

ФІЛОСОФІЯ ПОЛІТИКИ, ПОЛІТИЧНА ФІЛОСОФІЯ

DOI: 10.26565/2226-0994-2025-72-19

УДК: 172.1:177.9

Lidiya Gazniuk, Yuliia Semenova, Olena Orlenko

EXTREME VIOLENCE AND SELF-DEFENSE OF THE SUBJECT IN THE MODERN POLITICAL REALITY

This article substantiates an integrated understanding of the subject's self-defense in situations of extreme violence. This understanding is presented as a necessary component of the methodological complex for researching society and the processes of reformatting the modern world. The concept of "extreme violence" is considered a form of contradiction and a clash of potential answers to basic questions regarding the existential nature of human existence, the social purpose of certain communities, state formations, and their socio-political structures. Such clashes lead to a struggle among social subjects for the dominance of their worldviews. When the global order collapses, the weakest usually suffer the most. In the face of conflicting claims and interests, it becomes difficult to split blame and find a reasonable compromise.

Self-defense, as an activity of a subject within the social environment, is associated with threats stemming from a range of large-scale crisis and pre-crisis situations that endanger the existence and normal functioning of social groups and individuals. These situations are precipitated by processes such as globalization, terrorism, warfare, environmental disasters, pandemics, post-industrial modernization, and the development of information technologies and artificial intelligence. The threatening nature of these situations arises from accompanying processes of individualization and fragmentation across all spheres of society, including the fragmentation of each individual's socio-political behavior. These mentioned processes are further complicated by the evolving political reality of modern society and the difficulties individuals face in adapting to a rapidly and continuously changing social reality. This reality often disintegrates into numerous autonomous spheres that invade an individual's inner world, influencing values, ethics, attitudes toward politics and state events, and transforming the perception of social reality. Under such conditions, ensuring a stable human life can only be achieved through constant practices of identifying and understanding threats, coupled with developing methods and programs to influence these threats with the aim of avoiding, eliminating, or neutralizing them through social self-defense.

Keywords: *precarious subjectivities, pacifism, moralization of violence, political maneuvers, social self-defense, risk of destructiveness, identity nationalist subjectivity, nonviolence.*

The modern socio-political landscape is characterized by numerous large-scale crisis and pre-crisis situations that threaten the existence and normal functioning of humanity, most states, social groups, and individuals. These situations are intrinsically linked to processes such as globalization, terrorism, environmental catastrophe, post-industrial modernization, the proliferation of information technologies, and the appearance of artificial intelligence. The inherently threatening nature of these situations stems from the accompanying processes of individualization and fragmentation across all societal spheres, including the fragmentation of each individual's socio-political behavior. These phenomena and processes are driven by the complexity of modern society and the difficulties individuals and social institutions face in adapting to a dynamically developing and transforming social reality. This reality frequently disintegrates into autonomous, evolving realities, demanding adaptation to changes generated by rapid technological development, which directly invades the inner world of individuals, affecting their values, ethics, and political attitudes, and fundamentally altering their perception of the world [Gazniuk, 2022a].

Under such circumstances, ensuring the stability of life for both society as a whole and individuals requires significant effort, resilience, and resistance to constant risks and dangers.

Individuals necessitate active engagement in identifying and understanding threats, as well as developing methods and programs to influence them with the aim of avoidance, elimination, or neutralization, which forms the basis of self-defense. Clear evidence of the relevance of addressing the topic of individual self-defense in modern political reality is its widespread demand at all levels of social life, which is continuously developing and becoming more specific. This includes discussions of self-defense in civil society, encompassing physical, mental, and legal self-defense [Gazniuk, 2022b]. The presence of self-defense challenges, crucial for civil society and the rule of law, is underscored by two interrelated circumstances: a low level of civic responsibility, legal awareness, and legal culture, coupled with a lack of knowledge about life safety among a significant portion of the population, which hinders effective self-defense; and the absence of a clear state policy in this regard, particularly the underdeveloped mechanism of normative regulation of self-defense.

Therefore, the *purpose* of this study is a philosophical understanding and methodological analysis of social self-defense. This endeavor aims to enrich scientific knowledge regarding the general laws of human activity, the complexities of the relationship between society and nature, humanity and society, personality and state, civil society and the rule of law, natural and positive law, and subjective and objective human rights within the intricate political realities of the modern world and specific countries.

The global proliferation of militarized blocs is straining trade routes, leading to reduced trade, and disproportionately impacting the poor. The escalating tension among these blocs increases the likelihood that a minor localized spark could ignite a global conflagration. The history of all wars demonstrates that in global conflicts, the weakest and most disadvantaged segments of the population suffer disproportionately, enduring violence and necessitating protection. Etienne Balibar defines modern political reality as a state of extreme violence or cruelty, culminating in contemporary wars, which, in their purpose and methods, are waged as "wars of extermination" by the neoliberal system. The crisis of capitalist production manifests as the creation of "disposable people," upon whom various forms of "extreme violence," as studied by Balibar, are inflicted within society [Balibar, 2015]. "Disposable people," in contrast to Herbert Marcuse's "one-dimensional person" who was still valued by industrial society, are individuals who have become unnecessary, useless, existing without work, family, rights, or a future. Such individuals are involved in, and can exercise their right to existence and citizenship, only when they vote in elections. Their role in neoliberal democracy is limited to endorsing candidates pre-selected by political parties. Within the system of neoliberal competition, those who fail are solely held responsible for their transformation, as Balibar contends, into "disposable people." However, the system demands obedience from these "disposable people": they must comply, agree to be marginalized, and be left to the whims of fate. Their paternalistic and racially marginalized families sacrifice themselves to finance their children's schooling, despite the children's future lack of employment; the inevitable result, however, is the emergence of even more "disposable people," also termed "precarious subjectivities." The most profitable method for eliminating "disposable people" is war, specifically "wars of extermination," which, according to Balibar, encompass contemporary conflicts where the hidden objective is population extermination. In the context of "wars of extermination," Balibar suggests that the sole positive outcome would be the intervention of the international community, theoretically endowed with inherent authoritative powers. This would involve demands for an immediate ceasefire, the release of prisoners and hostages, the prosecution of war crimes by all parties to military conflicts, and the implementation of ignored UN resolutions [Sliusar, 2012]. Unfortunately, this is unlikely to occur: these international institutions, Balibar believes, are neutralized by the interests not of global peace, but of large or medium-sized imperialist powers. Modern wars, he notes, serve merely as objects of political maneuvers that redistribute spheres of influence among current geopolitical alliances in the context of cold and hot wars, with their "geopolitical" strategies and regional forecasts eroding any effective international legitimacy. Balibar observes that the modern political catastrophe is protracted, and ordinary people, as political subjects,

continue to suffer its consequences. Simultaneously, Balibar asserts that this political impasse he has explored presents an opportunity to competently seek non-ideological solutions. It is profoundly challenging to endure misfortune without feelings of revenge or hatred, which, paradoxically, might simplify the experience. If the predominant feeling is one of general disasters, there is an existential need for individuals who oppose war as a socio-political phenomenon. It is fortunate if there are such individuals nearby, but it is deeply distressing and isolating when they are absent, replaced instead by complete anomie, which fosters disappointment and distrust. Mutual understanding and support are always desirable in any life situation, particularly during times of social catastrophe [Beilin, 2024].

Within the social space, there exists a hierarchization of war victims and human suffering. Who suffers more: those who uphold a nationalist identity, or those who, defined by a discourse of power critique and the construction of their own subjectivities outside the dispositives of state power, do not conform to identitarian nationalist subjectivity? It should be emphasized that the paradox lies in the fact that nationalist political strategies become more profitable and active as war zones expand. Nothing, however, prevents participants from launching mass social initiatives, organizing micro-spaces of political resistance, within which oases of social support and solidarity should be created. Today, solidarity implies engagement in the field of hegemonic struggle, where transnational rights are gaining ground in many areas. It is crucial to recall the famous Lacanian question posed by the neurotic analysand to the analyst: "You tell me this ('solidarity,' 'freedom,' 'democracy,' 'homeland,' 'nation,' 'victory,' 'peace,' etc.), but what do you mean? What are you silent about? What is your desire? And how exactly do you intend to manipulate me?" [Julien, 1995].

To protect itself, the individual needs to reverse the established order, mentally envisioning a peaceful existence in favor of human, rather than merely state or nationalist, solidarity. Slavoj Žižek's critique of modern capitalism, particularly its "permissive" nature, highlights a "postmodern" boss who insists on being a coordinator rather than a master, the first among equals, where informality prevails (addressing him by nickname, sharing "dirty jokes"). Yet, other forms of subordination operate as their own negation: the individual must obey masters while acting as if free and equal, as if domination does not exist, which, of course, further humiliates the situation. What does obedience signify in this context? Does it merely mean performing the work specified in an employment contract during working hours? This discussion extends beyond working hours to the concept of "precariousness," which describes life in modern capitalism where the boundary between work and free time is blurred – a characteristic of cognitive capitalism. Unlike Marx, whose understanding of labor suggested that improved working conditions (productive forces) would lead to improved ways of life (social relations), Žižek emphasizes capitalism's "permissive" nature. Even practices of resistance, he argues, often inadvertently increase capitalist inequality and perpetuate modern forms of "exploitation of man by man," as formulated by Karl Marx. The most significant political event of our time, for which individuals have proven to be unprepared despite numerous warnings from theorists of violence, is the unexpected and brutally extreme intrusion of violence into their lives, including their private lives [Žižek, 2023]. This includes violence perpetrated by states that until recently appeared democratic but now apply virtually life sentences and torture against opposition where previously there were two or three years; terrible military violence that has migrated from Africa and Asia to Europe; massive terrorist violence; and other forms of arbitrary coercion aimed at compelling others to commit violence. Moreover, resistance to these forms of violence and previously effective methods of protection have proven to be utterly helpless and useless: anti-war protest movements are easily suppressed by special services, sanctions against aggression fail, anti-terrorist operations stall, and "iron domes" offer no guarantees. It appears that the global invasion of violence is only beginning, with its most horrifying assaults yet to be faced by individuals [Gelderloos, 2013]. Who is to blame for this horror and the individual's unpreparedness to confront and repel the wave of violence that has engulfed the social world? "Nonviolence is to blame for everything" – this is the prevalent answer from intellectuals across

political camps today. And personal guilt and responsibility, of course, fall upon its theorists — representatives of the philosophy of nonviolence, from Leo Tolstoy and Mahatma Gandhi to Judith Butler. Critics from the left accuse nonviolence theorists of proposing unsuitable methods of protesting state violence, which not only fail to undermine it but, conversely, contribute to strengthening the power of authoritarian and dictatorial regimes. Critics from the right accuse Butler and other theorists of effectively justifying terrorists and their barbaric attacks that destroy civilized states with their utopian ideas. The only way out, in this view, is to swiftly abandon any idealistic fantasies about nonviolence and instead hope for the saving practices of just conflict resolution through diplomatic means.

In the 21st century, with new generation weapons, where there is no possibility or need to confront an opponent face-to-face, one cannot speak of "just violence" because power and potential capabilities may be inherently unequal. It is crucial for supporters of violence to recognize that Butler is not an advocate of nonviolence; rather, she demonstrates that the fantasy of nonviolence is perilous. It is perilous because it creates a situation of competition in bodily vulnerability, threatening to isolate groups that define themselves as the "most vulnerable" and therefore deserving of life. Consequently, all "less vulnerable" individuals are deemed unworthy of life and potentially subject to elimination. Drawing on Melanie Klein's analysis of the psychic mechanisms of guilt and responsibility, Butler illustrates that within the framework of individualistic ontology, rooted in the logic of desire and frames of recognition, the individual develops "moral sadism" as a reaction to the question of survival. For Klein, the question of survival precedes morality: the "I" can only desire the survival of the "Other" if the "I" itself can simultaneously survive. The "other" thus becomes merely an instrument for one's own survival, rendering both guilt and morality as instrumental consequences of the desire for self-preservation, which is primarily threatened by one's own destructiveness [Butler, 2020].

In this context, Butler abandons the traditional "violence-nonviolence" opposition, emphasizing vulnerability. They argue that the "demand for nonviolence," as a requirement of so-called "moral transcendentalism" or purism that insists on "cleansing the modern world of violence," is a false form of "moral sadism." The essence of "moral sadism" ideology is that someone is recognized as a privileged moral subject who experiences violence, while others are not — for example, subjects who oppose the ideology of "just war" and practices of "moralization" of violence [Butler, 2020].

The conclusion follows that if the individual genuinely perceives the theory of nonviolence as a threat to its unimpeded implementation, then it makes sense to adopt the technique of "moral sadism," which, as Butler demonstrates, is one of the most experienced and effective strategies for moralizing violence, legalizing, and justifying its maximization. Pacifism and successful pacifist practices of social and political transformations have both critics and supporters. The question remains: are nonviolent methods truly the only ethically justified strategy for the struggle for social justice? Alongside the well-known names of prominent practitioners of pacifism — Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King Jr., and Nelson Mandela — there are many critics of pacifist theories. George Orwell was likely among the first to propose that pacifism is a type of pathology. In his 1942 letter, "Pacifism and War," Orwell labeled pacifism a "bourgeois illusion" and a pathological commitment to nonviolent strategies that were more likely to perpetuate, rather than undermine, the system. He noted that British pacifists who publicly opposed the war in Europe were moral hypocrites. By objecting to the use of military force, they were inadvertently benefiting from the food and security provided by British naval personnel who risked their lives to break the German blockade of the island. Orwell believed that, in addition to this hypocrisy, pacifists simply did not comprehend the realities of politics and the brutal workings of Nazi regimes [Orwell, 1968].

Turning to the general theoretical criticisms of pacifist theories and practices, several approaches can be distinguished. According to the first, some pacifists reject war but are nonetheless willing to resort to violence for personal self-defense or the protection of a loved one. To this reproach, pacifists typically respond that critics consider and criticize only one form

of pacifism, namely absolute pacifism, while pacifism itself is diverse and flexible. A second line of criticism usually claims that pacifism, as a commitment to nonviolent means of resolving social conflicts, is ineffective against particularly vicious, sadistic, or powerful adversaries. In other words, principled nonviolence is largely useless for achieving social transformation in a world permeated by structural violence and inequality. A third approach emphasizes the desire of pacifists to create organizations and activist spaces that model friendship and fellowship, based on non-hierarchical relationships that strive not to replicate white racist, bourgeois, patriarchal, and homophobic societal norms, but which, paradoxically, often end up reproducing the very forms of oppression they ostensibly criticize. What examples of pacifism's ineffectiveness do its critics typically cite? For instance, in the case of Indian independence, it is argued that it was not Gandhi's campaign that forced the British to leave, but rather Britain itself, weakened by two world wars and an overstretched army, found it difficult to maintain control over India; it was simply too expensive and impractical. In the case of the civil rights movement in the United States, some argue that the government yielded to the demands of leaders like Martin Luther King Jr. not primarily due to pressure from nonviolent activism, but because of the dual threat of defeat in Vietnam and domestic unrest. In response to this criticism, pacifist theorists first clarify that there is no single and absolute concept of pacifism, classifying nonviolent direct action into three categories: protest and persuasion, noncooperation, and nonviolent intervention.

Pacifist theorists cite examples of successful pacifist practices. One of the most striking examples is the suffragette campaign during World War I. Some suffragettes were arrested and mistreated in prison. Upon their release, they continued to picket the White House and embarked on a national tour to recount their suffering in prison. Although many citizens and voters disapproved of their wartime activism, they were shocked by the stories of the suffragettes' mistreatment. Finally, one representative declared that despite his historical opposition to suffrage, he was so outraged by the treatment of the imprisoned women that he decided to vote for the federal amendment. In this case, the success was not that women convinced Congress of feminism's importance, but that the suffragettes generated a mass social movement that disrupted key sectors of the state and economy. The campaign succeeded because it convinced the federal government that supporting the violence necessary to suppress women was worse than granting women the right to vote. The campaign did not require members of Congress to possess a moral conscience; it merely had to convince them that suffrage, rather than persecution, was more likely to allow them to maintain their power in the country.

An example of pacifist practices and the shift of energy from protest to institutionalization is the famous sit-ins that began in the automobile plants of Michigan in 1936. Workers at General Motors successfully coordinated work stoppages at several plants, which eventually spread across the country to other automobile factories and even inspired workers in other industries to participate in sit-ins to express their grievances. As a result, these practices of nonviolent resistance increased the number of union members from thirty thousand to a quarter of a million and formed the foundation of the labor movement in the United States for several decades.

Mahatma Gandhi's philosophy of nonviolence, now termed "ecology of change," called for his followers to live with him in ashrams and other organized communities. Here, they learned various forms of economic self-reliance and modeled the mutual aid necessary for life after independence. Gandhi's ashrams also served as headquarters for planning his numerous acts of civil disobedience. Consequently, Gandhi played a leading role in electoral politics, working to position the Indian National Congress as the organization that would institutionalize the gains made by the demonstrations into a legal framework for an autonomous India. It is evident that Gandhi's socio-political movement developed its own dynamics and operated at multiple levels of governance. It was far from a movement that relied solely on the successes of more violent movements or on a weakened British Empire for its success. What conclusions do contemporary theorists of pacifism draw from these pacifist practices? First, one should not rely on the simplistic binaries of "violence/nonviolence" or "pacifist/revolutionary," which are prevalent in

the works of both pacifists and their critics. The history of nonviolent movements is rich and complex, involving millions of people in countless acts of self-determination, autonomy, and the pursuit of a better world. Second, an analysis of contemporary nonviolent social movements demonstrates that pacifist strategies and tactics are indeed capable of employing coercive force against repressive institutions and bringing about social transformation even under the most repressive regimes. The thesis of pacifism's heterogeneity as a form of violent resistance precludes taking a "for or against" stance on this issue [Orwell, 1968]. In today's political reality, openly distancing oneself from official state policy is exceptionally difficult; there is no public act condemning the senselessness of wars and their conflicts, which are imposed on the general imagination by the logic of power and its actors.

Freedom and necessity coincide, yet in such a way that the individual does not merely become a cog in the defining structure. Conversely, the structure is never purely objective; it always incorporates a moment of subjectification. As Žižek notes: "Kant and Hegel knew this; they both realized that freedom was the most radical disease that parasitized organic well-being; it was something destructive and self-destructive, or, to put it in Freudian terms, it was 'on the other side of the pleasure principle.' Freedom is not something that can be violated or diseased; freedom is the very basis of disease, as a result of which, as Kant formulated, humankind is an animal that needs a master to discipline/create it." Žižek deconstructs postcolonial discourse as a search for a unique "home of being," while, apart from Dipesh Chakrabarty ("Provincializing Europe"), who combined Marx with Heidegger, the canon of postcolonial discourse (Said, Spivak, Bhabha) emerged from antithesis (Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze). From Žižek's perspective, it is clear that poststructuralism is in no way anti-Heideggerian. In the case of Foucault and Deleuze, this is generally obvious (there are many common motifs and, most importantly, depoliticizing conclusions). "When authors risk entering into a direct dispute with Heidegger (like Derrida's 'Of Spirit'), the result is usually ambiguous; they try to distance themselves from Heidegger, somehow following his path (Heidegger, as before, remains a philosopher of origins and true presence, although he did much to 'deconstruct' the metaphysical logic of origins)" [Žižek, 2023]. Despite the trauma of violence and the prohibition against speaking about it outside the dispositifs of power, the question arises of how to continue thinking today in the mode of hope, understood not in the transcendent but in the immanent register. Within the framework of hope and the theme of violence, one can think during war only from the perspective of how to make violence finally cease. Unfortunately, this does not always imply an anti-war position. In the transcendental order, there is a path through endless mourning, but in the immanent order, it is most likely only a utopia, which must be realized through the concrete practice of resistance to the discourse of violence, binary oppositions, and the need for even greater victims who seek mourning or heroization. Creating islands of autonomous action – a utopia that is the sole intellectual, active, and creative practice offering a path to an eternally coming immanent future, free from violence and wars – is incredibly difficult. Military confrontation is a distinct form of national activity; the blind rage that motivates war destroys the very social ties that make nations possible. The destructive forces unleashed by war dismantle social connections and produce anger, a desire for revenge, and bitterness, making it unclear whether these ties can ever be restored, or if any possibility of peaceful existence remains in the future. Military action is not about altering the political landscape or establishing a new social order, but rather about destroying the social basis of politics itself [Hofmeister, 2001]. Of course, such a statement might seem an exaggeration if one believes in just wars – wars against genocidal regimes for the sake of democracy. But even in this case, the explicit goal of waging war and the destructiveness unleashed by war are not the same thing. Even a so-called "just war" runs the risk of causing destructiveness that exceeds its tasks and perceived goals. Catastrophe nationalism, as Seymour defines it, offers "a meager, defensive nationalism scaled up to the era of deflationary politics." Indeed, upon reflection, people almost never vote for their own interests, for their own economic well-being. Even if the individual vaguely senses that the system is to blame, they cannot sue the political system or punish it. And where is the alternative? Thus, Seymour writes,

disaster nationalism proposes a politics of revenge. It identifies a number of phobic objects that can be either punished or killed: migrants, anti-fascists, cultural Marxists, Muslims, globalists, Jews, and terrorists. It offers an addictive cycle of threats and liberation, in which self-respect is temporarily secured by the destruction of one's neighbor [Seymour, 2024]. Participation in ultra-nationalist processions with racist chants and slogans, presented as a sign of respect for power and a form of self-defense, is where the current political subject undergoes formation not through subjectivity but through execution, as in Michel Foucault. Unfortunately, words are often expressed in inadequate abstractions, whether it is the academic discourse of "populism" or uninformative, trivial pseudo-debates about who is who, and who is labeled as such at a given moment in a particular political reality. According to Karl Marx, the correct method is not to begin with abstraction, but to study the material in detail, to analyze the various forms of its development, and to explore their internal connection. This is not fascism, but something else, which can be termed "catastrophe nationalism," where an individual absolutely needs to contemplate self-defense and act against extreme violence.

In conclusion, the humanistic orientation and interdisciplinary nature of the problem of self-defense underscore the importance of its problematization within the framework of social philosophy, which serves as the methodological basis for analyzing pressing modern problems. This is due to the practical demand for social self-defense as an amateur, non-state form of ensuring security in modern society; the need to integrate the idea of social self-defense into public consciousness as a vital component of civil society development; and the lack of a coherent state policy on the effective use of self-defense by citizens and the mechanism for its legal regulation in conditions of military confrontation and socio-political instability.

REFERENCES

- Almond, Gabriel A. (2002) *Ventures in Political Science: Narratives and Reflections*. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 245. ISBN: 978-1-58826-080-2
- Balibar, Étienne (2015) *Violence and Civility: On the Limits of Political Philosophy*. New York: Columbia University Press, 216. ISBN: 9780231153997
- Beilin, M. V., Zheltoborodov, A. N. (2024) Katastrofa jak ekzistencijno-socialnyi vymir istorychnogho buttja. *Humanities studies: Collection of Scientific Papers*, 18 (95). 18–23. Zaporizhzhia: Publishing house "Helvetica,". <https://doi.org/10.32782/hst-2024-18-95-02>. (in Ukrainian)
- Butler, Judith (2020). *The Force of Nonviolence: An Ethico-Political Bind*. New York: Verso. 224 p. ISBN-13: 978-1-78873-276-5
- Gazniuk, L. M., Beilin M. V. (2022) Ljudyna v sociokulturnomu buttji: mizh systemoju i antysystemoju. *Visnyk Kharkivskogo nacionalnogho universytetu imeni V.N. Karazina. Serija «Filosofija. Filosofyski perypetiji»*, 66, 38-46. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.26565/2226-0994-2022-66-4>. (in Ukrainian)
- Gazniuk, L. M., Semenova Y. A. (2022) Ljudyna i socialnyi svit: ekzistencijno-emocijni vyklyky suchasnosti. *Aktualni problemy filosofiji ta sociologiji*, 39, 16-21. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.32782/apfs.v039.2022.3>. (in Ukrainian)
- Gelderloos, Peter (2013) *The Failure of Nonviolence: From Arab Spring to Occupy*. Seattle: Left Bank Books. ISBN-13: 978-1909798038
- Hofmeister, H. (2001) *Der Wille zum Krieg oder Die Ohnmacht der Politik. Ein philosophisch-politischer Traktat*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 160.
- Julien, François. (1995) *Jacques Lacan's Return to Freud: The Real, the Symbolic, and the Imaginary*. New York: New York University Press, 212.
- Orwell, George (1968) Pacifism and the War. In *My Country Right or Left (1940–1943): The Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters of George Orwell*, edited by Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus. London: Secker and Warburg, 220-229.
- Seymour, Richard *Rise of Disaster Nationalism: Modern Far-Right Is Not Return to Fascism, but a New and Original Threat*. The New Statesman, July 22, 2024.

Sljusar V. M. (2012) Racionaljne nasyllja jak atrybut vlady u ghlobalizovanomu sviti. *Studia Politologica Ucraino-Polona*, 2, 82-85. <http://jnas.nbuv.gov.ua/article/UJRN-0000071306>. (in Ukrainian)

Žižek, Slavoj (2023) *Freedom: A Disease Without Cure*. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 328. ISBN-13.978-1350357129

Gazniuk Lidiia M.

DSc in Philosophy, Professor,
Head of Humanities Department
Kharkiv State Academy of Physical Culture
99, Klochkivska str., Kharkiv, 61022, Ukraine
E-mail: lidiagazn@gmail.com
ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4444-3965>

Semenova Yuliia A.

PhD in Philological Sciences, associate professor
Department of Humanities
Kharkiv State Academy of Physical Culture
99 Klochkivska str., Kharkiv, 61022, Ukraine
E-mail: semenova.yuliia.a@gmail.com
ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6652-1659>

Orlenko Olena M.

PhD in Historical Sciences, Associate Professor
Department of Humanities
Kharkiv State Academy of Physical Culture
99 Klochkivska str., Kharkiv, 61022, Ukraine
E-mail: helen.m.orlenko@gmail.com
ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4436-487X>

Authors Contribution: All authors have contributed equally to this work

Conflict of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest

Article arrived: 22.02.2025

Accepted: 14.04.2025

ЕКСТРЕМАЛЬНЕ НАСИЛЛЯ І САМОЗАХИТ СУБ'ЄКТА У СУЧАСНІЙ ПОЛІТИЧНІЙ РЕАЛЬНОСТІ

Газнюк Лідія Михайлівна

доктор філософських наук, завідувач кафедри гуманітарних наук
Харківська державна академія фізичної культури
вул. Клочківська, 99, 61058, м. Харків, Україна
E-mail: lidiagazn@gmail.com
ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4444-3965>

Семенова Юлія Анатоліївна

кандидат філософських наук, доцент
кафедра гуманітарних наук
Харківська державна академія фізичної культури
вул. Клочківська, 99, м. Харків, 61022, Україна
E-mail: semenova.yuliia.a@gmail.com

ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6652-1659>

Орленко Олена Михайлівна

кандидат історичних наук, доцент

кафедра гуманітарних наук

Харківська державна академія фізичної культури

вул. Ключківська, 99, м. Харків, 61022, Україна

E-mail: helen.m.orlenko@gmail.com

ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4436-487X>

АНОТАЦІЯ

Обґрунтовується інтегроване розуміння самозахисту суб'єкта в ситуації екстремального насильства, як необхідного компонента методологічного комплексу дослідження суспільства та процесів переформатування сучасного світу. Концепт «екстремальне насильство» розглядається як форма протиріччя, зіткнення варіантів відповідей на основні питання, що стосуються екзистенціалів людського буття, соціального призначення певних співтовариств, державних утворень та шляхів їх суспільно-політичного устрою, що ведуть до боротьби соціальних суб'єктів за домінування їх світогляду. Коли глобальний порядок руйнується, зазвичай найбільше страждають найслабші. Перед обличчям суперечливих претензій та інтересів важко розподілити провину й знайти розумний компроміс. Самозахист, як діяльність суб'єкта у соціальному середовищі, пов'язана із загрозами, викликаними низкою масштабних кризових та передкризових ситуацій, що загрожують існуванню та нормальному функціонуванню соціальних груп та окремих людей. Ці ситуації викликані процесами глобалізації, тероризму, війни, екологічної катастрофи, пандемії, постіндустріальної модернізації, розвитком інформаційних технологій та штучного інтелекту. Погрозливий характер зазначених ситуацій обумовлений супутніми процесами індивідуалізації та фрагментації всіх сфер життєдіяльності суспільства, що включають фрагментацію соціально-політичної поведінки кожної окремої людини. Названі процеси обумовлені ускладненням сучасної політичної реальності суспільства, труднощами пристосування людини до соціальної реальності, що швидко й безперервно змінюється, розпадається на безліч автономних сфер, які вторгаються у внутрішній світ людини, впливаючи на цінності, етику, ставлення до політики та подій, що відбуваються в державі, й трансформують сприйняття соціальної реальності. У таких умовах забезпечення стабільної життєдіяльності людини може бути досягнуто лише в ході постійних практик з виявлення та осмислення загроз, формування методів і програм впливу на них з метою уникнення, ліквідації або нейтралізації в процесі соціального самозахисту.

Ключові слова: *прекарні суб'єктивності, пацифізм, моралізація насильства, політичні маневри, соціальний самозахист, ризик деструктивності, ідентитарна націоналістична суб'єктивність, ненасильство.*

Внесок авторів: всі автори зробили рівний внесок у цю роботу

Конфлікт інтересів: автори повідомляють про відсутність конфлікту інтересів

Стаття надійшла до редакції: 22.02.2025

Схвалено до друку: 14.04.2025

Як цитувати / In cites: Gazniuk, L., Semenova, Y., & Orlenko, O. (2025). EXTREME VIOLENCE AND SELF-DEFENSE OF THE SUBJECT IN THE MODERN POLITICAL REALITY. *The Journal of V. N. Karazin Kharkiv National University, Series Philosophy. Philosophical Peripeteias*, (72), 201-209. <https://doi.org/10.26565/2226-0994-2025-72-19>