cast out – it removes the necessity of limits as such. The human form is lost not under pressure, but in comfort. Logos disappears not through prohibition, but through redundancy. What remains is only *phonē* – a voice incapable of response, distinction, or navigation [Agamben, 1998]. This is violence without gesture. Power without command. Exclusion without expulsion.

In this mode, the loss of navigation reaches its greatest subtlety – and its greatest danger. If the Cyclops excludes through engulfment, Circe operates more radically: she excludes through transformation. The human being is not removed from space – they are rewritten within it. Metamorphosis appears not as punishment, but as normalization [Foucault, 1972]. The subject is not destroyed – it is reduced to “bare life”, in which biological existence persists while the human mode of being is annulled [Agamben, 1998].

If the Laestrygonians destroy the subject as a body, Circe cancels it as direction. Here, no victim is required – comfort suffices. No fear is needed – calm is enough. No ritual is required – hospitality suffices. Return becomes superfluous because the distinction between path and rest, between movement and dwelling, between Ithaca and here disappears [de Certeau, 1984].

For this reason, Circe is philosophically more dangerous than the Laestrygonians. Where destruction provokes resistance or horror, transformation produces consent. Where total closure is visible, comfortable disorientation is barely perceptible. Navigation here is not broken – it is quietly deferred. First as rest. Then as norm. Then as the only possible mode of existence [Han, 2015].

The etymological connection of Circe's name with the circle (*κύκλος*) only reinforces this logic. As in the case of cyclopean vision, closure operates here – but not as aggression, rather as comfort. Transformation presupposes no exit, because it does not recognize itself as violence. It appears as care. As simplification. As a release from the complexity of human existence. In this regime, return becomes not dangerous, but unnecessary [Chun, 2016].

For this reason, Circe stands as the antipode of Odysseus not in a moral, but in a structural sense. Her *trope* is a violent turn without return, a transformation that cancels the very possibility of navigation. Odysseus, by contrast, having received from Hermes the *μῶλυ* (*mōly*), preserves the capacity to remain within transformation without becoming transformed. He can inhabit the zone of metamorphosis without losing the human form of thought. He remains *polytropic* – capable of turning, yet not of final fixation [Detienne & Vernant, 1978]. This is the extreme manifestation of navigational capacity: to remain a subject where the environment demands reduction to function, role, or biological condition.

In this reading, Circe appears as a prototype of radical moderation – not one that blocks speech, but one that abolishes the very possibility of speaking [Foucault, 1977; Han, 2015]. Exclusion here reaches a kind of biological purity: not through repression, but through comfortable reduction. The human being is not expelled from publicity – they are repackaged into a form in which publicity is no longer needed. They are not banished from the community – they cease to require return [Agamben, 1998].

Thus, the three figures – Aeolus, the Laestrygonians, and Circe – form not a mythological sequence of trials, but an analytical map of the loss of orientation.

These three modes of navigational loss can also be understood as three rhetorical regimes in which language ceases to orient and begins to capture [Bourdieu, 1991; Butler, 1997]. Aeolus,

the Laestrygonians, and Circe register not only forms of movement, but also ways of speaking reality – ways in which the distance between word and thing is systematically distorted.

Aeolus's wind operates according to the logic of euphemism. It neither denies reality nor directly distorts direction, but inflates meaning into a pathos of lightness in which the weight of distinctions disappears. Euphemistic rhetoric softens the tension of the journey, replacing the necessity of navigation with a sense of elevated obviousness: everything sounds right, everything moves "as it should", and precisely for this reason the map can be set aside [Ellul, 1973]. Meaning does not lie – it envelops, drawing movement into textuality and confidence, where orientation becomes superfluous.

The Laestrygonian scene, by contrast, is governed by the logic of dysphemism. This is a language that does not soften but coarsens; does not distance but brings near to the point of destruction. Here speech does not describe violence – it enacts it, reducing the object to a biological function [Žižek, 2008; Butler, 2009]. Dysphemism eliminates any rhetorical interval: there is no time for translation, no space for response. It is the language of immediate expulsion beyond limits, in which the subject disappears not as guilty, but as consumable.

Circe, in turn, represents the extreme form of periphrasis – not as an ornament of speech, but as an ontological substitution [Foucault, 1972]. She neither names nor accuses; she redescribes. Periphrasis here becomes an instrument of transformation in which a person ceases to be what they were – not through expulsion, but through an "improved" description. The subject is repackaged into a convenient form in which logos is replaced by function, and identity by a series of attributes [Lazzarato, 2014; Chun, 2016]. This is a rhetoric of comfort in which violence is not recognized, because it is enacted as care.

In this sense, the three figures form not merely a map of lost orientation, but a field of competing tropes. Euphemistic inflation, dysphemistic engulfment, and periphrastic transformation – three modes of rhetorical capture in which language ceases to point toward truth and begins to govern trajectories of movement [Jay, 1993]. Navigation is lost not because speech disappears, but because it no longer leaves a gap between what is said and what is done.

Delegated freedom. Instantaneous engulfment. Voluntary renunciation of return.

Three limiting modes in which publicity loses the capacity to hold a course without encountering explicit resistance. Three ways of not returning while remaining formally alive. Three forms of exclusion that do not recognize themselves as violence.

And only one – Odysseus – remembers that the path is measured not by the speed of arrival, but by the ability not to mistake the first island encountered for Ithaca [Detienne & Vernant, 1978; Montiglio, 2005].

Let us draw the threads together. The loss of navigation in publicity cannot be reduced to miscalculation, external violence, or moral failure. It unfolds as a series of almost imperceptible shifts arising in zones of trust, comfort, and illusory proximity to completion. Delegated freedom in Aeolus, instantaneous engulfment in the Laestrygonians, and voluntary dissolution in Circe register three limiting ways in which the path can be lost without direct resistance – not because movement ceases, but because return ceases to be necessary.

In all three cases, violence does not present itself as violence. It does not require recognition, does not crystallize into an event, and does not depend on the victim as a figure of public stabilization. On the contrary, it operates more effectively the less it is distinguishable. Navigation here is not broken – it is quietly revoked: through trust in the wind, through the collapse of space, through the comfort of transformation. Publicity continues to move, but movement no longer corresponds to direction.

The figure of Odysseus in this context matters not as a hero of resistance or as a bearer of moral superiority. His distinction lies elsewhere: he retains the capacity not to mistake proximity to Ithaca for arrival, safety for return, or stoppage for completion of the journey. Polytypicity here is neither cunning nor a survival strategy, but a form of navigational holding – the ability to remain in motion without surrendering it entirely to environment, comfort, or acceleration.

It is here that the limit of the described modes becomes visible. After euphemistic soothing, dysphemistic destruction, and periphrastic reduction, the path can no longer be continued by the means of living speech. To recover direction, a space is required in which language no longer governs movement, but bears witness to it.

For this reason, the next turn in Odysseus's journey leads to where rhetoric loses its power and the voice separates from the body: to the realm of the dead and to the threshold where audibility becomes more dangerous than visibility. A space where navigation is possible only through pause, sacrifice, and listening – and where return requires an encounter with that which does not live, yet speaks.

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АНОТАЦІЯ

У статті здійснюється філософський аналіз утрати навігації як специфічного режиму сучасного публічного насильства, за якого виключення відбувається не через відкритий конфлікт чи розрив, а в зоні уявної близькості до мети, згоди або завершення. Публічність дедалі частіше функціонує не як маршрут із дистанціями, корекціями й можливістю повернення, а як прискорення, в якому шлях здається майже пройденим, результат – гарантованим, а необхідність орієнтування – надлишковою. У такому режимі слово втрачає навігаційну функцію і перетворюється на сигнал розгону: воно скорочує дистанцію між сприйняттям і рішенням, між рухом і зупинкою, між довірою й відмовою від відповідальності. Насильство водночас не оформлюється як подія й не потребує визнання, а виникає як побічний ефект інерції, передчасної впевненості й добровільного делегування свободи орієнтації.

Культура скасування постає одним із симптомів цієї дезорієнтації. Виключення в ній здійснюється не через аргументацію чи моральний вердикт, а як наслідок оголошення самого шляху розрізнення зайвим. Відповідальність розсіюється між процедурою, колективною реакцією та алгоритмічним підсиленням; свобода навігації передається «на зберігання» не під примусом, а в умовах видимої ясності й безпеки. У цій зоні публічне насильство виникає не всупереч відчуттю близькості, а саме завдяки йому: зупинка сприймається як порушення, а повернення – як малоймовірне.

Теоретична рамка поєднує аналіз символічного насильства й мовної влади, перформативності й дискурсивної нормалізації, механізму жертви, критики прискорення й втрати горизонту, алгоритмічної публічності й практик простору й руху. У цьому контексті простежується трансформація публічного досвіду через три міфологічні фігури: делеговану свободу (Еол, де «правильний» вітер дозволяє відкласти карту), миттєве поглинання (лестригони, де гавань-укриття перетворюється на пастку без зазору) та добровільну відмову від повернення (Кірка, де трансформація постає як комфортна нормалізація, а логос заміщується функцією).

Центральним аналітичним поняттям є зона «занадто близько, щоб повернутися» – простір, у якому близькість мети притупляє пильність, а рух за інерцією стає небезпечнішим за шторм. Політропність Одисея постає як здатність не приймати перший острів за Ітаку й зберігати можливість повороту там, де безпека видається очевидною. У висновку показано, що філософський аналіз втрати навігації виконує функцію критичного спротиву, відновлюючи розрізнення між рухом і розгоном, близькістю й поверненням, довірою й відмовою від відповідальності.

Ключові слова: культура скасування, делегована свобода, дезорієнтація, риторика, політропність, цифрове прискорення.

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