МІЖДЕРЖАВНІ ВЗАЄМИНИ ТА ІНТЕГРАЦІЙНІ ПРОЦЕСИ У ЦЕНТРАЛЬНІЙ ТА ПІВДЕННО-СХІДНІЙ ЄВРОПІ (1980-ТІ – ПОЧАТОК 2020-Х РР.)

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ITALY, THE REUNIFICATION OF GERMANY AND THE END OF THE COLD WAR (1983−1990)

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The emergence of rivalry between United States and Soviet Union, the Cold War was not desired from Italy. Despite its allegiance to the Atlantic Alliance and its friendship to the United States, Italy always tried to keep alive the relations with the Eastern European States and with Soviet Union and the cultural and economic unity of the European Nations. Italy played an important role in the creation of the CSCE thanks to its Prime Minister Aldo Moro. During the final period of the Cold War the Italian foreign policy was directed by Giulio Andreotti, who was Foreign Minister from 1983 to 1989 and Prime Minister from 1989 to 1992. A promoter of the European integration and unity, a devout catholic, closely connected to the Vatican, Andreotti considered the Détente and the relations with the Soviet Union as means to end the Cold War and also to include Eastern Europe and the USSR in the European project. The Italians didn't foresee the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and initially they were not favorable to the German reunification. The Italian Government, however, accepted it later when the USSR agreed and this was linked to the creation of the Economic, Monetary and European Union as well to the strengthening of the CSCE and to the permanence of a united Germany in a redesigned NATO to allay the fears of its neighbours. These conditions sealed the end of Europe's division and the progress of the European unification that were priorities of the Italian policy.

Keywords: Italy and the Détente, Giulio Andreotti's Foreign Policy, Italy and German Reunification, European Economic and Monetary Union, CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe).

During the Cold War Italy tried to mediate with the Soviet Union and the Eastern Block despite its allegiance to the Atlantic Alliance and friendship to the United States to avoid an actual war, to achieve the Détente and for economic reasons. According to Sergio Romano, Italian ambassador to Moscow from September 1985 to February 1989, Italian-Soviet relations had «their own limited margin of autonomy within the relationship between the USSR and the West. Like the national currencies in the European monetary snake [called "Snake in the tunnel" in Great Britain], they could fluctuate upwards or downwards but within a predetermined range» (AGA, section Romano Sergio, b. 1940, Romano ad Andreotti, Rapporto di fine missione, Mosca, 02/21/1989).

As the Italian historian Luciano Monzali writes «Italy always tried to keep alive the relations with the Eastern European States and with Soviet Union for economic reasons (the search for markets and materials) and because it needed Soviet benevolence to solve the problems of the Italian Peace Treaty. The emergence of rivalry between United States and Soviet Union, the Cold War, produced a progressive and dramatic political and economic isolation of the Eastern Block's countries from the rest of Europe. This separation and this isolation were certainly not desired from Italy. We can say that since the late 1940s the Italian Republic rejected the division of Europe into two opposing blocks and made efforts to keep alive the cultural and economic unity of the European Nations» (Monzali 2011, 93−94; similarly, Tavani 2010, 243−304; for a more restrictive interpretation of the Italian role see Nuti 2011, 93−94; Bettanin 2012, 98−128).

It is known how the Soviets informed the Italians already in 1966 of their project to create a permanent Conference for the Security and Cooperation in Europe based on the guarantee of the borders (Ferraris 1996, 244). Italy played a role in the complex diplomatic path that led to the formation of the CSCE with the Helsinki Conference in 1975 (Ferraris 1977, 125−592). Aldo Moro, at that time Prime Minister, signed the Final Act also in name of the EEC as its rotating president. The Italians however strongly disappointed the Soviets: Moro stressed in the so called "Third Basket of the Conference" the importance of the inclusion of the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief (Ferraris 1996, 248).

The principal architect of Italian Foreign Policy in the second half of the 1970s and from 1983 to 1992 was Giulio Andreotti, probably the most important and controversial politician of the so-called "First Italian Republic" (Franco 2010). He was Prime Minister from 1972 to 1973, from 1976 to 1979, Foreign Minister from 1983 to 1989 and again Prime Minister from 1989 to 1992. He was the longest serving of the Republic's foreign ministers and led Italian foreign policy for nearly 10 consecutive years, if we include his final term as prime minister. A promoter of the European integration and unity (Lefebvre D'Ovidio et al. 2017), a devout catholic, closely connected to the Vatican (Riccardi A. 2010, 305−339), Andreotti considered the Détente and the relations with the Soviet Union as means to end the Cold War and also to include Eastern Europe and the USSR in the European project. His participation in the Craxi government in 1983, the first directed by a socialist in Italy, was also due to the desire of counterbalancing, in the conception of the Eastern countries, the pro-Atlantic image of Craxi who played a very important role in the installation of the Euromissiles. According to Giorgio Petracchi: «A Foreign Minister interpreting a line of "national dignity" towards friends and allies was already a signal sent to the Eastern diplomacy, which considered Andreotti the privileged interlocutor among the Westerns» (Petracchi 2007, 283).

Actually, despite the differences of character, there was full understanding between Bettino Craxi and Andreotti about the foreign policy. Giuseppe Mammarella writes that the two politicians «integrated and supported each other, finding full understanding in European politics, but also in Middle East and above all they shared the aim of recovering and relaunching the Italian initiative and influence, which had decreased during the seventies as a result of the country's political and financial crisis (Mammarella 2010, 206).

Andreotti shared the Soviet policy which was against any change of the borders established by the Second World War and thus was also against the German reunification which he feared would endanger peace in Europe. In an interview-based book on his political master Alcide De Gasperi, published in January 1977, the Roman politician stated that also De Gasperi was against the reunification of Germany, and that «he considered absolutely immutable the demarcation lines established by the Second World War»; Andreotti added that even German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer secretly agreed (Andreotti 1977, 162).

Andreotti is well known for his public statements of September 13, 1984 when he strongly opposed the reunification of Germany (Scarano 2020, 89−94; Cuccia 2019, 137−258). The opposition to the German reunification was widespread among the European allies of West Germany, but the Italian Foreign Minister was the first to publicly express it. He feared serious dangers for peace if the German reunification had taken place against the Soviet Union and outside a European framework. Besides, the Italian diplomacy feared a decrease in the Italian role and importance in case of a united Germany. His declarations shocked and angered West Germany even if the two allied nations were able to overcome this moment of crisis between them. Italian Prime Minister Bettino Craxi didn't share Andreotti's opinion and he reaffirmed his commitment to the final goals of the Federal Republic of Germany (AAPBRD 2015, D. 236, 1093, D. 301, 1400−1403); Andreotti had to relativize his words saying that he too was not against the final goals of Bonn's policy and he condemned only the Pan-germanist activities of South Tyroleans extremists (Scarano 2020, 94).

The rise to power in the Soviet Union of Michail Sergeevič Gorbačëv with his policy of openness, democratization and his project of a Common European House seemed to enhance the Italian position. The Italians connected it with another important Italian goal: the progress of the European Integration, the enlargement of the EEC and the creation of a European and Monetary Union.

Gorbačëv's program of reform and Détente was hailed with particular emphasis in Italy by all political alignments, making it very popular in the Peninsula and also among the Christian Democrats and many conservatives (Gaja 1996, 243−244).

Andreotti and the Italian President Sandro Pertini, an elder socialist personality, had a first conversation with Gorbačëv already on the occasion of the funeral of his predecessor Konstantin Ustinovič Černenko in March 1985, during which they reaffirmed the importance of continuing the negotiations already fixed in Geneva for the reduction of armaments (Andreotti 1988, 223). The Italian Foreign Minister and the Prime Minister Bettino Craxi were the first Western leaders to visit Gorbačëv in Moscow, already in May 1985, just two months after his rise to power.

The Italian policy in that period had some different positions from the US, especially concerning the Middle East but also the Soviet Union. Italy had a moment of real confrontation with the United States regarding the well-known episode of the Sigonella airport, when the US military tried in vain to get the Palestinian hijackers of the Italian ship Achille Lauro where an American Jewish passenger had been killed. It was just an accident, but in that occasion an armed clash between US and Italian military was narrowly avoided (Craxi 2019).

In any case the Italians supported the American position in the Geneva negotiations and reiterated the importance of the security and unity among the western allies.

Even for the Strategic Defensive Initiative (SDI), Andreotti supported the US position despite his personal doubts: he advocated it in the Italian Parliament and Italy kept in close contact with the Germans for an appropriate common position (Andreotti 1989, 197−198).

The signing of the INF Treaty (The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty) on December 8, 1987 by Gorbačëv and the American president Ronald Reagan in Washington with the simultaneous dismantling of the Soviet SS 20 and the American Pershing and Cruise missiles was greeted with satisfaction by the Italians; Andreotti underlined how Italy had been the first country to endorse the "zero option" proposed by Reagan despite some perplexities from Italian military circles and those who feared that the creation of a US-USSR duopoly could be damaging to Italy (Ferraris 1996, 259).

Gorbačëv in his memoirs praises the role of Andreotti, whom he met in Moscow in February 1987, for trusting Soviet proposals and for his action in convincing both him and Reagan of the counterpart's willingness to find an agreement (Gorbatschow 1995, 658).

In October 1988 the new Prime Minister Ciriaco De Mita, accompanied by Andreotti, went to Moscow to encourage Italian investment in the USSR and even talked about a Marshall plan for the USSR clashing with the Italian ambassador in Moscow Sergio Romano who was skeptical of the success of Gorbačëv's reforms. Romano would be replaced by Ferdinando Salleo (Romano 2011, 2431–2465).

Like Gorbačëv and almost all of the world leaders the Italians were surprised by the fall of the Berlin Wall and by the collapse of the communist regimes in the East at the end of 1989. Andreotti's first official reaction to the fall of the wall invited to great prudence without expressing himself on the future, but inviting to keep a cool head. The position of the Prime Minister was different from that of other Christian Democratic politicians, but also of the Socialists Gianni De Michelis, Claudio Martelli, Craxi. All of them and the leader of the PCI Achille Occhetto expressed themselves in favor of respecting the right to self-determination for the Germans. The President of the Italian Republic Francesco Cossiga too, expressed «understanding for the legitimate right of the Germans to reunification», even if in a context of security for all the concerned States (Cuccia 2019, 255; Scarano 2020, 100).

At the first summit of the EEC States after the fall of the wall, on November 18 in Paris, the British Prime Minister Mrs. Margaret Thatcher expressed her unreconstructed opposition to the German reunification. Andreotti declared the importance of maintaining the alliances and the role of the CSCE to ensure the USSR too (Weidenfeld 1998, 89–95; Attali 1995, 342–344; Bozo 2005, 135–138; Mitterand 1996, 74–75; Kohl 2007, 984–985; Teltschick 1991, 37–38).

However, two weeks later, on November 26, Andreotti gave a long interview to the "Corriere della Sera", on the occasion of Gorbachev's imminent visit to Rome, in which he expressed his opposition to the German reunification as in 1984. He stressed the importance of helping the countries of Eastern Europe and the USSR to face their terrible economic crisis and stated that the European borders were immutable as established by the Helsinki Act: the existence of a single German nation, but made up of two different states, was a real fact and the question of

German unity had not to arise in the foreseeable future. He realized how this problem could escape a rational evaluation, but he hoped that a German reunification would not take place, otherwise a drag effect would have arisen and the entire post-war European arrangement could have been overwhelmed ("Corriere della Sera" 11/26/1989).

When Kohl announced his 10-points plan for the reunification of Germany on November 28, 1989, Gorbačëv was in Rome for his first visit as Soviet leader to Italy. A visit that reinforced its great popularity in the Peninsula.

Andreotti with his Foreign Minister Gianni De Michelis confirmed to Gorbačëv his surprise for the fall of the wall and he declared Kohl's program for reunification to be wrong and to have been determined by fallacious electoral calculations (SD, D. 57, 245−248; AGA, section Urss, b. 696, Appunto di Andreotti sul suo colloquio con Gorbaciov, Roma, n.d.). With considerable insight for the future harsh experiences of post-communist Russia, the Italian Prime Minister stated that it was not to be believed that the uncritically marrying of the capitalist system and free market politics was the "cure-all" for the issues of the economy. On the contrary, corrections were needed in the form of anti-trust laws and corresponding taxation. If these corrections didn't happen, the dictatorship of the capital, concentrated in a few hands, would have been achieved. Pope John Paul II himself – stated the prime minister – had told him that the biggest mistake would have been to totally erase what communist societies had done (SD, D. 57, 246). Andreotti's words on capitalism impressed Gorbachev so much that he reported them in his memoirs. (Gorbatschow 1995, 660).

Andreotti told in NATO and European Councils that he feared that a hasty reunification of Germany would have undermined the process of the Détente, embarrassed Gorbačëv and caused the resurgence of nationalisms with a strong danger for peace. He clashed with American President Bush and especially with Kohl (Zelikow et al. 1995, 133; Teltschick 1991, 364−367; Bozo 2005, 149−150; Mitterand 1997, 149−150; Kohl 2007, 1006−1008). The German Chancellor told him that if the Tiber divided Rome like the Spree divided Berlin he would have not talked in that way (Zelikov et al. 1995, 133). The Italian premier, however, would have soon joined French President François Mitterand's project of a united Germany more linked to Europe and to the creation of a single European currency with the withdrawal of the German mark, as well as with the transformation of the EEC into a European Union.

An early turning point in this sense was the EEC Summit in Strasbourg on December 8 and 9 1989. This confirmed, with the only negative vote casted by Mrs. Thatcher's Great Britain, that the conference to change the EEC Treaty and the moving to the final phase of Economic and Monetary Union would be held in December 1990 at the invitation of the rotating Italian presidency of the EEC. At the same summit, after a heated debate in the night, the European heads of government drafted a communiqué that affirmed the right of the German people to achieve their unity through self-determination. They emphasized that this had to be done peacefully and democratically in compliance with the agreements and treaties and with all the principles contained in the Helsinki Final Act; in the contexts of the East-West dialogue and cooperation and of the European integration (Bozo 2005, 154; DBPO 2010, XXII; Kohl 2007, 1013).

This final statement was the result of the joint work of French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas and German one Hans-Dieter Genscher (Heumann 2012, 236).

Andreotti tried to support Mrs. Thatcher's position, which wanted to include in the communiqué the inviolability of the borders in Europe, but in the end he approved it (Weidenfeld 1998, 148).

The Italian historian Antonio Varsori, in an important volume on Italy and the end of the Cold War, wrote that the Italian position was already emerging: «there would have been no opposition to a reunification, which in any case should have been implemented with prudence and always taking into account the wider international context, with the already existing multilateral cooperation structures − NATO, the CSCE and above all the EEC. These structures could have favored a peaceful transition towards a united Germany» (Varsori 2013, 32). Varsori added that Italy, a founding member of all the three organizations, hoped to be directly involved in the reunification process.

Genscher promptly explained the German position in his memoirs: "Mitterand's strategy of linking the German unification to the integration into the European Community met our conceptions and our interests. It alone created the conditions for the German unity to result in an advan-

tage for Europe and not a European problem. From now on we knew we had the EEC partners by our side" (Genscher 1995, 691).

At the same time Italian Foreign Minister Gianni De Michelis tried to develop Italy's relations with the Danube-Balkan area, planning to establish the so- called "Quadrangular Group" between Italy, Austria, Hungary and Yugoslavia (Varsori 2013, 27−28). This was an old plan of Aldo Moro, but it wasn't very successful.

On February 10, 1990, during two long meetings with Kohl in Moscow, Gorbačëv declared that it was Germans' business to determine the moment of unification and the way to get it, but without allowing to a united Germany to be part of the NATO (SD, D. 72, 317−337; DE, 795−811; Weidenfeld 1998, 237−247).

At the Ottawa's weapons control conference between 12 and 14 February 1990, taking place among all the 23 member states of the Atlantic Alliance and of the Warsaw Pact, the great powers and the Federal Republic decided to carry out the reunification process by the so-called 2 + 4 negotiations, i.e. the two German states with the four main winning powers of the Second World War that still had residual rights over Germany and especially over Berlin. Dutch Foreign Minister Hans van den Broek protested and demanded in vain that all NATO countries took part in the negotiations. He was supported by the Belgian and Luxembourg representatives and also – strongly – by De Michelis. Genscher, worried about the difficulties that this request would have provoked, ended the discussion by noting that the applicants were not part of the powers with rights over Germany and still less were one of the two German states. With a much quoted expression, he declared to De Michelis that he was not "part of the game" (Genscher 1995, 328−329; DF, D. 38, 218−222; DE, D. 50, 260−262).

Three days later, on February 17, 1990 at a meeting of the European Popular Party (EPP) in Pisa with Kohl, Andreotti declared that the geopolitical dimension had changed and that he was now favorable to the union of the two German states in the framework of three circles: the European Community, the NATO and the CSCE, the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which included the security interests of all European countries, including Russia, as well as the United States, and Canada (Cuccia 2019, 319−320; Scarano 2020).

Andreotti underlined his position in an interview published on February 27 by the German conservative newspaper "Die Welt" and by the Roman one "Il Tempo", with the significant title: "Giulio Andreotti: A reunified Germany will strengthen Europe as a whole". The Roman politician stated that it was necessary to redesign the role of the NATO and to foster the Soviet integration in Europe (Die Welt 27/2/1990 in AGA, section Germania, b. 458).

The Italians were also favorable to the permanence of a unified Germany into the NATO and Kohl expressed his thanks to Andreotti for the support on this issue (AGA, section Urss, b. 711, Lettera di Kohl ad Andreotti, Bonn 7/17/1990).

Andreotti met the Soviet leader in Moscow on July 26; shortly after that Gorbačëv, on July 16, 1990, gave to Kohl free hand for the permanence of a united Germany into the NATO (SD, D. 104, 470−488; DE, D. 353, 1355−1367). The Italian Prime Minister reiterated that the newly unified Germany must be tightly anchored in the EEC and in a greatly changed NATO to allay the fears of its neighbours. On that occasion, Gorbačëv asked Andreotti for economic help and the guest promised it also from the EEC (AGA, section URSS, b. 711, Appunti di Andreotti su visita a Mosca, 07/26/1990; SD, D. 108, 508−511; Gorbatschow 1995, 750).

The 2 + 4 talks ended with the signing in Moscow on September 12, 1990 of the Treaty on Reunification, officially known as the "Treaty for the final settlement concerning Germany". On October 3 the Treaty entered into force when the four victorious powers left their last rights over the city of Berlin. It was the first time in history that a large country was unified without wars and with the agreement and assent of all its neighbors

Italy was excluded from the negotiations for the German reunification, but it would have played an important role in the creation of the European Union in her capacity as current president of the EEC in the second half of 1990; it started the two European inter-governmental conferences: the first on European Monetary Union, the second on political integration (Lefebvre 2017, 231−264).

Emblematic was Andreotti's signature, as rotating president of the EEC, of the Paris Charter for a new Europe, in the hall of mirrors of Versailles, on November 21 1990, on the occasion of the Summit of the heads of state and government of the 34 States participating to

the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe that had been proposed at the Dublin European Council during the previous June.

The Charter of Paris finally marked the end of the clash between West and East and laid the foundations for a united Europe of law and democracy. According to the German diplomat Reinhard Bettzuege, the Charter represented the overcoming of the division of Germany, as part of the growth of all of Europe, in agreement with all her neighbours (DEDAA, D. 170, 675). A position which was shared by Italy.

Andreotti during the Cold War certainly feared German reunification and a resurgence of Pan-Germanism and Teutonic nationalism with which he had had dramatic experiences in Rome when the latter was occupied by Nazi Germany during the Second World War (Andreotti 1986, 64−62; Vommaro 2009).

Memories of the dramatic conflict also explain his concern about the consequences that a premature and anti-Soviet unification process could bring to the world's peace.

Andreotti had a broad and above all pro-European vision, the result of De Gasperi's teaching and of his profound Catholic faith, which made him consider the Détente and the relations with the Soviet Union as means to achieve the end of the Cold War and to include also Eastern Europe and the USSR in the European project (also in the name of Catholic universalism and in conjunction with Vatican policy). Unlike Mitterand, who had long predicted the German reunification for the end of the twentieth century, and who therefore only tried to regulate and direct it but never really opposed it (Mitterand 1996; Bozo 2005), Andreotti would have fully accepted it only after the approval of Moscow. It is therefore impossible to speak, as was often the case before the publication of French documents, of a position similar to that of the French president; in fact, it was something intermediate between the latter and Mrs. Thatcher's position. The Italian Prime Minister then accepted it with conviction as part of the growth of a European project. In addition to collaborating with Kohl along with Mitterand for the Maastricht Treaty, the Italian prime minister would have agreed completely with the chancellor on the need to send aid to the USSR. Both, together with the French president, tried in vain to obtain strong financial support for the USSR at the Summit of the seven most industrialized countries of the West held in Houston in July 1990 and in London in July 1991 (Andreotti 1996, 411−418). Andreotti's vision of including the German unification process in the process of European integration, but also in the NATO and the CSCE was particularly far-sighted. NATO was important to keep collaboration with the USA, to reassure them and to avoid a comeback to an unpredictable and potentially dangerous policy of a unified Germany.

However, for the Italian prime minister, the NATO should have been transformed and should have taken on another role, owing to the disappearance of the Soviet threat. Instead, the CSCE existed to reassure the Soviets, to tie them more and more to Europe and to ensure international cooperation (Appunto di Andreotti sui colloqui con Gorbaciov*,* Mosca, 11/26/1990, AGA, section Urss, b. 711). Andreotti, like Genscher and Kohl, was not in favor of an enlargement of the NATO to the East and even the Americans in the 2 + 4 negotiations had promised the Soviets several times not to implement this (NSA 2017), although there was no written commitment considering that the Warsaw Pact still existed. The Soviet leader wished the strengthening of the ties with Italy and France to re-balance the weight of a united Germany (Gorbatschow 1995, 750).

The importance of the relations with Italy for the Soviets was further demonstrated by the appointment in June as ambassador to Rome of the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Italianist Anatolij Adamishin; he was a strong supporter of the new course of Soviet foreign policy, and he left us an important testimony (Adamishin 1995). In September 1990, the Italian Foreign Minister De Michelis and the Soviet one Eduard Shevardnadze agreed on an Italian program of financial assistance to the USSR of 7,200 billion lire in 5 years (AGA, *Appunto del MAE,* Roma, July 1991, section Urss, b. 711).

On November 18, 1990, Gorbachev signed a treaty of friendship and collaboration between Italy and the USSR in Rome. It was the first of this kind with a NATO State (Gorbatschow 1995, 751).

The disappearance of the USSR in December 1991 was not hoped for by Andreotti who would have liked to avoid it and had tried to establish an ever-increasing relationship with it, even in the serious crisis of the first Gulf War in which Italy saw her attempts at mediation fail (Riccardi L. 2014). Italy tried to avoid the military intervention against Iraq in February 1991 and

pushed her partners to invite Gorbachev to the summit of the seven most industrialized Western countries on July 18, 1991, but Rome's wish to guarantee strong material support for the Soviet leader was not accepted. In October 1991, Italy too would have suspended credit to the USSR given the strong worsening of her internal political crisis (Adamishin 1995, 140−141, 165). In his quoted volume on Italian foreign policy from 1989 to 1992, Antonio Varsori pointed out that in those years Italy did not play a prominent role and had to follow decisions taken by others in all the most important issues: the reunification of Germany, the Gulf crisis, the Yugoslav one (Varsori 2013). However, even if not decisive, Andreotti's policy of dialogue and mediation with the USSR, within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance and friendship with the United States, certainly played a role in that process of Détente, opening and liberalization of Soviet society led by Gorbachev who was the main factor for the end of the Cold War, which ended – according to the US ambassador in Moscow Jack Matlock – as early as 1988 (Matlock 2004, 312).

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