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A COGNITIVE LINGUISTIC PERSPECTIVE ON FIRST-PERSON VERBAL REPORT ON EMOTION EXPERIENCE

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This paper addresses the relation between emotions, emotion concepts and emotion names in first-person verbal report on emotion experience and confirms by way of cognitive linguistic argumentation that direct emotion names give no full and comprehensive report on emotion experience. It is cognitive linguistic argument that makes this paper original, whereas the claim of ineffability of subjective, in particular emotion, experience is a long-standing one in the domains of cognitive (emotion) psychology, philosophy of mind, and phenomenology. In this paper, I develop a meaningful state-of-the-art research context first by reviewing scientific literature on emotion experience and on first-person verbal report on this experience, and then proceed to spell out my own perspective as that of a cognitive linguist on the relation between the world (here, emotions), the mind (here, emotion concepts) and natural language (here, emotion names in first-person verbal report on emotion experience). This paper is my elaboration on and interpretation of some of the existing cognitive linguistic approaches to this relation suggested within major East and West European and American schools of thought. My paper suggests a way to combine these approaches within a single investigation. There are alternative major and minor approaches that I do not take into account in this paper because of its scope and purpose. This paper has the potential to inform emotion psychology, philosophy of mind and phenomenology. With a methodology and against a theoretical background that are foreign to either of these disciplines, this paper provides explanation for the incapability of direct emotion names to exhaustively report on emotion experience.

Key words: cognitive linguistics, emotion concept, emotion experience, emotion name, emotion, first-person verbal report, ineffability of emotion experience.

Ваховська О.В. Лінгвокогнітивний погляд на здійснюваний від першої особи словесний опис переживаної емоції. Ця стаття розглядає відношення між емоціями, концептами емоцій та іменами емоцій в здійснюваному від першої особи словесному описі переживаних емоцій. Стаття підтверджує з лінгвістичної точки зору, що імена емоцій з прямими значеннями не охоплюють емоційний досвід в його повноті та багатогранності. Новизна статті обумовлена саме запропонованою – лінгвістичною – точкою зору на невимовність емоційного досвіду, тоді як сам постулат про таку невимовність є відносно не новим, та недостатність засобів мови для опису суб'єктивного, зокрема емоційного, досвіду неодноразово підкреслювалася дослідниками в областях когнітивної психології (емоцій), філософії мислення та феноменології. У першій частині статті я резюмую деякі положення з наведених областей, з метою створити необхідний для мого дослідження теоретичний контекст, що охоплює поняття емоційного досвіду та його словесного опису. Потім я як лінгвокогнітолог розвиваю свою точку зору на відношення між об'єктивним світом (тут, емоціями), мисленням (тут, концептами емоцій) та природною мовою (тут, іменами емоцій, використовуваними в здійснюваному від першої особи словесному описі переживаних емоцій). Моя точка зору основана на деяких підходах до цих відношень, запропонованих у провідних лінгвокогнітивних школах Східної та Західної Європи та США. Стаття є одним з прикладів того, як зазначені підходи можуть бути поєднані у межах одного цілісного дослідження. Окрім тих, що наведені в статті, існують й інші підходи до тріади світ-мислення-мова. Я не згадую ці підходи через обсяг і мету моєї статті. Стаття пояснює з лінгвістичної точки зору нездатність імен емоцій в їхніх прямих значеннях передати переживаний емоціональний досвід, і може представляти інтерес для дослідників в областях когнітивної психології (емоцій), філософії мислення та феноменології, для яких теоретичний апарат когнітивної лінгвістики є апріорі чужим.

Ключові слова: емоційний досвід, емоція, здійснюваний від першої особи словесний опис, ім'я емоції, когнітивна лінгвістика, концепт емоції, невимовність емоційного досвіду.

Ваховская О.В. Лингвокогнитивный взгляд на осуществляемое от первого лица словесное описание переживаемой эмоции. В этой статье рассматриваются отношения между эмоциями, концептами эмоций и именами эмоций в осуществляемом от первого лица словесном описании переживаемых эмоций. Статья подтверждает

с лингвокогнитивной точки зрения, что имена эмоций с прямыми значениями не охватывают эмоциональный опыт в его полноте и многогранности. Новизна статьи обуславливается именно предложенной – лингвистической – точкой зрения на невыразимость эмоционального опыта, тогда как сам постулат о такой невыразимости относительно не нов, и недостаточность средств языка для описания субъективного, в частности эмоционального, опыта неоднократно подчеркивалась исследователями в областях когнитивной психологии (эмоций), философии мышления и феноменологии. В первой части статьи я резюмирую некоторые положения из указанных областей, с целью создать необходимый для моего исследования теоретический контекст, охватывающий понятия эмоционального опыта и его словесного описания. Затем я как лингвокогнитолог развиваю свою точку зрения на отношения между объективным миром (здесь, эмоциями), мышлением (здесь, концептами эмоций) и естественным языком (здесь, именами эмоций, используемыми в осуществляемом от первого лица словесном описании переживаемых эмоций). Моя точка зрения основана на некоторых подходах к этим отношениям, предложенных в крупнейших лингвокогнитивных школах Восточной и Западной Европы и США. Статья является одним из примеров того, как эти подходы могут быть объединены в рамках одного целостного исследования. Помимо тех, что приводятся в статье, существуют другие подходы к триаде мир-мышление-язык. Я не упоминаю эти подходы в связи с объемом и целями моей статьи. Статья объясняет с лингвистической точки зрения неспособность имен эмоций в их прямых значениях передать переживаемый эмоциональный опыт, и может представлять интерес для исследователей в областях когнитивной психологии (эмоций), философии мышления и феноменологии, для которых теоретический аппарат когнитивной лингвистики априори чужд.

Ключевые слова: имя эмоции, когнитивная лингвистика, концепт эмоции, невыразимость эмоционального опыта, осуществляемое от первого лица словесное описание, эмоциональный опыт, эмоция.

1. Introduction

This paper addresses the relation between emotions, emotion concepts and emotion names in first-person verbal report on emotion experience. The major purpose of this paper is to confirm by way of a **cognitive linguistic analysis** that direct emotion names give no full and comprehensive report on emotion experience. This is a traditional postulate within the domains of emotion psychology and philosophy of mind, and I make no claim to originality here. The originality of my study is in establishing the truth of this assumption by cognitive linguistic evidence and argument.

The purpose of this paper determines its flow and structure. **Section 1** addresses emotion experience and first-person verbal report that this experience lends itself to. Scientific literature for this section comes from the domains of emotion psychology, philosophy of mind, and phenomenology, and encompasses a definition of emotion experience, a statement for the role in this experience of first-person verbal report, and for the strengths and faults of this report. **Section 2** focuses on first-person verbal report on emotion experience in detail. This section takes the faults of verbal report as a point of departure. It is from the relation between emotions, emotion concepts and emotion names that the imperfection of verbal report stems, and I suggest an account of this relation from the standpoint of **traditional and cognitive semantics**. The major

issues I address in my account are the sign process in natural language, its constituents and their relations; linguistic manifestation of concepts; linguistic and conceptual world models and their relation; linguistic meaning, its nature, types and structure; mental construals, their nature and cognitive operations that shape them; the semasiological and onomasiological aspects of verbal report. I conclude the paper with prospects for further research.

2. First-person verbal report on emotion experience and its faults

Emotion emerges into human consciousness in form of a distinct experience. Emotion experience engages into an individual's subjective experience as one of its varied instances and inherits its properties. Emotion experience is idiosyncratic, nonstative, heterogeneous, manifold, and indivisible. It is ineffable in the sense that it is of no propositional structure, is difficult to verbally report on, and lends itself to metaphorical manifestation best [14]. Verbal reports on emotion experience are either raw descriptions given by ordinary people or published literary accounts written by professional authors. First-person verbal report is always integral to the emotion experience an emoter attempts to convey. She cannot take her emotion experience apart from her awareness and her interpretation of this experience. In order to report on

her emotion experience, an emoter uses discreet emotion names and combinations of these in complex expressions. Report of this kind is ‘the most reliable and possibly only window that researchers have on conscious, subjective, emotional experience’ [5, p. 47].

First-person verbal report on emotion experience is therefore generally praised for its virtue of laying emotion experience open. At the same time, it is charged with the fault of transforming and even distorting the experience it allegedly reports. The root of this fault is the cognitive mechanism of *awareness*. Operation of this mechanism is straightforward -- without awareness, there is no conscious experience and no verbal report on this experience. It is awareness that allows a particular emotion to emerge into consciousness and to become an experience that is altogether accessible and coherent. In doing so, however, awareness alters emotion experience and impairs it. Emotion experience is ‘a sort of experience-in-itself that cannot normally be captured except through awareness, which forms and shapes it and therefore changes it’ [7, p. 246]. Awareness requires that attention be directed at a particular emotion experience, which disrupts this experience in its continuance and unity and modifies it [12]. As a result, emotion experience that emerges into consciousness is not immediate; it is an interpretation that singles out salient features in immediate experience but never captures it as a whole.

The act of awareness is followed by the act of *naming* that entails another fault for verbal report. Through the mechanism of naming, an interpretation that is already subjective in relation to immediate experience is modified further. Emotion names impose on this interpretation additional cultural, social and individual schemas they carry [15]. Structuring schemas for emotion experience are repetitive, stereotyped and stable logical and emotive semantic components. These components are part of the collective unconscious indispensable from human cognition; they are responsible for holistic perception of reality in humans and contribute to formation of rational behavior.

Report on emotion experience is therefore imperfect in the sense that it can never be accurate and exhaustive for this experience. It transforms emotion experience, is influenced by social and cultural

conventions, and absorbs individual emotion representations that are biased and stereotyped. It also depends on the emotion vocabulary that is available to a particular emoter or in a particular language, or both, and can in some cases be deliberately distorted by an emoter in her determination to conceal or feign her emotion state. Most important, verbal report on emotion experience is imperfect due to some of the intrinsic properties of the relation between the experiential world, the human mind, and natural language.

3. From emotions to emotion concepts and emotion names. A cognitive linguistic account of the relation between the world, the mind, and natural language

To assume accuracy and exhaustiveness in first-person verbal report on emotion experience is to imply that this report uses emotion names that encode and activate respective emotion concepts, and these concepts are objective images of respective experienced emotions. In an idealized account of this kind, all emotion names available in a language form a lexical-semantic field that entirely covers its underlying conceptual category and, in doing so, captures the whole totality, diversity and variation of emotion concepts in the mind, collective and individual, of emoters who speak this language. Each emotion name similarly strictly relates to an emotion concept and objectifies this concept accurately and exhaustively.

Earlier approaches to language, for example, [16], endorse a possibility for such an idealization. Modern linguistics, however, departs from this view and recognizes in linguistic signs their cognitive foundations. The relation between natural language and the mind is in the focus of cognitive linguistics. From a cognitive linguistic perspective, the sign process in natural language is viewed as that involving primarily the act of *conceptual mapping*, and the form and meaning of a linguistic sign are viewed as the results of this act. Mapping is part of cognitive processes for information perception, encoding, storage, decoding, and use. In the sign process, ‘the mind maps the world (fragmentarily and often deviantly represents information about the world), and language maps the mind’ [1, p. 181]. A map ‘*is not* the territory it represents, but, if correct, it has a *similar structure* to

the territory, which accounts for its usefulness. <...> If we reflect upon our languages, we find that at best they must be considered *only as maps*. A word is not the object it represents' [10, p. 161].

Maps are generally made in accordance with some convention of representation. Conceptual mapping is conventioned by the inherent properties of the human mind, in particular by its embodied nature [11]. *The mind is embodied* because its structure and operation are determined by the human body with its interacting systems and embeddedness into an environment of this particular kind.

Maps make use of signs intended to represent some territory, objects within this territory and relations between them. In natural language, these are linguistic signs. A sign is 'a form that stands for something else understood as its meaning' [2], and *linguistic signs* are forms paired with meanings as well. The relations between a referent and the form and meaning of a linguistic sign are conventionally illustrated with the semiotic triangle model that exposes the major constituents involved in the sign process and their relations. In their use of language, humans manipulate linguistic forms that relate to linguistic meanings but not to referents that are entities of the experiential world. Linguistic signs are the means to encode concepts that exist in the mind of the speaker and to activate respective concepts in the mind of the listener. *Concepts* are pieces of information formed and stored in the human mind as its operational units. A concept that is captured by a linguistic sign becomes the *meaning* of this sign. A fragment of meaning that is chosen as a motivator for a linguistic sign at the moment of its creation is *the internal form* of this sign. The internal form is transparent in motivated signs and non-transparent in synchronically non-motivated signs. At the moment when they are created, all linguistic signs are motivated signs. A synchronically non-transparent motivator is the etymon of its sign that can be reconstructed through etymological analysis. The external form of a sign is a material form that objectifies the respective internal form for its auditory and visual perception. The internal form is built into the external form through metaphor, metonymy and some other semantic relations. The three stages of mapping that are involved into the sign process are therefore fragmentariness of concepts in relation to respective

referents, fragmentariness of meanings in relation to respective concepts, and fragmentariness of internal forms in relation to respective meanings. At these stages, the mind maps the experiential world and language maps the mind [1].

Most concepts in the human mind are purely internal and can not be manifested through language. Concepts that are not pure thoughts can be manifested with signs of different language levels. Primary role in linguistic manifestation of concepts rests with words. Words are minimal free forms that can occur and be meaningful by themselves [6]; they relate the conceptual and linguistic world models and thus bridge human cognition and communication. This function is uniquely reserved for words and makes them cardinal elements of language faculty in humans [3].

Linguistic manifestation of concepts can employ words with direct and indirect meanings. The form of a word with a *direct meaning* is not associated with any subsidiary concept, for example, *an eye* 'the organ of sight of human beings and animals, containing light-sensitive cells associated with nerve fibers, so that light entering the eye is converted to nervous impulses that reach the brain' [17]. A direct meaning is literal. The form of a word with an *indirect, or figurative, meaning* is associated with a subsidiary concept either metonymically (*an eye* 'the faculty of seeing, power of vision' [*ibid.*]) or metaphorically (*an eye* 'a hole, as in certain cheeses' [*ibid.*]).

Word meaning is *the signified* that comprises essential characteristics of a particular class of referents. The signified is generalized and context-free; it immediately relates to human cognition and is shared by all speakers of a language. The signified can be abstract or specific, cf. *a place* and *a café*. The degree of abstraction and specificity of information that is captured by a linguistic sign is associated with the notion of *schema*. According to [9, p. 70], 'schemas in language are generalizations extracted from linguistic forms and meanings. A schema is a cognitive representation consisting of perceived similarities across many instances of usage. Schemas are essentially routinized, or cognitively entrenched, patterns of experience. They arise via repeated activation of a set of co-occurring properties; once sufficiently entrenched they can be used to produce and understand linguistic expressions. Linguistic

expressions are categorized by schemas in production and comprehension; in other words they are licensed to occur by those schemas. In this way expressions are linked to the knowledge structures that produce them and make them interpretable'. Specification of the signified associated with a particular communicative context and a particular referent is **the referential meaning** (the sense, in some terminologies) of a word, cf. *a boy* and *the boy in that café*. The referential meaning can include various connotations, cf. *a boy* and *a half-pint* for 'a male child'.

The conceptual world model is broader and richer than the linguistic one. Its elements are concepts that constitute the entire culture-specific image of the world in the human mind; cf. *worldview* 'a comprehensive conception or image of the universe and of humanity's relation to it' [17]. **The linguistic world model** is part of the conceptual world model that comprises knowledge in language exposed in the system of linguistic meanings, and knowledge of language as of a system of linguistic forms. Knowledge in language results from cognizing the world [3]. It is linguistic meanings that expose concepts, and it is linguistic forms that encode concepts and activate them in the mind. This suggests that concepts are larger than linguistic meanings that expose them, and that there can be no symmetry between concepts and words as means of their linguistic manifestation. There are three patterns of this asymmetric relation. In a one-to-many relation, one and the same concept is manifested with several words (synonymy and antonymy in natural language). In a many-to-one relation, several concepts are manifested with one and the same word (polysemy and homonymy). In a one-to-none relation, a concept that is not a pure thought has no words that conventionally manifest it in a language. This relation is comparatively rare in natural languages.

Linguistic meanings are complex stochastic conceptual structures that split into central and peripheral semantic components. **The intension of meaning** is the essential core of meaning that comprises central semantic components; these components are a stable structure formative and obligatory for a certain class of referents. Intensions of meaning are the basis for the processes of categorization and naming. Different meanings are distinguished one from another and recognized through

their intensions. The intension of meaning is organized by a specification relation between semantic components, e.g., the intension of meaning of the word *a girl* is 'a female child' where the semantic component 'a child' is specified by the semantic component 'female'. The intension of meaning fixes the scope of referents that can be named with a linguistic sign of this particular meaning. The set of such referents forms **the extension of meaning**. Abstract meanings have broad scopes of extension, while specific meanings are restricted in their extensions.

The intension of meaning implies presence or absence of other semantic components in the structure of linguistic meaning. These peripheral semantic components form **the implication of meaning** [4, p. 105–109]. The implication of meaning can be strict, highly probable, weak, and negative. Semantic components whose implication is strict and highly probable find themselves close to the intension of meaning. They are most probable associates of intensional semantic components and are often part of lexicographical entries. At the same time, they remain outside the intension of meaning as long as their absence, with a greater or lesser degree of probability, does not exclude a referent from the class it is included into by virtue of its name. Weak implication is free and covers a rather broad range of semantic components whose compatibility with the intension of meaning is equally probable or improbable as far as different grounds for categorization are concerned. Finally, implication of semantic components can be improbable or impossible. These semantic components form the negative implication, or negimplication, of meaning. Knowledge of language presupposes knowledge of both what is probable and what is improbable for referents that are included into a particular class by virtue of their names. The negimplication of meaning is the negative information potential of a linguistic sign. For example, the negimplication of meaning of the word *a river* includes the semantic component 'capable of being ignited' as long as the characteristics of inflammability is impossible for rivers.

Whereas the intension of meaning results from constructivization of reality and is a deterministic abstraction from the infinity of referents and their relations, the implication of meaning reflects the probable, indeterministic nature of the world. Each word

of a language carries therefore information that is composed of an obligatory and invariant semantic core and of an optional and variable periphery. Peripheral semantic components are often culture-specific; they can be true, false and insecure or stereotypical. The periphery of linguistic meaning is always an open structure of an infinite number of semantic components. The level of generalization for this structure is determined by particular research objectives.

Linguistic meanings are not conceptual structures alone but *conceptualizations* [8, p. 467]. This means that linguistic meanings are mental construals where both conceptual structures and cognitive operations applied to these structures are important. Information construals in the human mind are shaped by the cognitive operations of specification, perspectivization, focusing, and prominence [13]. Different cognitive operations on one and the same conceptual structure produce different mental construals [2]. For example, *an aunt and a relative; The hill gently rises from the bank of the river and The hill gently falls to the bank of the river; John sold the vase to Bill and Bill bought the vase from John; John broke the vase, The vase was broken by John and There is the vase that John broke*. In a construal, information perceived by the brain is arranged in a particular fashion determined by attention patterns; some information fragments get into the focus and thus become prominent and specific while the others remain hidden and, if necessary, have to be inferred. Information about the interpreter and his location in space, e.g., is inferred from *The forest is getting thicker* [13].

Mental construals are representations of the experiential world in the human mind that are inherently partial as long as they are not exact replicas of this world but, rather, 'ways of seeing' it [8, p. 467]. These representations are subjective images, interpretations, and models of the reality but not the objective reality itself. Mental construals are not entirely arbitrary, however. They preserve their identity, which is crucial for cognition and communication. Individual whim in construing the world through language is restrained by intensions of respective linguistic meanings. It is intensions that 'anchor' mental construals and make them recognizable.

Flexible, diffuse and indeterminate semantics of linguistic signs induces and explains the soft character

of natural language as compared to the rigid languages of logic, programming and science. In natural language, the manifest is not (perfectly) complete and true. The manifest is often a misleading distraction from the true, and it is this hidden meaning that is most capacious and extensive because it is combined with something else that is soft, elusive and difficult to capture. These soft senses, not meanings, have to be rendered in a translation from one natural language into another, which is a difficult task even for human translators. Senses are naturally most difficult for computation. If I can appeal to an analogy to psychoanalysis, computing senses is like interpreting dreams. In a dream, the explicit content is opposite to the implicit message, and it is this message that is actually the meaning and interpretation of this dream; there is no access to the implicit message except through the explicit content. For an expert in artificial intelligence, teaching a machine to process natural language is the same as teaching a patient to interpret dreams for a psychoanalytic. In such a context, the machine and the patient should be provided with knowledge of both the manifest but misleading and the implicit but solely true.

There is, presumably, a cross-linguistic variation between natural languages with respect to this property of semantic softness. This might be represented as a graded scale that ranges from very soft languages through more or less soft languages to languages that are not so soft. Distribution of languages along this scale might be determined by their typological and genealogical features and also by major events in the history of respective linguistic communities. 'Information' languages are more formulaic and algorithmic; 'periphrastic' languages are imaginative and given to ambiguity, verbiage and cultural riches. Historical influence upon languages is long and frequent wars with their casern discipline and verbal frugality, ideological elaboration through religious or political institutions, etc. 'Information' languages whose fabric is primarily meanings, not senses, lend themselves to computation more readily than 'periphrastic' ones. It appears that in the modern ever globalized world, the humanity is facing a growing necessity for a universal 'information' language that will be a condensation of meanings alone; absence of senses will make this language safe, transparent and indifferent to national and cultural variation. This language, by virtue of its neutrality and

rigidness, might boost globalization, technologies and human-computer interaction.

4. Conclusion

In this paper, I have investigated from a cognitive linguistic perspective the relation of emotions, emotion concepts and emotion names in first-person verbal report on emotion experience. Objectification of the mind through language is the prerequisite and hallmark of human existence as that of a species. Man is *Homo sapiens* and at the same time *Homo symbolicum* (in E. Cassirer's terms) and *Homo loquens* (in J.G. Herder and J.F. Blumenbach's terms). These names emphasize that humans are the only species able to create signs, to represent the world through signs, and to manipulate signs. With the help of signs, humans hold the world in their possession, and language along with myth, art, and religion is the instrument of this representational occupation. Linguistic signs show the world that is linguistically possessed by humans and also demonstrate in what particular way this world has been taken hold of. In representing the world through language, humans create and use linguistic signs for cognitive, communicative and some other, for example, aesthetic, purposes that generally correspond to the functions performed by language. Creating a linguistic sign employs the onomasiological 'meaning → form' perspective which is taken in a communicative act by the speaker. Interpreting a linguistic sign employs the semasiological 'form → meaning' perspective which is taken in a communicative act by the listener.

First-person verbal report on emotion experience rests on the onomasiological relation. A particular emotion emerges into an emoter's mind through awareness and gets into attention focus. The emoter's mind construes this emotion; this subjective construal is fragmentary and deviant in relation to the immediate emotion experience and is shaped by the inborn architecture of the emoter's mind, by her cultural and social background, and by her individual vantage that can also be context-bound. As a result, the emoter's concept of her emotion is only a derivative from all perceptive information available to her in this emotion episode. In order to describe her emotion experience, she has to choose emotion names available in the language she speaks and known to her. Meanings of these names are information construals derived from

respective emotion concepts. On the other -- semasiological -- hand, the listener unfolds the emoter's words in the opposite direction. The power of first-person verbal report in capturing emotion experience departs, therefore, from its idealization, and emotion names with their meanings and forms capture only fragments of emotion concepts that these names encode and activate. Emotion concepts, in their turn, are subjective images of respective emotions whose immediacy is no longer the case. Emotion names are therefore metonymical units that represent emotion experience through its selected and most prominent features only. This disallows comprehensive verbal reportability of emotion experience with emotion names.

My investigation confirms that emotion experience can not be comprehended and communicated literally as long as literal emotion names expose emotion experience through its selected and most prominent features only and there is, consequently, no comprehensive and exhaustive report on the experience with these names. My investigation allows an assumption that qualitative aspects of emotion experience depend for their understanding and naming primarily on conceptual metaphor and its linguistic manifestations. In line with this assumption, the current paper is intended as part of a larger-scale research and in prospect is to be followed by two sister papers. One of these will address metaphor. It is metaphor that, by virtue of peculiarities of its nature, compensates for the ineffability of emotion experience. The follow-up paper will show from a cognitive linguistic perspective that metaphor increases first-person verbal report on emotion experience in its extent and scope. Metaphor conceives of particular aspects of emotion experience through their associations to concepts whose structure is immediate and well-delineated. Emotion concepts acquire their structure only with the help of metaphor. At the same time, because of subjectivity, selectiveness and fragmentariness of concept integration mechanisms metaphor will presumably not annul the ineffability of emotion experience and there will be aspects in this experience that remain beyond description. The other follow-up paper will consider my current assumption that whereas conventional metaphor may be the only way to highlight emotion experiences and make them coherent, creative metaphor exposes most recalcitrant

aspects of these experiences elusive from conventional metaphorical descriptions, let alone from literal non-metaphorical ones. And it is ultimately metaphor in its interrelation with the notion of creativity that I have the purpose to explore on a larger scale.

LITERATURE

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