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PRODUCTION OF PRESENCE: THE SUBJECTIVITY OF THE BODY IN PAIN

The purpose of the study is a critical analysis of the methodological limitations of hermeneutics in the study of the body in pain. The task of the study is to identify the flaws of objectification of pain within the subject/object paradigm and to provide a theoretical substantiation for the subject/subject paradigm.

Post-hermeneutic critique serves as the theoretical basis for the study. Key tools for analysis include H. U. Gumbrecht's theoretical developments, primarily the concept of "production of presence." Research on the processes of metaphorization and objectification of the body in pain was conducted based on S. Sontag's essays, particularly those devoted to photography. Additional methodological orientations are provided by G. Lukács' literary-critical theory, H. U. von Balthasar's theological critique of reductionism, and E. Scurry's phenomenological research.

The originality of the study lies in its articulation of the difficulties involved in hermeneutics when studying the body in pain, since hermeneutics turns it into an object of interpretation. The subject/subject paradigm has been developed theoretically – in this framework, the ability to resist is not considered a mistake, but rather an ontological quality of the subjectivity of the body in pain. Additionally, the concept of the "production of presence" was further developed as an ethical imperative that transforms the research space from a field of analytical objectification into a space of co-presence and self-unconcealment of the phenomenon under study.

The study identified that hermeneutic tools have methodological limitations when applied to the experience of physical suffering. It has been established that prioritizing interpretation and the search for "hidden meaning" leads to the objectification of the body in pain, transforming the living reality of pain into passive material for theoretical constructs. It was argued that the subject/subject paradigm helps identify the resistance to interpreting the body in pain as a manifestation of its subjectivity. The concept of the "production of presence" in this context takes on an ethical dimension, requiring the rejection of the interpreter's position of authoritativeness in favor of co-presence. This allows the singularity of the bodily experience to be explored without dissolving it into discourse. Further research prospects are related to extrapolating the principles of the subject/subject paradigm and the ethics of co-presence to studying other forms of existential experience that resist the hermeneutic approach.

Ключові слова: *body in pain, production of presence, hermeneutics, interpretation, subject/object paradigm, subject/subject paradigm, objectification.*

Introduction

The study of bodily pain remains a difficult and *relevant* challenge for philosophical anthropology and the humanities in general, as this experience radically resists language, textualization, representation, and interpretation. Contemporary philosophy tends to view pain through the prism of meanings, symbols, or medical categories, which inevitably leads to its objectification. *The problem* is that traditional hermeneutics, in its attempt to "understand" the body in pain, paradoxically distances the researcher from the living reality of pain, transforming suffering into a passive object of analysis.

In recent years, interest in researching the body in pain has grown within philosophical anthropology and phenomenology, which has resulted in a substantial *state of research* on the topic. In particular, S. Coninx, in the work *Pain Philosophy: Recent Debates and Future Challenges*, emphasizes the need to revise existing models, pointing to "strong intentionalist theories" as solely representational approaches [Coninx, 2024, pp. 5–6].

J. Saliba [Saliba, 2023] turns to existential phenomenology to analyze how the body in pain alters the structure of "being in the world" and relationship with the Other

[Saliba, 2023, pp. 68, 77]. This transformation is accompanied by a double objectification. On the one hand, the body in pain transforms from an unconscious instrument into an object that resists and demands our attention [Saliba, 2023, pp. 73–74]. On the other hand, the Other (often a doctor) plays a key role in transforming subjective suffering into an objective medical category [Saliba, 2023, pp. 74–75].

In his article *Pain and Sedimentation*, S. Geniusas provides an additional perspective from the standpoint of existential phenomenology, emphasizing the temporal depth of bodily pain [Geniusas, 2024, pp. 15–16]. Through the prism of E. Husserl's concept of "sedimentation," he argues that pain is not an isolated sensory experience, but a complex layering of previous experience [Geniusas, 2024, pp. 21–22]. The isolated "field of presence" of pain, according to S. Geniusas, is supplemented or "colored" [Geniusas, 2024, p. 22] by previous experience through sedimentation, which influences the perception of new pain. This viewpoint reinforces arguments against hermeneutic simplification, demonstrating that the subjectivity of the body in pain is shaped not only by the present moment but also by the history of experience, which cannot be fully exhausted by external interpretation.

An important theoretical basis for revisiting the methodology of humanities research is also provided by the dialogue between H. U. Gumbrecht and T. Shchyttsova on the "postlinguistic turn" [Gumbrecht & Shchyttsova, 2022]. In it, the respondent problematizes the dominance of "constructivism" and the subject/object paradigm, in which the subject constitutes the world from the outside [Gumbrecht & Shchyttsova, 2022, pp. 126–128]. Instead, he argues for the need to transition to the concept of embodied self-reference, where a person is always already included in the world and is part of it [Gumbrecht & Shchyttsova, 2022, pp. 126–128].

The originality of this study lies in the development of a subject/subject paradigm in studying the body in pain. While J. Saliba and S. Geniusas remain within the descriptive approach, the work adapts H. U. Gumbrecht's concept of "production of presence" as a tool for overcoming hermeneutic reductionism. In this context, resistance to theorising the body in pain is examined not as a mistake, but as a form of ontological self-unconcealment that necessitates a shift in the research approach, from analytical objectification to the ethics of co-presence.

The purpose is to critically analyze the methodological limitations of hermeneutics in the study of the body in pain. The main tasks include studying the mechanisms of objectification of pain within the subject/object paradigm, the theoretical development of the subject/subject paradigm, and development of H. U. Gumbrecht as the basis of co-presence, which allows preserving the subjectivity of the body in pain.

Statement of basic materials

The cover of the English edition of *Materialities of Communication* [Gumbrecht & Pfeiffer, 1994] displayed an illustration chosen from the book *La Machine Animale: Locomotion Terrestre et Aérienne* by E.-J. Marey [Marey, 1873]. Entitled "Marey's Myograph," the drawing depicts a frog with electricity passing through its dissected legs. The results of the experiment were recorded by a nearby myograph. In his book, E.-J. Marey accompanies the illustration with the following commentary: "In Fig. 3 the frog is represented in the experiment, fixed, by means of pins, on a piece of cork. The brain and spinal marrow have been previously destroyed, so as to extinguish all voluntary movement and sensibility. Although, to all appearance, the animal is dead, it will nevertheless retain for several hours the circulation of the blood, and the power of motion under the influence of electric discharges. An electric excitator conveys the current from an induction coil to the nerve of the frog" [Marey, 1879, pp. 32–33]. The frog's body, dissected by the researcher, as indicated by the title of the collection, serves as an illustration of "materialities of communication."

In the act of dissection, the researcher views the frog's body as a repository of meaning. That is, the researcher views the frog's body as a phenomenon that is "contributing to the constitution of meaning without being meaning" itself [Gumbrecht & Pfeiffer, 1994, p. 398]. After the experiment, the frog's material reality – its body – becomes, at best, something secondary and, in any case, insignificant.

This kind of materiality, including the human body, was “a central point of reference for the research program named ‘materialities of communication’” [Gumbrecht & Pfeiffer, 1994, p. 394]. The assertion that materialities of communication are consistently ignored in acts of interpretation and other hermeneutic practices is a central theme in the book. Many years later, H. U. Gumbrecht described it as an intellectual-Oedipal emancipation from the primacy of interpretation and hermeneutics at his alma mater and in the humanities in general at that time [Gumbrecht, 2007].

H. U. Gumbrecht’s article title, “A Farewell to Interpretation,” from the aforementioned collection refers to E. Hemingway’s novel, “A Farewell to Arms,” hinting at the limited instrumental potential of interpretation as a methodological foundation for research. The article’s leitmotif is what H. U. Gumbrecht calls “a reintegration of the body into our models of human self-reference” [Gumbrecht & Pfeiffer, 1994, p. 391].

In this context, H. U. Gumbrecht refers to D. E. Wellbery’s preface to the English edition of F. A. Kittler’s “Discursive Networks, 1800/1900” [Wellbery, 1990] to define the limit beyond which hermeneutics and interpretation lose their universal applicability and remain blind to a certain extent. This limit is the inability of hermeneutics to adequately work with the body in pain. D. E. Wellbery characterizes F. A. Kittler’s post-hermeneutic studies as follows: “Whoever would look for the bonds of solidarity that orient Kittler’s investigation will find them here: in its unmistakable compassion for the pathos of the body in pain. Hermeneutics would appropriate this corporeal singularity in the construction of a meaning. Post-hermeneutic criticism, however, draws its responsibility precisely from the unassimilable otherness of the singular and mortal body”. [Wellbery, 1990, pp. xv–xvi]. In other words, significant methodological issues may be present in certain types of research for which hermeneutics is chosen as the research method, and these issues are not always recognized by those who choose it. For instance, when studying the body in pain, interpretation as a hermeneutic practice through the concentration of redundant meaning may distance the researcher from the phenomenon under study. This distance formally manifests as a loss of empathy for the phenomenon under study. The presumption of an objective researcher is inconsistent with the phenomenon under study and complicates, rather than simplifies, “direct” work with it. In the act of interpreting the body in pain, meaning appears as a redundancy. This redundancy stands in the way of getting closer to the phenomenon under study.

It could be argued that this is due to the methodological basis of hermeneutics. Any phenomenon that is the focus of hermeneutic research is, by definition, not self-sufficient, at least with regard to meaning. For hermeneutics, the phenomenon under study contains “voids of meaning” a priori. Even if there are no “obvious” voids, hermeneutics offers meaning and generates “redundancy of meaning.” The researcher’s desire to fill in voids in a text aligns with the historical and philological desire to write commentaries, prompted by “the empty margins around the text” [Gumbrecht, 2003, p. 8]. From a hermeneutical perspective, redundancy of meaning cannot usually be classified as true redundancy.

The paradox of the hermeneutic approach is its inability to identify its own redundancy. What appears as an artificial layering of redundant meanings in the context of “living” pain is, for hermeneutics itself, a necessary procedure of “semantic complementation.” If its methods identify any phenomenon as having “voids of meaning,” then those gaps must be filled. Consequently, hermeneutics creates meaning even when a phenomenon is self-sufficient and does not require interpretation. This makes its instrumentation blind to the ontology of pain. In hermeneutics, the absence of meaning is considered a deficit that must be corrected. Therefore, the principles of semantic complementation and redundancy of meaning could be assumed as methodological presumptions of hermeneutics. When hermeneutic interpretation is applied to a self-sufficient phenomenon, one that does not require additional meaning, it offers nothing but redundant meaning. This is precisely what happens when interpretation encounters the body in pain.

D. E. Wellbery describes another methodological limitation of hermeneutics: the disregard for the singularity of the body in pain experience. Hermeneutics generally has two approaches to dealing with the singularity of the phenomenon under study.

The first approach is to reduce the singularity of the phenomenon under study to a generic concept, which is known as the inductive method. This hermeneutic mechanism is based on the assumption that the singular phenomenon under study is merely one manifestation of a larger system. This statement implicitly assumes that the phenomenon under study is insignificant and ephemeral compared to the larger system to which it belongs.

Such a type of hermeneutic mechanism also includes reducing the singularity of the phenomenon under study to its specific aspect, i.e., a reductive (deductive) mechanism. It is based on the assumption that, to understand the “essence” of a phenomenon, the researcher must break it down into its components and identify the most “essential” one.

H. U. von Balthasar [Balthasar, 1968] points out the methodological vulnerability of the inductive-reductive approach when examining unique events, such as the Christian truth of divine revelation. He outlines two types of reduction: “cosmological reduction” [Balthasar, 1968, pp. 11–24], which reduces the phenomenon to manifestations of the larger system (induction), and “anthropological reduction” [Balthasar, 1968, pp. 25–42], which reduces the phenomenon to the personal dimension (deduction/reduction). His conclusion that a singular event cannot be reduced “to the world in general, nor to man in particular” [Balthasar, 1968, p. 7] is a methodological precedent for reflecting on how hermeneutics loses the body in pain.

The second approach to hermeneutics and interpretation in their work with the singularity of the phenomenon under study is the allegorical-metaphorical approach. In her essay “Against Interpretation,” S. Sontag describes it as follows: “The interpreter says. ‘Look, don’t you see that X is really – or, really means – A? That Y is really B? That Z is really C?’” [Sontag, 1966, p. 5]. This approach suggests that the body in pain as a singular phenomenon alludes to or refers to another phenomenon. In this case, the “true” content always remains outside the phenomenon that is present. In such conditions, the singular phenomenon under study is implicitly more of a starting point than a self-sufficient entity. Therefore, the task of interpretation and hermeneutics is to demonstrate that the “true” meaning of the phenomenon exists “out there” rather than “here” in immediate presence.

In this way, a certain “interpretive world” is created – through the search for the meaning of the phenomenon under study beyond the phenomenon itself: “To interpret is to impoverish, to deplete the world—in order to set up a shadow world of ‘meanings.’ It is to turn *the* world into *this* world. (‘This world!’ As if there were any other)” [Sontag, 1966, p. 7].

If the second hermeneutic approach to dealing with the singularity of the phenomenon under study – in this case, the body in pain – is allegorical and metaphorical, then S. Sontag’s work is largely concerned with demetaphorization. For example, “Illness as a Metaphor” focuses on “liberation from metaphors” of the sick body in pain: “My point is that illness is *not* a metaphor, and that the most truthful way of regarding illness – and the healthiest way of being ill—is one most purified of, most resistant to, metaphoric thinking. Yet it is hardly possible to take up one’s residence in the kingdom of the ill unprejudiced by the lurid metaphors with which it has been landscaped. It is toward an elucidation of those metaphors, and a liberation from them, that I dedicate this inquiry” [Sontag, 1978, pp. 3–4].

In “Regarding the Pain of Others” [Sontag, 2003], an important work in this context written under the impression of photographs of American soldiers torturing Iraqi prisoners, S. Sontag explores the reduction and alienation inherent in photography as a metaphorization of the body in pain: “Like all her writing on photography, the essay showed how a subject that might have seemed intellectual or abstract – the separation of the person from the image of the person, of the thing from its metaphors – could break people’s bodies, and make them scream.” [Moser, 2019, p. 530].

According to S. Sontag, photographs are both metaphorized and alienated because they “objectify” what is depicted. In other words, they “turn an event or a person into something that can be possessed” [Sontag, 2003, p. 81]. S. Sontag writes about the objectification of the body in pain, which is an alienation from its “meaning.” One of the main mechanisms of interpretation is the transformation of the phenomenon into what it means through metaphorization.

In general, it should be emphasized that the process of metaphorization occurs in three steps: alienation, packaging, and appropriation [Sontag, 1977, pp. 3–4]. Alienation involves abstracting the “essential” features of what is depicted (or studied). Packaging involves creating a specific image that incorporates the previously abstracted features of the subject. Appropriation is the use of the packaged image as an arbitrary element in discourse. Metaphorization of the body in pain through alienation, packaging, and appropriation makes it possible to “move on” or “leave” the body in pain. One possibility of this process is the transformation of a photograph into a political message. For example, a photograph could be used to convey a political message: “And all photographs wait to be explained or falsified by their captions. <...> Alter the caption, and the children’s deaths could be used and reused.” [Sontag, 2003, p. 10].

Overall, it can be argued that hermeneutics and interpretation are essentially “appropriative” and have a reductionist-inductive and allegorical-metaphorical nature. In the interpretive process, the experience of bodily singularity is reduced, induced, allegorized, or metaphorized into a partial, general, approximate, or metaphorical meaning.

The meaning obtained by “generalized reduction” is highly mobile and transportable. It can be attached to a broader set of meanings and used to briefly represent the entire scope of a phenomenon. Thus, this unit of meaning is a building block in an unlimited set of models.

Hermeneutics has enormous descriptive potential because its fundamental processes are rooted in alienation. This alienation and the search for meaning equivalent to any phenomenon ensure hermeneutics’ universality while provoking it to ignore the singularity of the phenomenon under study. Hermeneutics and interpretation are unable to adequately work with the body in pain due to their tendency to “shift” attention away from the concrete presence of pain toward a common denominator of pain. When working with the body in pain, hermeneutics and interpretation nevertheless offer the allegory of thorns or the metaphor of an eternally suffering world. In any case, the focus shifts away from a specific phenomenon, leaving the sufferer behind. In such cases, researchers do not focus on the phenomenon under study as a whole, but rather on its metaphor, analogy, generic concept, or component.

The thesis about the methodological inadequacy of hermeneutics is consistent with E. Scarry’s concept presented in her work “The Body in Pain” [Scarry, 1985]. E. Scarry defines physical suffering as more than just a painful sensory experience; she describes it as a total event of “the unmaking of the world” that destroys the very ability to speak [Scarry, 1985, p. 4, 29]. Hermeneutics relies on meanings and symbols. Intense pain, however, is radically anti-hermeneutic. It returns the subject to a preverbal state where the ability to verbalize one’s condition disappears [Scarry, 1985, pp. 4–5]. Therefore, attempts to interpret pain as “text” are flawed from the outset since, in its ontology, pain is a destructive power that eliminates the possibility of textuality. Pain simplifies the complex world of a human being to a pure, non-alternative bodily presence that resists any external attribution of meaning [Scarry, 1985, p. 35, 56].

Hermeneutics represses the resistance of the body in pain using the mechanism of “objectification.” It would be helpful to distinguish between how photography objectifies and how viewing photographs objectifies compared to how objectification occurs in hermeneutics. In photography, when we are “regarding the pain of others” [Sontag, 2003], we turn it into an object. This mechanism works as follows. First, there is the direct act of photographing and “capturing” the pain of others. Second, it is viewing the resulting images. Therefore, in relation to photography, objectification is a second-order interpretation, or an interpretation of an interpretation. Second-order interpretation is a common way of using interpretation as a primary hermeneutic practice.

Hermeneutics also uses objectification of the phenomenon under study. In this context, objectification is the transformation of the phenomenon under study into an object – that is, the transformation of the phenomenon under study into a commonly used “object of study.” In order to understand the problem of transforming the phenomenon under study into an object of study, one must first understand the epistemological structure within which this transformation occurs.

H. U. Gumbrecht terms this epistemological structure the “subject/object paradigm,” tracing the genealogy of the separation of subject and object to a more fundamental division of the “observed and interpreted world” into the “spiritual” and the “material”: “At any event, the world that the observer observed and interpreted was supposed to be purely material. Of course, this dichotomization between ‘spiritual’ and ‘material’ is the origin of an epistemological structure on which Western philosophy would from now on rely as the ‘subject/object paradigm’” [Gumbrecht, 2004, pp. 24–25].

The proposed view of the dichotomy between the “spiritual” and the “material” consistently aligns with the division outlined in S. Sontag’s essay “Against Interpretation,” namely, the division in the “Western consciousness of and reflection upon art” into the commonly used ‘form’ and ‘content’. S. Sontag called it: «<...> the odd vision by which something we have learned to call “form” is separated off from something we have learned to call “content,” and to the well-intentioned move which makes content essential and form accessory» [Sontag, 1966, p. 4].

These two views converge in the title of G. Lukács’s book, “Soul and Form” [Lukács, 2010]. Here, “soul” represents what H. U. Gumbrecht calls “the spiritual,” and “form” represents what S. Sontag also calls “form.”

H. U. Gumbrecht mentions this book when discussing the “loss of the world” – the growing separation between the detached observer and the interpreted world: the loss of the “world reference” [Gumbrecht & Shchytsova, 2022, p. 132; Gumbrecht, 2004, pp. 46–49].

For G. Lukács, the “loss of the world” appears to be similar to the gap between the “soul” and “form,” or between the “I” and the “world.” In search of the distance between the “I” and the “world,” and questioning whether this distance actually exists, he came to the following question: “Where is the dividing line between dream and reality, the ‘I’ and the world, deep meaning and fleeting impression?” [Lukács, 2010, pp. 129–130].

It should be emphasized that the subject/object paradigm uses “objectification” as its main instrument. This is a type of optics that considers the spiritual and meaningful side of a phenomenon to be “valuable,” while the material and formal side is considered “of little value.” Creating an object of study from the phenomenon under study requires considering the object as an “ordinary” phenomenon in terms of both its material and formal aspects. Hermeneutics and interpretation can help this initially incomplete phenomenon join the “higher” spiritual and meaningful sphere by applying the aforementioned mechanisms.

In the subject/object paradigm, the researcher defines the phenomenon under study as the object of study. This defines the researcher’s role as active and the object’s role as passive. Thus, the researcher implicitly assumes that the initiative in interacting with the object of study lies with the researcher. This perspective ignores the possibility that the phenomenon under study could take the initiative and have intrinsic subjectivity. The expression of the subjectivity of the phenomenon under study in interaction with the researcher can be either a “self-unconcealment” or a “self-concealment” of the phenomenon to the researcher.

Under normal conditions, the birth of anything in the interaction between two subjects occurs as a voluntary movement toward each other. In the subject/object paradigm, violation of reciprocity in the self-unconcealment of the object of study is compensated by the application of research force. Here, it would be reasonable to mention S. Sontag’s citation of S. Weil’s article “L’Iliade ou le poème de la force” [Weil, 2014], which states that “violence turns anybody subjected to it into a thing” [Sontag, 2004, p. 12]; in other words, applying force to a subject turns it into an object.

Violence can turn the world into a “world of objects,” or a static world that is easy to manipulate. A dynamic world of subjects would be extremely difficult to manipulate. Not only would managing such a world be operationally complex, but the subjects would also be able to express their resistance. Repressing this resistance requires the use of force. In an article cited by S. Sontag, S. Weil argues that the total conversion of a human being into an object is the definition of murder [Weil, 2014, p. 2]. Living flesh demonstrates its life through an elementary

startle response: “A piece of living flesh manifests life above all through startle response; a frog’s leg, when subjected to an electric shock, startles; <...>” [Weil, 2014, p. 5]. The appearance of a frog through whose legs an electric shock passes is symptomatic of the theme of the creation of the object of study in the subject/object paradigm. Consequently, by revisiting E.-J. Marey’s drawing, we can ascertain its suitability as an illustration for the subject/object paradigm. In that paradigm, the researcher should view the world, particularly the natural world, as a world of objects, or “boxes with meaning.” In other words, the things of the world are “filled with meaning,” and the researcher can liberate that meaning by applying enough force.

Implicitly, a researcher of the subject/object paradigm must also presume the object of study is indifferent. This implies a view of the object of study in which the object does not (and cannot) have its own intentionality. Ignoring the phenomenon’s intrinsic intentionality contributes to the researcher’s logic being “injected” into the research results.

In summary, in the subject/object paradigm, objectification of the phenomenon under study by creating an object of study makes it passive, static, and indifferent. This also makes it suitable for interpretation and division into content and form, or spiritual and material.

Fundamentally, work on the problems of the subject/object paradigm should not be based on attempts to “modify” this paradigm, but on attempts to go outside its boundaries [Gumbrecht, 2004, pp. 56–57]. A fundamentally different paradigm, opposite to the subject/object paradigm, could be the “subject/subject paradigm” [Bykh, 2025, pp. 322–323]. According to the subject/subject paradigm, the phenomenon under study is also an active subject of the research process. In other words, the phenomenon under study – such as the body in pain – is not passive, static, or indifferent. This approach could overcome the deep division of the phenomenon under study into spiritual and material, or spiritual and material, and it could open up the potential for a different interaction with the phenomenon under study than that found in the subject/object paradigm.

In light of this, it is reasonable to wonder what the study of the body in pain would have been like if it had been based on the subject/subject paradigm instead of the subject/object paradigm. The answer to this question can be found in H. U. Gumbrecht’s reference to G. Lukács’s book “Soul and Forms” in his work entitled “Atmosphere, Mood, Stimmung: On a Hidden Potential of Literature” [Gumbrecht, 2012]. Discussing G. Lukács’s literary-critical theory, H. U. Gumbrecht writes: “Lukács demanded that essays deviate from the ‘scientific’ goal of finding the truth. ‘It is right for the essayist to seek the truth,’ Lukács wrote, ‘but he should do so in the manner of Saul. Saul set out to find his father’s donkeys and discovered a kingdom; thus will the essayist—one who is truly capable of seeking the truth—find, at the end of his way, what he has not sought: life itself.’” [Gumbrecht, 2012, p. 17]. According to G. Lukács, for an essayist, the phenomenon under study is not a static and completely permanent phenomenon that only needs to be described. On the contrary, the phenomenon under study is unknown in advance because it is dynamic. Also, the phenomenon under study appears in the essayistic mode as something that can express its resistance; that is, it is not indifferent. The essayist’s attempts to find what “he came for” are unsuccessful because they are guided by a predetermined “goal.”

However, to find “life itself,” the researcher-essayist must provide subjectivity to the phenomenon under study. Only then will they discover something they might not have suspected existed – something that does not fit into their predetermined framework. It is under such conditions that the phenomenon under study self-unconceals to the researcher. Thus, in the direct interaction between the researcher and the phenomenon under study, something emerges that did not exist before. In other words, research becomes a space for the interaction between the researcher and the phenomenon under study, and a place for the birth of something that did not exist before. In this way, research becomes a place to “to bring forth” things [Gumbrecht, 2004, p. 17] or a place for the production of presence.

This paradigm may be suitable for studying the body in pain. Approaching such a phenomenon with predetermined “goals” cannot escape the subject/object paradigm and, therefore, cannot avoid injecting the researcher’s logic into the research results. Transforming the

body in pain into an object of study is unhelpful because the body in pain becomes passive, static, and indifferent. However, providing the body in pain subjectivity brings the researcher closer to the phenomenon under study through empathy.

Any attempt to study the phenomenon of the body in pain within the subject/object paradigm must appeal to the tools of hermeneutics. The textualization of the body in pain poses the risk of reducing its living singularity to a shadow “interpretive world” of meanings, where the immediate reality of pain is replaced by an abstract description or metaphor. Thus, any conventional research writing within the subject/object paradigm risks re-objectifying the phenomenon under study, turning it into a passive object. Any attempt to modify these tools could lead to an epistemological collision: an attempt to go beyond the “primacy of interpretation” within the subject/object paradigm generates a new layer of interpretation that potentially nullifies the intention to go beyond its limits.

The solution to this collision may lie in changing the basis of research within the subject/subject paradigm when studying the body in pain. In this paradigm, research is not regarded as a repository of static meaning, but rather as a dynamic space for the production of presence. Appealing to the essayistic mode outlined by H. U. Gumbrecht through the prism of G. Lukács’ literary-critical theory, such research can reject a strictly defined “scientific goal” of seeking truth and instead open up to the contingency of “life itself.” In this approach, research is a dialogical space where the phenomenon cannot be fully dissected analytically, yet it keeps its intentionality and potential of resistance. Research is transformed into a field of interaction between subjects, where the subjectivity of pain is not suppressed by structure, but is given the opportunity for “self-unconcealment” due to the researcher’s refusal to claim power through interpretation. In this context, research functions as an event space rather than a description.

It is worth considering the criticism of the excessive binary opposition between the subject/object and subject/subject paradigms. A total rejection of objectification may seem naive. However, the proposed distinction does not aim to fully deny the instrumental potential or validity of objectification; it aims to expose its limitations as a heuristic tool, particularly in the humanistic study of extreme experience. When it comes to the body in pain, mechanistic reduction not only simplifies the phenomenon, but also transforms living suffering into material for external interpretations. Essentially, accepting the subjectivity of pain is accepting its ontological status as an event. This requires researchers to reject power through interpretation in favor of ethical co-presence.

In the outlined concept, resistance is considered as the ability to block, distort, or destroy the theoretical framework applied to it. According to E. Scarry, for example, the body in pain “does not simply resist language but actively destroys it” [Scarry, 1985, p. 4]. Thus, granting the body in pain the status of a “subject” capable of initiative is an act of phenomenological openness from the researcher. In a way, it’s a methodological safeguard that makes the researcher consider mismatches between theory and direct experience not as a “mistake” that needs to be fixed (objectified), but as a moment of truth (self-unconcealment) where reality breaks through the grid of interpretations.

In conclusion, it should be noted that hermeneutics has a basic methodological limitation when it comes to working with the body in pain. The traditional epistemological subject/object paradigm unavoidably reduces the phenomenon under study: living suffering is transformed into a passive object of study that is analyzed to extract abstract meaning. This approach, which is based on alienation and metaphorization, disregards the unique nature of the experience of the body in pain. It often replaces the immediate reality of pain with safe allegories or metaphors.

An alternative approach to studying the body in pain is the subject/subject paradigm. In this paradigm, the researcher rejects the interpreter’s dominant role of liberating meaning from the things of the world. Instead, the researcher engages in dialogical interaction, in which the phenomenon under study resists interpretation and unconceals its own intentionality. Accepting the subjectivity of the body in pain may also give back an ethical dimension in research: the ability to not just interpret the body in pain, but to empathize with its living, unreduced presence.

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ПРОДУКУВАННЯ ПРИСУТНОСТІ: СУБ'ЄКТНІСТЬ ТІЛА, ЩО СТРАЖДАЄ ВІД БОЛЮ

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АНОТАЦІЯ

Метою дослідження є критичний аналіз методологічних обмежень герменевтики у дослідженні тіла, що страждає від болю. Завданням дослідження є виявлення недоліків об'єктивізації болю в межах суб'єкт-об'єктної парадигми з теоретичне обґрунтування суб'єкт-суб'єктної парадигми. Теоретичним базисом для дослідження слугує постгерменевтична критика. Ключовими інструментами аналізу є теоретичні розробки Г. У. Гумбрехта, зокрема концепція «продукування присутності». Дослідження процесів метафоризації й об'єктивізації тіла, що страждає від болю, здійснено на основі есеїстики С. Зонтаг, зокрема її робіт присвячених фотографії. Додатковими методологічними орієнтирами слугують літературно-критична теорія Г. Лукача, теологічна критика редукціонізму Г. У. фон Бальтазара, а також феноменологічні розвідки Е. Скаррі.

Наукова новизна дослідження полягає в артикуляції труднощів герменевтики в дослідженні тіла, що страждає від болю, оскільки герменевтика перетворює його на об'єкт для інтерпретації. Набула теоретичної розробки суб'єкт-суб'єктна парадигма, де здатність до спротиву теоретичному фреймворку розглядається не як помилка, а як онтологічна властивість суб'єктності тіла, що страждає від болю. Крім того, отримав подальший розвиток концепт «продукування присутності» – як етичного імперативу, що трансформує дослідницький простір з поля аналітичної об'єктивізації у простір співприсутності й саморозкриття досліджуваного явища.

Дослідження окреслило методологічну обмеженість герменевтичного інструментарію при зверненні до досвіду фізичного страждання. Встановлено, що пріоритет інтерпретації й пошуку «прихованого сенсу» призводить до об'єктивізації тіла, що страждає від болю, перетворюючи живу реальність болю на пасивний матеріал для теоретичних конструкцій. Обґрунтовано, що суб'єкт-суб'єктна парадигма дає змогу ідентифікувати спротив інтерпретації тіла, що страждає від болю, як прояв його суб'єктності. Концепція «продукування присутності» в цьому контексті набуває етичного виміру, вимагаючи відмови від владної позиції тлумача на користь співприсутності. Це дає змогу дослідити сингулярність тілесного досвіду без його розчинення його у дискурс. Перспективи подальших досліджень пов'язані з екстраполяцією принципів суб'єкт-суб'єктної парадигми й етики співприсутності на вивчення інших форм екзистенційного досвіду, що чинять спротив герменевтичному підходу.

Ключові слова: тіло, що страждає від болю, продукування присутності, герменевтика, суб'єкт-об'єктна парадигма, суб'єкт-суб'єктна парадигма, об'єктивізація.

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