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This special issue presents findings of the transnational research project "Crisis, Conflict and Critical Diplomacy: EU Perceptions in Ukraine, Israel and Palestine" (C³EU) (2015-2018) focusing on Ukraine-specific results. Articles by researchers from Ukraine, New Zealand, Sweden, Germany, Canada, and the United Kingdom combine approaches of cognitive and communicative linguistics with the provisions of communication and media studies, cultural studies, political science, studies of international relations and European integration.

For linguists, teachers, graduate students and undergraduates.

МІНІСТЕРСТВО ОСВІТИ І НАУКИ УКРАЇНИ

ХАРКІВСЬКИЙ НАЦІОНАЛЬНИЙ УНІВЕРСИТЕТ
імені В.Н. КАРАЗІНА

КОГНІЦІЯ, КОМУНІКАЦІЯ, ДИСКУРС

Напрямок "Філологія"

№ 17
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"Відносини між Україною та ЄС:
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Цей тематичний випуск журналу висвітлює результати міжнародного дослідницького проекту "Криза, конфлікт і критична дипломатія: сприйняття Євросоюзу Україною та Ізраїлем / Палестиною" (C^{3}EU) (2015-2018) в частині, пов'язаній з Україною. Статті дослідників з України, Нової Зеландії, Швеції, Німеччини, Канади, Великобританії об'єднують підходи когнітивної та комунікативної лінгвістики з положеннями комунікативних і медіа-студій, культурології, політології, досліджень міжнародних відносин і європейської інтеграції.

Для лінгвістів, викладачів, аспірантів та магістрантів.

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МИНИСТЕРСТВО ОБРАЗОВАНИЯ И НАУКИ УКРАИНЫ

ХАРЬКОВСКИЙ НАЦИОНАЛЬНЫЙ УНИВЕРСИТЕТ
имени В.Н. КАРАЗИНА

КОГНИЦИЯ, КОММУНИКАЦИЯ, ДИСКУРС

Направление «Филология»

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Этот тематический выпуск журнала освещает результаты международного исследовательского проекта "Кризис, конфликт и критическая дипломатия: восприятия Евросоюза Украиной и Израилем / Палестиной" (C³EU) (2015-2018) в части, связанной с Украиной. Статьи исследователей из Украины, Новой Зеландии, Швеции, Германии, Канады, Великобритании объединяют подходы когнитивной и коммуникативной лингвистики с положениями коммуникативных и медиа-студий, культурологии, политологии, исследований международных отношений и европейской интеграции.

Для лингвистов, преподавателей, аспирантов и магистрантов.

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POLITICAL IMAGES AND PERCEPTIONS
AT THE INTERDISCIPLINARY CROSSROADS
Introduction to the Special Issue
"Ukraine—EU Relations:
Verbal Narratives, Images, and Perceptions"

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Natalia Chaban, Svitlana Zhabotynska. Political images and perceptions at the interdisciplinary crossdoards. Introduction to the Special Issue "Ukraine—EU Relations: Verbal Narratives, Images, and Perceptions". This special issue presents findings of the transnational research project "Crisis, Conflict and Critical Diplomacy: EU Perceptions in Ukraine, Israel and Palestine" (C^{3}EU) (2015-2018) focusing on Ukraine-specific results [C^{3}EU, online]. Supported by the Erasmus+ of European Commission, C^{3}EU united experienced and early careers scholars into a research team of 36 who studied and facilitated best practice in EU perceptions research. The results of the project contributed to policy debates on EU global and regional governance and fostered academic-policy-makers' dialogues in Ukraine and the EU. Leading to this extensive outreach to the stakeholders, the C^{3}EU research consortium had consolidated academic excellence by gathering linguistic and non-linguistic information, and producing comprehensive and methodologically rigorous analyses of EU perceptions and narratives in Ukraine and Israel/Palestine reflecting major societal challenges. The articles published in this special issue focused on perceptions and images exposed in narratives on the EU, Ukraine and EU—Ukraine relations are interdisciplinary. They combine methodologies of cognitive and communicative linguistics with the findings of communication and media studies, cultural studies, political science, international relations, and European integration studies.

Key words: C^{3}EU, political images and perceptions, narratives, the EU, Ukraine, interdisciplinary research.

Наталія Чабан, Світлана Жаботинська. Політичні образи та сприйняття на міждисциплінарному перехресті. Вступ до тематичного випуску "Відносини між Україною та ЄС: вербальні наративи, образи та сприйняття". Цей тематичний випуск журналу містить доробок міжнародного дослідницького проекту "Криза, конфлікт та критична дипломатія: сприйняття Євросоюзу Україною та Ізраїлем / Палестиною" (C^{3}EU) (2015-2018) у частині, пов'язаною з Україною [C^{3}EU, online]. Проект C^{3}EU, підтриманий програмою Єврокомісії "Еразмус+", поєднав 36 досвідчених та молодих фахівців, які у своєму дослідженні послуговувалися сучасними досягненнями студій, присвячених сприйняттю ЄС. Результати проекту стали внеском у дебати стосовно участі ЄС у регуляції глобальних і локальних процесів та стимулювали науково обґрунтований діалог між політичними колами України та ЄС. Орієнтований на отримання конкретних практичних результатів, дослідницький колектив C^{3}EU намагався досягти академічної якості шляхом опрацювання мовних та позамовних даних за допомогою ретельно розробленого методологічного апарату, який дозволяє виявити особливості сприйняття ЄС в Україні та Ізраїлі / Палестині з урахуванням основних суспільних викликів сучасності. Статті, опубліковані в цьому тематичному номері, присвяченому сприйняттю та

образам ЄС, України та відносинам між ними, є міждисциплінарними. Воно поєднують методологічні положення когнітивної та комунікативної лінгвістики із положеннями комунікативних і медійних студій, культурології, політології, а також студій у галузях міжнародних відносин та європейської інтеграції.

Ключові слова: C³EU, політичні образи та сприйняття, наративи, ЄС, Україна, міждисциплінарне дослідження.

Наталья Чабан, Светлана Жаботинская. Политические образы и восприятия на междисциплинарном перекрестке. Введение к тематическому выпуску "Отношения между Украиной и ЕС: вербальные нарративы, образы и восприятия". Этот тематический выпуск журнала представляет результаты международного исследовательского проекта "Кризис, конфликт и критическая дипломатия: восприятия Евросоюза Украиной и Израилем / Палестиной" (C³EU) (2015-2018) в части, связанной с Украиной [C³EU, online]. Проект C³EU, поддержанный программой Еврокомиссии "Эразмус+", объединил 36 опытных и молодых специалистов, которые в своем исследовании руководствовались современными достижениями студий, посвященных восприятию ЕС. Результаты проекта стали вкладом в дебаты относительно участия ЕС в регуляции глобальных и локальных процессов, а также стимулировали научно обоснованный диалог между политическими кругами Украины и ЕС. Ориентированный на получение конкретных практических результатов, исследовательский коллектив C³EU стремился достичь академического качества путем обработки языковых и неязыковых данных с помощью тщательно разработанного методологического аппарата, позволяющего выявить особенности восприятия ЕС в Украине и Израиле / Палестине с учетом основных общественных проблем современности. Статьи, опубликованные в этом тематическом выпуске, посвященном восприятиям и образам ЕС, Украины и отношений между ними, являются междисциплинарными. Они объединяют методологические положения когнитивной и коммуникативной лингвистики с положениями коммуникативных и медийных студий, культурологии, политологии, равно как и студий в области международных отношений и европейской интеграции.

Ключевые слова: C³EU, политические образы и восприятия, нарративы, ЕС, Украина, междисциплинарные исследования.

1. Introduction

Ukraine post Maidan has become one of the major theatres of contention in Europe. Dramatic events of the Revolution of Dignity in 2013-2014 demonstrated to the world Ukraine's geopolitical choice to move closer to Europe. These events also opened a new uneasy chapter in the history of the country. Tragic deaths on Maidan, annexation of the Crimean Peninsula, unfolding of the Donbass war, downing of the passenger plane MH17 over Eastern Ukraine, and the most recent escalation of tensions in the Azov Sea followed. Simultaneously, Ukraine's economy and political system faced the urgent need to reform and modernise. These events and developments confronted regional and international security and stability and challenged the EU's leadership in the region and its foreign policy focus on the exercise of global political and economic stewardship. In this light, a mutual understanding with its neighbours is vital.

The Special Issue "Ukraine—EU relations: verbal narratives, images and perceptions" presents findings and methods of the transnational research project "Crisis, Conflict and Critical Diplomacy: EU Perceptions in Ukraine, Israel and Palestine" (C³EU) (2015-2018) focusing on Ukraine-specific results [C³EU, online]. Supported by the Erasmus+ of European Commission, C³EU united experienced and early careers scholars into a research team of 36 who studied and facilitated best practice in EU perceptions research. The results of the project contributed to policy debates on EU global and regional governance and fostered academia-policy-makers dialogues in Ukraine and the EU. Leading to this extensive outreach to the stakeholders, the C³EU research consortium had consolidated academic excellence by gathering information and producing comprehensive and methodologically rigorous analyses of EU perceptions and narratives in Ukraine and Israel/Palestine reflecting major societal challenges.

Perception, images and narratives on the EU, Ukraine and EU-Ukraine relations are the main themes of this Special Issue.

The C^{3}EU project focused on EU visions in a society traumatised by war and civil unrest and gathered comprehensive systematic data. Respectively, contributions to the Special Issue informed by findings, methods and theories of the project build and exchange knowledge across such issue-areas as perceptions of the EU, Ukraine and EU-Ukraine relations in the issue-areas of defence and security, economy, investment, business, research, innovation, culture, education, tourism, environment, climate change, migration, norms and values. Contributions to the Special Issue also position the EU in the broader narratives of Europe in Ukraine rooted in historical and cultural visions and examine how those views can be incorporated into successful EU-Ukraine relationship. The Special Issue also aims to facilitate a better understanding of EU global actorness – and specifically understanding of the EU as an effective actor in its Eastern neighbourhood. EU Global Strategy of 2016, the leading policy that guides EU external relations, prescribed a priority to the EU's relations with its neighbours to the East and South [EUGS 2016]. Yet, the EU is presently trialled by its own multiple crises. With both actors facing existential crises, our Special Issue presents a timely reflection on the role of perceptions and narratives in EU-Ukraine relations represented in different kinds of political and media discourses.

The story of Ukraine—EU relations may be told from different standpoints. For many scholars understanding of this relationship is ultimately about a story of power, geopolitical interests and conflict. Our Special Issue takes on board these considerations, yet proposes a different way to think about this relationship – through a range of meanings attached to it by actors inside Ukraine (decision-, policy- and opinion-makers as well as the media) and outside it. The latter perspective includes in this Volume views from Ukraine's neighbours to the West (the EU and its Member States) and to the East (Russia). This two-prong approach to the study of images and perceptions of EU-Ukraine relations is intentional. On the one hand, the insight into the domestic set of perceptions and narratives circulating in various discourses allows tracing Ukraine-specific "interface between the political fantasies of people, information flows, public reasoning and government policies" [Horbyk 2017: 25]. On the other hand, the insight into the external images and perceptions of EU-Ukraine relations – coming from the EU/EU Member States and Russia in our cases – opens an opportunity for comparison and thus a more comprehensive understanding how the meaning flows. After all, the images of "Europe" and Ukraine in it come to life through perpetual interactions with external "Others" – to the West and to the East of Ukraine.

2. Theoretical framework

The Special Issue recognises the need to understand interactions between Self and Other from a comprehensive theoretical position. Importantly, theoretical reflections on the Self-Other interactions have already informed existing research in the field of EU external perception (see [Chaban and Holland 2014; 2018]). This theoretical model – inspired by conceptualisation from social identity, cultural and communication studies – guides our Special Issue. This theoretical model takes a somewhat different take on Othering as understood by Hall [1997], who was focussing specifically on the racial difference. He explained the construction of difference through "the set of representational practices known as stereotyping" [p. 257], or making sense of the world through simplification, reduction and exaggeration of difference (see also [Horbyk 2017: 70]). Chaban and Holland [2014; 2018] instead put at the core of their model the concept of the *responsive Other* when considering the EU's external relations with actors around the world. With the concept of "Other" bringing into consideration "both those involved in the process of Othering as well as the object of this process" [Pickering 2001: 69], the notion of *responsive Other* also stresses on the agency of the Other. From this vantage point, images and perceptions

of EU-Ukraine relations existing inside and outside Ukraine feed into the reception and ultimately, actions towards each other. Founded on this theoretical premise, contributions to the Special Issue aspire to bear relevance to international relations. We carry a hope that results of our systematic multidisciplinary research into images and perceptions – and meanings forming them – will help the EU and Ukraine engage with each other in a respectful and understanding way, maximise reception of messages in key policy areas and ensure joint action for mutual benefit. Significantly, the notion of *responsive Other* is argued to be instrument in overcoming one of the main limitations of EU foreign policy scholarship – its Euro-centric character [Chaban and Holland 2018].

Theorisation of Self-Other interactions proposed by Chaban and Holland [2014; 2018] for the study of EU perceptions also argues "degrees and shades" of "Otherness" since identity is "dependent on the difference that has been translated into Otherness" [Pickering 2001: 49]. Respectively, contributions to the Special Issue reflect on the complexity of the "imaginary geography" of Ukraine. Is it seen to belong to the so-called "European" space? If yes, is Ukraine recognised as Eastern or Central Europe? Is it "European enough"? Or is it seen as a "backyard" of Russia, a natural part of the so called "Eurasia"? And what about the "shades of otherness" inside Ukraine divided by the ongoing conflict in the East? The imaginary geography is not only about Ukraine's actual place on the map – it is about adopting certain norms and values that the "space" is imagined to possess. In the Special Issue, we expect that images and perceptions of EU-Ukraine relations will be location-, cohort- and time-specific (see also [Chaban *et al*. 2013; Chaban and Magdalina 2014]). Depending on the vantage point, the meaning assigned to each other or the perceived relationship between the two in the areas of political, economic, social or normative exchanges will vary. Perceptions of the Other are also issue-specific: "the same external actor can see different 'shades' of the EU's 'Otherness' simultaneously – e.g. a promising trading partner, yet a distant normative reference and an inward-oriented political interlocutor" [Chaban and Holland 2018: 8].

The model by Chaban and Holland [2014; 2018] also proposes four possible outcomes of the interactions between Self and Other: 1) appreciation and respect of the Other; 2) positive and voluntary changes in the Self's identity due to the respect and appreciation of the Other; 3) the negation of the Other; and 4) an active rejection and consolidation of the self-views against the Other. The four outcomes stem from the scholarship of intersubjectivity. According to Peeren and Horskotte [2007: 11], interactions between the Self and the Other may lead to either a "productive reformulation of identity and a generous, respectful relation to alterity … [or] … a negating reaction or a rigid entrenchment of the self". Contributions to the Special Issue demonstrate how meanings of EU-Ukraine relations – explicated through images and perceptions in various discourses – are distributed between the four options. The meanings are expected to be different between "those who fought for [Europe], for those who fought against it, and for those who watched from afar with either compassion or indifference" [Horbyk 2017: 29].

The final premise of the theory of Othering is that interaction between Self and Other is a powerful instrument that "may help each participant to learn more about themselves" [Chaban and Holland 2018: 8]. With both the EU and Ukraine facing existential crises of a political, socio-economic and security nature, a systematic account of mutual perceptions of EU-Ukraine relations present an opportunity to revisit their own self-images and self-narratives and to overcome their own limitations. Finally, Chaban and Holland [2014: 14] argued that the views of the Other are revealing about the Self: simply, "[A] systematic and comprehensive account of how various global actors view the EU will inform the EU about those actors at a more subtle 'first-hand' level". The same true for the EU's partners, including Ukraine. The EU's (or Russia's) images of Ukraine reveal the actor's own primary concerns. What the EU (or Russia) imagine about Ukraine reveals what these actors themselves care about the most.

The Othering model is instrumental to understanding what kind of Other the EU and Ukraine are for each other. This is especially useful at critical times. Contributions to the Special Issue will explore how the actors inside and outside Ukraine recognise and appreciate each other – whether they see each other worthy of engagement in policy dialogues and influential enough to evoke changes among the receivers' identities. Contributions also pinpoint the ways in which images and perceptions tell us a story of negative attitudes and rejection.

3. Research design and choices

The Special Issue draws on the expertise of meaning and perceptions research, utilising existing academic connections, successful structures, tested methods and innovative theoretical models. Importantly, our focus on meaning in our understanding of Ukraine—EU relations prescribes a close attention to language (words and visual images) and representations through language. According to Stuart Hall [1997: 22], "representation means using language to say something meaningful about, or to represent, the world meaningfully, to other people". Hall also postulates that the "meaning is constructed at the moment of both its expression and reception, enabling in this way a multitude of possible understandings and negotiated uses of text" [Hall 1980/2001 cited in Horbyk 2017: 36-37]. A similar notion of formulation/projection and reception of the narratives in international relations appears later in the strategic narrative theory [Miskimmon *et al.* 2013]. Guided by these understandings and by the theory of Self-Other interactions in the field of perceptions studies discussed above, contributions to the Special Issue are necessarily multi- and inter-disciplinary. They engage with theories, concepts and/or methods that relate to the scholarship of text and discourse in a broad sense and thus build bridges across several disciplines – cognitive and communicative linguistics, communication and media studies, cultural studies, political science, international relations, and European integration studies.

Reflective of this multidisciplinary setting, the Special Issue also engages with a diverse pool of empirical evidence. It considers Hall's encoding/decoding scheme [1986/2001] that calls to account for the construction of meaning both as expression and reception. Several contributions analyse official discourses and policy documents that formulate and project official positions of actors. In addition, several articles explore meanings communicated by influential news media. Such media are credited with ability to create a shared space for meaning circulation in a given society and thus impact public's imagination about external relations and foreign policy choices. Reflecting on the changing media landscape, contributions also explore Internet and social media productions. Other contributions undertake analysis of the texts of interviews with policy-, decision- and opinion-makers. Analysis of their views dispositions is critical when researching meanings on EU-Ukraine relations circulating inside and outside Ukraine. The individuals in these positions – sometimes called "elites" – are argued to be "transnational moral entrepreneurs" who are required to "mobilise popular opinion and political support both within their country and abroad", "stimulate and assist in the creation of likeminded organisations in other countries", and "play a significant role in elevating their objectives beyond its identification with the national interests of their government" [Nadelmann 1990: 482].

Multiple sources of data mean that the authors are employing a range of methods for data collection and analysis. Many contributions employ a mixed-method approach, combining rich qualitative interpretive analysis weaving into it techniques of quantitative analysis. Qualitative methods aim at identifying leading themes of EU-Ukraine relations within political, socio-economic, cultural, historical and normative contexts and discourses. These methods are of special value when nuances in meaning formation and circulation are of paramount importance. Quantitative methods assist with detecting more general patterns and dynamic regularities of the findings, especially when a study deals with voluminous samples.

Robust multi-disciplinary setting of the Special Issue leads to multiple theories, sources of empirical evidence and methods show-cased in each contribution. The multiple perspectives

provide readers with references to cross-check the meanings and engage with comparisons thus warranting the validity and reliability of research findings presented. Validity and reliability are further enhanced by the comparative approach undertaken by contributors – across sources of evidence, locations and time periods. This is in addition to comparisons between internal (domestic to Ukraine) and external (outside of Ukraine) meanings.

4. Structure of the Special Issue

The external perception of Ukraine—EU relations is represented by three perspectives: those of the EU, Germany and Russia.

The EU perception of its relations with Ukraine is discussed in the article *"Constructing bridges and fostering growth: Interdisciplinary insights into European Union role conceptions and prescriptions"* by Natalia Chaban (University of Canterbury, New Zealand) and Ole Elgström (Lund University, Sweden). In their focus are official EU discourses, namely texts of EU Global Strategy (June 2016) and the Official Memorandum of the EU Summit on the Eastern Partnership (EaP) (November 2017), as well as texts of 12 interviews with EU practitioners dealing with Ukraine (conducted in Brussels in 2017 within the C3EU framework). The authors test a novel theoretical synergy. They link a leading cognitive science theory of conceptual metaphor [Lakoff and Johnson 1980] to a role theory [Harnisch *et al.* 2011; Holsti 1970] well-established in international relations scholarship. The developed theoretical framework is applied to investigate the EU's role conceptions and projections towards its Eastern Neighbourhood, and Ukraine specifically. Using the tool of conceptual metaphor, the authors systemically explore the EU's role conception (self-image) as well as its perception and expectations of the Eastern Partnership (role prescriptions).

The article also analyses cognitive and emotive elements in the EU's foreign policy roles. Therefore, the methodological innovation based on the notion of conceptual metaphors reveals fundamental cognitive and emotional traits central to the roles played by actors.

The perceptions of Ukraine—EU relations by Germany and Russia as the two major players in European politics are studied in the article *"Frames and Images Facing Ukraine: Comparing Germany's and Russia's Media Perceptions of EU Relations with Ukraine"* by Katharina Kleinschnitger, Michèle Knodt (both of TU Darmstadt, Germany) and Nadiya Safonova (Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada). Germany and Russia are the members of the conflict negotiation quartet within the Minsk Format. For both, Ukraine is a key geopolitical interlocutor in Europe. The article explores the framing of Ukraine—EU relations by the leading German and Russian newspapers that reported the EU—EaP summits in a historical period between 2009 and 2015. The Summit of 2009 initiated implementation of the EaP policy, and the Summit of 2015 responded to Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea. While the leaders of the EU (including Germany) and Ukraine have committed to deepening political association and economic integration of Ukraine with the EU, Ukraine's close ties with Russia appear to be waning, and Russia's resistance to Ukraine's *rapprochement* with the EU is growing. The authors, who employ the cascading activation framing theory [Entman 2003, 2004] popular in media and communication studies, consider the concept of framing and propose an innovative method that operationalizes this concept. The analysis of empirical data draws contrasting pictures. Within the same observation period, interactions between the EU and Ukraine are framed in much more cooperative terms in the German press, while the Russian media, perhaps predictably, creates and disseminates an increasingly negative and conflicted frame over time.

The other contributions to this Special Issue explore internal perceptions of Ukraine—EU relations exposed in different kinds of texts: official documents of the Ukrainian government, interviews with representatives of Ukrainian elites, publications of Ukrainian influential newspapers and web-based media, as well as small stories written by Ukrainian Facebook users. These diverse sources of data enable exposure of stances taken by different societal groups – the Ukrainian

authorities, the leaders of particular societal domains, the newspaper makers who shape public opinion, and the public *per se*. In the articles of this Special Issue, perceptions of Ukraine—EU relations existing in a particular societal group are considered either as coherent system or as a particular aspect of such a system.

In the article *"Constructing a narrative of European Integration in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine: A Corpus-Based Discourse Analysis"* Hanna Kryvenko (Kyiv National Linguistics University, Ukraine) turns to the analysis the official website of the Ukrainian Parliament (Verkhovna Rada). Guided by the assumption that social transformations constitute and are constituted by discourse, the author maitains that discursive construction of European integration is an essential part of public policy making as well as shaping socially shared knowledge and attitudes in Ukraine. At the same time, European integration as a discursive construct is subject to modification in the course of time and / or in different settings of institutional communication. The article has two objectives: to reveal how consistently European integration has been constructed in discursive practices of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine in the 21st century, and to contribute to elaboration of a corpus-based methodology applicable for analyzing discourses of social change over time in the Ukrainian language. A combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches is employed to treat the data coming from an *ad hoc* built electronic corpus of the texts published on the official website of the Verkhovna Rada between 2002 and 2017. The findings include patterns of naming and reference to European integration as well as the distribution and dynamics of their usage within the observed period. The exposed modifications in the discursive construction of European integration are interpreted with respect to a wider socio-political context.

The article by Alister Miskimmon (Queen's University, Belfast, UK) and Ben O'Loughlin (Royal Holloway, University of London, UK) *"An EU recovery programme for Ukraine? Towards a new narrative for EU—Ukraine relations?"* address a rising need for a clearer articulation of EU-Ukraine relations in general, and of EU economic aid to Ukraine in particular. They do so by exploring perceptions and narratives among Ukrainian elites: politicians, business leaders, media professionals, civil society and cultural leaders (data gathered in 50 semi-structured key informant interviews conducted in 2016-2017 within the C3EU framework). The authors propose an innovative synergy of the strategic narrative theory [Miskimmon *et al*. 2013] and the agent-transformation theory, thus creating a novel conceptual template to understand generation and reception of the narratives when society faces a major change. In particular, the article dissects the narrative of the EU's 'Marshal Plan' for Ukraine circulating among Ukrainian decision- and policy-makers, and explore the myths devoid of details and historical memory. The myth is defined following Levi-Strauss' [1955: 430-431] seminal definition which underlines the importance of language: myth "is language, functioning on an especially high level where meaning succeeds practically at 'taking off' from the linguistic ground on which it keeps rolling". The authors also follow Barthes' [2009: 169] premise for whom "myth is constituted by the loss of the historical quality of things: in it, things lose the memory that they once were made". Ultimately, the authors question the value of a vision: does is serve to inspire or mislead in the age of low trust in leaders, experts and institutions to guide change to the collective benefit? They argue that in transformational projects (and Ukraine is one of those), it is important first to act according to a general principle, and then build a strategic narrative to legitimize that action later.

Perceptions of Ukrainian elites are again in focus in the contribution by Yevheniia Hobova (A.Yu. Krymskyi Institute of Oriental Studies, Ukranian Academy of Sciences, Ukraine). Her article *"East-West dichotomy in the context of Ukrainian conflict resolution"* analyses EU perceptions among Ukrainian representative of five decision-making cohorts (political, business, media, cultural and leader spheres). Adding to the multidisciplinary thrust of the Special Issue, Hobova engages with the cultural studies hypothesis of orientalism [Said 1978], as well as the concept of cultural geography of "imaginary borders". Specifically, she explores cognitive mapping of the world within the coordinates of East *vs*. West from the Ukrainian perspective. The article

employs Said's prediction that a Western knowledge of the Eastern world inevitably carries a negative connotation – a vision that interprets Othering as the process of "ascribing a rigid, reified and essentialised identity to the East, both idealised and demonised" [Horbyk 2017: 69, elaborating Said's argument]. The author uses this hypothesis to test the existence of contrasting images of the West and the East in the conflict narrative among Ukrainian elites. The study inquiries: Where is the line that divides these "spaces"? What countries constitute the "East"? What countries typically represent the "West"?; and finally, How does the Russia-Ukraine conflict affect the perceived division? The article also hypothesizes that an internalized 'othering' may be present within Ukraine's borders (due to the ongoing conflict in the East). However, the findings disprove this prediction. Interviewees demonstrated preference for peaceful resolution of the conflict and showed no prejudice or 'othering' of Eastern and/or Western regions. Other results show that Ukrainian elites share a sense of closeness with Eastern European countries due to historical and cultural ties as well as modern day partnership. Relations with Russia are seen in ambiguous terms despite the armed conflict in the East and the annexation of Crimea.

In the article by Viktor Velivchenko (Bohdan Khmelnitsky National University of Cherkasy, Ukraine / University of Canterbury, New Zealand) "*Donbas crisis key actors: narratives and perceptions in the interviews of Ukrainian elites*", the empirical data, collected in the course of the C³EU project in 2016-17, comes from 40 elite interviews with political, business, civil society and cultural leaders of Ukraine. Adding to the strategic narrative theorisation, the article considers intersections between the concept of narrative used in international relations studies, in linguistics and semiotics. The article positions Ukrainian elite at the overlap of two narrative projections – the internal one (Ukraine's 'European choice') and external ones, concerned with the EU (including the Normative Power Europe narrative). The analysis of elite perceptions of Ukraine's dyadic interactions, with the EU / EU member states, the US and Russia as the key actors in the Donbas crisis, aims to expose the constructed images of these actors. Methodologically, the article studies the interview texts with a three step protocol: 1) identification of denotational and connotational meanings of relevant words; 2) analysis of sentences in terms of direct and indirect (metaphoric) meanings with positive or negative assessments; and 3) propositional content-analysis. The results spell the need for a more nuanced understanding of Ukraine's perceptions of the respective key actors involved in the ongoing conflict, as well as understanding the origin of these perceptions, which is beneficial for the EU's critical diplomacy towards Ukraine.

The articles that consider portraying of Ukraine—EU relations in different kinds of media integrate the linguistic findings of the Conceptual Metaphor Theory [Lakoff and Johnson 1980] with the contribution of other theories developed inside and outside linguistics.

In the article "*Images of Ukraine—EU relations in conceptual metaphors of Ukrainian mass media*" Svitlana Zhabotynska (Bohdan Khmelnitsky National University of Cherkasy, Ukraine) explicates a coherent system of conceptual metaphors used to describe Ukraine—EU relations. The conceptual metaphors are reconstructed via analysis of metaphorical expressions employed by eight influential Ukrainian newspapers across political continuum: *Holos Ukrainy, Uriadovyi Kurier, Den', Dzerkalo Tyzhnya, Gazeta Po-Ukrains'ky, Segodnya, Ukraina Moloda,* and *Kommmentarii* observed in January-June, 2016. The study is detailing the metaphorical categorizations that serve to describe two key issue-areas of Ukraine—EU relations – those of politics and economy. The author show-cases the original innovative methodology intended for exposure and characterization of conceptual metaphors inferred from multiple linguistic data [Zhabotynska 2016]. Based on the conceptual metaphor theory [Lakoff and Johnson 1980], the proposed methodology represents an algorithm for processing multiple metaphorical expressions used in a thematically coherent discourse. Application of this algorithm allows to grasp the totality of metaphorical images of the EU, Ukraine and their relations, enables an in-depth study of the target and source conceptual domains, and a thorough account of their cross-mapping influenced by the discourse type. The reconstructed system of conceptual metaphors exposes Ukraine's stance on its relations with the EU, and the workings of conceptual metaphors as instruments for exerting influence on the public.

The conceptual metaphor theory also informs contribution by Olena Morozova (V. Karazin Kharkiv National University) *"The influence of context on the metaphoric framing of the European Union in Ukrainian mass media"*. In it, the author takes a somewhat different route to the article by Zhabotynska and shows how conceptual metaphors used to describe the EU by Ukrainian print media (the data collected from the eight newspapers observed in the C³EU project) can impose a narrative structure on the perception of this domain. Theoretical innovation of the article lies in the synergy between conceptual metaphor theory [Lakoff and Johnson 1980] and discourse metaphor theory [Cameron and Deignan 2006; Semino 2008; Musolff 2006; 2007]. The study argues that specificity of the use of metaphors in Ukrainian mass media suggests preference for specific socio-cultural values and may even include contrastive conceptualizations.

5. Conclusions

Contributions to the Special Issue aim to demonstrate nuanced mechanisms behind meanings of EU-Ukraine relations circulated in different discourses inside and outside Ukraine. They explore how certain images and perceptions of EU-Ukraine relations capture imagination of differing target groups and ask what they may mean for Ukraine and the EU, now and in the future. Findings demonstrate differing perceptions among target elite audiences and media discourses inside and outside Ukraine. Factoring these nuanced findings, contributions outline conditions for local (Ukrainian) partners to become more open to cooperation with the EU. They map topics relevant for the location in crisis where the EU could exercise the most impact; and identify regional *vs.* global trends and opportunities for the EU's leadership to reconceptualise its critical diplomacy and revisit the EU's image and credibility in Ukraine.

Ultimately, the Special Issue invites scholars who study images and narratives in international relations; EU global actorness, governance and leadership; European Neighbourhood Policy; and conflict, as well as media, cognitive and image studies to engage with perceptions research in a cross-sectoral, multidisciplinary and transnational setting. The *multidisciplinary reflections* are they key to facilitate an understanding of the EU's changing international role and foreign policy challenges in its immediate geo-political region. Multidisciplinarity is also the pathway to identify what can influence behaviour and attitudes amongst key audiences and serve as a reference for future EU policies towards Ukraine.

6. Acknowledgements

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UDC 81'42

CONSTRUCTING BRIDGES AND FOSTERING GROWTH: INTERDISCIPLINARY INSIGHTS INTO EUROPEAN UNION ROLE CONCEPTIONS AND PRESCRIPTIONS

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Natalia Chaban, Ole Elgström. Constructing bridges and fostering growth: Interdisciplinary insights into European Union conceptions and perceptions. This article studies the EU's role conceptions and projections towards its Eastern Neighbourhood, and Ukraine specifically. Informed by the novel focus on narratives and emotions in International Relations (IR) theory and in EU foreign policy studies, we propose an innovative interdisciplinary synergy between IR's role theory [Harnisch *et al.* 2011; Holsti, 1970] and cognitive linguistics' conceptual metaphor theory [Lakoff and Johnson 1980]. Using the tool of conceptual metaphor, we systemically explore the EU's role conception (self-image) as well as its perception and expectations of the Eastern partners (role prescriptions). In doing so, we put forward a new method to systemically analyse cognitive and emotive elements in the EU's foreign policy roles based on the notion that conceptual metaphors reveal fundamental cognitive and emotional traits central to the roles actors play. Empirically, we analyse the EU Global Strategy (June 2016) and the EU Eastern Partnership (EaP) Summit's Official Memorandum (November 2017), as well as 12 interviews with EU practitioners dealing with Ukraine (conducted in 2017).

Key words: the EU, Ukraine, the EU Global Strategy, Eastern Partnership, conceptual metaphor, role conception, role prescription.

Наталія Чабан, Оле Елгстрьом. Наводимо мости та сприяємо зростанню: міждисциплінарний підхід до розуміння та сприйняття Європейського Союзу. У цій статті розглядаються концептуалізації ролей ЄС та їхня проекція на його політику Східного сусідства, зокрема на відносини з Україною. З огляду на нові акценти, які з'явилися у студіюванні нартивів та емоцій в рамках теорії міжнародних відносин (МВ) та досліджень зовнішньої політики ЄС, ми пропонуємо інноваційне міждисциплінарне поєднання теорії ролей у МВ [Harnisch *et al.* 2011; Holsti, 1970] та теорії концептуальної метафори, розробленої в когнітивній лінгвістиці [Lakoff and Johnson 1980]. Послуговуючись інструментарієм концептуальної метафори, ми пропонуємо системний аналіз розуміння ролей ЄС (розуміння ним самого себе), а також сприйняття ЄС (його ролей) східними партнерами, супроводжуване їхніми очікуваннями. При цьому ми започатковуємо методику системного дослідження когнітивних та емотивних складників ролей, виконуваних ЄС у реалізації його зовнішньої політики. Ця методика спирається на припущення, за яким концептуальні метафори експлікують основоположні когнітивні та емотивні ознаки, якими наділені виконувані актантами ролі. Емпіричною базою дослідження є Глобальна стратегія ЄС (червень 2016) та офіційний меморандум саміту Східного партнерства (листопад 2017), а також 12 інтерв'ю з посадовцями ЄС, задіяними у розбудові відносин між ЄС та Україною.

Ключові слова: ЄС, Україна, Глобальна стратегія ЄС, Східне партнерство, концептуальна метафора, розуміння ролей, сприйняття ролей.

Наталья Чабан, Оле Элгстрём. Строим мосты и способствуем росту: междисциплинарный подход к пониманию и восприятию Европейского Союза. В данной статье рассматриваются

концептуализации ролей ЕС и их проекция на его политику Восточного соседства, в частности, на отношения с Украиной. Принимая во внимания новые акценты, появившиеся в исследовании нарративов и эмоций в рамках теории международных отношений (МО) и в рамках студий, посвященных внешней политике ЕС, мы предлагаем инновационный междисциплинарный синтез теории ролей в МО [Harnisch *et al.* 2011; Holsti, 1970] и теории концептуальной метафоры, разработанной в когнитивной лингвистике [Lakoff and Johnson 1980]. Использование инструментария теории концептуальной метафоры позволяет предложить системный анализ понимания ролей ЕС (понимание им самого себя), а также восприятия ЕС (его ролей) восточными партнерами, сопровождаемого их ожиданиями. При этом мы вводим в обиход методику системного исследования когнитивных и эмотивных составляющих ролей, исполняемых ЕС в реализации его внешней политики. Эта методика опирается на предположение, согласно которому концептуальные метафоры эксплицируют основополагающие когнитивные и эмотивные характеристики, присущие ролям, исполняемым актантами. Эмпирической базой исследования является Глобальная стратегия ЕС (июнь 2016), официальный меморандум саммита Восточного партнерства (ноябрь 2017), а также 12 интервью с должностными лицами ЕС, задействованными в развитии отношений между ЕС и Украиной.

Ключевые слова: ЕС, Украина, Глобальная стратегия ЕС, Восточное партнерство, концептуальная метафора, понимание ролей, восприятие ролей.

1. Introduction

Informed by the novel focus on narratives and emotions in International Relations (IR) theory and in EU foreign policy studies, this article studies the EU's role conceptions and projections towards its Eastern Neighbourhood, and Ukraine specifically. Analysing the EU Global Strategy (June 2016) and the EU Eastern Partnership (EaP) Summit's Official Memorandum (November 2017), as well as 12 interviews with EU practitioners dealing with Ukraine (conducted in 2017), we propose an innovative interdisciplinary synergy between IR's role theory [Harnisch *et al.* 2011; Holsti 1970] and cognitive linguistics' conceptual metaphor theory [Lakoff and Johnson 1980]. Using the tool of conceptual metaphor, we systematically explore the EU's role conception (self-image) as well as its perception and expectations of the EaP (role prescriptions). In doing so, we put forward a new method to systematically analyse cognitive and emotive elements in the EU's foreign policy roles based on the notion that conceptual metaphors reveal fundamental cognitive and emotional traits central to the roles actors play.

The choice of our empirical case – EU role conceptions and prescriptions in relation to the EaP, and to Ukraine in particular – is not accidental. Relevant literature argues that the problematic future of the EaP (with visa-free entry regimes, Association Agreements and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTA) in place, yet with no promise of EU membership in view) and the Ukraine crisis together pose a challenge to the EU's foreign policy and the EU's exercise of power in this geopolitical region (see the 2017 Special Issue "Europe's Hybrid Foreign Policy: The Ukraine‑Russia Crisis" edited by [Davis Cross and Karolewski 2017]). David Cross and Karolewski [2017: 3] specifically argue that the Russia-Ukraine crisis serves as a "critical juncture and catalyst for shaping the EU's power" – "constraining or enabling the EU's exercise of power". One way to understand the EU's "intentional exercise of power … in the international system…, especially during times of crisis" [David Cross and Karolewski 2017: 10] is to analyse how the EU formulates and projects its self-visions as a foreign policy actor who reacts to an "unpredictable and uncertain international system" [David Cross and Karolewski 2017: 3]. Thus our focus on the EU's official EaP-related key foreign policy discourses post-Maidan.

Our main findings show that authors of the EU's official discourses resorted to a limited set of conceptual metaphors, and these revealed a confined set of role conceptions prescribed to the EU. Conceptual metaphors of personification compared the EU to an ARCHITECT, a NURTURER and TEACHER/BENEVOLENT AUTHORITY as well as an IMPOSING/DICTATING AUTHORITY. All these compared the EU to a capable and knowledgeable person who exercises power in its relations with the EaPs. Another row of metaphors compared the EU to a PARTNER in the

relationship. In these descriptions, the EU comes through as a committed, attractive and close co-operator. This conceptual metaphor is of particular interest, as it suggests a certain parity in relations and potential to learn from each other, not just to the EU setting the agenda. Importantly, our analysis discovered a certain confusion in *role conceptions* traced through incongruent mapping of the conceptual metaphors. Specifically, our analysis demonstrates that the EU's self-images oscillate between the role of a *state- and region-facilitator*, an authority who is in charge and tells you what to do, and a *partner* who respects, listens and co-creates. Importantly, while there may be a cognitive incongruence on role conceptions, there was no emotive incongruence. In all roles that came through the analysis of metaphorical categorizations, the EU described itself, rather predictably, in positive terms. However, in the conclusion, we ask if a similar positive reaction is to be expected among the EaP recipients of the EU's formulations and communications.

The paper proceeds in the following way. We start by describing the empirical context and by introducing our theoretical framework where we link role theory to conceptual metaphor theory. After presenting our material and methodological approach, we analyse the conceptual and linguistic metaphors found in the three different data-sets. In the following section, we translate this pattern of metaphors into roles, discovering the existence of two major EU role conceptions in its relationship with the EaP. We conclude with a summary of our main findings and a discussion of their implications for EU diplomacy.

2. Contexts

The EU outlined its Eastern Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2003, with a subsequent update in 2011, with a goal to create a "ring of friends" who will serve a buffer zone of stability and security for the EU. From its inception, it has been directed towards six post-Soviet states – Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. In the rich and voluminous literature on the EaP, there is a growing critical analysis of the policy. In one such reflection, Howorth [2017] outlines three oversights of the ENP policy. Firstly, he claims that the policy offered an "one-size-fits-all' approach towards the group of six very different countries. Secondly, the policy came with demands of conditionality, yet it never promised a prospect of accession. Thirdly, the EU member states did not have a well-developed strategic approach towards the EaP region and its members [Howorth 2017: 126-127]. Scholars have also pointed out that the policy has underestimated the hostility it would elicit from Russia [Howorth 2017; Orenstein and Keleman 2017]. In addition, the policy spelt out a particular "either/or"-vision for trading agreements, challenging the EaP countries to make a choice between the EU and Russia and provoking Russia to approach the six countries with its own proposals and deals. These flawed policy choices were aggravated by the EU's "deep Euro-centrism that never doubted which way the partners would turn" [Howorth 2017: 127] – an argument that our analysis finds particularly interesting. Assuming that post-Maidan key official discourses of EU foreign policy would reflect on the flaws and aim to rectify them, will role conceptions formulated and projected in them avoid the trap of Euro-centrism?

The oversights in the EaP policy are argued to feed into the Ukraine crisis. The crisis provides a chance for the EU to revisit how it can and will exercise power. It is also a critical test for the EU's foreign policy post-Lisbon – it has a chance to enable the EU's exercise of power or constrain it [David Cross and Karolewski 2017]. In this paper, we examine how EU foreign policy discourse, and the role conceptions and prescriptions it conveys, can be instrumental in enabling or containing the EU's exercise of power.

3. Theoretical framework

Role theory has in recent years been heralded as a useful instrument to scrutinize foreign policies of international political actors, not least because its capacity to link actor-centred and structural approaches [Harnisch *et al.* 2011; 2015; Thies and Breuning, 2012; Klose, 2018]. In this paper, we combine role theory with theoretical and empirical inputs from the study of conceptual metaphors.

We do so as we believe a focus on metaphors provides novel insights to role analysis, being able to detect nuances and subtleties in actors' role conceptions and role prescriptions, including key emotional elements.

Roles refer to "patterns of expected or appropriate behaviour" [Elgström and Smith, 2006: 5]. They are shaped by an actor's role conception – its perception of appropriate behaviour, given a certain context – but also by its expectations of external actors, role prescriptions [Harnisch 2011]. Role conceptions refer to images that state representatives hold concerning the general function ("what they should do") and performance ("how they should behave") of the state in a certain context or situation. They reveal the intention and motives of foreign policy actors [Aggestam 2006]. An actor's role conception tends to be persistent, but is reshaped through confrontations with others' expectations [Aggestam 2006: 16]. Anticipated attributes of a social role are constantly re-interpreted in interaction with external actors at the same time as external expectations are influenced by the actor's role performance. States tend to conceive of several roles, which may be complementary but also sometimes competing, potentially leading to role conflict.

Metaphors – interpreted in this paper in terms of "conceptual metaphors" [Lakoff and Johnson 1980] – are utilized to comprehend a complex reality. Conceptual metaphors are devices which help us understand complex events with the aid of more familiar concepts, and by providing us with concrete and easily understandable images of abstract notions [Opperman and Spenser 2013; Chilton 1996; Drulak 2004; Musolff 2010]. They help us to interpret "reality" by "understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another" [Lakoff and Johnoson 1980: 5]. Thus, "humans communicate what they perceive as reality through metaphorical representation" [Marks 2011: 18].

Conceptual metaphors – "figures of thought" – can be traced through linguistic metaphorical expressions [Lakoff and Johnson 1980]. A complex political event can thus be represented by a number of different linguistic metaphors, with linguistic metaphors indicative of the conceptual metaphors underlying them. The choice among these linguistic expressions, often subconscious and implicit, reveals fundamental underlying mental pictures of the target domain, as some aspects are highlighted and emphasized while others are downplayed [Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 1, 10].

Importantly, metaphors offer not only a cognitive shortcut of how to understand an actor or a relationship, but also convey emotions. The affective salience [Flanik 2011: 4] of a metaphor varies with an actor's emotional ties to an event, situation or actor. Some metaphors are "hot", with high affective salience, and are then likely to effect the emotive status of the sender: being scared, angry, proud or guilty, etc. [Holland and Chaban 2011].

Lakoff and Johnson [1980: 454] argue that "Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature". Role conceptions are no exception. We therefore argue that a study of the metaphors utilized in a certain context – in this case the EU's relations to Eastern European neighbours – is an effective and innovative tool for unravelling the conception of complex foreign policy roles. Metaphors – in descriptions of self and of others, and of relations between self and others – reveal how an actor understands its roles in a particular context. By examining metaphorical expressions chosen in texts or speeches, and by tracing deeper conceptual metaphors underlying linguistic expressions, a nuanced and detailed picture of role conceptions will appear. Furthermore, studying metaphors is a way of systematically probing the emotive elements of roles. As metaphors are associated with emotions, they assist us in linking roles to underlying emotional traits. Our use of partly subconsciously chosen metaphors goes beyond the usual identification of role conceptions that relies on direct self-identification by an actor.

4. Method
The fields of politics and media have attracted particular attention in the study of metaphors, as their ability to influence the structuring of one domain to another can determine the way in which

large audiences conceive sensitive and controversial aspects of their reality [Jansen and Sabo 1994; Lakoff 1991; Rohrer 1995].

The EU's role conceptions, as revealed by conceptual and linguistic metaphors, were traced in the text of EU Global Strategy [EUGS 2016] released in June 2016, Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit (Brussels, 24 November 2017), and through the EU elites' responses to the questions about the EU' relations with Ukraine. Specifically, our analysis focused on EU metaphors traced in the EUGS' sections that outline EU foreign policy priorities towards "our South and East", "our neighbours" and "surrounding regions".

Interviews with 12 EU practitioners involved individuals who are engaged in developing and/or implementing EU policies in the neighbourhood, and specifically those who deal with EU-Ukraine relations on a daily basis. The interviews took place in Brussels, within the framework of the research project "Crisis, Conflict and Critical Diplomacy: EU Perceptions in Ukraine and Israel/Palestine", between December 2016-July 2017[1]. These face-to-face semi-structured in-depth interviews (lasting on average around an hour) were conducted by pre-trained researchers and produced rich narratives. This paper focuses on the analysis of responses to the questions that deal with practitioners' opinions on the EU-Ukraine relations:

In your opinion, who would be the three most important international regions and countries for Ukraine? In what policy areas?

How would you describe the relations between Ukraine and the EU?
- *Does the EU have an open agenda with Ukraine?*
- *Is the EU agenda-setter?*
- *Is the EU showing ability to compromise?*
- *Does the EU understand Ukraine?*
- *Is the EU ready to learn from Ukraine?*

In light of Ukraine's aspiration towards EU membership, how do you see the EU's openness and readiness to accept Ukraine as its member? As a candidate?

Responses are fully anonymized, following the Human Ethics requirements and practice.

Subsequently, the sentences presenting the EU and its institutions in the context of the "neighbours to the East" were singled out of the texts, scrutinized in terms of metaphorical categorizations employed and coded according to the source and target domains if metaphorical categorizations were detected. This approach is informed by cognitive linguistics methods. It addresses the call in relevant literature that linguistic approaches profiling "*detailed* attention to linguistic usage in its respective contexts" should be taken seriously in the analysis of policy and political events [Cienki and Yanow 2013: 167, emphasis added].

5. EU Global Strategy 2016: EU self-images through metaphors

We contend that the tool of conceptual metaphor is useful to trace the EU's self-images informing the EU's foreign policy projections towards the EaP countries. Here we present a brief overview of the metaphorical categorizations employed by the EU Global Strategy released in June 2016.

Among the most prominent EU metaphors in relations to the 'neighbours to the East' was the image of the EU as a NURTURER – a benevolent authority that is there to foster growth, to support and guide and to relieve fragility and crises in the neighbourhood. While the document spells that 'positive change can only be *home-grown*[1], and may take years to materialise' [EUGS 2016: 2], the EU is committed to '*nurture* societal resilience also by *deepening* work on education, culture and youth to *foster* pluralism, coexistence and respect' in the surrounding regions [EUGS 2016: 2]. The EU promises to '*foster* an enabling environment for new economic endeavours, employment and

the inclusion of marginalised groups' [EUGS 2016: 27], '*seek to enhance* energy and environmental *resilience'* [EUGS 2016: 27], as well as to '*support* these countries in implementing association agreements' [EUGS 2016: 25]. This 'nurturing' is justified as the counterparts are often described as 'fragile' and in need of becoming more 'resilient'. For example, the EU intends to '*support* different paths to resilience, targeting the most *acute cases* of governmental, economic, societal and climate/energy *fragility'* [EUGS 2016: 9]. In the eyes of the EU, '*fragility* beyond our borders threatens all our vital interests. By contrast, *resilience* – the ability of states and societies to reform, thus *withstanding* and *recovering* from internal and external crises – benefits us and countries in our surrounding regions, *sowing the seeds for sustainable growth* and *vibrant* societies. Together with its partners, the EU will therefore promote resilience in its surrounding regions.' [EUGS 2016: 23].

The EU is also presenting itself as an ARCHITECT who is actively engaged in the construction of links/bridges to the neighbours (including Ukraine) and paving paths towards future cooperation. The EU is ready to be '*building* physical and digital connections' [EUGS 2016: 25] with its neighbours. Or 'societal *links* will also be strengthened through enhanced mobility, cultural and educational exchanges, research cooperation and civil society platforms' [EUGS 2016: 25]. The neighbours are also up to for a full participation in EU programmes and agencies which 'will be pursued alongside strategic dialogue with a view to *paving the way* for these countries' further involvement in CSDP' [EUGS 2016: 25].

An idea of the EU as a CAPABLE PERSON in relation to its neighbours is also communicated through metaphors – the EU as an actor who can start and advance the movement, penetrate deeply, catalyse and fight. The EU plans to '*fight* poverty and inequality, widen access to public services and social security, and champion decent work opportunities, notably for women and youth' [EUGS 2016: 26]. The EU's development funds should '*catalyse* strategic investments through public-private partnerships, *driving* sustainable growth, job creation, and skills and technological transfers' [EUGS 2016: 26]. Through long-term engagement, the EU plans to 'persistently *seek to advance* human rights protection' [EUGS 2016: 26]. It 'can *spur* transformation' [EUGS 2016: 25] and 'think creatively about *deepening* tailor-made partnerships further [EUGS 2016: 25].

Another typical metaphor is of the EU as engaged in a personal relationship where the EU portrays itself as ATTRACTIVE and COMMITTED PARTNER: 'Under the European Neighbourhood Policy, many people wish to build *closer relations* with the Union: our *enduring power of attraction* can spur transformation in these countries' [EUGS 2016: 25]. Moreover, 'The ENP has *recommitted* to eastern Partnership and southern Mediterranean countries wishing to develop stronger relations with us [EUGS 2016: 25]. Also, 'many people within the scope of the European Neighbourhood Policy both to the east and to the south wish to build *closer relations* with the Union' [EUGS 2016: 25].

The metaphors that appear in the context of EU relations with Russia (mentioned in particular) reveal specific EU visions. Russia is presented as CHALLENGER to the EU's security and as a FORCE/IMPACT that destabilizes Ukraine: 'Russia's violation of international law and the *destabilization* of Ukraine, on top of protracted conflicts in the wider Black Sea region, have *challenged* the European security order at its core' [EUGS 2016: 33]. Consider also, 'managing the relationship with Russia represents a key strategic *challenge'* [EUGS 2016: 33]. In relation to Russia, the EU sees itself as a CONSTRUCTOR/ENGINEER/ARCHITECT who will '*strengthen* the EU, enhance the resilience of our eastern neighbours, and *uphold* their right to determine freely their approach towards the EU' and 'stand united in *upholding* international law, democracy, human rights, cooperation and each country's right to choose its future freely' [EUGS 2016: 33]. Importantly, a 'consistent and united approach must remain the *cornerstone* of EU policy towards Russia' [EUGS 2016: 33].

6. Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit 2017

This document includes a variety of metaphorical categorizations. Many are them are found in the General Strategy, but there are also subtle differences and elaborations. When interpreting the metaphors used in the Joint Declaration, it should be borne in mind that it is not a unilateral EU text but a product of negotiations between the EU and its eastern partners. This may obviously affect the type of metaphors used as the document arguably reflects the priorities and images of both parties.

The metaphor of the EU as a NURTURER and SUPPORTING AUTHORITY is found in several places. The EaP countries are portrayed as needing help and assistance to become more *resilient* – a core concept in the Global Strategy - and the EU is presented to be there to "strengthen" and "bolster" resilience [Council of the EU 2017: 8] of the EaP partners in a range of issue-areas and as ready to step in "where relevant and applicable" [Council of the EU 2017: 18]. The EU is thus depicted as the stronger partner in the relationship and comes through as a nurturing, benevolent authority who is supporting, bolstering, facilitating and developing the EaPs. The existence of this metaphor can be illustrated with examples from various issue-areas: regarding security, it is claimed that "through *support* … partners will be more resilient to hybrid threats" [Council of the EU 2017: 15]; in economic matters, the EU will "*unlock the growth potential*" through EU4 Business programs with "*support*" to client-oriented businesses [Council of the EU 2017: 12]; regarding climate change, the EU will be "*fostering* research-industry partnerships" [Council of the EU 2017: 19] and in gender equality, the EU will "*boost* economic prospects for women entrepreneurs" [Council of the EU 2017: 12].

The metaphor of the EU as a COMMITTED, NON-IMPOSING PARTNER is also found in the document. It is then presented as a partner who is committed to the relationship and who is there to discuss and exchange opinions, rather than to impose its will. Echoing the self-categorizations of the EU in the EUGS, the EU of the Joint Declaration "*remains committed* in its support to the territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty of all its partners" [Council of the EU 2017: 2], and the EU and its partners "underline their firm intentions *to carry forward the commitments* taken at previous Summits and in bilateral relations" [Council of the EU 2017: 2]. As a committed partner, the EU does not frame itself as imposing or pushing – "the EU will continue jointly discuss with each to the *partner* countries… attractive and realistic options…" [Council of the EU 2017: 14]. Developing strengthened relations between the EU and partners leads to stronger links – "*bonds forged* through the Eastern Partnership make the European Union and partner countries stronger together, better able to deal with common challenges" [Council of the EU 2017: 2].

The notion of resilience – in itself a metaphor – that pervades the EUGS and is used widely in the Joint Declaration also frames a set of other metaphors related to the EU. Referencing resilience as a term used in construction, the EU is compared to an ARCHITECT, aiming for a better support of the EaP structures. The EU is furthermore portrayed as a SKILLFUL CONSTRUCTOR, possessing the know-how and the tools and instruments necessary to carry out this task. Importantly, while the "blue prints" for the future EaP structures might be offered by the EU, the revision of architectural designs during the building process is described to involve both the EU and the EaP partners.

To illustrate, the EU's on-going support to the EaP "through a full and targeted used of the European Neighborhood *Instrument*… and other available financial *instruments*" [Council of the EU 2017: 7] was welcomed by the Summit participants, "while *leveraging* efforts of the European Union and International Financial Institutions will help create a *conducive* environment for the development of competitive, green, digitalized and innovation-driven economies" [Council of the EU 2017: 7]. In the issue-area of good governance and rule of law, the EU pledges to support "development of legal framework and *mechanisms* for recovery and management of assess and effective *tools* for financial investigations" [Council of the EU 2017: 14]. "*Tailor-made* strategic communication … will lead to better understanding of the European Union among the citizens across the Eastern neighbourhood, as well as a better understanding of partner countries and the

Eastern Partnership among the EU citizens" [Council of the EU 2017:12]. This is stated to help to improve "resilience against disinformation" [Council of the EU 2017:12].

The text also talks about the 20 deliverables for 2020. These are "conceived as a *working tool designed* in an inclusive manner with all stakeholders. A *streamlined architecture* for the multilateral cooperation within the Eastern Partnership will closely and regularly monitor the implementation of the agreed deliverables…" [Council of the EU 2017: 11]. The cooperation is seen to be intensified "in the revised multilateral *structure* of the Eastern Partnership, which will better *support* the political objectives pursued in the Partnership, including cooperation among the partners" [Council of the EU 2017: 5]. The Eastern Partnership aims at "*building* a common area of share democracy, prosperity, stability and increased cooperation" [Council of the EU 2017: 3].

Finally, we discover metaphors related to MOVEMENT. The EU is still a distant partner for the EaP, and these countries need to make efforts to move closer. In this context, the EU is perceived as a CATALYZER of the movement of the EaPs, as well as a COMPANION in the pursuit of closer relations and shared resilience.

Thus, "Sustained and effective reform *progress* is key to the continued success of the Eastern Partnership – it will bring the EaPs "*closer* to the European Union" [Council of the EU 2017: 1]. The example includes suggested moves for the EaPs in the areas of the rule of law and anti-corruption mechanisms (e.g. "*steps towards* implementation of application international recommendations on political party funding" [Council of the EU 2017: 14]); transport connections (e.g. "*steps forward* on the Common Aviation's Area Agreements"); energy (e.g. "*progress*" in the field of electricity interconnectedness [Council of the EU 2017: 16]), environmental protection (e.g. "key *steps*" [Council of the EU 2017: 17]) or climate change ("Decisive *steps* will be taken to pursue climate resilient, low carbon growth pathways… in line with the Paris Agreement on Climate Change" [Council of the EU 2017: 17]).

The scope and depth the EU's cooperation with the EaPs is formulated to depend on "*pace and quality of reforms* [Council of the EU 2017: 5]. Importantly, *resilience* is again in the frame – it is now the goal of the movement of both the EU and the EaPs, as they are both chasing this goal: it is about the "*joint pursuit* of stability and resilience in the European neighborhood" [Council of the EU 2017: 7]. Importantly, the desired end goals refer to the EaP – not to the EU, even though earlier the EU is presented as being in search of resilience inside the EU too.

6. Metaphors in interviews with EU officials

Perhaps unsurprisingly, metaphors observed in the responses of the EU officials dealing with EU Eastern Neighbourhood (and Ukraine in it) revealed visions of the roles that to a large degree paralleled the visions formulated and projected by the two key policy documents. The interviews came with multiple metaphors that delivered a view on the EU as a COMMITTED PARTNER and the EU as a NURTURER and SUPPORTING AUTHORITY and perhaps a TEACHER. However, these views, while not rare, were significantly less frequent than visions of the EU as an IMPOSING AUTHORITY who is an agenda-setter. In contrast, conceptualization of the EU as a CONSTRUCTION was not used by the respondents.

Elite actors who deal with Ukraine (as well as other Eastern neighbourhood actors) saw the EU as a COMMITTED PARTNER in relations with Ukraine – an attractive, committed open, embracing, close and important partner. The two are seen to be intimately linked – Ukraine was noted to have "*deep* cultural *ties*" with the EU (2) while "we [the EU] are *closer* than any other region in the world" to Ukraine (4.7). Ukraine is seen to be attracted to the EU – "the whole process of reforms in Ukraine started with this *attraction* of the EU" (4.7). The EU is recognized to be "definitely…by far the most *important partner* for Ukraine, especially after the Association Agreement" (4.8). The EU is believed to have "the most *open possible relationship* with Ukraine for mutual benefit, up to, but not including, membership". (8a.3), with "the Commission and the Parliament … really very *open* and *want to embrace* Ukraine as soon as possible" (8c.10). The

interviews did stress the openness – "we are quite *open* on our agendas with other countries and I think this is the case with Ukraine. It is open, of course, to the extent possible" (8a.4).

Linked is the vision of the EU as a NURTURER and SUPPORTING AUTHORITY in this relations. The EU "*stays very committed to support* Ukraine now in the modernization aspects, in the reforms they are undertaking" (4.7). In the eyes of the EU elites, EU supports Ukraine by providing technical assistance, as well as political and financial support. From this perspective, the EU is seen to set the priorities while Ukraine remains vulnerable. Interviewees shared, "we are open what we would like *to support* Ukraine with, but we are also rather open in *setting priorities* and working together in various processes" (8a.7): the EU provides "quite a lot of technical *assistance*. Roughly one billion euros per year, this is above the macro-economic *assistance* by European Central Bank. … – administration, fighting with corruption, assistance in legislation, and so on and so on" (4.8). The EU also provides "political *support*, as well as financial *support*" (4.9). Ukrainians on the other side "say where they need to invest more and they *ask for further support*, financial *support*, from our side" (8a.7).

Sometimes, the EU is seen as an authority who may be flexible and understanding. The images of a CARING AUTHORITY also came through in the following statements: "We try to *listen and to understand* what is important for Ukraine" (XX); or "we should be *very flexible and understanding*, because the situation and the circumstances are so much different" (8b.9). One commentator states, "It is rather a one-way street – we *advise* Ukraine what to do, but, of course, *we listen* to what Ukraine wants. They first reach out to us and *ask for help* (8e.2).

In many responses, the EU was compared to a TEACHER who has certain expectations of Ukraine, while Ukraine was seen as a good student who listens well and performs up to the expectations (echoing similar images formulated in the text of EU Global Strategy). While an overall agenda for Ukraine is seen as "open", it is "obviously, *according to our rules, according to the EU rules*" (8a.5). The EU is noted to "have set the agenda to some degree … *drawing up the list* of reforms and things that are needed and implemented" (8b.9). An EU official notes, "what we have observed, and that is a very positive development, is that Ukraine is very much *meeting our expectations* at the level of the government" (8a.7). Another interviewee shares, "more and more in Ukraine [are] saying "Here are our problems, this is what we have *learned* from you, this is what we still need in order to move in that direction" (8a.7): "we [the EU] see them *indicating what are their problems* and *identifying them very correctly*. (8a.7), "at least this area of *analysis* of the situation and existing problems is much better now than it was in the previous years" (8a.7).

One of the most visible metaphorical descriptions was the image of the EU as an IMPOSING, DICTATING AUTHORITY, who sets the agenda and had limited understanding of Ukraine. The EU is seen to be a rightful agenda-setter – "the bigger power is usually the *agenda-setter*" (8b.4). In this relationship, the "Ukrainian government does listen, so the EU is certainly an *agenda setter*" (8b.3) – "at the end of the day, it is the EU that more or less *dictates*, I think, it is normal" (8b.4). Another elite adds, "they [Ukrainians] have to *follow the rules of the stronger one*, and that, of course, is us" (8b.5). Another one elaborates, "because we are a big funder of Ukraine, therefore, we see it as opportunity to *push them* [Ukrainians] a little bit to some directions" (8c.7). The EU is seen on a different (better) ground that Ukraine – it will "have to adapt, because Ukraine wants to come to the level of the EU at one stage" (8b.5)

The interviewed EU elites agree that agenda of EU-Ukraine relations "is going to be *dominated* by the EU" (8c.8). Views that the EU can learn from Ukraine – like a true relationship would prescribe – are very limited. One respondent stated that "we do not learn from Ukraine – there is little appetite for that in general." (8e.2). Another noted, "I do not see that many positive examples that we can borrow to be honest, from my experience. So, I am not sure what positive we can learn (8e.4)". Yet, some interviewees are more self-critical: "The EU doesn't want to learn from anybody. It thinks it has all the answers, I am afraid to say." (8e.3). The same interviewee

continues, "We are the dominant partner, we have the model Ukraine wants to follow, so Ukraine should just follow, we haven't made much attempt to really deeply understand Ukraine" (8d.3).

7. Linking metaphors and role conceptions

The linguistic metaphors – and the conceptual metaphors underlying them – used by the actor in its public discourse are, we argue, excellent indicators of an actor's role conceptions. The producer of the discourse draws from the "pool" of available linguistic metaphors. These linguistic metaphors, e.g. ARCHITECT, have their roots in conceptual metaphors, in this case CONSTRUCTION. Note that conceptual metaphors exist irrespective of the EU discourse; they belong to all users of the language. The task of the analyst is to distill from the material at hand the linguistic metaphors used by the actor, to determine what conceptual metaphor(s) they belong to, assess their internal congruence and, finally, to 'translate' the metaphors into roles.

When a role is unambiguous, we would expect the selection of linguistic metaphors derived from a certain conceptual metaphor to be congruent, that is, they should all reinforce each other, thus consistently reflecting the actor's self-image: "congruent mapping provides evidence of understanding of an IR actor or situation through the use of more coherent metaphors within one cognitive scenario" [Chaban and Kelly 2017: 699]. If an actor's role conception is unclear and confused, on the other hand, we would expect to find partially incongruent linguistic metaphors in our material. In a case of incongruent metaphorical mapping [Chaban and Kelly 2017], more than one role conception may be derived from the discourse, indicating role competition [Bengtsson and Elgström 2012] and potential role conflict.

When analyzing the metaphors employed in EU documents and by EU officials, describing the EU's relationship with the EaP, we find that the linguistic metaphors are mainly clustered around three conceptual metaphors: CONSTRUCTION (architect, co-constructor), GROWTH (nurturer, supporter) and RELATIONSHIP (equal partner, authority). From these over-arching metaphors, which all carry positive connotations for EU authorities, linguistic metaphors can be chosen that indicate for example various degrees of pro-activeness and different types of relationships. When translating the metaphorical landscape into role conceptions, distinct patterns emerge that indicate the existence of two competing role conceptions: that of a benevolent, non-imposing *partner* (more prevalent in the Joint Declaration), and that of a stronger but committed *state- and region-facilitator* (dominating in the Global Strategy and, not least, in the interviews).

The partner-image is indicated by linguistic metaphors such as CO-CONSTRUCTOR (taking an active part but indicating relative parity), NON-IMPOSING PARTNER (indicating an equal relationship) and COMPANION (sharing the same goals and travelling together). The state- and region-facilitator role conception stems from the same conceptual metaphors but expressed with linguistic metaphors that indicate a quite different type of role for the EU. Here we find the metaphor of an ARCHITECT (a pro-active agent with authority; leading the building-process), a NURTURER and a SUPPORTER (a stronger party that can help a weaker partner in need of assistance; that can foster growth and resilience) and IMPOSING AUTHORITY (the strongest expression in our material of an unequal relationship).

The two role conceptions are cognitively incongruent. According to the partner-image, the EU and the EaPs are equals; they all strive for increased resilience and for an improved partnership, and they are committed to work together on an equal footing to reach these goals. According to the state- and region-facilitator image, the EU is the stronger party, while the EaP are dependent on support from its more powerful partner. It is the EU, the "architect" with the blueprints for the future, that gives, and the EaP who takes, the orders. This role carries vestiges of a well-entrenched "Euro-centric" mentality – an EU approach to its neighbours described by Howorth [2017: 127] as "a deep Euro-centrism that never doubted which way the partners would turn". The two roles attach different degrees of authority to the EU. As they co-exist in EU discourse, role confusion is, sooner

or later, likely to be one reaction. EaP countries may react negatively to Euro-centric messages, especially when they also hear a rhetoric that stresses partnership and equality.

The roles that the EU plays in its relationship with the EaP are associated with certain *emotional traits*. Both roles present the EU as a CONSTRUCTIVE and CAPABLE actor, clearly very positive characteristics that endow the EU with the tools and the competence required to reach the goals of regional co-operation. In its state- and region-facilitator role, the EU portrays itself as a SKILLFUL ARCHITECT, also a depiction with positive connotations. The EU has the knowledge needed to construct a resilient Europe and to assist its partners in their efforts to reach the same goal. The idea that the EU is a PARTNER on equal footing should also send positive and encouraging signals to its eastern associates. Conversely, the competing image of the EU as an AUTHORITY and unequal partner may carry with it negative associations in this context. Both roles thus seem to evoke positive feelings within the EU itself, while they send confusing or even conflicting signals, linked to contrary emotional responses, to the EaP countries.

8. Conclusions

This paper, we contend, breaks new ground in three respects: theoretically, methodologically and empirically. Theoretically, we have introduced the innovative idea of an interdisciplinary synergetic interplay between IR's role theory and cognitive linguistics' conceptual metaphor theory. Methodologically, we have demonstrated that patterns of linguistic and conceptual metaphors are eminent indicators of an actor's foreign policy role conceptions. We have also argued that as conceptual metaphors mirror fundamental emotional traits, a study of metaphors also reveals basic emotive elements in foreign policy roles. These insights add a previously unnoticed and sophisticated instrument to the tool-box used to uncover international role conceptions.

Empirically, we have discovered the existence of two predominant roles in the EU's relationship with the EaPs: that of a benevolent, non-imposing *partner* and that of a stronger but committed *state- and region-facilitator*. Importantly, these role conceptions are cognitively incongruent. The partner image refers to an equal relationship, while the state-and region-facilitator role implies a picture of the EU as an authority and a teacher, an actor that gives orders and expects compliance. While both role conceptions are associated with positive emotions within the EU, it may be expected that EaP countries receive the authority-imposing state-and region-facilitator role with negative feelings.

The three data-sets in our material differ in their emphasis on the two roles, though they co-exist in all of them. The Joint Declaration is dominated by metaphors indicating the partner role. As the declaration is a negotiated document, it is not surprising that it reflects the perspectives of all parties, thus including the self-images of the EaP countries as independent and equal partners – an image that is easy for the EU to subscribe to as it forms a part of its own role perceptions. On the contrary, the state-and region-facilitator role predominates in the Global Strategy and, even more so, in the interview material. In this regard, the interview responses indicate that while official rhetoric may play with the image of partnership and the EU's role conception of an equal partner, the dominant internal self-image is that of the EU as a stronger counterpart who can and will exert power while seeing little to learn from the other side.

The co-existence of incongruent roles may, we argue, lead to role conflict as the target countries, the EaPs, experience two simultaneous but contradictory signals. The EaPs could be expected to react negatively to messages that they interpret as patronizing and condescending, and this reaction is arguably reinforced by simultaneous signals that paint a vision of an equal partnership. The ensuing role conflict probably means that the EU in the end will be forced to take a decision: what role conception should it deliver? While at least some "domestic" audiences appreciate an image of the EU as a teacher and architect, EaP audiences would be more inclined to welcome a partner role conception. On the other hand, with the Ukraine crisis posing a test to the EU's foreign policy and its 'exercise of power' in the EaP neighbourhood, it is only natural to

expect that EU discourses will again resort to the authority-related role conception. Obviously, any chosen role conception should also be coherent with the EU's role *performance* – what practices it in fact enacts in its eastern relationship. The existence of role incongruence creates a challenge to EU public diplomacy as juggling competing images may in the end produce opposition and critique, that could ultimately constrain the EU's dialogue with Ukraine.

NOTES
1. We would like to express our gratitude to the project researchers Irina Petrova and Sharon LeCocque (both of KU Leuven, Belgium) who conducted interviews with EU practitioners in Brussels within the framework of this project
2. Emphasis in all quotes from the EUGS is added by us.

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FRAMES AND IMAGES FACING UKRAINE: COMPARING GERMANY'S AND RUSSIA'S MEDIA PERCEPTIONS OF THE EU RELATIONS WITH UKRAINE

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Katharina Kleinschnitger, Michèle Knodt, and Nadiya Safonova. Frames and images facing Ukraine: comparing Germany's and Russia's media perceptions of the EU relations with Ukraine. The recent EU-Ukraine Summit in July 2018 demonstrated that the leaders of the EU and Ukraine have committed to further deepen the political association and economic integration of Ukraine with the EU. Yet, this "strong partnership," based on a joint association agreement, has been overshadowed by Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea and its instigation of the war in Donbas. Given that Ukraine is an important geopolitical neighbour for both the EU and Russia, the EU and its Member States – especially Germany and France – have taken on the role of mediators in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. The focus of our study is on the image of the EU-Ukraine relationship as a unique and outstanding case. Ukraine's close ties with Russia appear to be waning, however, the more Ukraine tries to strengthen its ties with the EU, the more Russia seems to resist. In this regard, we ask: How are the relationships between the EU and Ukraine are represented in German and Russian print media? How do the print media sources frame this relationship and what different images do they communicate? The content analysis of data draws diverging pictures: within the same period, the patterns of interaction between the EU and Ukraine, evolving within European Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership, tend to be depicted as far more cooperative in the German press, whereas Russia's print media portray EU-Ukraine relations as increasingly negative and more conflicted over the years.

Keywords: frames and images, media perceptions, content analysis, the EU, Ukraine, European Neighbourhood Policy, Eastern Partnership.

Катарина Кляйншнітгер, Мішель Кнодт, Надя Сафонова. Фрейми та образи, з якими стикається Україна: порівняння сприйняття відносин між ЄС та Україною, представленого в німецьких та російських засобах масової інформації. У світлі недавнього саміту ЄС-Україна, який відбувся в липні 2018 року, лідери ЄС і України зобов'язалися поглиблювати політичне об'єднання і економічну інтеграцію України з ЄС. Проте це "сильне партнерство", засноване на спільній угоді про співпрацю, затьмарене незаконною анексією Росією Криму та роздмухуванням нею війни на Донбасі. З огляду на те, що Україна геополітично є важливим сусідом як для ЄС, так і для Росії, ЄС і його члени, особливо Німеччина і Франція, взяли на себе роль посередників в українсько-російському конфлікті. Основна увага в нашому дослідженні приділяється сприйняттю відносин між ЄС і Україною як унікального прикладу політичного співробітництва. У ситуації послаблення зв'язків між Україною та Росією зміцнення зв'язків України з ЄС викликає збільшення опору з боку Росії. У статті надаються відповіді на питання: Як відносини між ЄС і Україною сприймаються та подаються у друкованих ЗМІ Німеччини, і як ці відносини висвітлюються в Росії? Як засоби масової інформації зображують ці відносини, і як ці зображення відрізняються одне від іншого? Дослідження даних за

допомогою контент-аналізу надає різні картини: протягом однакового періоду моделі взаємодії між ЄС і Україною, які набувають становлення в рамках Європейської політики сусідства та політики Східного партнерства, зображуються набагато більш дружніми в німецькій пресі, тоді як в друкованих ЗМІ Росії відносини ЄС і України виглядають більш негативними і неоднозначними.

Ключові слова: фрейми та образи, медійні сприйняття, контент-аналіз, ЄС, Україна, Європейська політика сусідства, Східне партнерство.

Катарина Кляйншнитгер, Мишель Кнодт, Надя Сафонова. Фреймы и образы, с которыми сталкивается Украина: сравнение восприятия отношений между ЕС и Украиной, представленного в немецких и российских средствах массовой информации. В свете недавнего саммита ЕС-Украина, состоявшегося в июле 2018 года, лидеры ЕС и Украины обязались углубить политическое объединение и экономическую интеграцию Украины с ЕС. Тем не менее, это "сильное партнерство", основанное на совместном соглашении о сотрудничестве, омрачено незаконной аннексией Россией Крыма и разжиганием ею войны на Донбассе. Учитывая то, что Украина геополитически является важным соседом как для ЕС, так и для России, ЕС и его члены, особенно Германия и Франция, взяли на себя роль посредников в украинско-российском конфликте. Основное внимание в нашем исследовании уделяется восприятию отношений между ЕС и Украиной как уникального примера политического сотрудничества. В ситуации ослабления связей Украины с Россией укрепление связей Украины с ЕС вызывает возрастание сопротивления со стороны России. В статье предлагаются ответы на такие вопросы: Как отношения между ЕС и Украиной воспринимаются и подаются в печатных СМИ Германии, и как те же отношения освещаются в России? Как средства массовой информации изображают эти отношения, и чем эти изображения отличаются друг от друга? Исследование данных с помощью контент-анализа дает разные картины: в течение одного и того же периода модели взаимодействия между ЕС и Украиной, формируемые в контексте Европейской политики соседства и политики Восточного партнерства, изображаются гораздо более дружескими в немецкой прессе, в то время как в печатных СМИ России отношения ЕС и Украины предстают более негативными и неоднозначными.

Ключевые слова: фреймы и образы, медийное восприятие, контент-анализ, ЕС, Украина, Европейская политика соседства, Восточное партнерство.

1. Introduction

On November 18, 2015, the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the European Commission laid out the main ideas for the review of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Federica Mogherini stated, "We should switch from the idea that the European Union is at the centre, surrounded by neighbouring countries, to the idea of a new partnership based on cooperation" [EEAS 2015]. This phrase symbolised a turn in the ENP and highlighted that cooperation must be more "flexible" [European Commission 2015] in the future. Significantly, the Eastern Partnership (EaP) was heralded to be the "privileged relations" [Casier 2017: 17] within the neighbourhood. The 2016 EU Global Strategy (EUGS) echoed this sentiment and introduced the notion of principled pragmatism into the EU's foreign policy direction. The notion showed a new realism in the EU's foreign policy, especially in its neighbourhood policy, which focuses on security, hard power and interests. The new approach will most likely bring a change towards a stronger bilateralism between the EU and its member states on the one side, and ENP countries (Ukraine included) on the other side.

At the most recent EU-Ukraine Summit in July 2018, the leaders of the EU and Ukraine committed to further deepening of the political association and economic integration of Ukraine with the EU. Yet, this partnership based on a joint Association Agreement – which was signed in 2014 and finally entered into force on September 1, 2017 – has been overshadowed by Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea and its support of the Eastern Ukrainian separatists. With Ukraine remaining an important geopolitical and economic neighbour for both the EU and Russia, this article traces and analyses what frames and images of EU-Ukraine relations are communicated inside the EU *vis-à-vis* in Russia. Since there is a lack of representative pan-European news media[1],

this analysis focusses on German media. Germany is a key driver behind European integration and one of the most influential member states within the EU. Additionally, Germany has played a special role for the Eastern European states, historically, through its experiences as a divided state and the reunification in 1990. It is also involved in the EU-Ukraine relations in the context of the Russia-Ukraine conflict: it is one of the four mediators in the Minsk negotiation format.

Our analysis of the images of EU-Ukraine relations in Russia and Germany is guided by the following research questions: How is the relationship between the EU and Ukraine framed in Germany's and Russia's media discourses? What different frames and images do they communicate? Our inquiry is multidisciplinary. We synergise perspectives from political science, communications and media studies, and linguistics – a novel combination in the field of EU studies. Theoretically, this research case study is grounded within the framework of interpretative constructivism and the "cascading activation framing theory" by Robert Entman [2003; 2004]. We employ a mixed method undertaking qualitative and quantitative media content analysis. The study analyses images of EU-Ukraine relations in German and Russian print media. We selected two leading newspapers per country. In Germany, we chose *Süddeutsche Zeitung* and *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* as an EU-internal perspective on EU-Ukraine relations. The Russian sample – as an EU-external perspective – included the influential *Kommersant* and *Rossiskaya Gazeta*. The comparison between the German and Russian leading newspapers draws a diverging picture: within the similar observation period, the interaction between the EU and Ukraine is framed to be far more cooperative in the German press, whereas Russia's print media portray EU-Ukraine relations as increasingly negative and conflicted over time.

The article proceeds in the following way. Firstly, it lays out the theoretical framework and then moves to explain the methodological approach, focusing on case selection and research method. Subsequently, it presents the empirical analysis including a discussion of the results. Finally, a conclusion summarizes our findings.

2. Theoretical considerations and a methodological framework

The following section outlines the underlying theoretical perspectives used to conceptualize our research case. In particular, our analysis of the perceived relationship between the EU and Ukraine engages with theoretical concepts of media representations/framing and the role of media in creating and shaping these. In this section, we discuss the methodology behind our empirical analysis, the specific choices in the research design and the method for our data collection.

The underlying epistemological approach of understanding the interactions of international actors, and specifically the EU and Ukraine, is informed by constructivism. Following the theoretical positions of interpretative constructivism, the images and framings of actors in media influence how these actors are perceived by the consumers of media products. This is, in particular, the case regarding foreign policy issues, as people mainly base their knowledge upon news media, due to the complex and distant character of foreign policy. In this analysis, an image is understood as "a reference to some aspect of the world, which contains within its own structure and in terms of its own structure a reference to the act of cognition, which generated it. It must say, not that the world is like this, but that it was recognized to have been like this by the image-maker, who leaves behind this record: not of the world, but of the act" [Cohen 1979, quoted in Bersick *et al.* 2012: 15]. Following this definition, framing of EU-Ukraine relations in German and Russian news is conceptualized in terms of a cognitive structure constructed with a help of an "image-maker" – in our case, newsmakers who map the image leaving a "record" in the form of media texts and visual support.

The main strand of media effects research postulates the agenda setting ability of media. Mass media are hypothesized to be "agenda setters" that select information for presentation, frame selected topics and thus possess an ability to influence the understanding of social issues and ultimately act as opinion formers for the recipient [see McCombs & Shaw 1972]. In 1967, the

sociologist Bernhard C. Cohen examined, by means of interviews, mechanisms that intervene between the newspaper industry and American foreign policy. His conclusion was that specifically in the field of foreign policy communications, newspapers "may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but they are stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think *about*" [Cohen 1967: 13]. As a result, he identified the agenda-setting function as a "label" of a "short-term cognitive effect of the media" [Cohen 1967], i.e. the ability of news media to draw attention to certain issues and ignore other. Media are also argued to impact the ranking of topics in the public perceptions – through the volume of reports and the placement of the topic in the reportage. Media "image-makers" decide "which priority will be assigned to the problems at hand" [Vowe 2002: 18; own translation] and thus can potentially structure the public discussion.

A different conceptual take is proposed by Robert M. Entman [2003, 2004] in his theory of cascading activation framing. Entman developed his "cascading" model in 2003 on the basis of a large-scale study of numerous news media outlets in the US. The model hypothesizes how news about foreign policy spread and activate certain frames in a given society. The model consists of several tiers. The highest tier is the administration (government) who are argued to possess the utmost ability to spread and activate particular frames in foreign policy issue-areas. The following tiers are: other elites, media (who create news frames), and the general public (the least powerful tier is spreading and activating frames on foreign policy). Entman defines frames as "selecting and highlighting some facets of events or issues, and making connections among them so as to promote a particular interpretation, evaluation and/or solution" [Entman 2004: 5]. The cascading model suggests that the 'selected highlights' of information originating on the upper tier (the government) are then pushed down the cascade to the lowest tiers, the public, through the network of non-administrative elites and news organizations that frame the messages about foreign policy [Entman 2003: 415]. The public can also use the media with its own interpretations and supply new frames through the media back up to the administration level [Entman 2003: 418–419] as a kind of "feedback loop". As such, the media level in the imaginary "cascade" has a central role in the flow of frames up and down the "stream". The media's role is significant in how the general public frames foreign policy and international relations, and perceives the changes in the world [see Chaban *et al.* 2014: 2]. In this sense, media frames play an important role in the generation of cognitive imagery and perceptions of international partners. It is important to note that according to Entman's model, frames of foreign policy that travel 'down' from the government to the public are more effective, than frames in the reverse flow – from the public to the government.

Our analysis, guided by Entman's definition of framing, is very much clear that framing is an extremely complex cognitive concept, understood differently in many works and used in numerous research designs in a differing way. Entman sees framing as the central process in which state officials and journalists – "image-makers" in the parley of this article – exert political influence on each other and the public [Entman 2003: 417]. According to Chaban *et al.* [2014: 4], this process reflects a struggle for the meaning that involves many different actors. Our analysis focuses the so-called "media frames" – frames generated by news media and designed to present the recipient with a preformed reality through communication symbols such as words and images" [see Chaban & Holland 2008: 8].

In conclusion, this study assumes that political communication about external relations is not an arbitrary or unlimited flow of information, but rather consists of "packages of established mental maps and schemas" [Chaban *et al.* 2014: 2; see also Chaban & Holland 2014, 2015; Elgström & Chaban 2015]. We assume that the German and Russian news media create a set of particular nation-specific schemes when framing EU-Ukraine relations and these schematic frames may influence the perceptions of the readers (not lastly through stereotyping and priming mechanisms employed by the "image-makers"). These frames may be instrumental not only in shaping opinions but also in prompting national audiences' reactions to EU external action, and ultimately have an impact on the conduct of EU foreign policy. It is important to remember that media are capable to

impact significantly what events become news and how they are proclaimed and presented [Chaban *et al.* 2008: 22]. Indeed, in the foreign policy communication, media often has a power to be the basic (and often single) source of information for the public [Chaban *et al.* 2014: 7]. Finally, media may also influence the external relations (of the EU and third countries) through its impact on policy- and decision-makers. They are also among the recipients of news media and may orientate their actions using the media frames and not on the reality itself [the so-called "CNN effect", see Livingstone 1997].

To answer our research questions – how are the relations between the EU and Ukraine framed in German and Russian media and what different frames and images do they communicate? – we employ mixed-method analysis, led by the qualitative approach first. Such an approach implies that the research process cannot be linear, but instead it is identified by circularity and interdependence between the different phases, which characterize a qualitative research project [Westle 2009: 116]. Quantitative elements of analysis follow. The observed sample is rather large and quantitative techniques for data collection and analysis are justified.

Content analysis with qualitative and quantitative elements is the leading research method in our study. It enables a systemic and consistent data analysis through the employment of the coding protocol applied to the both cases – coverage of EU-Ukraine relations in German and Russian media respectively. Furthermore, changes in the content over time can be examined [Häder 2006: 325]. The time period in the focus is from 2009 to 2015. The year of 2009 is a meaningful starting point for the analysis. It marked the launch of the EU's EaP, the key instrument of the EU's foreign policy to further deepen the relationship with its Eastern neighbours both multilaterally and bilaterally with each of the six participating countries. The period of observation ends with an important EaP summit in 2015, which followed the Russia-Ukraine crisis. Our focus is German and Russian news coverage of EU-Ukraine relations during the specific periods around the biennial EaP summits in Prague (2009), Warsaw (2011), Vilnius (2013) and Riga (2015). We examine the EaP summits coverage one week before, and three days after each summit (Table 1). In total, approximately seven weeks of news media coverage was analysed. This seven-year period allows us to examine the trends, changes and variations in the imagery surrounding EU-Ukraine relations. Additionally, this time period is expected to profile a higher number of media items in which the EU is reported to interact with Ukraine.

Table 1

Periods of observation

EaP Summit	Duration	Period of observation
Prague Summit	7 May 2009	30 April – 10 May 2009
Warsaw Summit	29 – 30 September 2011	22 September – 3 October 2011
Vilnius Summit	28 – 29 November 2013	21 November – 2 December 2013
Riga Summit	21 – 22 May 2015	14 – 25 May 2015

The framing of EU relations with Ukraine is traced from two different perspectives: from *inside* the EU (case-study Germany) and from *outside* the EU (case-study Russia). As mentioned above, Germany is a key driver behind European integration and one of the most influential EU member states [Semetko *et al.* 2000]. This status comes with the potential to influence public and political discourses within the EU and play a significant role in the relations with the Eastern European states, including Ukraine. It is not just about Germany's involvement in the Minsk peace processes (the Normandy contact group to mitigate the persistent war in the Donbass region of Eastern Ukraine since 2014). Germany also demonstrates a strong economic and political interest towards Ukraine. Russia also has a very strong economic and political interest in Ukraine due to their closely intertwined history, the size of the country, the geopolitical location (e.g. in terms of energy policy), and economic connections. Ukraine would be an important and suitable member for Russia's Eurasian Customs Union (EACU), however, Ukraine's Association Agreement (AA) with

the EU hinders Ukraine's ability to join the EACU. Russia has tried to pressure Ukraine to drop its AA with the EU, and replace it with the EACU membership. This makes Ukraine a key player between the EU and Russia.

The focus of our study is on print media. In each case, we selected two influential, daily press outlets. In Germany, we chose *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (*SZ*) and *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (*FAZ*). In Russia, the sample included the influetial *Kommersant* (*Коммерсантъ*) and *Rossiskaya Gazeta* (*Российская газета*) (*RG*). All four newspapers are often used as credible references by policy- and decision-making elites in the respective countries. *SZ* and *FAZ* are the two daily, high quality newspapers with the highest circulation in Germany[2]. Politically, *SZ* is seen as social liberal, leaning to the left, whereas *FAZ* is a clearly centre leaning newspaper. Both reflect common attitudes and political viewpoints within the German media landscape. In the Russian sample the *Kommersant* is focussing economic issues and is, politically, considered to be a more liberal newspaper out of the two selected newspapers. *RG* is the leading government newspaper that focuses more on domestic issues and reflects the ruling party's political base and its foreign policy stance.

The data were collected in German and Russian languages respectively. To collect the news items for our analysis, we used the following key words: "European Union" and "Ukraine". The search terms for the European Union also included such key words as "EU", "European Commission"/"EC", "European Central Bank"/"ECB", "European Court of Justice"/"ECJ", "European Parliament"/"EP", "EU Presidency", and finally "EU Council". The newspaper articles from the chosen Russian and German news outlets entered the sample if they mentioned Ukraine and at least one of the listed EU-related terms. In total, 160 news items were collected: the German dataset contains 111 articles and the Russian dataset consists of 49 news items in the observed period.

A crucial part of the media content analysis is the formulation of categories and sub-categories for the content analysis (Table 2). The categories are partly theory-based and partly empirical-based. The theory-based formulation of categories derived from our research question, while the empirically-based categories are derived from the actual material [Früh 2011: 153]. Informed by previous research on media framing [see for example Chaban 2016; Knodt *et al*. 2017; Chaban *et al*. 2017; more specifically on EU relations to the Eastern neighbours see Kleinschnitger & Knodt 2018], we measure the category *Visibility* through the indicators of "volume" (number of news items), the "length" of each article (short [<500 words]; medium [500–1000 words]; large [>1000 words]) and through the "degree of centrality" of the representation of EU-Ukraine relations as well as of the representation of the EU itself (minor [the EU and Ukraine are mentioned in passing, very briefly]; secondary [the EU and Ukraine are acting on par with other international actors]; major [the EU and Ukraine are the focus of the story]).

The *Understanding* category evaluates on the one hand the type of "interaction" of the actors presenting the relations between the EU and Ukraine within respective articles. We distinguish and code for different modes of interactions to evaluate the framing of the relations between the EU and Ukraine. The possible frames are "cooperation", "conflict", as well as "value-based", "interdependent", "no interaction" and "comparison". Cooperation is defined as interacting together with a win-win result. Conflict on the other hand refers to a situation where we observe conflicting interest with asymmetrical profit. Value-based interaction classifies a situation where at least one of the actors represents its normative ideas and values to influence its partners. Interactions were coded as interdependent if both interacting partners were presented as dependent on each other, with their actions having mutual, positive or negative outcomes for the other. Finally, no interaction is the code of cases when the actors do not interact in any way and comparison is the code for when the actors are compared in a rather neutral manner. We also considered that a pure description of facts is always influenced by the one presenting it. On the other hand, the *Understanding* category evaluates specific "thematic frames": "politics", "economy/business", "energy", "mobility" and "normative". These five identified thematic frames are reflective of the subject areas of the EaP.

The thematic frames represent the thematic areas in which the actors of the EU-Ukraine relationship interact.

As part of the "image theory" tradition, Richard K. Herrmann [2013] emphasized emotive charge as one key condition for images of "Others" to leave a deeper imprint. Regarding the category *Emotional Charge*, we define the "evaluation" in the media items of the EU-Ukraine relations from "negative", "negative/neutral", "neutral", "positive/neutral", to "positive". Additionally, we analysed "metaphors" to evaluate the emotional charge in a nuanced way (about the theoretical foundations see the Conceptual Metaphor Approach by Lakoff & Johnston [1980]). Metaphors are important sources to analyze how actors and their interaction are presented, as especially often these reveal an opinion and the choice e.g. of using "friendship" or "enemy" are crucial and are helpful in capturing perceptions. Metaphors can therefore prompt whether the actors are viewed as "negative", "neutral" or "positive". Metaphors play a crucial role in stereotyping and it is of great interest to see which, if any, stereotypical pictures can be worked out on the EU-Ukraine relation (Table 2).

Table 2

Categories of analysis

Visibility			Understanding		Emotional Charge	
Volume	**Length**	**Degree of Centrality (EU-Ukraine and EU)**	**Interaction**	**Thematic Frames**	**Evaluation**	**Metaphors**
Number of News Items	Short Medium Large	Minor Secondary Major	Conflict Cooperation Interdependence Value-based No Interaction Neutral Comparison Other	Politics Economy/ Business Energy Mobility Normative	Positive Positive/neutral Neutral Negative/neutral Negative	Positive Neutral Negative

Source: compiled by the authors,
based on Chaban [2016: 104–109] and Knodt *et al*. [2017: 49].

3. Comparing media perceptions of EU—Ukraine relations in Germany and Russia

Focusing our research questions – how is the relationship between the EU and the Ukraine framed both in Germany's and Russia's print media and what different frames and images do they communicate? – this section presents the analysis of the empirical material on EU-Ukraine relations from the German and Russian samples. In it, we describe our empirical findings, include possible explanations of these and discuss the results within a broader context of the general discourses on the perceived EU relations with Ukraine. The section is structured to reflect the three main categories of analysis detailed above: *Visibility*, *Understanding* and *Emotional Charge*.

3.1. Visibility of EU—Ukraine relations

The formal institutionalization of the relations between Ukraine and the EU began with the signature of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) on June 14, 1994, which was ratified in March 1998. Subsequently, in February 2005, the EU and Ukraine adopted the EU-Ukraine Action Plan, which entailed political reforms and visa facilitation as a conditional basis for further trade relations. The tailor-made Action Plan represented a subsequent step in the

formalization of EU-Ukraine relations and has been extended by implementation plans after three years' validity within the framework of the EaP.

Ukraine is a central state of the EaP and has been described by academics as the "driving force" [Trabandt 2012] for relations with the EU within the framework. This finding can be explained not only by its geographical size but also by the high status of economic relations with the EU and because of its significance in normative and geopolitical relations with Russia. Figure 1 shows the total volume of EU-Ukraine articles we have collected during the specific seven-year period around the biennial EaP summits. Remarkably, the Russian dataset on EU-Ukraine relations (49 articles) is less than half of the German dataset (111 articles). Looking at the data volume of EU-Ukraine over time, nearly half of the German as well as the Russian dataset cumulates in the year 2013 (Figure 1). This visibility pattern is rather predictable as the EU-Ukraine relationship becomes highly visible right at that moment, when the former president Viktor Yanukovych decided not to sign the AA to everybody's surprise.

Figure 1: Volume on EU-Ukraine over time, 2009–2015
(German and Russian media).
Source: ENPerceptions, TU Darmstadt, 2016/2018

In contrast to the coverage of the crisis in 2013, the year 2011 represents the smallest volume of published articles in Germany. In the Russian case, it is the year 2009 with the lowest number of articles. Although 2009 is the founding year of the EaP and thus an important turning point for the development of EU-Ukraine relations, the Russian media gave little or no attention to this event.

Overall, the German dataset has 66 articles by the *FAZ*. These are followed closely by 45 articles by the *SZ*. In the Russian case, 37 articles came from *RG*, the dominant source for the data over time, and only 12 articles are from the daily newspaper *Kommersant*. Looking at the volume and the length of published articles (Figure 2), it is noticeable that, proportionally, Russian articles mentioning the EU and

Ukraine are large or at least medium in length. Short articles only appear in 25% (*Kommersant*) and 29% (*RG*) of media coverage. The German case, in comparison, included a rather high number of short articles – both German newspapers published about 60% short length articles. This empirical findings suggest, that in the German case the EU-Ukraine relationship was 'on the radar', which means that German media were following the developments in the EU-Ukraine relationship on a regular base, yet in a more superficial manner. In contrast, Russian media were much more case-sensitive. If they reported on EU-Ukraine relations, Russian media tend to discuss important changes in the EU-Ukraine relationship in a greater detail.

Figure 2: Volume and length on EU-Ukraine by newspaper, 2009–2015
(German and Russian media).
Source: ENPerceptions, TU Darmstadt, 2016/2018

Bringing the focus to the degree of centrality, the media analysis of the German and the Russian news reveals that the EU-Ukraine relations as well as the EU itself were presented mainly in a major or secondary perspective (Figure 3), which is a very strong finding. Arguably, it shows the importance assigned by newsmakers to the relationship between the EU and Ukraine. Both datasets contained a significant number of articles reporting about EU-Ukraine or the EU on its own either acting at least on par with other international actors (secondary) or even as the main focus of the story (major). The German media presents the EU-Ukraine in the main focus less frequently than the EU itself (40% vs. 62% of major focus respectively), which is not surprising due to the fact that for Germany as an EU member state the EU itself is more important in general. The situation is opposite in the Russian dataset. Here, the EU-Ukraine relationship is framed as the main focus of the story in 61% of the sample *vis-à-vis* 45% of articles where the EU on its own as a major focus. This indicator of visibility suggests that within Russian media the EU itself may be framed as less important than the EU's relationship with Ukraine.

Figure 3: Degree of centrality of EU-Ukraine relations and of the EU,
2009–2015 (German and Russian media).
Source: ENPerceptions, TU Darmstadt, 2016/2018

3.2. Understanding EU-Ukraine relations

From 2007 to 2011, the EU and Ukraine were negotiating an AA, which should have included an in-depth Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) and aimed to further develop trade relations. When Viktor Yanukovych, however, won the presidential election in February 2010, two prominent events led to stagnating the development of the relations between the two parties in the following years. On the one hand, there were ongoing negotiations on association, complicated by the imprisonment of former opposition Presidential candidate Tymoshenko and, on the other hand, failure to reach agreements on the bilateral EU-Ukraine association in November 2013.

Looking at the patterns of interaction of the perceived relationship between the EU and Ukraine, at first glance, it appears that the German news sources portray EU-Ukraine relations under the "conflict" frame more than the Russian news sources (Figure 4). However, the section "others" under the Russia column in Figure 4, can almost exclusively be classified as "pressure" or "blackmail". Many of the Russian articles captured under "other" describe the EU as either pressuring Ukraine, or more extremely, blackmailing Ukraine. Also notable is that the majority of the articles that describe European pressure and blackmail are concentrated in 2013 when much of the news was focused on the AA. In conjunction with pressure from the EU, Russian articles also mention "empty promises" from the EU, which paints an even more negative image of the EU, and what the AA would bring to Ukraine. Furthermore, even the Russian articles that are classified under "neutral comparison", state that the AA with the EU would not be beneficial for Ukraine.

Figure 4: Patterns of interaction on EU-Ukraine relations,
2009–2015 (German and Russian media).
Source: ENPerceptions, TU Darmstadt, 2016/2018

A significant majority of German and Russian articles on the EU-Ukraine relationship classified under "conflict", were clustered in 2013 mostly in respect to the refusal by Yanukovych to sign the AA (Figure 5), just before the Vilnius summit in 2013. As mentioned above, Russian media emphasised that the EU, as the dominant player, is blackmailing Ukraine. In contrast to the German articles, the Russian media clearly referred less to the conflict itself, but more to an apparent asymmetrical power relationship that prevails between the EU and Ukraine. This asymmetry puts the EU in a position to oppress Ukraine. The German articles, however, highlighted the non-signature of the AA and the connected conflict, and did not mention the asymmetrical power relationship.

Despite the troublesome domestic situation in Ukraine, on March 21, 2014 – during the three-month transitional presidency of Oleksandr Turchynov – Ukraine signed the political part of the AA with the EU. Subsequently, on June 27, 2014, under the new, democratically elected President Petro Poroshenko, the economic part of the agreement was also signed. However, it was suspended until December 31, 2015, to find a settlement with Russia regarding compatibility with the DCFTA free trade agreement. The ratification by the Ukrainian Parliament of the Joint AA on September 16, 2014, marked the next, vital stage in cooperation and, as such, constituted the new foundation of EU-Ukraine relations. As Figure 5 shows, in the German sample, 2015 is the year with the highest share of reports framing the EU-Ukraine relationship in terms of "cooperation", which marked a change of the relationship towards more cooperative modes of interaction. In contrast, framing in terms of "cooperation" between the EU and Ukraine within the Russian sample stagnate since 2013. This stagnation is of interest – a higher level of cooperation is to be expected in 2015, as the AA signed in 2014 leads to deeper cooperation between the EU and Ukraine. It seems more likely that Russian media simply ignored the agreement and the subsequent deepening of EU-Ukraine relations.

Figure 5: Patterns of Cooperation and Conflict on EU-Ukraine relations,
2009–2015 (German and Russian media).
Source: ENPerceptions, TU Darmstadt, 2016/2018

Turning to the question of how EU-Ukraine relations were framed in the German and Russian media with respect to the thematic frames, such as politics, economy, energy, mobility and normative (Figure 6), the frames of "politics" and "economy" were found within more than 90% of the German media coverage over time. It seems that the influential German press delivers a strong message that the EU relationship with Ukraine focuses on economic and political issues. This framing can be explained – from a political point of view – by the fact that German media reports almost entirely about the ambitious reform agenda relating to the AA to deepening the EU-Ukraine relationship that includes huge reforms of the country's public administration and the judicial sector. In the reportage of EU-Ukraine relations in the Russian newspapers, the two frames, "politics" and "economy", accounted for just over 70%. Strikingly, the frame of energy is barely visible in the German press, which might be an outcome of the German-Russian cooperation in the Northstream 2 project, which left Ukraine's role as a transit country unattended. In contrast, the energy frame in the Russian dataset on EU-Ukraine has almost the same percentage as the frame economy. This higher visibility reflects the status of Ukraine as a transit country for Russian gas, which has impacted energy supplies to the EU in the past. Since energy constitutes approximately half of Russian exports, energy prices are a critical factor to keeping Russia's economy stable. The majority of articles in the Russian sample that focused on energy, actually described no interaction between the EU and Ukraine, but focused more on Russia's interaction with Ukraine, in regards to price of energy and tariffs on gas. Finally, within the Russian sample, the normative frame is more prominent than in the German ones. In almost every "normative" framed article, the interaction between the EU and Ukraine was classified as neutral, and in one case negative/neutral. These articles were less about these interactions, and more about the EU's normative status in general.

Figure 6: Dominant Thematic Frames on EU-Ukraine relations,
2009–2015 (German and Russian media).
Source: ENPerceptions, TU Darmstadt, 2016/2018

The frame "mobility" shows in both datasets on EU-Ukraine interactions with the same low visibility despite that it is an important topic for Germany and Russia, in regards to visa liberalization for Ukrainian citizens to travel to and work in the Schengen area of the EU. However, the low visibility of this frame can be explained by the fact that our analysis ends in November 2015, but the agreement on visa liberalization between the EU and Ukraine came into force in June 2017. This agreement binds Ukraine even more closely to the EU.

3.3. Emotional charge of EU-Ukraine relations

Finally, the evaluation of EU-Ukraine relations shows that the distribution of classification of both German and Russian articles was skewed towards "negative" and "negative/neutral" (Figure 7). In the German case, there are some classifications of positive portrayals on EU-Ukraine relations (20%). In contrast, there are absolutely no "positive" or "positive/neutral" evaluations of EU-Ukraine relations in the Russian sample. In addition to a higher percentage of "negative" classifications, the Russian articles also used more emotionally charged language, particularly through the use of metaphors. The articles that are classified as "neutral" in the Russian case mostly refer to the EU, or Ukraine, in relation to the EU in a minor way. Other "neutral" articles, which were written in a more diplomatic way, acknowledged that many Ukrainians want eurointegration, but still highlighted that Ukraine and Russia are very closely tied through history, culture and mentality. These articles do not openly oppose Ukraine's closer ties with the EU, but at the same time emphasis that the AA should not harm the Ukrainian economy or Ukraine's close ties with Russia. Other neutrally written Russian articles stated only facts about the EU, and did not impose any views through the tone or metaphors used. However, even the neutrally stated facts about the EU often implies a great deal of negativity towards the EU.

Figure 7: Evaluation of EU-Ukraine relations in comparison,
2009–2015 (German and Russian media)
Source: ENPerceptions, TU Darmstadt, 2016/2018

As mentioned earlier, metaphors play a crucial role in framing the international actors, often engaging with stereotypes. In this analysis, we discuss only the most typical metaphors which described the EU, Ukraine, or the relations between them. Such metaphors are the ones of sickness, negative emotions, war, flood, game etc.

Metaphors were rarely used in the German sample. *SZ* was more prone to use metaphorical images than the *FAZ*. Most metaphors were found in the crisis year of 2013 in the articles referring to Yanukovych's decision not to sign the AA. The sudden rejection of the AA by Yanukovych was negatively described by the German media. It was compared to "A Ukrainian bomb for the EU" [*FAZ* 2013a], one of the strongest negative metaphor we found in our data. In addition to this war metaphor, the game metaphor was often used in this case: German media described Yanukovych as a "juggler" [*SZ* 2013a; *SZ* 2013b]. In another instance, a negative image emerges again: "just look at his cards and compare them with the cards in Putin's hands" [*SZ* 2013c]. The image that comes through is the one of the Ukrainian leadership at the time who did not take the association seriously and played with the EU. A rather neutral game metaphor could be the verbal image "end of swinging" [*SZ* 2013d], which refers to the fact that the decision has now been made and there is probably no AA between the EU and Ukraine. A similar intention has the rather neutral theater metaphor "curtain after the interval" [*SZ* 2013e], which suggests that the decision has been made too early. Positive metaphors were also found in German data – e.g. "friendship" [*SZ* 2015] or the "European family" [e.g. *FAZ* 2013b; *SZ* 2013f]. The family metaphor is a very strong positive emotionally charged verbal image and highlights the closeness and togetherness that prevails despite many quarrels between the EU and Ukraine, not only geographically but also emotionally.

In contrast to the German media, both observed Russian newspapers used metaphors frequently. All metaphors are charged on the spectrum from neutral to very negative, while not a single metaphor with positive connotations was observed. One of the reoccurring negative metaphors used to describe EU-Ukraine relationship was the one of the "carrot" [*Kommersant* 2013a] or the "sweet gingerbread" [*RG* 2013a]. The sweet gingerbread, which is offered by the EU, symbolized the EU promise of integration to attract Ukraine's youth – perhaps, a parallel to the fairytale about Hansel and Gretel, a storyline which did not end well for the children (Ukraine in

this case), on the one hand. On the other hand, when it came to Yanukovich's decree finally the "carrot" will not be given to the Ukrainians. Some metaphors within the Russian dataset took this idea and made it even more negative by stating that the carrot had no real substance and that you cannot "spread a promise onto bread" [e.g. *RG* 2013b]. It meant that the promises the EU was giving about integration were empty, they would not bring real economic benefit to Ukraine. However, when it comes to discussing blackmailing, some articles used that terminology in a harsh and bold way [*RG* 2013c; *RG* 2013d; *Kommersant* 2013b]. Directly following the Vilnius Summit, a Russian article praised Kiev for not "succumbing to euroblackmail" [*RG* 2013e].

Referring to EU integration in a more negative manner, the news authors came with such expression as "the only free cheese comes in a mousetrap" [*RG* 2013f] stressing that Ukraine will have to pay a high price for joining the EU. Another metaphor which also relates to life threatening devices is the description by the Russian media of the AA as "a noose around Ukraine's neck" [*RG* 2013g].

Metaphors of fluidity are used in different ways. For example, when some articles describe the Ukraine "comes out dry from water" [e.g. *Kommersant* 2013c], it implies that signing the AA means a great deal of troubles to Ukraine. But they also admonish that it is too early "to drink champagne" about stopping the movement of Ukraine to Europe and "the drink is European, and with gas" [*RG* 2013e]. Metaphors relating to hot temperature are often used referring to the Maidan movements: while "Maidan is boiling" [e.g. *RG* 2013h], the economists discuss how the AA will turn out for Ukraine's economy. In this regard, it is important to "save Ukraine from the imperial nightmare" [e.g. *RG* 2013i] the EU is trying to impose, some article stated.

The game metaphor is often used when energy policy is reported. Journalists are trying to understand which "games each side is playing" [*RG* 2009] or regarding Ukraine, which is like an "active item" [*RG* 2013i] on an overheated market where the players inflate the prices hoping to make some profit. In a more sarcastic manner, some say that the EU does not act out of some moral ideological ideas, but out of self-interest. Therefore, the EU only intervenes if there is some strategic benefit to them: "Oil was found in the Antarctic. Luckily the bloody regime of the penguins does not have much time left to torture its people" [*RG* 2011].

When reporting the EaP, Russian articles described the hopelessness of the EU the most: e.g. "fishing without catching a fish" [*RG* 2015] referred to the EU as a fisherman who is trying to get a moldy worm onto a rusty and dull hook with the hope that a fish will bite. Regarding the EU itself, Russian articles use the sickness metaphor, for example, saying that the EU has an "allergy" [*Kommersant* 2013a] towards Russia and everything what this country stands for. The family metaphor is used not only in the German media but also in Russian articles when it says that Ukrainians are not "small children" [*RG* 2013j] who are scanty for sweet candies. While the German media frames the EU and Ukraine as a "European family", the Russian media emphasize that Ukrainians are not children and not even "poor relatives" [*RG* 2013j].

4. Conclusions

In the conclusions we are coming back to our initial research questions – How is the relationship between the EU and the Ukraine framed both in Germany's and Russia's print media? And what different frames and images do they communicate? Using methods from multidisciplinary backgrounds, we conducted a mixed (qualitative and quantitative) content analysis and analyzed leading newspapers in Germany (EU-internal perspective) (*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* and *Süddeutsche Zeitung*) and in Russia (EU-external perspective) (*Kommersant* and *Rossiskaya Gazeta*). We aimed to grasp the leading frames of EU-Ukraine relations from both perspectives. The period of observation stretches from 2009 (the launch of the EaP) to the important EaP summit in Riga in 2015 (which followed the unfolding of the Russia-Ukraine crisis).

The comparison between the framing of EU-Ukraine relationship in the German *vs.* Russian leading newspapers showed that the *Visibility* of these relations differs widely between Germany

and Russia. Overall, the German dataset (111 news items total) count for a significantly larger volume of articles than the Russian dataset (49 news items in total) on EU-Ukraine relations within the similar time period. However, even though the number of Russian articles is significantly lower, Russian media tend to report EU-Ukraine relations in a greater detail, as explicated by a larger proportion of medium and large articles in the Russian dataset. In contrast, more articles with short lengths in German sample demonstrated that the relationship between the EU and Ukraine is 'on the radar' of the German newsmakers. A high proportion of articles that framed EU-Ukraine relations with a higher degree of centrality was found in both datasets. In other words, if the EU and Ukraine are both mentioned in an article, their relationship is mainly the focus of the story within the German as well as the Russian media. Visibility patterns suggest that while Germany and Russia focus on EU-Ukraine relations, they do it differently: Russian leading press prefers to cover them in lesser but more detailed articles, while German newsmakers publish more and more regularly, yet in shorter, less elaborated articles.

Concerning the *Understanding* of EU-Ukraine relations, the second main category of our analysis, thematically, the dominant frames of 'politics' and 'economy' were found within more than 90% of the German sample. In the Russian case, these frames accounted for about 70%. Importantly, the frame of energy in the Russian dataset on EU-Ukraine relations has almost the same percentage as the frame economy which reflects the framing of Ukraine as a transit country for Russian gas. In terms of the perceived interaction modes, a significant majority of German and Russian articles on EU-Ukraine relations classified these relations under "conflict". These were clustered mostly in 2013. German media mostly focusses on the decree of the former Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych who refused to sign the AA with the EU. In contrast, Russia's media emphasizes that the EU, as the dominant player, was blackmailing Ukraine and referred less to the conflict itself, but more to an apparent asymmetrical power relationship that prevails between the EU and Ukraine. The year 2015 is the year with the highest share of reports framing the EU-Ukraine relationship in terms of "cooperation" in the German case. This framing marked a change in the framing of the relationship towards more cooperative modes of interaction. In contrast, the perceived "cooperation" rate between the EU and Ukraine within the Russian media articles has been stagnant since 2013.

The evaluation of the third main category *Emotional Charge* shows that evaluations of EU-Ukraine relations in both German and Russian samples was skewed towards "negative" and "negative/neutral". In the German case, there were some positive portrayals on EU-Ukraine relations (20% of the German articles). Importantly, there were absolutely no "positive" or "positive/neutral" evaluations of EU-Ukraine relations in the Russian sample. In addition, when assessing the metaphors, Russian newsmakers were found to use them more frequently. None of these metaphors has positive connotations when describing the relationship between the EU and Ukraine.

Interestingly, shifts in the real world of European foreign policy mirror Russia's critics of the EU or could be read as an answer to this critique. As mentioned in the beginning of the article, the EU Global Strategy and the related new developments towards a new pragmatism mark a shift from an asymmetrical relationship to joint ownership. This new pragmatism of the EU gives the impression of a kind of 'response' to the framing of the EU-Ukraine relations produced by the Russian press. No other country has criticized EU policies as much as Russia has done, especially towards its Eastern European neighbours within the EaP. Somehow, it looks like the framing by Russian leading media might have contributed to the development of the strategic direction of EU's foreign policy and the shift towards a new pragmatism but also towards joint ownership. More research is needed to analyse this potential "feedback loop" of the media frames of third countries towards the EU's foreign policy. Nevertheless, if the administration level in Entman's cascade is influenced not only by the country-specific media interpretations and supply of new frames but also by the media interpretations and supply of frames by third countries, then the feedback loop of the

cascade may provide a 'loose coupling' to third countries cascades. Arguably, frames of foreign policy may not only travel 'down' the cascade from the government to the public and in the reverse flow, but also from one country cascade to another country cascade.

NOTES
1. A pan-Europe weekly *Politico* has a very low volume of publications on the EU-Ukraine relations, thus it has been excluded from the analysis.
2. *SZ* is mainly owned by the "Südwestdeutsche Medien Holding GmbH", a company based in Stuttgart in Germany. *FAZ* belongs to the majority of the non-profit "Fazit-Stiftung", a foundation based in Frankfurt am Main in Germany. The current circulation of *SZ* is 366.999 newspapers/day (IVW/II.2018). While *FAZ* has a lower number of circulation with 261.583 newspapers/day (IVW/II. 2018), for more information about circulation numbers see: www.ivw.eu.

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UDC 81'42

CONSTRUCTING A NARRATIVE OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
IN THE VERKHOVNA RADA OF UKRAINE:
A CORPUS-BASED DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

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Anna Kryvenko. Constructing a Narrative of European Integration in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine: A Corpus-Based Discourse Analysis. Social transformations constitute and are constituted by discourse. The discursive construction of the narrative of European integration is an essential part of public policy making as well as shaping socially shared knowledge and attitudes in Ukraine. At the same time, European integration as a discursive construct is subject to modification in the course of time and /or in different settings of institutional communication. The objective of this article is twofold: to reveal how consistently the narrative of European integration has been constructed in discursive practices of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (the Ukrainian Parliament) in the 21st century and to contribute to the elaboration of a corpus-based methodology suitable for analyzing discourses of social change over time in the Ukrainian language. A combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches is employed to treat the data coming from an *ad hoc* built electronic corpus of written texts posted on the official website of the Verkhovna Rada between 2002 and 2017. The findings include patterns of naming and reference to European integration as well as the distribution and dynamics of their usage within the observed period. The uncovered modifications in the discursive construction of European integration are interpreted with respect to a wider socio-political context. Since this research is ongoing, avenues of further work on this subject are outlined.

Key words: narrative of European integration; electronic corpus; corpus approaches to discourse analysis; collocation; consistent collocates.

Г.Л. Кривенко. Аналіз конструювання наративу європейської інтеграції у Верховній Раді України крізь призму корпусної дискурсології. Статтю присвячено проблемам побудови і аналізу моделей дискурсивного конструювання наративу європейської інтеграції в комунікативних практиках Верховної Ради України крізь призму корпусної дискурсології – нової трансцисциплінарної сфери досліджень, що постає як синтез двох мовознавчих дисциплін: дискурсології та корпусної лінгвістики. Спираючись на положення конструкціоністської епістемології про те, що соціальні перетворення конституюють і конституюються через дискурс, дискурсивне конструювання наративу європейської інтеграції розглядається як невід'ємна частина розбудови державної політики, а також формування спільних знань та поглядів в українському суспільстві. Водночас, європейська інтеграція як дискурсивний конструкт може змінюватися з часом та / або за різних умов інституційного спілкування. У статті переслідуються дві мети: з'ясувати, наскільки послідовно відбувалося конструювання наративу євроінтеграції у дискурсивних практиках Верховної Ради України у XXI столітті, та зробити вклад до формування методологічних засад корпусних досліджень, придатних для аналізу україномовного соціально значущого дискурсу на часовому зрізі. Здійснено спробу поєднання кількісних та якісних підходів для аналізу даних, отриманих у процесі обробки спеціально побудованого електронного корпусу текстів, опублікованих на офіційному веб-сайті Верховної Ради України у період з 2002 по 2017 рр. Результати включають у себе зразки іменування та референції європейської інтеграції у досліджуваних текстах, а також розподіл і динаміку їхнього використання протягом спостережуваного періоду. Виявлені модифікації дискурсивного конструювання європейської інтеграції трактуються на тлі ширшого соціально-політичного контексту. Пропонуються шляхи подальших наукових розвідок, присвячених темі дослідження.

Ключові слова: наратив європейської інтеграції; електронний корпус; корпусні підходи до аналізу дискурсу; колокація; послідовні колокати.

А.Л. Кривенко. Анализ конструирования нарратива европейской интеграции в Верховной Раде Украины сквозь призму корпусной дискурсологии. Статья посвящена проблемам построения и анализа моделей дискурсивного конструирования нарратива европейской интеграции в коммуникативных практиках Верховной Рады Украины сквозь призму корпусной дискурсологии – новой трансцисциплинарной сферы исследований, которая выступает как синтез двух языковедческих дисциплин: дискурсологии и корпусной лингвистики. Опираясь на положения конструкционистской эпистемологии о том, что социальные преобразования конституируют и конституируются через дискурс, дискурсивное конструирование нарратива европейской интеграции рассматривается как неотъемлемая часть развития государственной политики, а также формирования общих знаний и взглядов в украинском обществе. В то же время, европейская интеграция как дискурсивный конструкт может меняться со временем и / или при различных условиях институционального общения. В статье преследуются две цели: выяснить, насколько последовательно происходило конструирование нарратива евроинтеграции в дискурсивных практиках Верховной Рады Украины в XXI веке, и внести вклад в формирование методологических основ корпусных исследований, пригодных для анализа украиноязычного социально значимого дискурса на временном срезе. Предпринята попытка сочетания количественных и качественных подходов для анализа данных, полученных в процессе обработки специально построенного электронного корпуса текстов, опубликованных на официальном сайте Верховной Рады Украины в период с 2002 по 2017 гг. Результаты включают в себя образцы именования и референции европейской интеграции в исследуемых текстах, а также распределение и динамику их использования в течение наблюдаемого периода. Выявленные модификации дискурсивного конструирования европейской интеграции трактуются на фоне более широкого социально-политического контекста. Предлагаются пути дальнейших научных поисков, посвященных теме исследования.

Ключевые слова: нарратив европейской интеграции; электронный корпус; корпусная подходы к анализу дискурса; колокация; последовательные колокаты.

1. Introduction

Yavorska and Bohomolov [2010] make a point that in the Ukrainian political discourse of the 1990s and 2000s, Europe was represented as a desired yet dubious object. Importantly, European integration was also imagined in relation to a travel destination for the country. Ukraine has undergone tectonic political and social shifts since the approval of the Strategy and the Programme of Ukraine's Integration with the European Union (EU) by presidential decrees in 1998 and 2000 respectively. Despite the fact that "the intention to join the EU was initially voiced solely by the presidency", by 2002, "references to 'European integration' found their way into the programmes of most political parties and blocs, however 'virtual' some of these programmes may have been" [Wolczuk 2009: 193]. Yet, review of the relevant literature reveals that whether or not the Verkhovna Rada (the Ukrainian parliament) has been consistent in constructing the narrative of European integration in the recent history of Ukraine has been overlooked from a linguistic perspective.

This article contributes to filling this gap by revealing how the narrative of European integration is constructed in the discursive practices of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine in the 21st century. The Verkhovna Rada (VR) is viewed here not as a mere location for the political debates of its members [cf. van Dijk 2002: 214] or a range of members having competing voices and struggling for power [cf. Wodak 2009: 191]. In contrast, it is interpreted as a "plural subject" (in terms of [Gilbert 1989]) – a representative institute, which, in accordance with Article 85[1] of the Ukrainian Constitution, determines the principles of domestic and foreign policy. This definition permits one to account for the phenomenon of collective intentionality, in particular, observed in organizations, corporations and governments [Tollefsen 2002], which rests on sociological and phenomenological theories by Durkheim, Weber, Heidegger and Searle, to name a few. However, alternatively to the premise of real and true beliefs and their collective acceptance adopted in rational system theories [Tollefsen 2002: 400], this analysis assumes the possibility of institutional

discursive intentionality, which does not necessarily represent "real and true beliefs" but is clearly manifested via recurrent discursive practices of an organization. These are materialized by means of various semiotic systems, including language, especially language-in-use.

The time span of 2002 – 2017 covered in this research embraces not only the five latest convocations of the Verkhovna Rada of 2002, 2006, 2007, 2012 and 2014, but also a series of crucial developments in recent Ukrainian history, including the Orange Revolution of 2004, the Revolution of Dignity of 2013 – 2014, the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU signed in 2014, and the ongoing Russian aggression against Ukraine since 2014.

The selected perspective limits this research to the "frontstage" discourse, i.e. discourse produced in staging and performing politics designed for the public (after Wodak [2009: 4ff]). The official website of the VR – a popular medium of communicating politics to both the general public and media professionals – was used as a source of texts for analysis. There is an underlying assumption that, as is the case with the European Parliament, the VR also maintains its website "to enhance public access to information about the institution and its activities"[2].

The theoretical and methodological framework of this research draws on advancements in corpus linguistics and discourse analysis, which enable a combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches in the data analysis. There is growing evidence that the systemic employment of corpus tools in discourse analysis adds an empirical dimension to introspection [Haarman *et al.* 2002], provides a more rigorous quantitative discourse analysis of the data [Baker and Levon 2015: 223–225]. It also enables one to focus on non-obvious meanings and usage patterns from a "modern diachronic" perspective in the spirit of modern diachronic corpus-assisted discourse studies [Partington 2013: 265–321]. This research also utilizes the notions of topic and topoi as well as discursive strategies of nomination and predication elaborated within the discourse-historical approach [Reisigl and Wodak 2009] when interpreting the quantitative data. However, it does not adopt a critical perspective of exploring and combating "discursive injustice" [van Dijk 2009: 63] that realizes "social wrongs" [Fairclough 2009: 167ff], which is typical of critical discourse analysis.

The objectives of this study direct it towards searching for similarity as well as addressing difference across verbal practices of interest in the VR. In fact, a focus on similarity in corpus approaches to discourse studies is "somewhat neglected" [Taylor 2018: 19–22] beyond the stage of selecting or creating comparable corpora. This approach undermines the completeness of the analysis, produces potentially misleading difference-oriented findings in quantitative terms and fosters expectation bias on the part of the researcher.

Due to space limitations, this article focuses primarily on the consistency of collocational patterns used to create or recreate the meaning of European integration in the VR over time. In terms of corpus linguistics, the following definition of collocation is adopted in this paper: any computationally derived "above-chance frequent co-occurrence of two words within a pre-determined span, usually five words on either side of the word under investigation (the *node*)" [Baker *et al.* 2008: 278]. The centrality of collocation in corpus linguistics, especially in the analysis of meaning [Sinclair 1991: 115–116; McEnery & Hardie 2012: 79], and the importance of 'themes, images, or motifs that seem to go together" [Gee 2011: 165] in discourse studies makes a collocational perspective the common ground and a fruitful area of research for both branches of linguistics.

In terms of structure, this article consists of five parts: introduction, data and method, results, discussion and conclusions.

2. Method

Data for this research came from an *ad hoc* built electronic corpus of written texts posted on the official website of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (the Ukrainian parliament) between 2002 and 2017. The selection of texts was done semi-automatically based on one criterion: at least a

single explicit mention of European integration in the text. The texts to be analyzed by corpus software were preserved in machine-readable form and grouped into 16 sub-corpora (each representing one year). The total corpus contained nearly 1,26 million word tokens and over 56 000 word types (as calculated by the software [AntConc 3.5.7]) and it consisted of 2 549 full-size texts. The distribution of texts and tokens per year is shown in Figures 1 and 2. The genres employed in the corpus embraced parliamentary news, minutes of plenary sittings, hearings and committees meetings, Speaker's addresses, committee agendas, reports, announcements, etc. The span of time and the variety of genres included into the VR corpus made it representative for the purposes of this research and increased the generalizability of research findings.

Although full written texts were treated as sampling units at the stage of building the VR corpus, they were not examined individually at the stage of quantitative analysis of the sub-corpora. They were interpreted as an aggregate sample of the "frontstage" discursive continuum within each respective year. However, not only concordance lines, but also some selected paragraphs and full texts were closely read at the stage of data interpretation.

Figure 1. The VR corpus size:
the number of texts per year

Figure 2. The VR corpus size:
the number of tokens per year

In order to identify lexical items/word phrases used in the VR corpus to explicitly denote the notion of European integration, a frequency count of words containing the Ukrainian equivalents of the stems *euro*, *integr-* and *EU* was run and analyzed against the data on the distribution of texts and tokens in the sub-corpora. To compensate for significant variability in the size of the sub-corpora, the received frequencies of the selected search nodes were normalized per 10 000 tokens.

To uncover statistically prominent lexical associations with European integration in the VR corpus and their dynamics over time, the immediate "co-text" (in the sense of [Stubbs 2001: 5ff]) of the selected search nodes was explored by means of the collocation tool, the cluster tool and the concordance plot tool in the software [AntConc 3.5.7]. On top of raw frequencies, some other quantitative parameters typical of contemporary corpus studies were accounted for in this research. The distance of collocates from the node words was measured both to the left and to the right of the node with the specification of the size of collocation window and the size and the range of the cluster. The strength of the collocation was combined with the statistical significance of the co-occurrence. The range of the collocate was measured as the number of sub-corpora in which the collocate appeared. The dispersion of the selected nodes within the sub-corpora was informative for the purposes of discourse analysis due to the chronological order of texts in each sub-corpus. In this article, the strength of the relationship between node words and their collocates was measured by the combined Mutual Information (MI) and Log Likelihood (LL) statistics with the probability value >0.05 and the minimal collocate frequency of 5. The corresponding equations are described in [Stubbs 1995]. These steps were taken to address a known tendency of MI, when used on its own,

to favor low-frequency words [Baker 2006: 102]. Overall, the higher was the MI (LL-filtered) score, the stronger was the association between a node and collocate.

Of particular interest for this research – given its focus on a discourse analysis looking for consistency over time – were consistent collocates of the selected node words. Consistent collocates, or c-collocates, are understood in corpus linguistics as "words that stably collocate with the node in multiple datasets and are to be viewed as indicating core elements of meaning, semantic associations and semantic prosodies" (in other terms, discourse prosodies – A.K.) [Germond et al. 2016: 140ff; cf. Gabrielatos & Baker 2008: 11]. There is no fixed numerical expression of collocate consistency in the literature on corpus linguistics (e.g. Gabrielatos & Baker [2008] stipulate that a consistent collocate has to occur in at least seven out of the ten annual corpora, whereas Germand *et al.* [2016] deem collocates as consistent when seen in all or most sub-corpora. This article maintains that in order to investigate consistency of representation in discourse, it is worth looking beyond individual c-collocates [cf. Gabrielatos & Baker 2008]. Respectively, it profiles the selected nodes with respect to consistency in their semantic preferences, i.e. the relations "not between individual words, but between a lemma or word-form and a set of semantically related words" [Stubbs 2002: 65], as well as their discourse prosodies, i.e. features that "express speaker attitude" [Stubbs 2002: 65].

Consistency markers in a broader sense are seen here as indicators of institutional discursive intentionality. The procedure of their extraction involved comparing the collocational profiles of the selected node words across sub-corpora and their dynamics was established as regards continuities, discontinuities and ruptures in their usage over time. Because of technical limitations of the software, which was originally geared towards English, the automatically generated collocate types were first saved as word lists and then lemmatized with the lemma list, which was manually created for the purposes of this research. Also, coupling wildcard characters like * (zero or more characters), @ (zero or one word) and | (search term OR search term) with the selected nodes as well as the advanced search option allowing one to import a set of search terms and to list context words were widely used for various searches to overcome the lack of automatic lemmatization and to enable word-group queries.

The concordance tool and the file view tool were used for close contextualized reading of the results generated by the other AntConc tools, as described above.

3. Results

This article reports on a selected range of findings in the VR corpus. The findings are relevant for the discussion of consistency in the construction of the narrative of European integration by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.

Although the noun phrase *європейська інтеграція* (*yevropeys'ka intehratsiya* "European integration") is considered the core term of the Ukrainian official discourse on the relations between Ukraine and the EU [Yavorska and Bohomolov 2010: 113], a variety of connected linguistic expressions is regularly employed to refer to these relations in the VR verbal communication. They include the noun *євроінтеграція* (*yevrointehratsiya* "Eurointegration"), the adjective *євроінтеграційний* (*yevrointehratsiynyy* "Eurointegration(al)") derived from the noun, and phrases such as *інтеграція України до ЄС / європейськиї структур* (*intehratsiya Ukrayiny do YeEs / yevropeys'kykh struktur* "integration of Ukraine to the EU / European structures") or *інтегруватися до Європи / ЄС* (*intehruvatysya do Yevropy / YeEs* "to integrate to Europe / the EU"). In order to reveal some general trends in denoting European integration in the VR over time, frequencies of the search nodes *євроінтегр** (*yevrointehr** "eurointegr*"), *інтегр** (*intehr** "integr*"), *євро** (*yevro** "euro*"), *ЄС* (*YeEs* "EU") in the VR corpus were normalized per 10 000 tokens and calculated one by one for each sub-corpus representing one year between 2002 and 2017 (Figure 3). The data for *євро** (*yevro** "euro*") and *інтегр** (*intehr** "integr*") exclude instances of *євроінтегр** (*yevrointehr** "eurointegr*"), which are presented separately.

Figure 3. Normalized frequencies of the search nodes *євроінтегр** (*yevrointehr** "eurointegr*"), *інтегр** (*intehr** "integr*"), *євро** (*yevro** "euro*"), *ЄС* (*YeEs* "EU") in the VR corpus between 2002 and 2017 (per 10 000 tokens).

As seen from Figure 3, references to European integration on the VR website are habitual throughout the whole period of observation. The spike for *євро** (*yevro** "euro*") and *ЄС* (*YeEs* "EU") in 2009 is not accompanied by the other two search nodes; however, a number of rises and falls after 2010 are overall comparable with respect to all four search nodes. Occurrences of *євроінтегр** (*yevrointehr** "eurointegr*") are the most prominent in the sub-corpus for 2013.

The denominal adjective *yevrointehratsiynyy* "Eurointegration(al)" as well as the core term *yevropeys'ka intehratsiya* "European integration" and its more colloquial clipped duplicate *yevrointehratsiya* "Eurointegration" were selected for a closer examination in the VR corpus. In total, word-forms of these lemmas occur 3,422 times in the corpus. Their aggregate dispersion through each annual sub-corpus generated via AntConc is shown in Figure 4. Since the texts in each sub-corpus are ordered chronologically, some general conclusions can be made about trends in the focus on matters of European integration throughout each year under observation based on how evenly the bars are dispersed through each plot. For instance, plot 12 featuring the 2013 sub-corpus suggests that European integration was salient in the VR discursive practices throughout the year, particularly in the first few months, due to the intense preparation for the Ukraine-EU Association Agreement and not just in relation to Maidan, which took place in late 2013 – early 2014.

Figure 4. Concordance plots showing dispersion of the node lemmas *yevrointehratsiynyy, yevropeys'ka intehratsiya* and *yevrointehratsiya* across each annual sub-corpus.

However, visual results in the 'bar-code' format should be interpreted with great care [Anthony 2018]. First, a normalized length of the plots limits comparisons among the sub-corpora due to significant differences in their size (the size of each sub-corpus (in this case, the number of characters in the sub-corpus) as well as the number of hits (in this case, raw frequencies of the search words) is to the right of each bar-code plot). Second, bar-code plots can "exaggerate the frequency of items in very long texts and similarly under-represent the frequency of items in short texts" [Anthony 2018: 213]. Hence, tentative tendencies suggested by the bar-code plots need to be further explored by other corpus tools and confirmed by other calculations.

The immediate co-text of the nodes *yevrointehratsiynyy* "Eurointegration(al)", *yevropeys'ka intehratsiya* "European integration" and *yevrointehratsiya* "Eurointegration" was examined in both the 1L (one word to the left) and 1R (one word to the right) positions by the cluster tool. Some of the most frequent results are shown in Table 1, excluding the clusters with functional words. An additional search revealed that the lemmas *realizatsiya* "realization" and *pidtrymka* "support" are found immediately to the left of the node *yevrointehratsiyn** in 59 and 41 occurrences respectively, both in 12 sub-corpora, and the collocate lemma *prahnennya* "aspiration" occurs immediately to the right of the node *yevrointehratsiyn** 151 times in 14 sub-corpora. Also, the genitive plural form *pytan□ yevropeys□koi intehratsiyi* was the most frequent cluster token with 1837 hits (cf. 25 hits for the token in the nominative plural). In fact, this cluster token was part of the name of the VR committee *Komitet Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy z pytan' yevropeis'koi intehratsii* "the Committee of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on issues of European integration", which was originally formed in 2003. The most frequent clusters with the node *yevropeys'ka intehratsiya* and a collocate immediately to the right in Table 1 also refer to this committee.

A collocation analysis of the nodes *yevrointehratsiynyy* "Eurointegration(al)", *yevropeys'ka intehratsiya* "European integration" and *yevrointehratsiya* "Eurointegration" focused on the co-text of five collocates to the right and five collocates to the left of the nodes. In particular, the search of the node *yevrointehratsiyn** "Eurointegration(al)", when applied to the whole VR corpus, resulted

in 141 collocate types and 2,755 collocate tokens within the 5L/5R window span with the minimum collocate frequency of 5. The first hundred collocate types ranked by statistics are shown in Appendix 1. The top-ranked lemmas include *prahnennya* "aspiration", *ustremlinnya* "striving", *chynnyk* "factor", *transkordonnyy* "cross-border", *protses* "process", *yevroatlantychnyy* "Euro-Atlantic", *paket* "package", *kurs* "course", *realizatsiya* "realization", *ukladennya* "conclusion (of the UA-EU agreement)", *spryamuvannya* "direction", *pidtrymka* "support (noun)" and *perspektyva* "prospect". The collocates *poslidovnyy* "staunch", *aktyvnyy* "active" and *vazhlyvyy* "important" and *priprytet* "priority", which might have to do with the discourse prosody of the node, as well as the possessive pronoun *nash* "our" are not far behind in the ranking.

However, not all of the relatively frequent and /or statistically prominent collocates of the node lemma *yevrointehratsiynyy* "Eurointegration(al)" are consistently used throughout the VR corpus. For instance, *yevroatlantychnyy* "Euro-Atlantic", *paket* "package", *ukladennya* "conclusion" are observed only in three, two and one sub-corpora respectively within the specified window span. On the other hand, collocates like *Ukrayina* "Ukraine" or *derzhava* "state" are consistently used throughout the VR corpus but are less exclusive in their association with the node lemma *yevrointehratsiynyy* "Eurointegration(al)" and therefore have noticeably lower MI+LL scores.

Table 1

**Frequent clusters with the selected nodes in the 1L and 1R positions,
in the descending order**

Node (lemmatized)	Position	Clusters (lemmatized)
yevrointehratsiyn*	1L	*realizatsiya yevrointehratsiyn** "realization of Eurointegration(al)"; *pidtrymka yevrointehratsiyn** "support of Eurointegration(al)"
	1R	*yevrointehratsiyne prahnennya* "Eurointegration(al) aspiration"; *yevrointehratsiynyy protses* "Eurointegration(al) process"; *evrointehratsiynyy kurs* "Eurointegration(al) course"; *yevrointehratsiyne ustremlinnya* "Eurointegration(al) striving"; *yevrointehratsiynyy paket* "Eurointegration(al) package (a set of laws)"; *yevrointehratsiynyy zakon/ zakonoproekt* "Eurointegration(al) law/ draft law"; *yevrointehratsiyna perspektyva* "Eurointegration(al) prospect"; *yevrointehratsiyna reforma* "Eurointegration(al) reform"; *yevrointehratsiyna polityka* "Eurointegration(al) policy"
yevropeys'ka intehratsiya	1L	*pytannya yevropeys'koyi intehratsiyi* "issue of European integration"; *sfera yevropeys'koyi intehratsiyi* "sphere of European integration"; *shlyakh yevropeys'koyi intehratsiyi* "way of European integration"; *protses yevropeys'koyi intehratsiyi* "process of European integration"; *napryamok yevropeys'koyi intehratsiyi* "direction of European integration"; *polityka yevropeys'koyi intehratsiyi* "policy of European integration"
	1R	(unlemmatized): *yevropeys'koyi intehratsiyi rekomenduye* "(of) European integration recommends"; *yevropeys'koyi intehratsiyi rozhlyanuv* "(of) European integration considered"; *yevropeys'koyi intehratsiyi Ukrayiny* "(of) European integration of Ukraine"; *yevropeys'koyi intehratsiyi vyznav* "(of) European integration recognized"; *yevropeys'koyi intehratsiyi pidtrymuye* "(of) European integration supports"

| *yevrointehratsiya* | 1L | *pytannya yevrointehratsiyi* "issue of Eurointegration"*; shlyakh yevrointehratsiyi* "way of Eurointegration"*; dosvid yevrointehratsiyi* "experience of Eurointegration"*; kontekst yevrointehratsiyi* "context of Eurointegration"*; sfera yevrointehratsiyi* "shere of Eurointegration"*; protses yevrointehratsiyi* "process of Eurointegration"*;* |
| | 1R | *perspektyva yevrointehratsiyi* "prospect of Eurointegration" (unlemmatized): *yevrointehratsiyi Ukrayiny* "(of) Eurointegration of Ukraine"; *yevrointehratsiyi komitetu* "(of) Eurointegration (to/for) the Committee"; *yevrointehratsiya ye* "Eurointegration is"; *yevrointehratsiya zalyshayet'sya* "Eurointegration stays/remains" |

As for the semantic preference of the node lemma *yevrointehratsiynyy*, on top of the expected parliamentary lexicon (*zakon* "law"*, zakonoproekt* "draft law; bill"*, paket* "package (set of laws)"*, akt, postanova, uhoda, reforma, polityka, parlament, Verkhovna, Rada, holova*), the proper names of two Speakers (*Lytvyn, Rybak*), and the country names (*Ukrayina* "Ukraine"*, Polshcha* "Poland") occurred on the list of statistically strong collocates (see Appendix 1).

The same basic algorithm was applied to derive collocates of the nodes *yevropeys'ka intehratsiya* "European integration" and *yevrointehratsiya* "Eurointegration", all possible word-forms of which were joined as equal alternatives in a single search entry for convenience. Within the 5L/5R window span, this search derived 651 collocate types and 25,689 collocate tokens with the minimum collocate frequency of 5. The results were also sorted by statistics, and 4.7 MI (LL-filtered) value was used as a cut-off point for the purposes of illustration (see Appendix 2) and comparability with the results in Appendix 1. The top-ranked collocate lemmas of potential interest for this research include *yevroatlantychnyy* "Euro-Atlantic"*, nezvorotnist* "irreversibility"*, nezminnyy* "invariable"*, nezminnist* "invariability"*, zovnishnyopolitychnyy* "related to foreign policy"*, shlyakh* "way"*, kurs* "course"*, priorytet* "priority"*, dosvid* "experience"*, napryamok* "direction"*, zovnishniy* "foreign; external"*, zdobutky* "achievements"*, pryskorennya* "acceleration"*, protses* "process"*, krok* "step", which are listed here in MI-value descending order. A closer concordance reading showed that some other top-ranked collocates either refer to the venue of the Committee for European Integration meetings (*kuluary* "lobby (vestibule)"*, kimn.* "room"*, vul.* "street", the street names *Sadova* and *Hrushevskoho*) or are, with a few exceptions, first and last names of chairpersons or deputy chairpersons of the parliamentary Committee for European Integration.

Based on the data above, a joined list of selected c-collocates of the node lemmas *yevrointehratsiynyy, yevropeys'ka intehratsiya* and *yevrointehratsiya* was produced within the 5L/5R window span with the minimum collocate frequency of 5 (Table 2).

Table 2

**Selected c-collocates of the node lemmas *yevrointehratsiynyy, yevropeys'ka intehratsiya*
and *yevrointehratsiya* with raw frequencies
of the collocate lemmas and their range across the sub-corpora**

C-collocate	Hits (total)	Range (sub-corpora)
Ukrayina	1260	16
protses "process"	162	16
kurs "course"	135	15
shlyakh "way"	146	15
pidtrymka "support"	120	15
prahnennya "aspiration"	169	14
nash "our"	144	14
dosvid "experience"	56	14
perspektyva "prospect"	54	14
realizatsia "realization/implementation"	87	13
napryam "direction"	57	13
priorytet "priority"	48	11

Figure 5. Normalized frequencies of some selected c-collocates of the node lemmas
yevrointehratsiynyy, yevropeys'ka intehratsiya and *yevrointehratsiya*
across the annual sub-corpora (per 10 000 tokens).

Given the limitations of this paper, five c-collocates out of Table 2 were further selected for a chronological analysis of their distribution across the annual sub-corpora based on their normalized frequencies. As seen from Figure 5, the selected c-collocates peak in 2008, 2011 and, most of all, in 2013. Also, the frequency patterns of *prahnennya* and *shlyakh* show more similarity than the patterns of the other selected c-collocates. The research results are further discussed in the next section.

4. Discussion

There is enough evidence in the data to claim that the narrative of European integration has been consistently, if irregularly, constructed in the Verkhovna Rada's discursive practices within

the observed period, especially in relation to the concepts of desire and journey. These findings loosely resonate with the observations by Yavorska and Bohomolov [2010: 80-84, 86-89, 116] of the Ukrainian political discourse of the 1990s and 2000s, with Europe delineated as a desired yet dubious object and a travel destination for Ukraine. However, habitual co-occurrences with the search nodes *yevrointehratsiynyy* "Eurointegration(al)", *yevropeys'ka intehratsiya* "European integration" and *yevrointehratsiya* "Eurointegration" in the VR corpus present a more nuanced picture.

The statistically strong association between *yevrointehratsiynyy* "Eurointegration(al)" and *prahnennya* "aspiration" in the VR corpus on the whole as well as its consistency as a collocate across the sub-corpora and its allowance for the close[3] synonymous noun *ustremlinnya* "aspiring; striving" – another collocate strongly associated with *yevrointehratsiynyy* – in most of the same contexts (cf. (1) and (2)), all suggest that the concept of desire is a salient point of representation of European integration in the Ukrainian parliamentary discursive practices.

(1)

за владу, на ділі, а не на словах підтверджувати наші євроінтеграційні прагнення. Успіх багато в чому залежить від співпраці |2002

Ш. Барретт запевнив українських колег у підтримці євроінтеграційних прагнень України. Він заявив, що «все зроблять, аби бул |2013

у Україні у здійсненні її права вибору на реалізацію євроінтеграційних прагнень. У той же час проблема, що виникла з Росією, |2013

имогою українського суспільства, прагненням нашої європейської інтеграції». «На превеликий жаль, багато українців заплатили |2015

(2)

саміті дозволить детально обговорити шляхи реалізації євроінтеграційних устремлінь України.   Повідомлення 16 ЛИСТОПАД |2006

літичних акцентів всередині Грузії. «Ми підтримуємо євроінтеграційні устремління українського народу і сподіваємось, що украї |2013

лимпуш-Цинцадзе доповіла про стан виконання наших євроінтеграційних устремлінь, зокрема, про перші підсумки виконання У |2016

In the VR discursive practices, both nouns *prahnennya* "aspiration" and *ustremlinnya* "aspiring; striving" are featured rather as names for goal-oriented activities (in terms of [Trub 2007: 57]) and may be interpreted as an ambitious declaration of intention on behalf of both the personified state of Ukraine and its people (1, 2). However, the context of *prahnennya* "aspiration" and *ustremlinnya* "aspiring; striving" gradually shifts as the determination grows over time, from references to their legal grounding and justification (3) to their development (4) and realization (5), the latter being particularly salient in 2013-2017.

(3)

|парламент працюватиме над правовим забезпеченням євроінтеграційних устремлінь нашої держави, - сказав Голова Верховної |2004

|прав меншин. В цьому, і насамперед у цьому – мотивація наших євроінтеграційних устремлінь, як і виправдані сподівання на до|2004

(4)

іньополітичного відомства висловив зацікавленість у розвитку євроінтеграційних прагнень України, зазначивши, що це «зближу |2006

(5)

дійшли згоди стосовно проекту заяви Верховної Ради України "Про реалізацію євроінтеграційних прагнень України та укладенн |2013

яхів подолання нинішніх викликів і загроз, допомагатиме ефективній реалізації євроінтеграційних прагнень України, а також под |2017

ою якої є набуття членства в Європейському Союзі, реалізуючи євроінтеграційні прагнення народу України, що були підтвердже |2014

режиму з ЄС. Це буде конкретним втіленням у життя прагнень до євроінтеграції сотень тисяч українців, які вийшли на Майдан' |2015

Unlike *prahnennya* "aspiration" and *ustremlinnya* "aspiring; striving", the noun *bazhannya* "wish; desire" does not collocate with the selected nodes in the VR corpus within the given parameters. A separate search revealed that, in fact, there is only a handful of uses of *bazhannya* "wish; desire" with respect to the EU or Europe in the entire corpus, all of them exemplified in the concordance lines (6). Moreover, the behavior of *bazhannya* in the VR corpus noticeably differs from that of *prahnennya* and *ustremlinnya*: grammatically, it readily colligates with a verbal complement, and semantically, it expresses a wish but lacks intensity, a clear way of achieving it in

the foreseeable future and, possibly, a sense of reality. It is indicative that in 5 out of 11 instances *bazhannya* collocates with the words used figuratively in the following co-texts: *spilnyy yevropeyskyy dim* "common European house", *yevropeyska simya/*rodyna "European family", *spilnyy yevropeyskyy humanitarnyy* prostir "common European humanitarian space".

(6)

на є сьогодні, то слід звернутися саме до східного регіону…". Бажання інтегруватися до ЄС і НАТО стало частиною нашої сучасної національної ідеї. 2004_

ження" підтримуватиме демократичні прагнення України, її бажання інтегруватися до європейської спільноти, стати членом Європейського Союзу. 2004_

е ступенем наполегливості, з якою Україна заявляє про своє бажання отримати статус "асоційованого члена ЄС", а конкретними досягненнями в ек 2004_

ені Країни, що головує у Раді ЄС, висловив розуміння щодо бажання України набути членства в ЄС. Р.Шефферс зазначив, що зараз не слід говорить 2007_

ських контактів між нашими народами повністю відповідає бажанню розбудовувати спільний європейський дім на засадах довіри та взаємоповаги 2011_

ація об'єднує усі фракції парламенту України та демонструє бажання українського народу стати членом європейської сім'ї,- заявив член Комітету I 2013_

ула вимога запровадження європейських стандартів життя, бажання бути в європейській сім'ї. «Це нормально», - сказав він. Разом з тим, В.Рибак за 2013_

зеренним правом нашої країни, але це не подобається Росії Бажання стати невід'ємною частиною європейської родини є суверенним правом наш 2015_

н ЄС на свободу пересування. Відкритість сторін та взаємне бажання до об'єднання у спільний європейський гуманітарний простір мали наслідком 2015_

аїни Андрій Парубій. Основним лейтмотивом конференції є бажання змінювати Європейський Союз відповідно до вимог часу, посилення безпеки 2016_

ною та ЄС, при явці 32%), створюють додаткові перешкоди бажанню України приєднатися до ЄС" - з доповіді "ДВІ ВІЙНИ УКРАЇНИ: ЗАХИСТ НЕЗА. 2016_

Salience of the goal-oriented *prahnennya* and *ustremlinnya* with respect to European integration in the VR corpus is further amplified by the strength of the collocational relationship between the selected search nodes and the words denoting physical location and locomotion. Two collocates *kurs* "course" and *shlyakh* "way" stand out due to their statistical strength of association with the nodes and their consistency through the whole corpus, but the selected nodes also realize their semantic preference for locomotion via some other related words like *napryam(ok)* "direction; trend" or *krok* "step".

In the literature adopting a cognitive linguistic approach, these words are usually interpreted in terms of the generic-level "motion" image-schema and a set of the specific-level metaphors conceptualizing JOURNEY, which include: ACTION IS SELF-PROPELLED MOTION, PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS, MEANS ARE PATHS, LONG-TERM, PURPOSEFUL ACTIVITIES ARE JOURNEYS, etc., within the Event Structure metaphor system (see Kövecses [2010] for an overview; cf. [Yavorska and Bohomolov 2010: 80-84]). In the VR corpus, European integration is conceptualized both ways: as the simple motion schema – movement along the path, often without an initial location and with an explicitly or implicitly expressed destination, or as a journey metaphor, which gets filled in with various details including speed and means of motion, determination, and fellow travelers. Moreover, European integration itself is variably conceptualized either as a path (7) leading towards a goal (8) or as a goal in itself (9).

(7)

и також обговорили деякі аспекти просування України на шляху євроінтеграції. В.Клаус висловив розуміння і підтримку європейс 2005_

а Польща підтримувала, підтримує і буде підтримувати Україну на євроінтеграційному шляху розвитку». За словами польського 2015_

успішного розвитку націй, держав, кожної людини. Обравши шлях європейської інтеграції, наша держава якнайшвидше повинн 2016_

(8)

взаємодії» між Європейським Союзом та Україною на шляху її європейської інтеграції, надання нашій державі «чіткої перспекти 2015_

Наш цивілізаційний шлях – незмінний! Наш шлях – це євроінтеграція! Наша мета - повернення у родину вільних європейських н 2017_

А.Парубій підкреслив, що обидві наші країни «пліч-о-пліч йдуть по шляху євроінтеграції – в ЄС і НАТО», і що наша співпраця має 2017

(9)

називають себе друзями України», і повністю підтримує її кроки на шляху до євроінтеграції, зокрема, у частині підписання угод п 2010_

лих країн». К.Вігенін запевнив, що його країна підтримує Україну на шляху до євроінтеграції, і запросив В.Рибака відвідати Респуб 2013_

Латвійська Сторона заявила, що всіляко підтримуватиме Україну на шляху до євроінтеграції. «Ми свідомі тих труднощів, з якими є 2014_

The latter is particularly obvious in the phrase *kurs na yevropeys`ku intehratsiyu* "course toward European integration" (10), although compare (11), which is associated with the direction that a vehicle, especially a ship or plane, is travelling in or plans to travel in. Yavorska and Bohomolov [2010: 82] note that references to course or being on course emphasize an early or middle stage of the journey. In fact, the frequency of the collocational relation between *kurs* and the selected nodes has been steadily decreasing in the sub-corpora after 2013 (see Figure 5), which suggests that these days the process of European integration is seen as being further along. There is also a recurrent emphasis on the irreversibility (*nezvorotnist*) and invariability (*nezminnyy, nezminnist*) of this course.

(10)

дружби, прикладом дотримання правлюдини, тим більше, що курс України на євроінтеграцію є незмінним", - наголосивВ.Литвин, 2003

кену, цілеспрямовану та послідовну зовнішню політику, взявши курс на європейську інтеграцію. За його словами, зараз триває п 2003

ету України на міжнародній арені відповідно до проголошеного курсу держави на європейську інтеграцію. Відповідний проект з 2006

и законів, попідписували конституційною більшістю, визначили курс на євроінтеграцію. Голова Верховної Ради підтвердив про т 2008

в також зазначив, що Президент України і Партія регіонів взяли курс на євроінтеграцію. "Три з половиною роки ми готували док 2013

и проблемами, - сказав Голова Верховної Ради. - Україна обрала курс на євроінтеграцію, а система правоохоронних органів залиі 2015

(11)

, Рахімкулов вважає, що реалізація політики європейської інтеграції як пріоритетного курсу державної політики України вимагає 2007

Верховної Ради заявив, що зовнішньополітичний курс України «визначений у напрямку євроінтеграції, і це залишається незмінні 2010

його прийняття дозволить забезпечити реалізацію євроінтеграційного курсу України в умовах потенційних та реальних загроз те 2014

Despite challenges on the way, Ukraine's aspirations and self-propelling are widely supported both externally (12) and internally (13). Repetitive references in the VR corpus (see Figure 4), predominantly to external support coming both from individual countries (commonly the Member States and the US) and international organizations, including the European Parliament, may be interpreted as a counterpoint to the refrain "Europe doesn't want us" [Yavorska and Bohomolov 2010: 88], which was identified in the Ukrainian media discourse on European integration. Moreover, the states that have recently joined the EU or have made more progress on their way to the EU membership are depicted as sharing or willing to share with Ukraine their own *dosvid* "experience" of European integration, so that Ukraine could benefit from it (12).

(12)

у, Л.Заоралек висловив готовність обмінятись з Україною досвідом євроінтеграції Чеської Республіки. В.Литвин запросив Л.Заоралека в 2005

ргівлі. Б.Тадич висловив готовність поділитися з Україною досвідом євроінтеграції Сербії.   Повідомлення 14 ЛИСТОПАДА 2011, 15:28 2011

убліки Польща підтвердила прагнення Польщі поділитися досвідом євроінтеграції, щоб Україна могла забопігти помилкам, скористатиі 2015

(13)

ніхто із політиків сьогодні не відмовиться від підтримки євроінтеграції України, додавши, що в суспільстві ця ідея має підтримку 2008

В.Швець наприкінці зустрічі позитивно відзначив курс молоді на підтримку євроінтеграційних прагнень України, наголосив на ві 2011

склався стійкий політичний консенсус та масова підтримка переважною більшістю населення європейської інтеграції України. Г 2013

декілька тисяч українців, затриманих після початку масових протестів на підтримку євроінтеграції. "Звільнення політвязнів пови 2014

The dynamics of the selected c-collocates in Figure 4 can be, quite speculatively, related to the discursive construction of European integration as a goal-oriented activity with respect to its various phases, which might be more clearly seen in the 2013-2017 sub-corpora. After the peak in 2013 and the decline in 2014, possibly related to the Russian aggression against Ukraine, the associations between European integration and *prahnennya* and *shlyakh* are on the rise again, whereas *kurs*, which was declared and confirmed earlier, as well as *pidtrymka* and *dosvid* from other countries, much needed in the earlier stages, are not in the foreground any longer.

Probably, the most indicative consistent feature of the discursive construction of European integration is its overall positive discourse prosody in the VR corpus. Actually, in the theoretical literature on corpus linguistics, discourse prosody is discussed in terms of habitual positive or negative connotations of the collocates that regularly occur with a search node [Xiao & McEnery 2006: 106; McEnery & Hardie 2012: 136]. However, in the spirit of a methodological synergy between corpus linguistics and the discourse-historical approach, discourse prosodies may be expressed in terms of topics and topoi [Baker *et al*. 2008: 297; Gabrielatos & Baker 2008: 11]. This methodological move looks promising for a more focused analysis of patterns of argumentation dominating the discursive construction of European integration in the VR corpus, which is subject to future research.

Another promising avenue is the interpretation of the discursive construction of European integration in relation to inclusion and exclusion strategies, on the one hand, and part/whole relations, on the other. Yavorska and Bohomolov [2010: 116] point out "the ambiguity of the word *integration*, which can be used to indicate 1) entering a certain, already united whole, and 2) connecting parts within the whole", which explains why the notions behind the term *yevropeys'ka intehratsiya* "European integration" differ significantly in the local political discourse and within the EU. In fact, along with collocationally strong associations between European integration and foreign relations (*zovnishnyopolitychnyy, zovnishniy*), the former is also constructed in relation to home policy (14), also see (13) , which suggests that the notion of European integration in the VR corpus has extended to Europeanization – "the processes by which European integration affects domestic change and the outcome of this change" [Börzel & Risse 2000: 3].

(14)

иву. Курс на європейську інтеграцію - це невід'ємний елемент внутрішніх реформ, які спрямовані на зростання нашої економіки 2002

ай важливо продовжувати євроінтеграційний напрям у зовнішній і внутрішній політиці України. "Третя сесія, - сказав В.ЛИТВИН, 2003

європейська інтеграція є незмінним ключовим пріоритетом внутрішнього розвитку України. «2013 рік є вирішальним для відно(2013

досвід європейських структур, тому що євроінтеграція стала частиною внутрішньої політики України, адже на практиці ми часто 2016

Last but not least, future research shall reveal in detail the incongruities between the patterns of "eurointegr*" and "integr*", on the one hand, and "euro*" and "EU", on the other, in the VR corpus (Figure 2).

5. Conclusions
The article presented the initial stage of the ongoing research. Its main finding is that the narrative of European integration has been consistently, if irregularly, constructed in the Verkhovna Rada's discursive practices within the observed period despite drastic changes in the political and social landscape of Ukraine in recent years. In fact, preparation for the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU in 2013 had the most salient impact on the frequency of explicit mentions of European integration on the Verkhovna Rada's website. Overall, European integration is discursively constructed as a goal-oriented activity – a long-lasting process, which is a conscious choice and an aspiration of Ukraine as a personified whole, its people and its political elites, and which is supported by the EU Member States and other states engaged in the same goal-oriented activity. It is a challenge requiring 'movement toward' and 'change within' but there is no other alternative. It is also Ukraine's right grounded in the country's history and recently paid for by the blood of its citizens.

At the same time, a close analysis of the explicit mentions' immediate co-texts across the sub-corpora identified recurrent lexical patterns and uncovered their semantic fluctuations within the observed period. A detailed examination of their salience and consistency was enabled by the employment of the large-scale data, which came from the machine-readable corpus of written texts grouped into annual sub-corpora for the purposes of this research. The use of corpus software tools allowed for such patterns to be extracted based on a clearly defined and automatically applied set of

criteria. However, the interpretation of the lexical patterns obtained via the corpus-based processes required the explanatory power of other research approaches suitable for quality discourse analysis. The emerging transdisciplinary field of corpus-based studies – *corpus discoursology*, empowered by the theoretical and methodological synergy of modern diachronic corpus-assisted discourse studies in terms of A. Partington and A. Marchi, the discourse-historic approach by R. Wodak and elements of conceptual metaphor theory, particularly in terms of Z. Kövecses, is arguably best equipped for comparisons of discourse data through time.

When applied to exploring narratives of European integration consistently produced by state institutes, this kind of research provides empirical evidence of how plural subjects communicate to the public fundamental issues related to the nation's present and future. It also reveals the dynamics of adjusting and bringing into accord their discursive constructs with continuous political and social developments both at the national and transnational European levels. On a broader scale, the approach presented in the article might meaningfully contribute to multidisciplinary studies aiming to make sense of an increasingly complex socio-cultural and political reality.

NOTES
1. Retrieved November 30, 2018, from
   https://www.president.gov.ua/ua/documents/constitution/konstituciya-ukrayini-rozdil-iv
2. Retrieved November 30, 2018, from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/portal/en/legal-notice
3. As opposed to near synonyms, i.e. "lexical pairs that have very similar cognitive or denotational meanings, but which may differ in collocational or prosodic behaviour" [Xiao & McEnery 2006: 108].

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APPENDIX

Appendix A[1,2]. Non-lemmatized collocates of the lemma *yevrointehratsiynyy*: collocation spin: 5L/5R; min. frequency: 5; cut-off point: 4.7 MI (LL-filtered) value

Rank	Freq	Freq(L)	Freq(R)	Stat	Collocate
1	124	1	123	11.86203	прагнень
2	14	0	14	11.80711	устремлінь
3	28	28	0	11.69749	чинник
4	5	0	5	11.56961	прагненнях
5	6	0	6	11.24768	устремління
6	6	0	6	11.02529	утримались
7	29	28	1	10.85774	транскордонне
8	7	0	7	10.41118	прагненням
9	58	1	57	10.19878	процесів
10	10	0	10	10.11018	євроатлантичних
11	19	3	16	9.94102	пакету
12	26	1	25	9.75830	прагнення
13	36	2	34	9.64943	курсу
14	28	28	0	9.64565	реалізацію
15	7	7	0	9.56319	послідовну
16	25	0	25	9.38375	укладення
17	7	0	7	9.24768	спрямування
18	12	1	11	8.89013	курс
19	5	5	0	8.66272	підтримці
20	8	8	0	8.63297	активну
21	53	53	0	8.60492	підтримку
22	8	0	8	8.30517	перспектив
23	7	7	0	8.19706	координації
24	29	29	0	8.16315	тему
25	5	5	0	8.14335	бачення
26	29	28	1	8.04767	співробітництво
27	36	3	33	7.88039	нашої
28	8	8	0	7.74784	заяви
29	5	0	5	7.72412	процесі
30	38	37	1	7.70934	реалізації
31	11	11	0	7.65727	підтримує
32	5	4	1	7.56961	важливою
33	5	3	2	7.49280	пріоритетів
34	13	0	13	7.47645	народу
35	5	3	2	7.45067	досвіду
36	6	5	1	7.38144	нашій
37	7	5	2	7.30015	питаннях
38	6	6	0	7.06446	повязаних
39	6	6	0	7.06446	заяву
40	7	7	0	7.06069	ухвалення
41	12	6	6	7.05457	шляху
42	6	2	4	6.86686	закони
43	10	2	8	6.80474	перспективи
44	7	2	5	6.76964	досвід
45	37	3	34	6.75843	держави
46	12	9	3	6.70853	законопроекти
47	6	3	3	6.70336	відзначив
48	6	3	3	6.66272	польщі
49	15	6	9	6.64282	реформ
50	12	8	4	6.64282	контексті
51	16	8	8	6.63114	висловив
52	10	0	10	6.63003	червня
53	10	6	4	6.60961	парламент
54	7	1	6	6.60383	сподівання
55	9	6	3	6.58789	обговорили
56	12	12	0	6.56352	підтримки
57	9	9	0	6.53497	наших
58	6	4	2	6.48392	завдань
59	5	5	0	6.39969	державі
60	30	27	3	6.38474	її
61	15	8	7	6.32644	законопроектів
62	5	3	2	6.22532	зовнішньої
63	26	1	25	6.16758	угоди
64	17	0	17	6.12813	законів
65	5	4	1	6.09794	важливим
66	8	3	5	6.05539	боку
67	40	33	7	5.94756	як
68	9	3	6	5.89797	рибак
69	251	46	205	5.80494	україни
70	7	7	0	5.78591	роботу
71	6	0	6	5.77466	проти
72	18	8	10	5.77285	наголосив
73	10	6	4	5.73356	сторони
74	9	2	7	5.72936	українського
75	5	3	2	5.69925	розгляд
76	7	7	0	5.58540	дій
77	5	3	2	5.52795	заявив
78	8	7	1	5.48780	актів
79	22	8	14	5.43390	зокрема
80	10	1	9	5.40848	литвин
81	6	3	3	5.38350	р
82	6	1	5	5.29543	були
83	5	0	5	5.28421	прес
84	8	1	7	5.27902	країни
85	6	6	0	5.25333	постанови
86	8	5	3	5.19512	зустрічі
87	38	20	18	5.15799	також
88	5	2	3	5.01311	підкреслив
89	5	2	3	5.00166	саме
90	17	12	5	4.95306	питання
91	15	13	2	4.91319	парламенту
92	15	6	9	4.89366	зазначив
93	7	7	0	4.84315	прийняття
94	38	24	14	4.83317	верховної
95	9	2	7	4.80843	цьому
96	24	11	13	4.80509	є
97	6	4	2	4.80474	рада
98	22	2	20	4.79872	голова
99	8	5	3	4.79339	буде
100	40	36	4	4.74605	щодо

Appendix B[3]. Non-lemmatized collocates of the lemmas *yevopeys'ka intehratsiya* and *yevrointehratsiya*: collocation spin: 5L/5R; min. frequency: 5; cut-off point: 4.7 MI (LL-filtered) value

Rank	Freq	Freq(L)	Freq(R)	Stat	Collocate
1	15	1	14	8.74978	кімн
2	7	0	7	8.65024	кулуари
3	5	0	5	8.65024	коліндоно
4	32	0	32	8.40232	немирі
5	5	2	3	8.38721	підкомітети
6	5	0	5	8.38721	грабар
7	2383	44	2339	8.26194	інтеграції
8	15	0	15	8.23521	кім
9	73	0	73	8.15357	садова
10	18	0	18	7.96219	іоновою
11	16	0	16	7.94980	марією
12	35	30	5	7.87264	євроатлантичного
13	7	7	0	7.87264	незворотність
14	90	0	90	7.73271	вул
15	11	2	9	7.65024	незмінним
16	11	0	11	7.65024	марії
17	8	0	8	7.65024	зеркаль
18	13	8	5	7.65024	брифінг
19	8	0	8	7.56278	інтеграцією
20	132	0	132	7.53982	визнав
21	5	0	5	7.51274	зовнішньополітичним
22	73	0	73	7.50915	ратифікувати
23	73	0	73	7.44775	інтеграція
24	36	0	36	7.39390	марія
25	12	0	12	7.37722	іонової
26	14	0	14	7.37014	шт
27	41	40	1	7.34958	експертного
28	82	2	80	7.34246	інтеграцію
29	149	0	149	7.33414	розглянув
30	13	12	1	7.30629	урядового
31	44	0	44	7.30232	рекомендував
32	103	8	95	7.28690	підтримує
33	19	0	19	7.25431	світлана
34	22	21	1	7.20278	чергове
35	45	43	2	7.19958	курс
36	155	1	154	7.17482	рекомендує
37	5	5	0	7.16482	незмінність
38	42	0	42	7.14774	іонова
39	59	1	58	7.08994	борис
40	6	6	0	7.06528	обрала
41	15	0	15	7.00255	вечерко
42	2061	1965	96	6.95568	питань
43	54	0	54	6.80522	такими
44	8	0	8	6.79226	остап
45	121	0	121	6.77794	низку
46	459	419	40	6.76212	повідомлення
47	17	1	16	6.76043	прокоповичі
48	27	2	25	6.74692	пріоритетом
49	16	0	16	6.74335	грушевського
50	10	9	1	6.72424	подiлитися
51	710	681	29	6.70882	комітет
52	40	0	40	6.62344	григорій
53	8	0	8	6.60585	семерак
54	8	8	0	6.60585	продовольства
55	103	98	5	6.55867	шляху
56	66	3	63	6.50976	тарасюк
57	41	1	40	6.50795	немиря
58	47	46	1	6.43665	курсу
59	45	42	3	6.42785	висновку
60	7	0	7	6.41320	різне
61	64	3	61	6.40707	провів
62	5	0	5	6.38721	обговорив
63	7	5	2	6.37014	круглому
64	9	1	8	6.36074	тарасюка
65	10	9	1	6.32832	офісу
66	14	0	14	6.32832	наталія
67	7	5	2	6.28767	столі
68	5	2	3	6.27173	пріоритет
69	7	0	7	6.24814	інститутом
70	45	1	44	6.14210	к
71	7	0	7	6.13567	іванна
72	49	45	4	6.13567	комітеті
73	8	1	7	6.12668	зарубінський
74	7	5	2	6.10005	конференцію
75	10	0	10	6.08953	залщук
76	76	0	76	6.07799	таким
77	8	0	8	6.06528	шевчук
78	5	0	5	6.06528	рекомендують
79	43	39	4	6.05970	комітетом
80	8	2	6	6.03553	комітетські
81	6	0	6	5.98728	бориса
82	70	59	11	5.98186	грудня
83	32	2	30	5.96374	підтримати
84	139	6	133	5.94105	законопроектів
85	5	0	5	5.92778	зустрілися
86	112	100	12	5.89154	інформаційне
87	71	63	8	5.88113	жовтня
88	29	25	4	5.87887	досвідом
89	5	5	0	5.84289	стратегічні
90	22	21	1	5.84289	напрямку
91	9	9	0	5.84289	вимір
92	44	2	42	5.83821	угоду
93	14	12	2	5.81374	просування
94	775	618	157	5.80691	комітету
95	37	17	20	5.77223	заступника
96	12	9	3	5.75947	складовою
97	41	5	36	5.73633	г
98	9	1	8	5.73271	співдоповідав
99	9	9	0	5.71164	ідеї

Appendix B[4]. (Continued)

Rank	Freq	Freq(L)	Freq(R)	Stat	Collocate
100	6	5	1	5.71164	стратегічний
101	21	2	19	5.68501	всього
102	13	5	8	5.67826	януковича
103	41	27	14	5.66350	зовнішньої
104	12	6	6	5.65024	спільне
105	15	0	15	5.63827	провели
106	71	62	9	5.63508	лютого
107	68	59	9	5.62657	вересня
108	8	3	5	5.60585	урядовки
109	5	5	0	5.57985	здобутки
110	7	0	7	5.57496	відхилити
111	13	0	13	5.56932	запропоновані
112	5	0	5	5.54591	семінар
113	26	4	22	5.51779	залишається
114	13	7	6	5.51779	директор
115	10	1	9	5.51274	хорватія
116	12	0	12	5.49374	надзвичайним
117	8	6	2	5.48032	торкаючись
118	17	4	13	5.47092	круглий
119	16	6	10	5.46042	член
120	6	2	4	5.45385	стратегічним
121	5	0	5	5.44861	адаптація
122	17	5	12	5.43393	стіл
123	7	5	2	5.41320	питаннями
124	2299	2028	271	5.39721	з
125	24	7	17	5.38972	спільно
126	5	4	1	5.38721	запоруконо
127	6	0	6	5.37722	відповіді
128	249	23	226	5.36886	парламенту
129	57	48	9	5.35643	березня
130	112	64	48	5.34777	закордонних
131	10	2	8	5.32832	головуванням
132	37	15	22	5.32442	слухання
133	75	43	32	5.30541	справах
134	11	10	1	5.30232	стратегічного
135	5	4	1	5.27173	директора
136	47	14	33	5.26232	тему
137	56	5	51	5.26038	зустріч
138	6	3	3	5.25793	народної
139	6	4	2	5.25793	міністерством
140	6	4	2	5.25793	комітетами
141	12	1	11	5.24652	делегацією
142	8	2	6	5.24085	уповноважений
143	46	40	6	5.23423	червня
144	8	0	8	5.22398	направити
145	5	2	3	5.21728	хочемо
146	63	40	23	5.19081	міністра
147	41	32	9	5.17174	квітня
148	43	39	4	5.15467	травня
149	67	0	67	5.14079	прийняти
150	6	1	5	5.10592	ключовим
151	120	109	11	5.09770	управління
152	12	1	11	5.09565	молдова
153	21	1	20	5.09334	ряд
154	225	115	110	5.08140	засідання
155	15	3	12	5.07281	головним
156	16	13	3	5.06528	шлях
157	7	7	0	5.05913	прискорення
158	39	33	6	5.05550	процесу
159	49	48	1	5.04538	економіки
160	48	37	11	5.04143	контексті
161	5	5	0	5.03881	трудової
162	9	0	9	5.03553	протокол
163	20	16	4	5.03133	процесі
164	7	1	6	5.02997	стратегія
165	37	26	11	5.02442	обговорили
166	10	9	1	5.02966	правовим
167	54	50	4	5.02143	листопада
168	5	1	4	5.01798	зінченко
169	33	0	33	5.01516	ірина
170	6	0	6	5.00639	климпуш
171	6	6	0	5.00639	більшістю
172	6	0	6	4.98728	цинцадзе
173	7	2	5	4.93404	молдови
174	33	24	9	4.92977	перспективи
175	5	2	3	4.92778	викликів
176	10	0	10	4.92778	взяв
177	7	1	6	4.91844	революції
178	42	36	6	4.90301	служба
179	5	0	5	4.88471	оксана
180	5	2	3	4.88471	групно
181	6	6	0	4.87765	інформування
182	44	1	43	4.86650	геращенко
183	6	5	1	4.86017	стратегічних
184	7	5	2	4.84289	активну
185	9	5	4	4.83148	питанням
186	95	67	28	4.81922	заступник
187	24	21	3	4.80894	липня
188	27	19	8	4.78675	міністерства
189	51	23	28	4.78545	нашої
190	7	3	4	4.78517	комітети
191	7	0	7	4.77110	співголова
192	7	0	7	4.77110	валерій
193	11	3	8	4.76095	участю
194	145	113	32	4.74402	голови
195	9	0	9	4.72214	поінформувала
196	9	9	0	4.72214	крок
197	8	3	5	4.70773	захід
198	7	6	1	4.68941	руху

NOTES
1. All the data were treated as lowcase.
2. Apostrophe was automatically replaced with j in the whole VR corpus for technical reasons.
3. All the data were treated as lowcase.
4. In the current version of AntConc, if more than one word is specified as the search term, the second and any other words of the node will appear among collocates. That is why the word-forms of *intehratsiya* are on the collocation list.

UDC 81'42

AN EU RECOVERY PROGRAMME FOR UKRAINE?
TOWARDS A NEW NARRATIVE
FOR EU—UKRAINE RELATIONS?

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Alister Miskimmon and Ben O'Loughlin. An EU recovery programme for Ukraine? Towards a new narrative for EU—Ukraine relations? In 1947, the United States of America launched the European Recovery Programme to support the post-war reconstruction of Europe. The Marshall Plan, as it became known after U.S. Secretary of State George C. Marshall, was one of the major success stories of US foreign policy in the twentieth century. The notion of an EU Recovery Programme for Ukraine provoked interest – and division in Ukraine. The enlargement of the EU in 2004 and 2007 demonstrated the EU's capacity to mount grand economic and political projects. However, since then, the EU has faced difficulties exerting influence and constructing a coherent narrative of its role in the European neighbourhood and the wider world. Would a more transformative aid and development programme for its Ukrainian neighbour offer an opportunity for the EU as well as Ukraine? In this article we use a series of elite interviews conducted across Ukraine in 2016-17 to explore how such a notion is understood. We find that Ukrainian elites have mixed feelings about existing EU aid programmes; many respondents resented the conditions the EU imposes, but nor do they want or expect aid to be given unconditionally. Whilst many aspire for Ukraine to reach EU standards of law and prosperity, Ukrainian elites favour self-help in their efforts to forge a stable sovereign state. Both the EU and Russia are understood as metonymies – as standing for two sets of values and geopolitical futures – and neither quite fit what Ukrainians seek. We conclude that whilst a Marshall Plan-style action could have benefits, it is not desired as a basis for a shared narrative and basis of cooperation and development.

Key words: EU—Ukraine relations, Marshall Plan, economy, politics, narrative, Ukrainian elites, interviews.

Алістер Міскімон, Бен О'Луглін. Програма ЄС, спрямована на оздоровлення України? У напрямку до нового наративу у відносинах між ЄС та Україною? У 1947 році Сполучені Штати Америки започаткували Програму європейського оздоровлення задля підтримки відбудови післявоєнної Європи. План Маршалла, названий на честь Держсекретаря США Джорджа Маршалла, став одним із найвагоміших досягнень в американській зовнішній політиці двадцятого століття. Ідея європейської програми, спрямованої на оздоровлення України, викликає як інтерес, так і несумісність думок українців. Розширення ЄС у 2004 і 2007 роках продемонструвало здатність ЄС здійснювати масштабні економічні та політичні проекти. Однак з тих пір ЄС зазнала труднощів у розповсюдженні свого впливу і формулюванні зрозумілого нативу щодо своєї ролі в європейському сусідстві та у широкому світі. Чи зможе конструктивніша допомога та програма розвитку для українського сусіда надати нові можливості як для ЄС, так і для України? У цій статті ми аналізуємо серію інтерв'ю, взятих у представників еліти з різних регіонів України в 2016-2017 роках з метою отримати відповідь на поставлене запитання. Результати аналізу показують, що представники української еліти мають змішані почуття щодо існуючих програм допомоги Україні з боку ЄС; багато респондентів обурені умовами, висунутими ЄС, проте вони й не очікують на відсутність умов як таких. Численні представники української еліти прагнуть досягнення Україною європейських стандартів у

законодавстві і добробуті громадян, але водночас надають перевагу самостійній розбудові незалежної держави. І Україна, і Росія сприймаються метонімічно – як носії двох систем цінностей та геополітичних прагнень; і жодна з цих систем не задовольняє вимоги українців. У висновку ми стверджуємо, що хоча дії, подібні до плану Маршалла, можуть бути корисними, їх навряд чи можна розглядати як об'єднуючий суспільний наратив та основу для співробітництва та розвитку.

Ключові слова: відносини між ЄС та Україною, План Маршалла, економіка, політика, наратив, українські еліти, інтерв'ю.

Алистер Мискімон, Бен О'Луглин. Программа ЄС, направленная на оздоровление Украины? В направлении нового нарратива в отношениях между ЕС и Украиной? В1947 году Соединенные Штаты Америки развернули Программу европейского оздоровления с целью поддержки восстановления послевоенной Европы. План Маршалла, названный в честь Госсекретаря США Джорджа Маршалла, стал одним из наиболее существенных достижений в американской внешней политике двадцатого столетия. Идея европейской программы, направленной на оздоровление Украины, вызывает как интерес, так и несовместимость мнений украинцев. Расширение ЕС в 2004 и 2007 годах продемонстрировало способность Европы осуществлять масштабные экономические проекты. Однако с тех пор ЕС испытывает трудности в распространении своего влияния и формулировке понятного нарратива относительно своей роли в европейском соседстве и на мировой арене. Сможет ли более конструктивная помощь Украине, а также программа развития для украинского соседа предоставить новые возможности как для ЕС, так и для Украины? В этой статье мы анализируем серию интервью, взятых у представителей элиты из разных регионов Украины в 2016-2017 годах с целью получить ответ на поставленный вопрос. Результаты анализа показывают, что представители украинской элиты демонстрируют смешанные чувства относительно существующих программ помощи Украине со стороны ЕС; многие респонденты возмущены условиями, выдвигаемыми ЕС, однако они и не ожидают отсутствия условий как таковых. Значительная часть украинской элиты стремятся к тому, чтобы Украина достигла европейских стандартов в законодательстве и благополучии граждан, но одновременно отдают предпочтение самостоятельному построению независимого государства. И Украина, и Россия воспринимаются метонимично – как носители двух систем ценностей и геополитических устремлений; и ни одна из этих систем не удовлетворяет требования украинцев. В итоге мы утверждаем, что, хотя действия, подобные Плану Маршалла, могут быть полезны, их вряд ли можно рассматривать как объединяющий общественный нарратив и основу для сотрудничества и развития.

Ключевые слова: отношения между ЕС и Украиной, План Маршалла, экономика, политика, нарратив, украинские элиты, интервью.

1. Introduction

> Price: The Marshall Plan seemed a spark of light 70 years ago.
> Where do those sparks come from today? There is a yearning
> for transformative visions!
> Kornprobst: If you have a vision you need to see an ophthalmologist[1].

This exchange between US international law professor Monroe Price and German political scientist Markus Kornprobst in 2017 takes us to the heart of how we think and talk about political change. Can societies be deliberately transformed, particularly societies facing malaise, crisis or conflict? And what is the role of communication in transformative processes? Can communication bring visions into being or, equally, take visions off the agenda or even off the horizon of what is thought possible?

In our research on public opinion in Ukraine[2], the idea of an EU Recovery Programme for Ukraine occurs frequently in Ukrainian news media and elicits strong reactions among young people in focus groups. Many Ukrainians expected the EU and its member states to do more to help when Russia invaded its territory in 2014 and annexed Crimea. Whilst recognizing that the EU provides economic and development assistance, some Ukrainians felt this was the moment for a

dramatic, visible gesture – whilst others were extremely wary [Chaban and O'Loughlin 2018]. Just as the US piled money into Western Europe after WWII to stop the spread of Soviet influence, why would the EU not move decisively against Russian influence now? Certainly, times have changed. Politically, the notion of "nation-building" has acquired different, often pejorative meanings in recent decades. Economically, while markets for capital and lending were stunted after World War II, today any Marshall Plan-size investment should in theory be available through financial markets [Eichengreen 2001]. And yet, even if financial assistance does go to Ukraine from the EU and Ukrainians can borrow money on international markets, this does not offer the same sense of collective human agency. The Marshall Plan stands as a template – a simplifying cognitive device that gives rapid meaning to events [Kitzinger 2000; Hoskins 2006]. History provides the template; events give the EU an opportunity. If not now, when?

The EU already provides a significant amount of assistance to Ukraine through formal programmes, such as the €11 billion support package for Ukraine agreed in March 2014. Renewed Russian aggression in late 2018 triggered calls within Europe for more assistance [CEPA, 2018]. However, the EU has not raised the profile of its assistance and elites within Ukraine display ambivalence towards the March 2014 programme. Local elites point to the unwieldy nature of financial assistance and academic analysis supports this view [Wolczuk and Žeruolis 2018]. In addition, many Ukrainians are unaware of these levels of assistance; or, such assistance is not the first thing they think of when they think about the EU. Creating a strategic narrative for this assistance is challenging. On the one hand, turning the existing large but low-profile assistance into a full-blown 'plan' would not require a huge stretch of narrative ingenuity – merely more practical organization in how this is communicated. It is a matter of political will, imagination and confidence. However, what might appear a compelling strategy to exert greater EU influence faces significant challenges. Interviews with leading members of media, business, cultural and political elites in Ukraine highlight wide ranging views of the EU and its assistance programmes, both positive and negative. Even with the most positive responses to EU activity in Ukraine, few interviewees saw EU assistance as the sole answer, and indeed, in the longer term, respondents stressed the importance of Ukraine finding a *unique* path through the political, economic and social challenges it faces. From an EU perspective, its reticence to outline a more ambitious basis for relations points not only to the dominance of internal crises in the EU's agenda, but also to limitations of EU agency. Nearly all of the 50 Ukrainian elites we interviewed stressed EU internal challenges as impediments to the EU playing a more forceful and active international role.

Despite these challenges, the EU and its leading member states need a clearer articulation of EU-Ukraine relations, that both provides a basis for a progressive relationship and recognizes the current challenges. We argue that the Marshall Plan template suggests that in transformational projects it is important to act first according to a general principle, and then build a strategic narrative to legitimize that action later. We define strategic narratives as 'a means for political actors to construct a shared meaning of the past, present and future of international politics to shape the behaviour of domestic and international actors [Miskimmon *et al*. 2013: 2]. Leaders and ordinary citizens are continually fitting new events into prior embedded narratives. Each narrative has a setting, a plot involving an obstacle to overcome, characters, tools they use to address the obstacle, and an orientation towards desirable or undesirable endings [Burke 1969; Shanahan *et al*. 2011]. Here the concept of myth helps unpack the mechanism through which a strategic narrative of transformation can appear credible. Myth functions by obscuring the origin of a phenomenon. Levi-Strauss writes that myth 'is language, functioning on an especially high level where meaning succeeds practically at "taking off" from the linguistic ground on which it keeps rolling' [Levi-Strauss 1955: 430-431]. Details cease to matter. Barthes writes, 'myth is constituted by the loss of the historical quality of things: in it, things lose the memory that they once were made' [2009: 169]. What actually happened in the original Marshall Plan becomes masked by *the idea of* what the Marshall Plan was, as a totality. Myth simplifies that past to offer a template for the future. This is

how it contributes to strategic narratives that leaders craft to construct a shared meaning of the past, present and future of international politics (see also [Bliesemann de Guevara 2016]).

Consequently, our expectation as we go on to analyse how Ukrainians consider the idea of an EU Recovery Programme today is that there will be less focus on what the Marshall Plan actually did and, instead, a more open sense of what aid and transformation might look like today.

Our analysis explores a theory of agent-led transformation in which the meaning of the agent's action becomes clear only after the transformation. We postulate the following model:

1. Leaders monitor the "soup" of policy ideas and visions available to them [see Kingdon, 1984]
2. An emergency situation demands leaders to choose ideas and articulate a vision
3. Ideational entrepreneurs step forward and seek authorisation to lead a transformative programme
4. The programme is enacted in the target country or countries through economic, political and cultural policy instruments
5. Some aspects work, some do not, and there are some unforeseen dynamics
6. Post-hoc rationalisation and mythologizing lends the programme coherence; it stands as a template for future action

We trace how this operated for the Marshall Plan and then we identify how these aspects are considered in contemporary Ukraine.

Certainly, any EU Recovery Programme would risk upsetting Russia, at a time when the EU's open support for NATO already irks the Kremlin. It must not be forgotten that after the fall of the Soviet Union, the idea of a Marshall Plan for Russia was an idea in the Washington DC policy "soup" through the 1990s [Spechler, 1992; Helprin, 1998]. Many commentators suggested external action was needed to stabilize Russia's economy and institutionalize democracy. Today, however, a Recovery Programme for Ukraine would risk reinforcing a 'new Cold War' narrative that has already been building up in European news media in the past few years [Ojala and Pantti, 2017]. It would raise expectations within more pro-European sections of Ukrainian society that would have to be met. At the same time, the EU would have to recognize that even pro-EU Ukrainians largely reject any complete severing of ties from Russia [Szostek, 2018] and that a Recovery Programme-boosted Ukraine would still be open to cultural and familial people-to-people ties with Russia. It would have to avoid deepening any binary antagonism between the EU and Russia, West and East. In short, it would have to be a socio-economic and political plan like the original Marshall Plan but not be used to deepen geopolitical divisions and initiate a new Iron Curtain. The EU is largely comfortable with hybrid identities and cross-border cultural linkages; such forms of identification and modes of being are intrinsic to the European model. But the new plan must not be presented as *against* Russia, no matter how much defensive Russian voices seek to re-narrate it that way.

In closing the introduction, we highlight three significant implications of our arguments. First, for the study of narrative in International Relations, we learn that strategic narratives can help organize and signal an actor's goals before they act, but the real "power" of strategic narratives lies in the moment when *post-hoc* rationalization and mythification of the action meshes with the performative expectation that that actor can achieve equal goals in the future. While the US had vague goals of limiting Soviet influence and restoring markets for US exports, the Marshall Plan's power became located in the mythical status that, first, the US could achieve major transnational outcomes and, second, such plans (more Marshall Plans) are possible.

Second, that whatever benefits an EU Recovery Programme might bring to Ukraine, it might bring more benefits to the EU itself. This argument is based on an examination of the original Marshall Plan and what it reveals about international transformational projects. These projects are rare – EU enlargement in the 1990s and China's current Belt and Road initiative are perhaps the

most similar ambitious efforts to lead change on a transnational scale. The EU is marked by internal crises, not least a direct challenge to liberal values from populist-nationalist leaders which generates anxiety about whether liberal societies should exclude the non-liberal [Rae, 2018]. The EU also faces a turbulent external order. The EU requires opportunities to *evidence* its particular form of power in the world and to show that its vision of a liberal world order based on democracy, managed markets and rule of law is still viable. 'The gravest risk the European Union faces is to be the guardian of a status quo that has ceased to exist,' writes Krastev [Krastev, 2018, no page]. It must show – make visible, through action – that such an order can deliver prosperity and security. Our interview data will show the extent to which such a project would be welcome.

Finally, our focus here is the broader strategic canvas – indeed what is at stake here is the very notion of a vast canvas for human action and how action works on that canvas. Ideas about Marshall Plans offer a chance to reflect on exactly what role visions are supposed to play in international relations. We are familiar with imagined communities – our nations or political communities in the present and how they emerged from the past. But in a post-ideological age with low trust in leaders, experts and institutions to guide change to the collective benefit (at least in the West), we must reflect on the value of visions. In our study we evaluate whether Ukrainian elites are closer to Price or Kornprobst: Are visions inspirational or an affliction?

2. What was the Marshall Plan? The creation of a template

Here we examine the actual historical record of how the Marshall Plan unfolded, through the six steps of our theoretical model of agent-led transformation in which the meaning of the agent's action becomes clear only after the transformation. This will allow us in the next section to compare to contemporary Ukrainian views of a possible EU Recovery Programme for Ukraine.

1. Leaders monitor the "soup" of policy ideas and visions available to them (see [Kingdon, 1984]).

At the US State Department by 1945 the prevailing ideas about the causes of world wars focused on class hatred, poverty and a lack of hope that populations' circumstances would change (Ellwood, 2006). It was felt that European societies had never experienced economic democracy – direct access to capital and technology. US policymakers observed two narratives competing with the Marshall Plan idea: Commintern's aggressively socialist narrative of development, and a narrative of the welfare state that saw security and prosperity emerging through the provision of collective goods rather than personal wealth-seeking. US policymakers would come to adapt and bend to the welfare state narrative that had wide support in Europe.

2. An emergency situation demands leaders must choose ideas and articulate a vision.

A harsh winter in Europe in 1946-47 created urgency to act. Communist parties in Italy, France and Germany appeared to be rising and offered their own rationales and narratives for how Europe could be rescued. US policymakers also sought to minimise the chances of another war in Europe by addressing public needs and concerns. There was no actual plan: it was a balance of payments exercise over the course of a year, motivated by the short-term aim of industrial renewal in Europe. It became a four-year initiative as members of the US Congress realized this was a chance to reform Western and Central Europe as a bulwark against the USSR and communism. However, there was a political aim too. The US recognized an opportunity to convince Europeans that a mix of capitalism and democracy did not automatically lead to Nazism, an experience from the 1920s and 1930s that scarred European perspectives. The Marshall Plan offered the promise to Europeans of a better life through modernization along capitalist-democratic lines.

Second, the US was suffering a balance of payment surplus while Europe was largely bankrupt – the "dollar gap" [Milward 1989]. Industrial activity in Europe would drive wages and thus demand for US goods and currency.

3. Ideational entrepreneurs step forward and seek authorisation to lead a transformative programme.

Marshall and his colleagues wanted to give Europeans not just aid but autonomy. The US would deposit reserves for development programmes into European banks. It would be for Europeans to decide how that would be spent. Marshall said that the programme was to be 'a cure rather than palliative' and hence the aim was to enact structural change in how European economies functioned [cited in Ellwood, 2006: 19]. There would be no conditionality on aid, and without any stipulation about what type of policies recipients must pursue this left the programme open to Soviet countries to join. This was a very risky strategy and the USSR soon objected and narrated the Marshall Plan as instead an imperial strategy to control Europe.

4. The programme is enacted in the target country or countries through economic, political and cultural policy instruments.

In economic terms, Europeans were encouraged to buy US goods and services. European payments would go not to the US but to the Marshall fund that Europeans could draw on.

As an effort to persuade wary Europeans that capitalism and democracy were the route to a better life, the Marshall Plan took on the trappings of a marketing campaign. The primary narrative was that economic stability and growth were the basis for political independence. Economic stability entailed the effort of all individuals, as workers and as consumers. Growth would bring ever-expanding prosperity for the ever-expanding mainstream and middle class.

The US Marshall Plan narrative was not uncontested. For this reason, it would be easy to look for similarities and lessons for European strategic communications professionals seeking to subvert or counter communications from Russia in Eastern Europe today. The US realised that narratives from the USSR depicted the Plan unfavourably. The US launched a public and cultural diplomacy programme that largely bypassed governments and targeted citizens directly.

The USSR projected messages about the benefits of communism and framed the Marshall Plan as US imperialism or neocolonialism. In 1947 the Cominform decided on a strategy to limit 'Marshallization' in France, Italy, Austria and elsewhere. In France, the Parti Communiste Français (PCF) was encouraged to 'rely on the masses' because a broad section of workers were unhappy with conditions and might be willing to strike, resisting any smooth transition to a new capitalism-democratic formation [Ross, 1975: 509]. And indeed, working class disenchantment did exist to varying degrees across European societies; the Soviet narrative would have credibility to some.

It is striking that the public and cultural diplomacy efforts were led not by military strategists, as many campaigns against Russian information warfare are today, but by civilians in government and those recruited from the private sector. Efforts were made to show the future benefits to all sections of societies. Leaflets, films, theatre performances as well as photography and news articles were mobilized. For instance, in 1948 the US Information Service (USIS) hired Yoichi Okamoto to run its Pictorial Section in Vienna, a crucible of propaganda given the Soviet occupation of some of the city. Okamoto used artistic photography to document progress and to show individual Austrians benefiting from the Plan. As Bischoff and Petschar [2017] argue, Okamoto's photographs were dominated by people smiling – unusually for archive images of that time. Okamoto specifically set out to take a present a visual narrative about improved quality of life rather than an abstract struggle. It was not a matter of "defeating" the enemy's vision, but of generating support for the US vision. Civil agents were not secondary to military agents.

5.   Some aspects work, some do not, and there are some unforeseen dynamics

The Marshall Plan succeeded in reducing trade between European states and their old empires and instead boosting trade within Europe – a key structural transformation. Relations between France and Germany improved. Yet there was resistance too: each country had political factions opposed to the Plan in some way and US policymakers had to give way to governments introducing welfare programmes.

There may have been one Marshall Plan, but it meant many things to many countries inside and outside Europe, depending on each country's self-image and national narrative. This is the case for all phenomena in international relations. France's post-WWII narrative was that the French nation recovered through its own hard work, not a Marshall Plan.

Austria became a specific focus point for contestation between the Marshall Plan narrative and Soviet communications. Many Austrians feared becoming another Germany and thus open to persuasion about how to achieve some kind of political stability. When the Marshall Plan began, Austria was particularly under Soviet-occupation. However, motivated by the aim of limiting Soviet influence in the country, the Marshall Plan avoided placing conditions on participation and provided funding to all sections of Austria anyway.

6.   Post-hoc rationalisation and mythologizing lends the programme coherence; it stands as a template for future action

A US action to restore European economies after World War II became possible because of bipartisan support motivated by fear of totalitarianism, extremism and the rise of the USSR – US Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson reversed his backing of *détente* in 1946. Hence we might question the degree to which a transformational project needs a dangerous external force it must unify against.

The Marshall Plan has gained mythical status as the most successful US foreign policy ever. For Ellwood [2006] the Marshall Plan was a focal point that allowed the US develop grand strategy for the first time. This in turn allowed US policymakers to reflect on the characterization of their nation and their national narrative. The personal became tied to a wider mission. One Marshall plan policymaker later reflected: 'We had a goal; we had fire in our bellies; we worked like hell; we had rough, disciplined thinking; and we could program, strive for, and see results' [cited in Ellwood 2012: 344].

As a geopolitical exercise the Marshall Plan also brought the notion of European integration to public consciousness, beyond policymakers and intellectuals.

In summary, based on this history, what might we expect an EU Recovery Programme for Ukraine to encounter? First, that reception and effects will vary by region. Second, that counter-narratives will emerge and the EU would have to recognize and even perhaps accommodate local preferences. Given the imbalance of power between the EU and Ukraine, a Plan would need to avoid the appearance of pacification. Third, a Plan would be easier if presented in opposition to a threatening other, but loyalties in Ukraine are not binary and the EU would have to manage relations with Russia sensitively. Fourth, that it would provide a sense of purpose and confidence for both Ukrainians and the EU.

The EU has provided assistance to Ukraine since 1991. From 1992-2015 the EU offered around €12.1 billion in assistance. The European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI) offered the largest assistance of €2.3 billion [Wolczuk and Zeruolis, 2018]. When Russia invaded Ukrainian territory in 2014 the EU launched a Macro-Financial Assistance (MFA) programme – a crisis response instrument intended to secure the EU neighbourhood. The EU obtains the capital on international markets and loans it to Ukraine on the same conditions under which the EU borrowed

the capital. As reported in the *Kyiv Post*, this positions the EU as 'lender' and Ukraine as 'borrower' [Petrov 2018]. Following Russian aggression against the Ukrainian navy in the Azov Sea in November 2018 the EU released the first tranche of a new MFA of €500 million in assistance [European Commission, 2018]. This made Ukraine recipient of the largest amount of EU funding by any non-EU country, but on what the EU concedes are similar conditions to IMF assistance [ibid].

Member states have offered around €1.4 billion in direct grants since 1992 and also offer assistance in a number of forms. For instance, the British Council and Goethe Institute use cultural relations activities to help Ukrainians develop their civil society. Funded by their respective foreign ministries, these organisations use arts and language programmes to foster social entrepreneurship and dialogue across Ukraine's regions. The EU also supports technical assistance projects at a local level. Both these cultural and technical instruments operate according to a mix of cascade, network and diffusion models of social change to shift norms and practices. However, they face limits whereby the funding of short- and medium- term projects does not necessarily help Ukraine build stronger institutions [British Council and Goethe-Institut 2018; Wolczuk and Zeruolis 2018]. There is also a lack of an overarching concept and the EU, facing the opportunity to be the primary conduit to channel international assistance to Ukraine, has been slow to offer such conceptual or practical coordination [Rabinovych 2018]. There are, in short, enough instruments to allow for a single 'plan' but this is not realized.

3. Method

As part of an EU-funded project on EU crisis diplomacy in Ukraine, throughout 2016-2017 fifty elites were interviewed across Ukraine working in the media, business, the cultural sphere, civil society and politics. Our aim was to understand how the EU is perceived in Ukraine, and to identify the narratives used by elites to explain not only the challenges Ukraine faces, but also how elites narrate their understanding of the EU and Ukraine-EU relations. Interviews were semi-structured with elites in the capital Kyiv, centre and east of Ukraine. Interviews were conducted in Ukrainian or Russian depending on the interviewee's preference, and recorded, transcribed, and translated. Interviewees gave consent to publication on condition of anonymity; the anonymity procedure also follows Human Ethics Committees' prescriptions. The questionnaire ranged across themes of the EU's perceived role in the world *vis-à-vis* other major powers, perceptions of the EU's potential role in resolving the Ukraine-Russia conflict, and the role of media in shaping the images of the EU and EU-Ukraine relations (this last theme was explored in-depth in the interviews with media professionals).

Central to these discussions was what role the EU should have in Ukraine's economic and political development. We found a wide range of views of how Ukraine should best develop and a largely ambivalent view of the role of the EU in this process. Economic aid was a universal topic for discussion, but often couched in less than positive terms, despite its centrality to EU-Ukraine relations. Economic assistance was little understood and importantly, there was no clear overarching narrative of its medium to long-term perspective.

Four major narratives emerged from the wide-ranging interviews we conducted. First, that the EU's work and economic assistance in Ukraine is little understood, even among elites, who frequently point to a lack of awareness of the EU's role. Ukrainian elites narrate the international system as state-centric, rather than defined by constitutive institutions. Second, Ukrainian elites focused almost universally on the need to domestic reform, without which, an assistance was seen as papering over the cracks. Third, elites were very aware of the EU's internal challenges and directly pointed to that as limiting the EU's engagement in Ukraine. Finally, there was no clear future oriented narrative of EU-Ukraine relations and development goals for Ukraine. We highlight this below in the analysis of our findings. We analyse the findings through the lens of our six-stage model of transformative projects.

4. Results: Analysis of Ukraine elite interviews

1. Leaders monitor the "soup" of policy ideas and visions available to them (see [Kingdon, 1984])

In our analysis of the interview data, we looked for what ideas Ukrainian elites refer to, and in particular, whether after years of EU assistance they are dissatisfied with existing aid programmes or want something new. National reforms set the context for much of the respondents' statements. The ebb and flow of reforms, driven by perceived sporadic engagement with the EU and inconsistent domestic application of policies, is a major theme in our discussions with interviewees. The lack of full realisation of reforms provides a source of frustration for interviewees and provides challenges for a coherent reform process to emerge. For instance, a civil society actor speaking in December 2016 argued the following:

> All the history of Ukrainian reforms is the inconsistent, incomplete, half-reforms. This means, classical political science says that such reforms, they are worse than the absence of any reforms because stopping the reforms at some point, it is usually advantageous to certain clans, certain forces, certain mobbing groups that peruse this incompleteness, these holes, which are consequently formed. And here we have the same experience, for twenty-five years we have been having these pseudo reforms.

The incompleteness of the national reform efforts is foregrounded in interviewee responses. However, several interviewees refer to the EU in aspirational terms. One political elite, when interviewed in January 2017 suggests,

> The EU as an institution for me is this benchmark, of what we have to build in Ukraine. I am not talking about immediate membership in the EU because it is impossible. If we take the experience of Poland, applying in 1994 until 1 January 2004, when Poland joined the EU, it took at least 10 years. But the EU for me is that strategy of how not only the EU has to be developing, but those principles that are inherent in the functioning of this institution that we have to build in Ukraine.

Here we see the policy 'soup' of ideas these elite consider are based on templates: a template of positive reform with the EU and its principles as a benchmark, versus incomplete and therefore harmful reform.

Next, we treat two stages together:

2. An emergency situation demands leaders to choose ideas and articulate a vision

3. Ideational entrepreneurs step forward and seek authorisation to lead a transformative programme

In the main, most interviewees considered that EU member states and their leaders, rather than the EU as a unitary actor, were the major players in shaping policy discussions between the EU and Ukraine. For example, a civil society actor interviewed in February 2016 was asked if they though the EU is a leader in international politics. They replied:

> Yes and no. Because, you know, as they say, in the EU there is a matter of perception of the EU. That is, you know, the old joke when I need to talk to the EU, the Americans say "who I

need to call?" right. That is, on the one hand it claims to be a leader, yes, and there competing, for example, with the same United States or China in the world. Nevertheless, this leadership can often be treated with doubt because there is on the one hand the leadership of three major, core countries, i.e. Germany, France and the UK. And the leadership of the European Union as a union, yes. That is always, as they say ... These, as they say, certain problems, nuances related to this. But clearly, still I would say that the EU is a leader in the world.

Other interviewees were more explicit in pointing to what they thought were the limitations of the EU. Speaking in December 2016 a civil society actor responded to the same question stating:

Good question. Well, obviously [the EU] is not a leader to the extent that it could have been, to the extent, say, the United States certainly are, that take this more proactive position, and paradoxically that is Russia. It is not a leader, it is a spoiler, but a very effective spoiler. The European Union in this respect is much weaker and more passive, but it is the leader, well at least in the sense that it sets some, well, given that it is economic power, that is, it sets some parameters.

Respondents refer to a small number of EU member states – Germany, the UK, Poland, Lithuania, Sweden, and to a lesser extent France – as being the main supporters of Ukraine in the EU. Overall, however, interviewees highlight both internal and external actors being engaged, largely proactively, in reform processes. Business elites point to the under-exploited role of SMEs in driving economic reform and point to the impediments to supporting this in current EU funding mechanisms [see also Wolczuk and Zeruolis 2018]. Interviewees do not look to political leaders. Rather, each group of interviewees – business, media, civil society, culture and politics – point to how their own sectors could have greater influence in driving reform. This indicates overall support for gradualism through networks in specific sectors and engaging with EU member states. It does not indicate support for a radical transformation plan.

4.   The programme is enacted in the target country or countries through economic, political and cultural policy instruments

We have learnt a lot about economic and political development since 1947, and Ukraine has its own experiences of assistance since gaining independence. We know that transformations require hierarchy and transactions between different layers of administration both internally and externally. Experts from international organisations, from local government, and from NGOs will compete to shape policy implementation and may not have an interest in opening up public involvement in policy (Odugbemi and Lee, 2011). However, public acceptance of any transformation matters for long-term institutionalization. Peripheral regions within a society may have the capacity to resist or elect local leaders who seek to roll back the transformative policy; reversal is possible.

Some of the interviewees pinpoint concrete ways in which the EU's assistance is helping Ukraine. Cultural and educational links were regularly raised in interviews as showing potential for good. Some respondents focus on the challenges this has brought. Business and political elites focused on the pros and cons of EU assistance from the perspective of wealth generation and political influence. For instance, one interviewee from the business sector when interviewed in March 2017 stated:

I think that, generally speaking, everyone should pursue his interest in the EU makes it much better [for business] than Ukraine. I personally have not analyzed the free trade agreement between Ukraine and the EU. I listened to people who told me that unfortunately the interests of Ukraine … are not very well represented and protected. That, say so – there is no free

cheese. And unfortunately the Ukrainian state is too weak to defend its interests. And I think everything else is derived from this.

The same interviewee went on to describe the EU as 'conservative, hypocritical, inefficient'. Interviewees view economic instruments both positively and negatively. For example, a political actor interviewed in December 2016 responded asked whether the EU's image had improved as a result of committing resources to Ukraine replied in the following way:

Well, let's probably put it this way. All this allocated money has to be returned by us. So, I see this as an exclusively negative thing. The allocation of funds is done on credit. So, naturally, I am against it. From my point of view, I think it to be wrong. In my understanding, now the EU is enjoying the hard situation in Ukraine and places its spheres of influence by, let's say, allocating funds to us. First, they have to be returned... Secondly, let's say, the IMF's participation... of course, it's not exactly the EU, but nevertheless they're sending the same message: to change the social situation, to increase tariffs. I also associate this with the work of the EU in this direction. That is, we are now setting ourselves the task of bringing our fundamental prices, tariffs and everything to the level in the EU, and, as a result, [our] perception of the EU is not positive in this respect….

Another interviewee stressed the conditional nature of the funding from the EU. In an interview with a political elite in October 2016 they argued that financial aid had not substantially changed the perception of the EU in Ukraine:

Taking into account the fact that... The implementation of a support package of 11 billion euro... and what was it used for? For the military conflict to a greater extent. But not everyone understands that it needs to be returned. Of course, there is [some help] for the city. There are programmes. We're working with the World Bank; they're financing, improving, roughly speaking, network utilities, all assets, for example, some pumps... Extra money is being allocated for the housing stock. There's a programme... which is also the World Bank's... a plant recycling household waste is being planned to be built. The first stage has already... It's in the Dergachevsky training ground. In this respect, yes. But this is taken on credit in any case. That is, we took, we're building. Yes, it's good. But we will have to return it.

This respondent felt any aid must be repaid, while Ukraine loses from the cost of reforming practices to meet EU benchmarks. Another political elite, speaking in January 2017, refers rather cynically to different incentives within Ukraine for working with the EU:

Smart people think, they understand that the EU is some values, processes, values, people. And for the rest of the public it is like an ATM, as a source of income, etcetera. Maybe in this way it has changed more. Expectations that here they have to help us somehow.

This respondent pointed to attitudes in Ukraine that the state did not have to reform as aid would come anyway. These responses show that whether aid is conditional or 'like an ATM' there is no sense that EU aid has had positive effects.

5.   Some aspects work, some do not, and there are some unforeseen dynamics

Interviewees based much of their discussions on the future impact of intra-EU problems for Ukraine. A civil society actor interviewed in February 2017 was asked their view of the impact of the Euro crisis, Brexit and the migration crisis on the EU. They said:

Well, it's a bit devalued. And in the world and in Ukraine, I think. But when it comes to the world, selectively. For Brexit is perceived by many in the United States, including Trump primarily, positive. Some here perceive Brexit, including me, positively too. Although this position is quite unusual. It even shocked our local commentators, so to say, and the politicians … That is, everyone thought that Europe should grow like a snow ball, adding on and adding on its surroundings on itself. Suddenly it began to disintegrate.

This narration of the unravelling of the EU came up several times across the interviews. The unraveling was understood to be limiting the EU's agency to play a defining role in Ukraine. This is particularly significant for Ukraine, given the events of Maidan. There has been a double shift in narrative since 2014 in Ukraine – moving from a narrative of Ukraine's EU destiny, to one of Ukraine's need for domestic reform as the priority *and* a shift towards a narrative of the EU focused on the centrifugal pressures on European integration, rather than its integrative strengths. This shift complicates the reception of any EU narrative in Ukraine, highlighted in our interview data.

6.   *Post-hoc* rationalisation and mythologizing lends the programme coherence; it stands as a template for future action

It was generally unclear across the interviews what narratives or myths elites in Ukraine had for future relations, which could act as a template for action. There was no sense of a tangible future but nor a template in the past to draw upon. In an interview on 29th June 2016, one media elite suggested:

The relationship of Ukraine and the European Union is, unfortunately, changing from a romantic period to a period of a kind of confrontation at the moment. At least on the regional level, it's 100%, I mean on the level of separate states. Just today they have written that the Netherlands are very likely to block the signing of the Association Agreement. Our relationship with Poland, our closest neighbor, on the public level is, unfortunately, deteriorating a lot, and this is a result, in many ways, of the information policy both of Russia and of our country, a disastrous one, unfortunately. That's why we, and especially after what has happened to Britain [Brexit], unfortunately, are becoming a very unpleasant and problematic topic which they should try to avoid, to "sweep under the rug" at best or even to get rid of totally. The Ukrainian topic is untimely.

This respondent suggests that the time for optimism where relations were close is changing and that given the priority of other challenges, Ukraine is now not a priority. Historical relationships which proved useful in the past are waning. There is no sense that a coherent solution is possible - the window of opportunity has passed and Ukraine has been left unloved.

However, one member of the cultural elite in Ukraine interviewed in December 2016 suggested that Ukraine faced an historical choice:

From my point of view, for Ukraine to join the EU, it is necessary to break its relations with the Soviet past at all levels. The nearest reminder of the Soviet past is Russia. So now a strategic process of breaking relations is taking place. But since we did not use to have a feeling that Russia was an enemy, it has happened, and this process is under-way. But our innate skepticism, it helps many people to keep some balance of awareness that what may happen is like "out of the frying pan into the fire". That is, visible softness is a myth. As Ostap Bender said: "Talks about Europe are myths of the afterlife."

This interviewee suggests that myth is central to any future-oriented trajectory which Ukraine may have. Indeed, the idea of joining the EU has come to possess the qualities of myth – where the notion originated no longer matters, and how much of a guide for action is could be is wholly uncertain. With this trajectory comes challenges, with no clear resolution. From this perspective, EU membership, and hence the underlying logic of relations with the EU, is not clear. The EU has no clear strategic narrative to help address this, hampered by not having a clear membership perspective for Ukraine, and indeed for the wider European Neighbourhood Policy [Miskimmon, 2018].

A civil society actor, speaking in December 2016 made this point when they said:

… it is probably easier to describe it as different perspectives of expectations. Because the EU sees Ukraine and in general all the neighbours. This, by the way, this so-called European Neighbourhood Policy, or the European neighborhood, this reflects it very well. The very name of this policy is ambivalent, because it is not clear what is at stake - European Neighbourhood Policy. Is this the Policy of European Neighbourhood or the European Policy of Neighbourhood? It can be interpreted both ways. I also assume that this name was coined not without such an intent.

This civil society tries to see how Ukraine is viewed from the perspective of the EU, continuing:

In any case, this policy reflects the attitude of the EU to its neighbors primarily as soft and potentially hard threat. That is, their attitude towards neighbours is aimed primarily to minimizing the external threats. So that there was no threat of uncontrolled migration, penetration of crime, human trafficking, etc., drugs, pollution, all these infectious diseases. That is, they see us primarily as a threat. They are of course trying to somehow keep these neighboring countries afloat, so they do not become failed states, so to minimize these threats. Well, such a pragmatic policy.

This individual concluded by considering whether Ukraine is being spurned by the EU by accident or simply by neglect of attention:

In any case it is not about integration, it is not their agenda. That is, this attitude is about the same as America's to Mexico. It is necessary that Mexico was more or less sustainable and viable. Ukraine, on the other hand, has very different expectations, Ukraine still always emphasizes the desire to integrate, that is to learn, integrate the structures, which means to take all these values, to meet the Copenhagen criteria. That is a completely different attitude and, of course, as one partner wants the marriage, the other just wants neighbour's cohabitation. It is difficult to reconcile these expectations, there is always some friction.

This lack of clarity is an opening for manipulation of how the EU is presented in Ukraine, but also serves as a potential opportunity for greater clarity and public debate. A Ukrainian media elite, interviewed on 28 July 2016 argued the following:

Because in this country the topic of the EU is often used as an attempt to manipulate public opinion and that's bad. In all that "slag", as I call it, even topics of high quality get lost. Professional approach is just profaned. It's a problem, but it's a general problem, but it's also evident in the EU case. There are also a great number of myths which need to be dispelled or confirmed because the EU is something frightening to them. Russia is also playing on those myths and stereotypes, with all those horror stories. And this general ignorance of the audience, of course… It's very simple to play on that ignorance. But it's a very long process.

It must be a separate trend on forming an adequate attitude. It should be dealt with professionally, and not only mass media should take part in it. It doesn't concern the EU exclusively; it's just can be seen vividly in the case of the EU.

Media elites pointed to the need for greater support for a free press in Ukraine to have a firm basis for discussion of Ukraine's future development. For this respondent, the EU must help Ukraine build a more robust public sphere both as an intrinsic good and as a mechanism to reduce the potential influence of Russian myths.

In another response, Ukraine's relations with the EU and Russia are set within a challenging binary of potential rebirth and psychoanalysis – looking back to Ukraine's historical ties affecting which paths lie before Ukraine. A civil society actor speaking in December 2016 argued:

Well, from what I see – of course they are opposed. I see this on the level of the elites, and the so-called elites, and the society. To varying degrees, but I think that everyone understands what they are, so to speak, metonymies of two different projects, the EU and Russia. Embodiments of different value systems, totally different development paths. So I think that when we say these two words, immediately there is a whole chain of associations that entails almost all of the geopolitics. So, the other thing that we have, well, you see, there is a huge part of society that has a kind of schizophrenia because they came out of this Orthodox Eastern Slavic world, this imaginary community or imagined community, right. But at the same time their logic suggests them that Russia is still hostile, Russia is dangerous, Russia is threatening, Russia is the dead end of development, but at the same time this belonging remains.

The EU and Russia stand as metonyms for wider value systems and geopolitical futures – but both are problematic. This civil society actor continued:

This umbilical cord [with Russia], it is still uncut, it creates a huge conflict, I just see it that way, again you can see that from sociology [that] shows that the society it is shifting, gradually drifting to the West, even if for different reasons there is not much enthusiasm about the EU. I can understand that too, the EU itself is often alienating Ukrainians. Moreover, there is no more enthusiasm about Russia, about this Eastern Slavic union, it is already too, thank God, gone or disappearing.

This reinforces a narrative where there is no clear path or clarity on the role that the EU will have in Ukraine's future development. Nation-building defines many of the responses concerning the future of EU-Ukraine relations. A member of the business elite interviewed in January 2017 argues,

I think that if in ten years we got the status of a candidate in the EU, an official one, a confirmed one with calm and clear prospects, it would be the best outcome for Ukraine. Because the country would already get some, you know, firm understanding that in the future… I understand that it is too early for us to be a member, it is so early, we still have to do so much work in order to reach the level of those states. Talking about the level, I mean the level of legislation first of all, military power, let's say the capacity to defend ourselves. Those values, we are talking about, European values, they must be really absorbed by us, not simply declared, bur absorbed: we do not have corruption or we understand to some degree and mentally, and personally we do not support corruption. We are building a sovereign state…

Ukraine lacks the qualities of a coherent sovereign state, in this account. Free of any myths of rescue, support or shared destiny offered by the EU or Russia, Ukraine should be left to itself as it passes through these stages.

5. Conclusions

The idea of an EU Recovery Programme for Ukraine, based on a template of the Marshall Plan, emerged within a three-year research project analyzing Ukrainian perceptions of the EU. As a thought experiment, and based on lessons learnt from the original Marshall Plan, we can say that such a vision offers the EU an opportunity to challenge the sense of retrenchment and fatalism in the face of challenges to a liberal order of market democracies. It would also offer Ukraine a sense of movement in the context of the stalemate of its war with Russia and slow pace of development. In this article we took the notion of an EU Recovery Programme for Ukraine identified in our ongoing research, developed it into a six-stage model of transformational political projects, and then explored how Ukrainian elites considered those stages. These interviewees talked about the nature and results of current EU aid practices. Some criticized aid as conditional, others as containing an unevenness that could cause unintended damage, and others as 'like an ATM' that meant Ukrainians might not confront the substantive challenges they face. There is no support for anything project fitting the Marshall Plan template. Interviewees offered no simple acceptance of how any transformation would work in any of the six stages. The emerging narrative is instead: leave us to reform ourselves and gradually enhance relations through cultural, business and civil society networks.

Critically, interviewees drew attention to the mythical and metonymic qualities of transformative visions; mythical because any original transformation has been long forgotten and is no basis for current discussion, and metonymic because the EU and Russia stand for wider value systems and historical trajectories that Ukrainians might choose between. Each of those futures is uncertain. That uncertainty is reinforced by doubt about the capacity and motives of both the EU and Russia as actors. EU member states rather than the EU itself are viewed as more credible actors. The EU is equated with financial and migration crises, for some. Indeed, some respondents supported Brexit in part because it suggested it is possible for a country to be European but not of the EU.

What are the implications for the EU's narrative towards Ukraine? Our analysis indicates that national sovereignty is key to Ukrainian elites' narratives of the past, present and future of their country. The Marshall Plan boosted states who welcomed managed markets and capitalism but did not involve overt transformation of political structures. Through post-1990 enlargement policies the EU has, in contrast, always conceived of a linkage between conditional aid and political reform both in domestic institutions and joining EU institutions. There is no indication Ukrainian elites would welcome such a process; they prefer national consolidation.

Perhaps the idea of another Marshall Plan points to an intrinsically regressive mode of thinking. Templates bring problems as well as inspiration. Kitzinger writes, 'Far from opening up historical reflection they reify a kind of historical determinism which can filter out dissenting accounts, camouflage conflicting facts and promote one type of narrative' [Kitzinger, 2000: 76]. *Another* Hiroshima, *another* Great Depression, *another* EU enlargement – these simplifying cognitive devices can limit the range of options considered and prevent policymakers from understanding what is unique about the present situation. Our interviewees were alert to the dangers of myths and this challenges those in Ukraine and the EU to imagine alternative models of building a shared future.

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NOTES

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EAST-WEST DICHOTOMY
IN THE CONTEXT OF UKRAINIAN CONFLICT RESOLUTION

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Yevheniia Hobova. East-West dichotomy in the context of Ukrainian conflict resolution. This article analyses the contrasting images of the West and the East in the conflict narrative in Ukraine: Where is the imaginary line that divides them? Which countries constitute the 'East' and which the 'West'? and How does the Russia-Ukraine conflict affect the perceived division? This article is informed by Edward Said's hypothesis of orientalism, specifically that Western knowledge of the Eastern world(s) carries a negative connotation. Testing this hypothesis on the materials of elite interviews conducted in Ukraine in 2017, the article 'maps' the image of the world from a Ukrainian point of view. It explores if an internalized 'othering' may be present within Ukraine's borders due to the ongoing conflict in the East. The findings, however, disprove this assumption. Results show that there is a perceived sense of closeness between Ukraine and Eastern European countries due to historical and cultural ties as well as modern day partnership. Relations with Russia were perceived as ambiguous despite the armed conflict in the East and the annexation of Crimea. There is also no evidence for "othering of Eastern *vis-à-vis* Western regions inside Ukraine.

Key words: East-West dichotomy, Russia-Ukraine conflict, orientalism, imaginary geography.

Євгенія Гобова. Дихотомія Схід-Захід у контексті вирішення українсько-російського конфлікту. У цій статті проаналізовано протиставлені образи Заходу та Сходу у наративі конфлікту в Україні: Де пролягає межа між ними? Які країни складають "Схід", а які - "Захід"? Яким чином конфлікт між Росією та Україною впливає на це уявне розділення? У статті розглядається гіпотеза орієнталізму Едварда Саїда, зокрема щодо негативних конотацій у західних знаннях про світ Сходу. Випробовуючи зазначену гіпотезу на матеріалі інтерв'ю з представниками українських еліт, що були проведені у 2017 році, стаття окреслює сприйняття світу з української точки зору. У статті аналізується ймовірна інтерналізація "інакшості" в межах України через тривалий конфлікт на Сході. Результати дослідження спростовують це припущення та, з іншого боку, вказують на відчуття зростаючої близькості України до країн Східної Європи завдяки історичним та культурним зв'язкам на рівні із сучасним партнерством. Відносини з Росією виглядають неоднозначними всупереч збройному конфлікту на Сході країни та анексії Кримського півострова. Також відсутні свідчення щодо "інакшості" східних та західних регіонів країни.

Ключові слова: дихотомія Схід-Захід, російсько-український конфлікт, орієнталізм, уявна географія.

Евгения Гобова. Дихотомия Восток-Запад в контексте разрешения украинско-российского конфликта. В данной статье проанализированы противопоставленные образы Запада и Востока в нарративе конфликта в Украине: Где проходит граница между ними? Какие страны составляют "Восток", а какие - "Запад"? Каким образом конфликт между Россией и Украиной влияет на это воображаемое разделение? В статье рассматривается гипотеза ориентализма Эдварда Саида, в особенности относительно негативных коннотаций в западных знаниях о мире Востока. Верифицируя данную гипотезу на материале интервью представителей украинских элит, которые были записаны в 2017 году, статья очерчивает воображаемую карту мира с украинской точки зрения. В статье анализируется вероятная интернализация "инаковости" в границах Украины из-за длительного конфликта на востоке. Результаты исследования опровергают данное допущение и, с

другой стороны, указывают на ощущения растущей близости Украины со странами Восточной Европы ввиду исторических, культурных связей, а также современного партнерства. Отношения с Россией выглядят неоднозначными, несмотря на вооруженный конфликт на востоке Украины и аннексию Крымского полуострова. Также отсутствуют свидетельства относительно "инаковости" восточных или западных регионов страны.

Ключевые слова: дихотомия Восток-Запад, российско-украинский конфликт, ориентализм, воображаемая география.

1. Introduction

In the trying times of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict, it is natural to expect that Ukraine will seek support from more powerful partners. However, the reaction of international partners to the conflict is increasingly unenthusiastic, despite most recent aggravations in the Azov Sea. A growing awareness of the so-called 'Ukrainian fatigue' among international partners invites Ukrainian decision- and policy-makers, as well as general public, to reflect on Ukraine's own resources, self-support and self-reliance. Alongside the necessity to find an optimal course of development, these issues have become increasingly important as the conflict shows no end. One of the arguments surfacing in this debate is that the East-West division within Ukraine may become internalised and impact the relations within the country, in the present and in the future. As such, analysis of images and narratives on East *vs.* West within Ukraine may assist in informing and fine-tuning a dialogue in the country and help to seek out compromises and roadmaps for reintegration of the occupied territories. This analysis also asks if the notions of East and West influence how Ukraine sees its neighbours and the wider world. The ultimate aim of this paper is to identify the imaginary geography of Ukraine and trace Ukraine's place on the mental map of the world within the coordinates from East to West and in the context of the ongoing conflict. This 'mental mapping' is argued to be instrumental in understanding images of external Others as well as images of Self.

The data are collected from the interviews of Ukrainian elites – decision-, policy- and opinion-makers – representing different policy fields including media, culture, politics, civil society and business. The semi-structured interviews with Ukrainian elites, conducted face-to-face by pre-trained researchers, were held in 2016-17 as a part of the Jean Monnet Network "Crisis, Conflict and Critical Diplomacy: EU Perceptions in Ukraine, Israel and Palestine" (C^3EU) led by the National Centre for Research of Europe, University of Canterbury (Christchurch, New Zealand) in cooperation with nine international partners (https://jeanmonnet.nz/c3eu/, see also Chaban and Zhabotynska 2018 in this Issue). In the analysis provided below, the respective references are "Media", "Culture", "Civil", and "Business" followed by a number of the interview, as it is registered in the C^3EU data; for example, Civil5. The questionnaires for the interviews focused on the perceptions of the EU in the context of conflict and crisis in Ukraine. The interviews were conducted in Ukrainian and Russian with responses transcribed verbatim and later translated into English. This paper uses quotations from the English version as a purely linguistic approach is not the goal in this case study. Due to Human Ethics regulations, all responses will remain fully anonymous, and only the cohort will be identified when the words are quoted.

While the questionnaire did not explicitly ask about "East *vs.* West" images, the interviewees often referenced and compared East *vis-à-vis* West, typically in order to highlight the differences between Ukraine and other actors. Following this empirical observation, this article sets to trace if there was a clear placement of Ukraine in these "mental mappings". Where exactly is Ukraine's place on the imaginary map of the world? Can the opposition "East *vs.* West" be explained by the influential theory of orientalism [Said, 1978]? The theory hypothesizes a negative connotation assigned by the West to the East. The article respectively explores if the narrative of unconquerable discrepancies between Ukraine's East and West regions exist in the imagination of the Ukrainian movers and shakers. The article also aims to map the imaginary geography in terms of "East-West" divide outside the country's borders.

The theoretical framework section describes the theories behind the research, sets the focus of studying Ukraine's vision of East, West and self. Said's orientalism and Huntington's clash of civilizations hypotheses inform the theoretical framework of this study. The analysis is also guided by a set of concepts developed by the scholars of Eastern Europe – Wolff [1994], Pittaway [2003], and Todorova [2009] among others – in highlighting the similarities and differences in the images of East *vs.* West in neighbouring countries. These theorisations are instrumental to explain the perceptions among Ukrainian elites (traced through the data collected from the interviews and discussed in detail in the Findings section). The images are categorized into two main frames of "outside Ukraine" and "inside Ukraine" with several sub-categories – a conceptual architecture that explicates an elaborate and complex mental mapping of the world by Ukrainian policy- and decision-makers. The Conclusions section outlines how the tested theories were partially disproved, showing that the East is not necessarily weak or exotic in Ukraine's elite perceptions, and that the East *vs.* West opposition within the country's borders is not internalized by the interviewed stakeholders.

2. Theoretical frameworks

According to the theory articulated by Edward Said in his book *Orientalism* [1978], the pattern of dissecting the world into East and West has been present since the ancient times. One of the most influential works on the imaginary geography of the post-colonial world, Said's analysis had become the trend-setter. It invited a generation of scholars to launch into further investigation how the East is perceived by the West and *vice versa*. Receiving a fair share of criticism for its historical inaccuracies and author's personal bias, *Orientalism* nevertheless sparked an ongoing discussion that has only grown since the first edition of the book. This article is informed by Said's theory of 'strong West *vs.* weak East' -- as the result of inaccurate cultural representations. In his work, he claims that Orient not only was constructed by the West but also "has helped to define Europe (or the West) as its contrasting image, idea, personality, experience" [Said, 1978: 13]. He also suggests that for centuries the Orient has been "a place of romance, exotic beings, haunting memories and landscapes, remarkable experiences" [Said, 1978: *2*]. Using Ukraine's experience, this paper explores how these claims have stood against time and the effects of globalization, if their viability has suffered over the last four decades.

Referencing a later work by Huntington -- the much debated *Clash of Civilizations* [1993] -- Ukraine may be described as one of the 'cleft countries' [Huntington, 1993: 30]. On the one hand, it belongs to the so-called Orthodox civilization. On the other, it has a large number of people who are identifying with a different, neighbouring civilization. In Ukraine's case, the "other" civilisation may be located in the Western regions of the country that are predominately Eastern Rite Catholic or Ukrainian Greek Catholic. It is also possible to speculate whether Ukraine is a Huntington's 'torn' country, i.e. a country that has made a drastic turn to change its civilizational path. Huntington [Huntington, 2013: 44] outlines three requirements for a country to redefine its civilizational identity in a major way: support of its own political and economic elites, approval of the public, and acceptance of the elites of the given civilization that a country is striving to join. So far, it is not clear if conflicted Ukraine can fully become a 'torn' country in Huntington's sense, with EU membership not being on the agenda and without a transparent response on that matter from the West. However, Ukraine's Association Agreement with the EU may be seen as a sign of at least a beginning of the acknowledgement of Ukraine as a country that belongs with the Western civilization.

The image of the West and the Self in Ukraine have been scrutinized by scholars prior to Maidan and the following conflict [Gritsay & Nikolko, 2009; Tarasenko, & Ivanenko, 2004; Yavorska & Bogomolov 2010]. These works reported the emergence of the narrative of the 'desired yet distant' Europe and the importance of this narrative in the formulation of the national identity narrative in Ukraine. For Ukraine, Europe has been a desired and seemingly unreachable

destination for a long time, the perfect example to follow [Yavorska & Bogomolov, 2010: 86]. The image of Europe is mythological and mostly blended into the image of the West in general [Gritsay & Nikolko, 2009: 176].

Following the dramatic events on Maidan in 2013-14 and the later conflict in the East and annexation of Crimea, literature in the field debates the reasons underlying the Ukrainian crisis [Black *et al*., 2016; Merry *et al.,* 2016]. While some researchers imply outside influence, including Russian propaganda, as one of the main causes [Kolstø & Blakkisrud, 2018], others point out to internal origins of the problem. Importantly, the latter group of scholars often cites crucial cultural and historical differences between Eastern and Western regions in Ukraine [see e.g. Besier & Stokłosa, 2017]. This article questions whether there is ground to these assumptions and tests them empirically.   In this, the article innovatively adds to the discussion on Ukraine's self-visions and identity in the post-Maidan period.

Studying the perceived differences between East and West is by no means a novelty among historians, sociologists, economists, etc. Attempts to define borders within Europe and debating their existence brings a new perspective on putting Ukraine on this "philosophical map". Norman Davies has set the precedent in the historical studies of shifting the focus from the predominantly Western-centered view of the European history and drawing more attention to the role of the Eastern and Central European countries in shaping the modern Europe [Davies, 2006]. He claims that the so-called East Europe is an inherent part of the Western civilization and should not be seen as subordinate. Mark Pittaway on the other hand goes even further, suggesting that both the internal and external borders of Europe are fluid [Pittaway, 2003] and cannot be defined. He also states that the "former socialist states are both part of outside Europe" [Pittaway, 2003: 156], which includes Ukraine as a region that previously was on the other side of the "iron curtain".

Using evidence from maps, travellers' memoirs and works of literature Wolff argues that the imaginary division between Eastern and Western Europe has been present since the Enlightenment and still determines not only the perception of the East as the "other" but the image of self in eastern countries. [Wolff, 1994; 16]. The complex and diverse Balkan region especially has been the focus of several studies in the context of new countries joining the EU [Bideleux & Jeffries, 1998; Petrovic, 2014; Todorova, 2009]. Ukraine's case, however, may bring an even more profound insight into the matter of these perceived divisions, especially at such a turbulent period of fighting the Russian aggression and striving to find support from its European partners, when finding its own place and stance is vital.

3. Findings

Among the first observations is that the imagined geographical positioning of Ukraine in general seems to be very often identified *vis-à-vis* Russia. This place on the map of the world is seen to be problematic, as it means for Ukraine difficulties in avoiding conflict in the present and securing a peaceful future. A media professional comments, "Ukraine has such a geographical position that places it between the EU and Russia, … a very powerful country, both on the economic and political levels…" (Media7). This geographical position is seen by some to be a trap for Ukraine: 'You cannot escape Russia, of course. We are just surrounded' (Civil5), or '…we cannot get rid of geography, that is why Russia is important for us' (Civil9).

Yet, some see Ukraine on the move away from the East: 'We announced the [European] vector, we are leaving. We are still Europeans in our mentality and can not belong to the eastern regions, that want to swallow us, to return us' (Civil2). Others believe that being a country on the edge of two civilizations may be actually advantageous for Ukraine and the West. This presents Ukraine with an opportunity to play an important role on the international arena. One cultural elite compared Ukraine to a "stumbling block on the way of the eastern and southern and northern hordes" (Culture1). Another representative of the cultural circle stated:

Ukrainians are the "resource" for the EU as a civilized, cultural and educated workforce, especially for Eastern Europe - for Poland and Czech Republic. The thing is that Ukrainians have moved to Italy, France, Spain and Portugal earlier and this migration wave is at present moving towards Poland, Czech Republic, a bit less to Hungary. But still nobody denies the logistic importance of Ukraine (Culture7).

Perceptions of the notions "East" and "West" among the interviewed elites may be grouped into two main categories: 'outside Ukraine' and 'inside Ukraine'.

3.1. Perceptions of the East: Outside perspective

If we consider the "outside Ukraine" perspective, the imaginary geography of East *vs.* West does not necessarily correspond to the real world mapping conventions, where Europe and Asia are divided by the Ural Mountains. Instead, geopolitical and cultural issues guide the construction of the perceived borders in the imagination of our respondents. Ukraine's struggle in general is "the issue of us quitting to be part of Asia and moving to Europe" (Media2).

The 'East' outside Ukraine has its own subdivisions in the eyes of Ukrainian elites: 'Asia', 'Russia', 'Eastern Europe' and 'Eastern Partnership' with the latter not a geographical, but a socio-political concept that is rather visible in the interviews.

The notion of 'Asia' of the 'outside East' is comprised in the imagination of Ukrainian policy- and decision-makers of China, Japan and Turkey, while other Asian actors are largely invisible (e.g. "Eastern countries, we'll name China, and perhaps even others - Japan and the like" (Civil2); "I would say, East - I mean Japan, China and Singapore" (Politics6)).

The three visible actors are seen as rapidly developing countries that may potentially offer an alternative pattern of progress if Ukraine's struggle to be accepted in Europe, or more generally 'the West', fails. A civil society representative, for example, argues that instead of relations with the EU, he would rather be talking about some closer relations with Turkey" (Civil4). A politician echoes, "Turkey is just one of the major players in the Black Sea region. ...It is clear that, maybe we need to establish or attempt to establish relations with China, because China is becoming a serious player…" (Politics3).

Russia is seen as one of the key representatives of the 'outside East'. It is often described as one of the great powers, an influential actor in the region along with the EU and the US: ("[...] other serious subjects which are the USA, Russia" (Media1)). Unsurprisingly, its image is ambiguous -- it is both an enemy and a former significant partner. As one media elite argues 'From the state policy perspective, they [Russia] are our enemies, but from the people's perspective… we have a million of relatives there, here and there, and they cannot be our enemies." (Media3). Despite these connections, the path is seen to be changing for Ukraine: "previously, we tried to follow … how it should be in Russia. At present, we try to follow the West." (Culture9).

Another actor in the mental space of the 'East' is 'Eastern Europe'. The interviewees often mentioned Eastern Europe as an important partner for Ukraine. It is typically represented by Poland and the three Baltic states. Consider a rather typical response by a civil society representative: "[They] are our partners on borders with Eastern Europe: it is Poland, the Baltic States, and partly Romania" (Civil9). These states are seen to have historical and cultural ties to Ukraine but at the same time belong to the 'outside West' represented by the EU. However, Eastern Europe is seen in a position not dissimilar to Ukraine - they belong to the West, but are not fully accepted there as its rightful members. This is despite having their status of EU member states. Moreover, this region is sometimes seen to be excluded from the very definition of Europe: "The reference of the notion "Europe" in most of its usage does not include the Eastern Europe, many parts. And [certainly] not Ukraine" (Civil5).

East European countries are also viewed as advocate for Ukraine in Europe (e.g. Poland as Ukraine's advocate in the European Union (Business6)) and intermediaries between Ukraine and the West, a gateway of sort to the Western civilization. These countries are somehow perceived to

be on their own, not always abiding by the EU rules. In this case the placement of these countries on the imaginary map is particular - regions located to Ukraine's West are placed in the East and not just by the name, but by cultural proximity. Although the name itself is also seen as an issue. Business respondent comments, "I am very happy that they [young EU MSs like Poland and the Baltic States] are already named not "Eastern Europe", but "Northern Europe" -- what they actually are" (Business5).

Importantly, Ukraine is seen within the circle of the actors of "Eastern Europe". On the one hand, Ukraine's people are now a part of the societies in Eastern Europe: "Ukrainians are the "resource" for EU as a civilized, cultural and educated workforce, especially for Eastern Europe - for Poland and Czech Republic" (Culture7). On the other hand, Ukraine is an equal partner to Eastern European countries when it comes to security and defence matters: "[Ukraine is] in the military block of Eastern European countries, and, as a matter of fact, there is also an exchange of experience there. It is like a 'micro NATO', let's call it that" (Business8).

Another 'inverted' perspective surfaced in the imagining the 'Eastern Partnership'. It was discussed in the interviews as a tool that is supposed to bring Ukraine closer to the West, but at the same time puts it among the countries that are not yet accepted by the EU as verified partners. The Eastern Partnership in fact is seen as not facilitating the relations with the EU, but making them vaguer and unclear. It is even implied that the very reason for its creation was "that its member countries could never be accepted to the EU (Media7)". On the whole, 'Eastern Partnership' along with 'Eastern Europe' is seen to create a connection with the West: "the EU also had deep enough relationship with Ukraine within this Neighbourhood Policy, in the Eastern Partnership framework so it would not be acceptable for them to leave this game completely, well, to ignore the problem" (Civil4). Importantly, the EU's Eastern Partnership is seen as policy that is designed to make its member "not members, but close friends, close partners" (Politics7) and Europe continues to "co-work with countries, organizations, with institutions … in other countries of Eastern Partnership" (Civil9). Yet, some respondents are less enthusiastic about the policy: "what is to be done with the East Partnership countries…(with) these six countries…[is] absolutely unclear" (Politics4).

3.2. Imagining East: Perspectives inside Ukraine

Now, we are turning in our analysis to images of the space "inside Ukraine". Naturally, war-torn Eastern Ukraine has a high profile in the discussions about the Ukrainian crisis and the EU's involvement in the peacemaking process. One of the important observations here was that naming the conflict was problematic in itself for a number of interviewees. Some disagreed strongly with the usage of the term 'conflict': "Overall role of the EU in the war of Russia against Ukraine - and not a conflict! - Requires increased pressure on Russia and the rejection of double standards of the EU itself" (Culture2). Other descriptors were 'what we have now going on in the East' (Civil2), 'the events', 'problems' (Politics3), 'the war' (Media6), 'attacks of Russia' (Culture8), 'warfare or outbreaks' (Politics6). The situation in Ukraine's East is frequently mentioned alongside another geographical indicator – the Crimea, or just South in general.

Ambiguity of Russia's image reminds how Huntignton used Ukraine-Russia conflict of 1991 over Crimea as an example of tensions within the same civilization: "Such conflicts, however, are likely to be less intense and less likely to expand than conflicts between civilizations. ...If civilization is what counts, however, the likelihood of violence between Ukrainians and Russians should be low. They are two Slavic, primarily Orthodox peoples who have had close relationships with each other for centuries" [Huntington, 1993: 38]. For some of the interviewees Russia is still a part of the same civilization as Ukraine, but current situation shows, that the conflict is not de-escalating, which may indicate that Ukraine is almost forced to become a "torn country" through this conflict.

To sum up, none of the perceptions of the East, inside and outside of the country, appear to support Said's orientalism theory. Apart from the perception of "Eastern Partnership", that is seen as ambiguous and sometimes negative, the rest of the images contradict the negative "othering" of the East. Still, Ukraine is a part of the Eastern Partnership which makes it a self-image to a degree.

3.3. Perceptions of West: Imagining "Outside West"

Diverse responses were observed when interviewees reflected on the concept of West. The West is general is frequently named as an important actor in the region. Yet, it is not seen as infallible and omnipotent. In the eyes of the elite respondents, it lacks integrity when it comes to dealing with external problems. Similarly to the notions of East, the perceptions of the West belong to two general groups: views of the 'Outside West' and 'Western Ukraine'.

The former notion has turned out to be a much more complicated and diverse one. With the interviews designed to investigate the image of EU in Ukraine, the 'outside West' is seen to be comprised of the EU (often represented as "Europe" or separate EU countries, such as Germany and France), the USA, and sometimes NATO. The notion of the West, however, is typically associated with the USA, and only then with Europe: "the so-called West, metaphorical one, because we are talking about the EU and about America and Canada [...] The West is primarily America." (Civil4). Importantly, the West is seen to possess "its own values which it tries to disseminate in Ukraine" (Civil 9).

One of the most typical visions of the 'outside West' was the one of an example for Ukraine to follow. The interviewees also felt that Ukrainians are supposed to belong to the Western society, but are not accepted by it yet because of the current state of events, and internal issues with corruption and slow reform implementation process. The 'move' towards the West is recognised in a paradoxical way – it is both inevitable yet seemingly fruitless at the same time. The West is believed to be not ready for Ukraine's bureaucracy, poverty and territorial disputes. Nevertheless, many elites do not see other alternatives to Ukraine's orientation towards the West:

> That is a lot of things are inherent in Western civilization, which unfortunately we do not have, that either they were not here or they were destroyed in totalitarian conditions [...] It is becoming more and more attractive to all those territories to want to return, so that they would fought to return. Just like East Germans fought for a return to West Germany. And I do not see and do not want it any other way (Civil4)

Being an important actor, a supporter of Ukraine, the West is not seen to be willing to exert much power to help it or maintain its own interests nonetheless. Still, the interviewees understand the complexity of the situation and do not accuse the EU or the US – as the main representatives of the imagined West – of being neglectful. Still, there is a sentiment shared among elites that the West is not using sanctions or other measures against Russia to the full extent because that would disadvantage the West. These statements are often accompanied by reflections on the necessity of self-reliance and self-dependence, etc. Typical examples of such responses are below:

> ...the West could have achieved much more than with military force, because it is a tremendous economic power, and it could certainly ... find arguments both for Russia and China in order to persuade them to accept some compromise. ...the West has so many powerful cards that could be used, but for various reasons they are not … used (Civil4)
> At the same time, the West does not intervene, does not violate the sovereignty of the Russian Federation, but very significantly restricts its economic, political, and diplomatic abilities, because they (Russians) violate human rights. So the West remains holding the position, and the world, the civilized world remains holding the position that human rights are above all (Civil9)

3.4. Perceptions of West: Internal Perspectives

Considering the "internal to Ukraine" interpretation of the "West", Western Ukraine is seen as a link between the country and the 'outside West', as well as a region that responds to the European influences more eagerly: "The western region, Western Ukraine is more responsive to the European

Union" (Culture1). This is the region which is seen to be well linked with the 'Eastern European' part of Europe: "in Western Ukraine a certain image of Poland has already been formed, and the relations are clear there, they, nevertheless, began to understand that the same things should be done in the east of Ukraine" (Culture4).

Western Ukraine is not mentioned as often as the East of Ukraine, which can be explained by the general context of the interviews that had specific questions about the conflict. It is mentioned only occasionally, either as a contrast to the East, or in a completely unrelated setting. A political interviewee argues, *"we have a pro-European population, it mainly resides in Western and Central Ukraine, and certainly there are people who live under the pressure of Russian propaganda and that more are on the eastern Ukraine"* (Politics7).

Since the focus of the interviews was on the conflict in the East of Ukraine, it is understandable that Western Ukraine was mentioned less frequently. Still, the interviews materials point to a particular framing of this regions of Ukraine. Unlike the East, it appears to be closer to Europe not only geographically, but in terms of common history. The region is seen to become a basis for cooperation and more involvement than with the countries of Central and Western Europe.

Some researchers of Ukrainian crisis point out to the discrepancies between its Western and Eastern regions as one of the underlying causes of the conflict [Black *et al.* 2016; Hahn 2017; Olchawa 2017]. Other speculate that it has been an issue even before the Orange Revolution of 2004 [Portnov2013: 241]. Comparing the perceptions of East *vs.* West within the country in the responses of interviews in our case does not support this premise. Only one of fifty interviewees, who also happens to be from the East of Ukraine, insisted on 'Westerners' being the ones to blame for the conflict in Donbass and justified the separatists' actions with deeply rooted cultural differences: *"many [in Eastern Ukraine] wanted federalization precisely for this reason, because they understood that this is a foreign culture for us, strange values for us, and that once they came to power by armed means, for us it was unacceptable"* (Business1), at the same time rejecting Western values decisively: "I do not see a single value that we should have adapted and would be useful for us, not one." (Business1). This point of view is not shared by other respondents. Moreover, some are rather sarcastic about these sorts of opinion:

> for some parts of society, particularly under the influence of Russian propaganda, it can also have a different interpretation, namely that 'that darned EU, darned West started the fire, we used to live so well, peacefully, amicably, had a loving relationship with Russia and suddenly here they spoiled it all' (Civil4).

Regarding the image of the West in all of its variety, empirical findings seem to suggest that Ukraine is indeed a "cleft country", yet not a "torn country", as described by Huntigton. Without a clear approval from the imagined "outside West" in form of EU membership or substantial and decisive support in the conflict with Russia, Ukraine does not seem to be able to overcome the perceived limitations imposed by imaginary borders. At the same time, the vision of the West, embodied mostly by the EU, partially goes in line with Said's "strong West" narrative. Nevertheless, the image of "strong Asia", discussed earlier in this paper, makes the orientalism hypothesis inconclusive.

4. Conclusions

This study traced the images of the East vs. West emerging in the interviews with Ukrainian elites about the image of the EU in the context of the ongoing conflict and crisis in Ukraine. Importantly, the questionnaire did not ask specific questions about the 'imagined geography' of Ukraine, and future studies may choose to focus on this research objective exclusively. This article presents an initial attempt to outline the mental map of the world along the East/West divisions in the eyes of Ukrainian people (in this case Ukrainian decision- and policy-makers). It is necessary to stress out

that both the notions of East and West are imaginary and their relations are complex and sometimes perplexing.

The results can be grouped into two levels: "external frames" and "internal frames". The "external frame" includes the notions of "East" represented by Asia, Russia, Eastern Europe and Eastern Partnership. The image of Asia has a definitively positive connotation and this finding contradicts Said's orientalism hypothesis. In addition, Russia – a country to the East of Ukraine -- has an ambiguous image, albeit with an inclination to negativity. This finding does not fully correspond to the image of the exotic and demonised "Other", proposed by Said. The notion of "Eastern Europe", on the other hand has mostly positive connotations and is, to an extent, a part of Ukraine's self-image. The image of "Eastern Partnership" supports Said's theory, featuring negative associations attached to the notion of the East. These are also partially a component of Ukraine's self-image. The image of the "Outside West" is complex and does in part resonate with Said's concept of the 'strong West', however from Ukraine's perspective, the strength remains unrealized due to lack of stern action in dealing with the conflict.

The "internal frame" includes two main images - "East of Ukraine", heavily associated with the conflict in the country, and "Western Ukraine", seen being closer to Europe not just in a geographical manner. None of these notions is described either as better or worse, or stronger or weaker. While their images are contrasted to a minor extent, they are not seen as rivals or competitors.

The basic contours of the 'imaginary map' of Ukraine traced through the responses of Ukrainian elites partially dismiss Said's orientalism maxim of 'West is strong; East is weak'. In the eyes of the Ukrainian respondents, countries in the Far East were seen as models of economic growth and development in contrast to Europe's slow but noticeable decline. Moreover, they were seen as a source of alternative models for Ukraine to follow, in case its European orientation does not work out.

The interviews were conducted during the period when the visa liberalisation regime for Ukraine had not been implemented yet. At that time, no-visas regime was believed to be unobtainable due to poor fulfilment of reforms on Ukraine's side and reluctance on the EU's side. The controversy surrounding the visa-free issue was viewed in the context of Ukraine's relations with the EU, and more generally with the West. Indeed, it had a symbolic meaning of transcending the borders and getting closer to the West, or rather getting away from the East, and from being the 'no man's land' between the two sides. From the elites' point of view, the country is not yet a 'torn' country in Huntington's sense, as it lacks the approval and acceptance from the symbolic West -- the EU continues to deny EU membership for Ukraine. But it is indeed seen as a 'cleft' country with the growing ties to the West, that are spreading further into Ukraine's East.

The world in the East-West coordinates is not multipolar, but is stretched between two opposing, equally distant epicenters of power, namely the US and China. There is very little visibility to the notions of Center, North or South. These were hardly mentioned in the interviews, and if mentioned then exclusively in the "outside frame". Notably, Russia seems to have "moved" to the East since the beginning of the conflict: previously it often used to be referred as "the Northern neighbour" of Ukraine, but the interviewees seem to be inclined to associate it with the East (partially supporting Said's theory).

Notably, Ukraine is not the only country that is seen having a marginal status. Countries of Eastern Europe were seen to belong to the same group. While being Western in the definition by geography textbooks, they are not seen to be fully accepted by the West as an intimate part of it. Further research is needed for the perceptions of the imaginary geography of several most mentioned countries, such as Poland, Russia, China and the USA. They had a high visibility in the interviews even though they were not the main focus of them.

The fluidity of Europe's 'imaginary borders' provides an opportunity for Ukraine to overcome the perceived differences and to use the historical and cultural ties as an advantage in building new

and more far-reaching connections with the EU. Both the current conflict in the East and common history with many Eastern and Central European countries create a potential for fostering even closer mutual relations. However, there is a danger of crossing even those imaginary lines and creating unnecessary tensions, which is more that possible if there are no palpable guidelines.

Perhaps the most important conclusion is that the data gathered in the interviews demonstrated that the East-West dichotomy is not fully internalized in Ukraine. Despite some historical discrepancies, in the eyes of Ukrainian elites there is no innate perceived opposition between Eastern and Western regions of the country. This finding is of critical importance to Ukraine. Considering limited external influences, a peaceful dialogue within Ukraine is possible through accentuating common ideals and values.

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DONBAS CRISIS KEY ACTORS:
NARRATIVES AND PERCEPTIONS IN THE INTERVIEWS
OF UKRAINIAN ELITES

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Viktor Velivchenko. Donbas crisis key actors: narratives and perceptions in the interviews of Ukrainian elites. This article examines real events, their perceptions and narratives concerned with the key actors in the Donbas crisis – Ukraine, the EU/EU member states, Russia and the USA. Perceptions and narratives are traced in the texts of interviews with Ukrainian policy- and decision-makers from political, business, cultural, and civic cohorts (40 respondents). The elites were interviewed in the winter of 2016 within the framework of the Jean Monnet Network "Crisis, conflict and critical diplomacy: EU perceptions in Ukraine and Israel/Palestine" (C^{3}EU), supported by Earsmus+ program of the European Commission. Informed by the strategic narrative theory [Miskimmon *et al*. 2013], the article undertakes a qualitative content analysis of the interview texts, explicating elite perceptions of the crisis in Donbas. The results spell the need for a more nuanced understanding of Ukraine's perceptions of key actors in the ongoing conflict as well as the origin of these perceptions. Arguably, such understanding may benefit the EU's critical diplomacy towards Ukraine and add a valuable insight to the constructive dialogue between Ukraine and the EU.

Keywords: political image, strategic narrative, content analysis, EU perceptions, Ukraine, crisis in Donbas.

Віктор Велівченко. Ключові суб'єкти кризи на Донбасі: наративи та сприйняття в інтерв'ю українських еліт. У статті надано аналіз реальних подій, їхнього сприйняття та відповідних наративів, пов'язаних із ключовими суб'єктами кризи на Донбасі – Україною, ЄС/країнами ЄС, Росією та США. Сприйняття виводиться з текстів інтерв'ю українців, які визначають напрями діяльності та ухвалюють рішення в політиці, бізнесі, культурній та громадській сфкрах (40 респондентів). Представники цих українських еліт були проінтервйовані взимку 2016 року в межах проекту «Криза, конфлікт та критична дипломатія: сприйняття ЄС в Україні та Ізраїлі/Палестина» (C^{3}EU) за підтримки програми Еразмус+, наданої Європейською комісією. Спираючись на теорію стратегічного наративу [Miskimmon et al. 2013], стаття надає контент-аналіз текстів інтерв'ю, що віддзеркалюють сприйняття кризи на Донбасі представниками українських еліт. Результати аналізу свідчать про необхідність більш детального розуміння того, як сприймаються ключові суб'єкти, задіяні у конфлікті на Донбасі, а також причин такого сприйняття. За припущенням, розуміння природи сприйняття зазначених ключових політичних сил може принести користь критичній дипломатії ЄС щодо України та надати цінну інформацію, яка сприятиме конструктивному діалогу між Україною та ЄС.

Ключові слова: політичний образ, стратегічні наративи, контент-аналіз, сприйняття ЄС, Україна, криза на Донбасі.

Виктор Велившенко: Ключевые субъекты кризиса на Донбассе: нарративы и восприятия в интервью украинских элит. В статье дан анализ реальных событий, их восприятия и соответствующих нарративов, связанных с ключевыми субъектами кризиса на Донбассе – Украиной, ЕС/странами ЕС, Россией и США. Восприятия выводится из текстов интервью украинцев, которые определяют направления деятельности и принимают решения в политике, бизнесе, культурной и общественной сферах (40 респондентов). Все интервью были проведены зимой 2016 года в рамках

проекта «Кризис, конфликт и критическая дипломатия: восприятие ЕС в Украине и Израиле/Палестина» (C^{3}EU) при поддержке программы Эразмус+, предоставляемой Европейской комиссией. Опираясь на теорию стратегического нарратива [Miskimmon et al. 2013], статья предлагает контент-анализ текстов интервью, которые отражают восприятие кризиса на Донбассе представителями украинских элит. Результаты анализа свидетельствуют о необходимости более детального понимания того, как воспринимаются ключевые субъекты, задействованные в конфликте на Донбассе, а также причин такого восприятия. Предположительно, понимание природы восприятия упомянутых политических сил может быть полезным для критической дипломатии ЕС относительно Украины и предоставить ценную информацию, которая будет способствовать конструктивному диалогу между Украиной и ЕС.

Ключевые слова: политические образы, стратегические нарративы, контент-анализ, восприятие ЕС, Украина, кризис на Донбассе.

1. Introduction

The ongoing war in eastern Ukraine highlights the crisis of the global system of international security and invites a study of Ukrainians' perceptions of the key actors – Ukraine, the European Union (EU) /EU member states and Russia – in resolving the crisis. This crisis began in April 2014, after the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation in February–March 2014. Since then, for more than four years now, the armed conflict has been ongoing in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts of Ukraine (collectively called the 'Donbas') – two regions that border on the Russian Federation.

The main focus of this article is on Ukrainian policy- and decision-makers' perceptions of the main actors in the Donbas conflict. The analysis aims to answer the following questions: Who are the key actors in the Donbas crisis as perceived by Ukrainian elites? How are these actors perceived? And more specifically, how is the EU and its role in the crisis resolution perceived in Ukraine? and Is the EU's role different from that of other key actors? This article argues that the perceptions of the EU as Ukraine's partner are dented due to the EU's limited understating of the current situation in Ukraine and its needs effected by the conflict. Arguably, the understanding of Ukraine's perceptions of key actors in the ongoing conflict and the origin of these perceptions is crucial for the EU's successful critical diplomacy towards Ukraine as well as a constructive dialogue between Ukraine and the EU. The conceptual framework of this study integrates theoretical perspectives from the field of political science and cognitive linguistics, providing us with tools to trace and interpret the narratives. We analyze the responses of 40 Ukrainian elite representatives to the questions on the EU and its role in Donbas crisis resolution, which provide a sufficient database for content-analysis and generalization. This study contributes to the theorization of contribution to narratology in general, and strategic narratology in particular.

The article begins with a brief historical overview of the Russia-Ukraine conflict that started in 2014, featuring its major events and actors – from the protests in Kyiv at the end of 2013 up till the present-day stalemate. In the following section, the study describes the emergence of narratives and strategic narratives and their role in shaping our world, identity and perceptions. The article elaborates on the necessity of analyzing Ukrainian elites' perceptions of the EU in the resolution of Ukraine crisis and details the objective to assess the range and flow of narratives among Ukrainian policy- and decision-makers. With perceptions argued to feed into the narratives of reception, this analysis helps build better understanding between the EU and Ukraine. After a brief introduction of the research data and the method of analysis, the article turns to empirical findings. At the end, the study draws conclusions on Ukraine elites' perceptions of the EU in the Donbas crisis and argues a set of key issues that shape EU perceptions.

2. Contextualizing the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the Donbas crisis

The Donbas drama followed the events in the end of 2013, when Viktor Yanukovych, the then President of Ukraine, forwent to put his signature under Ukraine's Association Agreement (including a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area) (AA/DCFTA) with the EU. Instead,

Yanukovych decided to accept a counter-offer from Russia to invest USD 15 billiards [Reuters 2013] into Ukraine's external debt without any clear public explanation of this charity move.

The AA/DCFTA was meant to be signed between the EU and four Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries – Armenia, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. It had spurred serious concerns in Russia whose leadership felt it was losing influence on these post-Soviet countries. Russian elites were aware of the high chances of Ukraine to sign the AA/DCFTA and considered this step as a threat: this agreement would lead Ukraine to closer ties with the EU and further broaden its cooperation with NATO. These moves were seen as an encroachment on Russia's influence in the shared neighborhood (a number of states that lie between the EU and Russia known to the EU as its "eastern neighborhood" and to Russia as its "near abroad" [Smith 2015].

Russia has had very close ties with Ukraine. Ukraine is the largest and the most developed economy among the three countries of the "shared neighborhood" with a distinct geopolitical importance to Russia. Ukraine is also a special case in Russia's security strategy as well as in the historical and national identity discourses. A broader vision by "President Putin is to re-establish as much influence over the former Soviet space as possible" [Alcaro 2015:13]. Unsurprisingly, Ukraine's aspiration to move closer to the European orbit of action has been received with suspicion. Current Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov considers the Eastern Partnership to be an attempt to extend the EU's sphere of influence [Pop 2009]. In this light, Ukraine's decision to join the NATO Alliance was perhaps the most sensitive for Russia. Deputy Russian Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko once said, "Georgia's and Ukraine's membership in the alliance is a huge strategic mistake which would have most serious consequences for pan-European security" [Reuters 2008].

Yanukovych's refusal to sign the AA/DCFTA resulted in the mass anti-government protests in Kyiv and then spread throughout Ukraine. The Kyiv Maidan (which started as a peaceful protest by students) had escalated to violent fights with shootings in early 2014. More than hundred people were killed on Maidan and their deaths contributed to the escalation of the crisis. The EU-supported mediation between the protestors and Yanukovych in February 2014 involved the EU as well as German, French and Polish officials. They brokered the deal with the Ukrainian government that envisaged early (extraordinary) elections in May 2014 and prescribed the much anticipated changes to Ukrainian constitution to take place in the autumn of the same year.

Yanukovich fled to Russia in February 2014 and the interim pro-European government led by Oleksandr Turchynov and Arseniy Yatsenyuk came to power. Yet, political stability did not eventuate. The destabilized country ended with the conflict on its hands, with Eastern Ukraine affected the most. Following the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula by the Russian Federation, Ukraine has encountered the raise of separatist movements in the east and the creation of the separatist entities (the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics). Russian government has exerted significant pressure on the new government in Kyiv to discourage it from siding with the West against Moscow. For example, Gazprom, the Russian energy company, sharply raised its price for natural gas. President Putin said he would intervene to protect Russian speakers anywhere in Ukraine, if Ukrainian nationalists threaten them [*The New York Times* April 1, 2014]. Commentators around the world noted that Russia was aiming to create a dysfunctional Ukraine, "and the economic avenue is just as promising as the military route, although the two are likely to proceed in tandem" [Wilson 2015]. According to Mearsheimer [2014], Moscow "provided advisers, arms and diplomatic support to the separatists in eastern Ukraine". Moreover, Russian government "has amassed a large army on the Ukrainian border to the east, threatening to invade if the Ukrainian government cracked down on the rebels". The confrontation with the Donbas separatists turned violent once the Ukrainian authorities started to restore control in the country. This has led to the involvement of both Ukrainian army and volunteers (freelance fighters). Scholars and commentators argue that Russian involvement in the Donbas has included the provision of leadership, financing, ammunition, heavy weapons, supplies and, in some cases, regular units of the Russian army to support armed separatism against the Ukrainian government ([Robinson 2016];

[Pifer 2017]; [Matveeva 2016]). The US is quite clear on Russian participation in the conflict. As Kurt Volker, the former U.S. Ambassador to NATO and present-day U.S. Special Representative for Ukraine, admits, "Russia has forces in eastern Ukraine and it needs to pull them out" [Financial Times 2017]. Even the Russian President Vladimir Putin, speaking at his Annual News Conference, admitted the presence of "people dealing with tasks… in the military sphere" in Donbas (Vladimir Putin's Annual News Conference, 17 December 2015).

The war in Donbas inflicted huge social and economic damages. Almost 8,000 civilians and over 2,000 army servicemen were killed, and up to 1.4 mln became IDPs (Internally Displaced People) [Sanders, 2015]. During 2013-15, Ukraine's GDP dropped by 15% [The Economist 2017]. According to the "black book" [Kremlin's Black Book 2015], the war has cost Ukraine "20 percent of its economic potential, including its forecast revenues and foreign exchange earnings". But despite the above mentioned hardships, Ukraine did manage to improve and enlarge its armed forces substantially. Ukrainian army was transformed from the 6,000 combat-ready troops available in mid-2014 [The Ukrainian Week 2014] to a skillful, battle-hardened army of 250,000 [Peterson 2018] that managed to stabilize the front line. However, the local fighting still continues in Donbas, despite the signed agreements in Minsk (September 2014 and February 2015).

Russia's ongoing support to the break-away region of Donbas means that the conflict is not close to resolution. The key element that guarantees survival to DNR and LNR is the open border with Russia – a section around 400 km long. This section is used for the regular transfer of funds, financial and military support and personnel [Piechal 2015]. While Moscow denies its involvement in the Donbas crisis, this position has little credibility in the West. Western powers – including the EU and the US – have introduced a package of sanctions to mitigate aggression and show political support to Kyiv. Some economic effects of the sanctions did take place, yet the Western sanctions have not triggered any change in Russia's policies towards Ukraine (including a stop to the intervention in eastern Ukraine and the return of Crimea). For some commentators, the results of the sanctions have been rather disappointing so far (and a revision of the annexation of Crimea is completely unrealistic) [Havlik et al. 2014].

A new threat to Ukraine's stability emerges with Russia's hostile actions in the Azov Sea in 2018. These actions aim to secure Russia's full control over the Kerch Strait in order to establish a land corridor and link the Eastern parts of Luhansk and Donetsk regions with the Crimean Peninsula occupied by Russia. Russia's actions also appear to put pressure on Ukrainian commercial shipping and trade activity in the Black Sea area and the Sea of Azov. By constructing the bridge between Crimea and mainland Russia in 2018 [Troianovski 2018], the Kremlin has obtained a chance to harass Ukrainian vessels and negatively impact Ukraine's shipping to and from Ukrainian ports of Mariupol and Berdyansk. In particular, the Russians are practicing systematic and long-term searches of Ukrainian crews and cargoes, thus causing thousands-dollar losses for Ukrainian shipping companies and ports [The Economist 2018].

So far, the EU has been reluctant to contribute extensively to the protection of Ukraine's territorial integrity by military means (Despite the absence of military support, the EU provides unwavering support to Ukraine's independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty, and it has launched many initiatives to support the development of Ukraine's economy, governance, civil society, and connectivity [EEAS].). According to Depmpsey [2015], "Europeans' unwillingness to defend Ukraine's territorial integrity is due not only to the reluctance of most EU governments to provide Ukraine with weapons <…> this unwillingness also stems from the fact that most European governments do not believe Ukraine's territorial integrity matters that much to their own security".

And while this argument makes sense at a certain level, it also may send a message that in the eyes of many EU states territorial integrity of Ukraine concerns only Ukraine and has nothing to do with the security of the Eastern European region. "For most Europeans, the war in Ukraine does not threaten their values" [Dempsey, 2015]. However, the ongoing crisis in Donbas has already put into

question the Helsinki Final Act signed in 1975, the document that affirmed the fundamental principle of inviolable post-World War II frontiers [Helsinki Final Act, 1975].

Since the collapse of the USSR, the EU has used its neighborhood policy mechanisms to diffuse its normative visions (argued by Manners to be characteristic of the "Normative Power Europe" [Manners 2002]). According to Manners, among the core EU's norms are peace, democracy, human rights, liberty and rule of law. However, the multiple (economic, migration, security and political) crises in the EU have started 'denting' the image of the EU in Ukraine [C3EU 2015-2018; EUNPACK 2018], including images of its normative identity. Ukraine's own long-term political and economic crises on the one hand, and the EU modest successes in solving the ongoing crisis in Eastern Ukraine on the other, are also behind the evolution of EU perceptions in Ukraine to the negative. This intensifying trend may contribute to a less enthusiastic attitude of Ukrainians towards 'European choice' and potential integration, as well as impact burgeoning relations of Ukraine with the EU.

This study adds to literature on the conflict in Ukraine (see Mearsheimer [2014]; Tsygankov [2015]; Smith [Smith 2015]; Yost [Yost 2015]; Yurgens [2015]; Strasheim [2016] and many others) and a growing body of research on EU perceptions in Ukraine (e.g. Elgström [2018]; Elgström [2015]; and others). The article focuses on the perceptions of the EU and other key actors in the Donbas crisis resolution viewed through the prism of narratives. Theoretical grounds and empirical findings are elaborated in the following sections.

3. Theoretical framework: a Strategic Narratives approach and EU perceptions

In its study of Ukrainian elite perceptions of key actors in the Donbas crisis, this article engages with a new theory in international relations research – strategic narrative theory [Miskimmon *et al.* 2013]. A novel theorization in IR, it deals with meaning circulation, information flows, and communication in external relations. Importantly, this theory uses the notion of narrative, which is not a new one. According to Gerald Prince, narratives are the "representation of real or fictive events and situations in a time sequence" [Prince 1982: 1]. Kenneth Burke [1974)] stated that each narrative is formed through five obligatory interrelated components: characters or agents, a setting, environment or scene, a conflict or action, tools and behavior actors use to address it, and a resolution. In semiotics, narrative is, as Roland Barthes [1977] puts it, "prodigious variety of genres, themselves distributed among different substances – as though any material were fit to receive man's stories. Able to be carried by articulated language, spoken or written, fixed or moving images, gestures, and the ordered mixture of all these substances" [Barthes 1977].

In linguistics, a narrative is viewed as a major vehicle of human thought. Narrative is "blueprints for a specific mode of world-creation", or "world imagination" [Herman 2011]. It is a kind of information processing strategy characterized by an overall causal frame, the general plot, which is itself composed of a frequently tangled hierarchy of nested plots and subplots" [Argyros 1992: 662]. Reflecting personal experiences and meaning, narratives facilitate placing personal experience within broader institutional and social contexts. As such, narratives may play a dual role. Internally, they help hold members within a social community together, providing a sense of shared identity. Externally, narratives convey the nation's image to outside audiences.

For many scholars, identity is a central issue in any narratives. The notion of identity in this case incorporates national identity, collective identity, and self-esteem. Actors give meaning to themselves and others through narratives (for theorization of the relation between Self and Other that informs this Special Issue see Introduction [Chaban and Zhabotynska 2018]. Thus, narratives have the capacity to shape who we are (our identity) and also what we know (our knowledge), and what we do (our actions).

The image-making role of narratives is also significant. Kenneth Boulding defines an image as "the total cognitive, affective, and evaluative structure of the behavior unit, or its internal view of itself and its universe" [Boulding 1959:120–1]. However, some scholars refer the notion of image

only to national image, self-image, and reputation [Zahara 2016)]. Apart from images, perceptions – the way in which something is regarded, understood, or interpreted [English Oxford Living Dictionaries] and stereotypes – a fixed, over generalized belief about a particular group or class of people" [Cardwell 1996] are also significant in international relations, because they "serve to justify a nation's desired reaction or treatment toward another nation" [Alexander et al. 2005]. As Robert Jervis [1989] puts it, "the image of a state can be a major factor in determining whether and how easily the state can reach its goal". Therefore, a desired image can often bear a greater impact on international relations than a significant increment in military or economic power.

Country leaders are argued to shape the domestic and international public opinion by means of well thought-out communication with some emotional coloring, use of "compelling story lines which can explain events convincingly and from which inferences can be drawn" [Freedman 2006:22]. Importantly, "narratives are not necessarily analytical and, when not grounded in evidence or experience, may rely on appeals to emotion, or on metaphors and dubious historical analogies. A successful narrative will link certain selected events while excluding others, define and separate good news from bad tidings, and explain who is winning and who is losing" [Freedman 2006: 23].

Stories seem to play an extremely important role in communication, including the ways how organizations talk about themselves.

Identity-determining and image-making characterize the strategic narrative. Anne Marie Slaughter, defining a strategic narrative in terms of the competitive interests of the US nation, argues: "A narrative is a story. A national strategic narrative must be a story that all Americans can understand and identify with in their own lives" [Slaughter 2011:4]. This article follows the definition of strategic narrative suggested by Miskimmon *et al.* [2014] who sees it as a means for political actors to construct a shared meaning of the past, present, and future of international politics to shape the behavior of domestic and international actors. In other words, a strategic narrative is a tool for political actors to extend their influence, manage expectations, and change the discursive environment in which they operate. It is a narrative about both states and the system itself, both about who we are and what kind of order we want [Miskimmon et al. 2014]. Consequently, the strategic narrative analysis comprises three levels: the system level (how a political actor conceives his understanding of international order), the identity level (the story of a political actor, its values, character, and its goals), and the issue level (why a policy is needed and desirable, and how it will be achieved) [Miskimmon A., et al. 2018]. The theory of strategic narratives also suggests that the strategic narrative process is subdivided into *formation* (includes understanding how and under what conditions political actors construct narratives), *projection* (includes considerations of how and under what conditions narratives are disseminated), and *reception* (includes considerations of how and under what conditions narratives are received/understood) [Miskimmon *et al.* 2018]. Therefore, leaders have a considerable range in constructing strategic narratives to exercise "public justifications" [Kornprobst 2012)], though they are constrained by domestic and international political contexts and their communication environment.

Grounded in the strategic narratives theory, this analysis tries to answer the following questions: Who are the key actors of the Donbas crisis as perceived by the elites? How are these actors perceived? More specifically, how is the EU and its role in the crisis resolution perceived in Ukraine? Who are the other key actors in the Donbas crises in the eyes of Ukrainian elites?

The analysis of the Ukraine elite opinion (40 interviews) helps us assess the range and flow of narratives. Elites are people in the position to shape the political agenda and perceptions of the general public of Ukraine towards the role of the EU and other countries in the Donbas conflict resolution. Since the structure of the narrative prescribes the obligatory consideration of the actors in the "story line", this article focuses on the elite's perceptions of the key actors in the "Donbas drama" – Ukraine, the EU/EU members states and Russia – and treats them as indicators of the reception of the "European choice" as the narrative formulated and projected by the Ukrainian post-Maidan government as well as "Normative Power Europe" as the narrative formulated and

projected by the EU towards the members of its Eastern Neighborhood. The position of elites in the intersection of domestic and external strategic narratives is natural. Introduction to this issue quoted Nadelemann who argued that elites are "transnational moral entrepreneurs" who are required to "mobilize popular opinion and political support both within their country and abroad", "stimulate and assist in the creation of likeminded organizations in other countries", and "play a significant role in elevating their objectives beyond its identification with the national interests of their government" [Nadelmann 1990: 482, as cited in Chaban and Zhabotynska 2018].

4. Introducing the method

The conceptual framework of this article integrates theoretical perspectives from the field of political science and cognitive linguistics, providing us with tools to trace and interpret the narratives. The dataset of this article is comprised of the texts of 40 interviews with Ukrainian elites from business, political, cultural and civil society spheres. The analyzed elite opinions were obtained in the course of semi-structured interviews undertaken within the framework of the C3EU project [C3EU, 2015-2018] in winter 2016-2017, after the conflict in Donbas had started.

The interviews were semi-structured. This format warranted comparison between individual respondents and cohorts. At the same time, the format allowed interviews to resemble conversation. The empirical data gathered in interviews are presented below without names. The anonymity is prescribed by the Human Ethics rules. The responses, however, do indicate what cohort the interviewees belong to (Bus for business elites, Pol for political elites, Civ for civil society representatives and Cult for cultural elites). The respondents represent different parts of Ukraine: the capital, its central part, as well as eastern regions. The answers of the interviewed were recorded and then transcribed verbatim and later translated verbatim from Ukrainian or Russian (the interviewees chose the language they would like to the interview to be conducted).

Ukrainian elites' responses are analyzed to trace the perceptions of key actors in the Donbas crisis – perceptions that are believed to feed into the narratives of reception (within the strategic narrative theory). The preliminary analysis of the data pointed to the perception of four main actors by the elites: Ukraine, the European Union (EU), Russia, and the USA. Elites also singled out other players – mostly EU member states (Germany, France, Poland, Lithuania, etc.). Yet, those other actors were seen to play a less significant role in the mediating the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, particularly in Donbas. With Ukraine being in the epicenter of the conflict, three axes of dyadic relations were formulated for the further analysis: Ukraine–the EU/EU member states, Ukraine–the US, and Ukraine–Russia. The narratives that appeared in reflection to the first axis of relations were the most visible in the material (the interview focused on the EU perceptions in Ukraine, after all). The last axis of relations – Ukraine-Russia – has received the least of reflections.

The forty texts provide a sufficient database for content analysis and generalization. The content analysis was conducted on three levels. Firstly, topical words of each text were analyzed in terms of their denotational and connotational meanings (e.g. *assistance* denotes 'help' and has positive evaluation; *insufficient* denotes 'not enough' and has negative evaluation). Secondly, the sentences were analyzed in terms of their direct or indirect (metaphoric) meaning and the meaning of positive or negative evaluation (e.g. *"these countries have made Russia sit at the negotiating table"* has a metaphoric meaning of participation in the negotiations on the conflict resolution and positive evaluation). And thirdly, sentences of each text were analyzed in terms of their propositional content, which identified the opinion expressed about key actors and their actions / attitudes towards the Donbas crisis (e.g. *"the European Union is the main guarantor of the maintenance of this peace process"* where the EU is recognized as an actor of the peace process which guarantees peace process and its evaluation is positive). The obtained opinions were grouped, generalized and processed.

5.   Empirical Findings

The Donbas crisis: Ukraine–the EU axis. In the framework of the Russia-Ukrainian conflict, the EU's position on Ukraine is seen as somewhat ambiguous. The EU is perceived to aim to resolve the conflict, but, at the same time, it is not seen to show initiative or persistence: "It [EU support] is stable. Stable but insufficient. We understand what the unpredictable or rather predictable imperial policy of the Russian Federation is" (Bus6). The EU is not seen to demonstrate its political power and will either, although Ukraine anticipated more resolute actions on part of the EU: "I think this [EU] support and assistance is insufficient and in general it is so shallow... but in absence of other options … well, it is good we have at least this support" (Soc4). This somewhat indistinct policy of the EU is seen to contribute to elites' more negative assessments of EU diplomatic and mediation efforts to resolve the Donbass crisis.

The Minsk agreements and the role of the EU in their implementation are perceived in ambiguous terms too. On the one side, they are seen as a positive factor: "The European Union is the main guarantor of the maintenance of this peace process. And, unfortunately, I cannot formulate any alternatives to it, and I haven't met any options either" (Soc1). On the other hand, they are criticized. This important, as the EU is not a formal member of the Minsk Agreements (two EU member states – Germany and France – are the official mediators and arguably, the EU's proxies). There is also a shared consensus that Minsk agreements have influenced Russia's actions and somehow protected Ukraine from external Russian aggression:

> As for the Minsk process, these countries have made Russia sit at the negotiating table, but things are not moving any further. <…> To radically change the situation there, we need to understand the reasons, but the EU does not want or cannot do this (Soc8).

One of the most common opinions is that the EU is not going to resort to its full potential to end the Donbas conflict:

> It is a party of compromise. The EU cares neither about Ukrainian nor about Russian interests. They [the EU] seek to end the conflict. That is, it doesn't matter for them who's right and who's wrong. And that's the question. <…> On the one hand, it is probably good, but on the other hand, it is a very conformist position. Let me say, this is a position of a bureaucrat, not a politician (Bus9).

Interviewed elites believed that the EU seeks ways to stop military actions in the short-span time period only, but it does not address all the deeper issues that caused the crisis. Such a position, as well as the EU's limited desire to engage fully in the conflict does not appeal to the Ukrainian elites:

> … because this [EU position] I consider as negative and, unfortunately, wrong. They either don't understand or, as I've already said, they firstly care about their own interests. They do not want to see refugees on their own territory. That is why they would like to freeze this conflict (Bus10).

The EU's rather reluctant reactions to the conflict in Ukraine, and in Donbas in particular, are explained by the current mutual economic and political interests that exist between Europe and Russia. Yet, despite these interests, the EU has gone ahead with the sanction, "The EU has unanimously imposed sanctions against Russia and so far continues to adhere to them, although there is always a risk that Russian lobbyists in Europe will be able to weaken them" (Soc8). Consequently, Europe in this conflict is not seen to use all of its capabilities, because it primarily tries to secure its own interest in

relations with Russia. In the eyes of elites, such a position sufficiently narrows the field for EU's maneuvers and weakens the significance of its peacekeeping aspirations:

"There are some themes, certain topics that do not concern Ukraine but exist by themselves. Among them, there are mutual economic interests between the EU states and Russia. Of course, this is a factor that limits the capabilities of the EU" (Soc5).

Overall, the EU is perceived as a weakened political structure that has some significant internal problems which affect its foreign policy concerning efforts to resolve the Donbass crisis. Brexit and the strengthening of right-nationalist movements in the EU member states are among the most significant problems that are facing the EU, according to the respondents:

In my opinion, this [Brexit] is the most ... failure and what is of negative significance for us, because it weakens the EU, weakens EU's support of Ukraine <…> It is clear that this [the strengthening of right-nationalist movements] also weakens the unity of the European Union and weakens its support for Ukraine in the war with Russia (Soc4).

The interviewed decision-makers believed that these two main problems have the most negative impact on resolving the Donbas crisis, as they weaken the EU from the inside:
Europe is losing much internally, [it has] many challenges … So all this accounts for skepticism on the side of Ukraine and for skepticism as to the reliability of European institutions. That is, they are reliable, but how long they will last and how well they are able to withstand an external pressure remains a question (Pol2).

The Donbass conflict was seen to significantly affect Ukraine-EU relations. Elites shared an opinion that Ukrainians started to get disillusioned with the EU, because they think that the EU did not adequately pressure Russia to stop its hostile actions in Donbas, "I consider that Ukraine should solve this conflict on its own. But the international community should not stay aside" (Bus3). The weak EU's position towards Russia and the lack of rapid counteractions made Ukrainians feel a bit abandoned, which motivates them to believe that it is better to get focused more on their own country than to seek a refuge in the EU: "And now, well, now Ukraine needs to gain strength and rely mainly on its own forces. To restore the state and the army, then the European Union will understand us better" (Cul7).
At the same time, most of the interviewees believe that often Europeans do not understand Ukraine and the problems it confronts as a post-totalitarian / post-Soviet state:

In different ways [Europeans perceive Ukraine]. During Euromaidan, it was certain sympathy, but the attitude to Crimea is not unified, because many Europeans associate Crimea rather with Russia than with Ukraine. A severe conflict in the East – it depends: firstly, on the work of Russian propaganda, and secondly, on how much sensitive Europeans are to such things. Because they [Russians] pose it as an internal Ukrainian conflict. And, well, there are people who believe this (Bus7).

A somewhat distorted perception of Ukraine can be explained by the lack of truthful information obtained by Europeans as well as by effective work of Russian propaganda:

Today Ukraine really ...there was time when Ukraine topped [EU] news. Now we do not top the news, yet [we] are still present in the European information space. So, certainly, such events as the Euromaidan formed a very attractive and positive image of the country, but further events related to the war and this or that conflict, let us speak frankly, thanks to a very

active and effective Russian propaganda, this interest… it still remains, but Europeans became more pragmatic in their attitude to Ukraine, and they are not as fascinated as they were after the Euromaidan (Pol6).

The EU is recognized to effectively promote its legal norms and values, even in the framework of the Donbas crisis, spreading them to all the participants:

…lifting of sanctions is tied to full implementation of Minsk Agreements, it is enshrined in EU legal documents. This means that even if the majority of EU countries start crying out for lifting sanctions but there will be no legal grounds for it, the sanctions will remain. This is what makes the EU different from the USA, where sanctions can be lifted by the President's executive order. And this is what makes America, on the one hand, potentially much stronger (resolute), and on the other hand, much less predictable. And the EU, in this case, as it puts a strong emphasis on law and standards rather than on some personal decisions" (Pol8). "<…> but now there is the intensification, there is a dialogue between institutions, the exchange of experience, I mean they [Euromaidan and the Donbass crises] did affect [the EU], as it [EU integration] is our world-view choice and I am very confident and I will do everything possible for it not to be changed. Otherwise I just do not see myself in a country that is not developing in a European way (Pol7).

The interviewees ascribe a significant role in settling the Donbas crisis to the position of individual EU countries, primarily Germany and the United Kingdom. The role of France is understood as visible, but much weaker than that of Germany. Among other active participants, Poland and Lithuania are named:

I think that here everything is historically linked, that those who are most interested in stabilization and stopping of aggression in Ukraine – [they] are our partners on borders with Eastern Europe: it is Poland, the Baltic States, and partly Romania. The countries that understand what the Russian aggression is, that still remember the WWII. And I think they don't have any illusions about Russia's territorial ambitions. That is why they are the biggest defenders of Ukraine, and I would like to emphasize the role of Germany in this issue. It is because Angela Merkel did really much for Ukraine, and she plunged personally into these processes, [the ones] she could even have avoided, but she took a personal responsibility for them. It is important" (Soc9). "I mean Germany is very active, and Poland has its own agenda. France is partially active. Yes, the member states are more active than the EU as an institution (Soc10).

In summary, content analysis of the interview texts grouped alongside the *Ukraine–EU* axis demonstrates that Ukrainian elites recognize the EU's legal norms and values, its pro-Ukrainian position in the Donbas crisis and its diplomatic and mediation efforts to resolve this crisis. However, they see the EU's policy as aimed to freeze the conflict so as to not hurt itself. The inability of the EU to resort to its full potential to end the Donbas conflict is explained among elites by three factors: (1) mutual economic and political interests that exist between Europe and Russia, which results in the (2) the desire to secure its own interest in relations with Russia; and (3) the absence of adequate understanding of Ukraine as a post-Soviet state and the current problems it confronts. The EU is considered to be a somewhat weakened political structure with major internal problems that challenge it. The EU's internal challenges are seen to impact the resolution of the Donbas crisis. An insufficiently distinct or resolute pressure by the EU on Russia to stop the conflict underlines a certain disillusionment among Ukrainian elites – a sentiment that risks undermining the pro-European aspirations in Ukraine. A narrow scope of the EU's actions around the conflict trigger a particular perception – Ukrainians are to be more self-sufficient in solving

their own country's problem rather than seek help from the EU. Importantly, a significant role in settling the Donbas crisis is ascribed to the positions of individual EU countries, first of all Germany and the United Kingdom, and also Poland and Lithuania.

The Donbas crisis: Ukraine–US axis. Apart from the EU, an important role in resolving the Donbas conflict is seen to be played by the US. The US is perceived to be a more effective mediator than the EU, able to negotiate and communicate with Russia while delivering results, thus protecting Ukraine's interests: "I think that without the US participation the effectiveness is quiet low and that's exactly what we observe nowadays" (Bus6). Ukrainians recognize an important and significant role of the US in resolving the conflict, noting that, on the one hand, the US exercises pressure on other countries and, on the other hand, support Ukraine and Ukraine's development via providing financial aid and training:

> … the United States, because, I would say, it's our ally in the struggle against Russia…. America [the United States] invests a lot in Ukraine's public sector, it finances many different programs, and, I guess, it powerfully presses the Ukraine's state power, urging it to fulfil certain international obligations (Soc7).

In brief, the content analysis of the interview texts grouped along the *Ukraine-US* axis shows that Ukrainian elites very often (48 references) recognize the US as the country whose role in the Donbas crisis resolution is very important, significant and highly appreciated, and it is a much more effective mediator and helper to Ukraine than the EU.

The Donbas crisis: Ukraine–Russia axis. Russia is clearly identified as a party that has the most powerful negative impact on the Donbas conflict: "…Russia, because there's a direct conflict with it, and of course its actions greatly affect this conflict, sharpening or weakening it. It is the most important problem for Ukraine, that's why it's clear that [it is] Russia" (Soc7). Despite repeated attempts of the Russian Federation to deny their active participation in the conflict (in hostilities and sending its armed forces to fight against Ukraine in Donbass), all interviewees qualify Russia as the main participant in breaking away the two regions on the East:

> Russia is a carrier of soviet-imperial ideology, and it openly imposes [it] on Donbas and Luhansk residents and it promotes these values, in which there isn't any sense at all. So, I think that in this conflict a European mind is versus a Soviet mind (Bus9).

Some Ukrainians are still oriented towards Russia, due to close political, economic and peer-to-peer ties that existed between Ukrainians and Russians before 2014:
> Well, another thing that we have, you see, is a huge part of the society that has such a … certain schizophrenia, because they did not outstay from this Orthodox Eastern Slavic world, this imaginary community, or rather imagined community, yes. But at the same time, their rationale tells them that Russia, nonetheless, is hostile, Russia is dangerous, Russia is terrible, Russia is after all a dead end of development, yet, all the same, this belonging still remains. However, on the other hand, the same sociology shows that the society is somehow shifting and gradually drifting to the west, even if for various reasons there is no great fuss about the European Union (Soc4).

However, after annexation of Crimea and the beginning of the war in Donbass, and after heavy human and material losses suffered by Ukraine in the current war, the number of such people is constantly decreasing:

…people begin to understand, and first of all Ukrainians, I would say that they had a rethinking of their views as to who is a friend, who is an enemy, who is a brother, who is, so to say, not a brother [under 'brother' Russia is meant, as Russians have long been perceived as 'brothers', 'fraternal people']… [it happened] when they [Ukrainians] understood that, after all, the brother turned out to be not a brother at all, that this brother creates serious problems, that he can come and kill (Pol3).

To sum up, the content analysis of the interview texts along the *Ukraine–Russia* axis shows that Russia is recognized as the main participant in the war, a hostile party that exerts the most powerful negative impact on the Donbas conflict, though it pretends not to participate in it officially on part of the separatists. While there are Ukrainians that are still Russia-oriented, their numbers are constantly decreasing due to the annexation of Crimea and heavy human and economic/material losses suffered by Ukraine in the Donbas war.

6. Conclusions

The analysis of the perceptions grouped along the three axes of Ukraine's dyadic interactions in the Donbas crisis brings to the fore a set of narratives of how the Ukrainian elites understand the conflict:

−   It is due to the interference of the EU that the Donbas conflict has been suspended from a further deployment and from highly probable more negative consequences for both Ukrainians and Europeans.
−   The EU is not an ineffective intermediary in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. It cares for its own economic and political interests and does not use its full force and influence to resolve the conflict.
−   In search of an intermediary or an effective force to settle the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, in Donbas in particular, Ukrainian politicians are oriented not so much on the EU but rather on the US and individual EU countries.
−   Europeans do not have full information about the situation in Ukraine. Russian propaganda has a great influence on the formation of views of ordinary Europeans and opinion leaders on Ukrainian realities (the real state of affairs in Ukraine).
−   Europe is perceived as a weakened political structure because of its internal conflicts, including Brexit. The EU is often not as resolute as EU member states (primarily Germany) and the US. That is why the EU's influence on the international arena is not as significant as it was before, and it is also not as strong as the influence of individual EU countries or the US alone.
−   The overwhelming majority of Ukrainians perceive Russia as an aggressive force, the initiator and the party to the conflict, although there is still a small proportion of Russia-oriented Ukrainians. However, Ukrainians identify themselves as Europeans and seek an alliance with Europe.
−   Although the EU is not sufficiently involved in resolving the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, particularly in Donbas, without this involvement, the conflict would go far beyond the bounds of Donbas and Crimea. Such events as the Maidan, the annexation of Crimea and the Donbass crisis have contributed much to the identification of the main vector for Ukraine's further development and orientation on the European integration course. These events also decisively influenced the self-identification of Ukrainians as part of a wider European community.

To conclude, Ukrainian elites' perceptions of the role of the EU in resolving the Donbas crisis are critical for the EU if it aims to remain Ukraine's legitimate and credible partner. The perceptions of the EU's role in mediating the Donbas crises are shaped and modified by the cohesiveness and content of the strategic narratives employed by EU actors towards Ukraine, the EU's effective public diplomacy, and the way the EU hears and understands Ukraine. The EU-Ukraine relations will benefit from the EU's policies, diplomatic actions and narratives reflective of the dominant EU perceptions among various cohorts in Ukraine – elites and the general public. One avenue to max making EU's role in mediating the crises resolution more visible is to engage with

target audiences in a respectful and understanding way to maximize reception of EU messages in key policy areas, upgrade and diversify the range of public diplomacy actions, etc.

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IMAGES OF UKRAINE—EU RELATIONS
IN CONCEPTUAL METAPHORS OF UKRAINIAN MASS MEDIA
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Svitlana Zhabotynska. Images of Ukraine—EU relations in conceptual metaphors of Ukrainian mass media. This paper discusses the system of conceptual metaphors reconstructed via analysis of metaphorical expressions (ME) employed by eight popular Ukrainian newspapers (*Holos Ukrainy, Uriadovyi Kurier, Den', Dzerkalo Tyzhnya, Gazeta Po-Ukrains'ky, Segodnya, Ukraina Moloda,* and *Kommmentarii*) published in January – June, 2016. The ME describe perceptions of the EU, Ukraine, and their cooperation in the target conceptual spaces of POLITICS and ECONOMY. The data are processed according to an authentic methodology applicable to multiple metaphorical expressions [Zhabotynska 2013a; 2013b; 2016]. Grounded on the findings of Conceptual Metaphor Theory [Lakoff and Johnson 1980], this methodology represents an algorithm for exposure and further description of conceptual metaphors applied in a thematically homogeneous discourse, and manifested by multiple ME. Their analysis, aiming to portray some metaphorical system as a whole, provides an in-depth study of its target and source conceptual spaces and an empirically rigorous account of their cross-mapping influenced by the discourse type. In this study focused on mass media political discourse, the reconstructed system of conceptual metaphors demonstrates Ukraine's stance on its relations with the EU and contributes to understanding the role of political metaphor as a mind-shaping device.

Keywords: political images, the EU, Ukraine, Ukrainian newspapers, conceptual metaphor, multiple data, methodology.

Світлана Жаботинська. Образи відносин між Україною та ЄС в концептуальних метафорах українських засобів масової інформації. У статті розглядається система концептуальних метафор, реконструйованих на підставі аналізу метафоричних виразів (МВ), застосованих у 8 українських газетах (*Голос України, Урядовий кур'єр, День, Дзеркало тижня, Газета по–українськи, Сегодня, Україна молода* та *Комментарии*), публікації яких охоплюють січень – червень 2016 р. МВ описують сприйняття ЄС, України та їхнього співробітництва у референтних концептуальних царинах ПОЛІТИКА та ЕКОНОМІКА. Опрацювання даних відбувається із залученням автентичної методології, призначеної для аналізу великих масивів метафоричних виразів [Жаботинская 2013a; 2013b; 2016]. Заснована на доробку теорії концептуальної метафори [Lakoff and Johnson 1980], ця методологія надає алгоритм для виявлення і подальшого опису концептуальних метафор, представлених у тематично гомогенному дискурсі і маніфестованих множинними МВ. Їхній аналіз, спрямований на відтворення цілісної метафоричної системи, забезпечує поглиблене дослідження її референтної і корелятивної царин, а також емпірично обгрунтоване пояснення взаємодії цих царин, особливості якої залежать від типу дискурсу. У статті, зосередженій на політичному дискурсі ЗМІ, реконструйована система концептуальних метафор демонструє позиціювання України щодо її відносин із ЄС і сприяє з'ясуванню ролі політичної метафори як засобу формування свідомості.

Ключові слова: політичні образи, ЄС, Україна, українськи газети, концептуальна метафора, множинні дані, методологія.

Светлана Жаботинская. Образы отношений между Украиной и ЕС в концептуальных метафорах украинских средств массовой информации. В статье рассматривается система концептуальнх метфор, реконструированных на основе анализа метафорических выражений (МВ), использованных в 8 украинских газетах (*Голос України, Урядовий кур'єр, День, Дзеркало тижня,*

Газета по–українськи, Сегодня, Україна молода та *Комментарии*), публикации которых охватывают январь – июнь 2016 г. МВ описывают восприятие ЕС, Украины и их сотрудничества в референтных концептуальных сферах ПОЛИТИКА и ЭКОНОМИКА. Обработка данных осуществляется с привлечением аутентичной методологии, предназначенной для анализа больших массивов метафорических выражений [Жаботинская 2013a; 2013b; 2016]. Основанная на наработках теории концептуальной метафоры [Lakoff and Johnson 1980], эта методология предлагает алгоритм для выявления и дальнейшего описания концептуальных метафор, представленных в тематически гомогенном дискурсе и манифестированных множественными МВ. Их анализ, направленный на воспроизведение целостной метафорической системы, обеспечивает углубленное исследование её референтной и коррелятивной сфер, а также эмпирически обоснованное объяснение взаимодействия этих сфер, особенности которого предопределяются типом дискурса. В статье, сосредоточенной на политическом дискурсе СМИ, реконструированная система концептуальных метафор выявляет позиционирование Украины относительно ее взаимоотношений с ЕС и способствует уяснению роли политической метафоры как инструмента для формирования сознания.

Ключевые слова: политические образы, ЕС, Украина, украинские газеты, концептуальная метафора, множественные данные, методология.

Introduction:
Political images and metaphor as a tool of their creation

The image of UKRAINE—EU RELATIONS belongs to the realm of political images – those concerned with interaction of the actors in international and home politics, and with international and domestic public opinions [Sadri and Flammia 2014: 30]. As Fisher [1997: 4] notes, "international relations evolve around interplay of images" (see also [Movahedi 1985; Herrmann *et al*. 1997; Chaban and Bain 2014]). The latter emerge from subjective perception and reconstruction of the "objective international reality" [Movahedi 1985: 3]. One of the key factors involved in the process of such reconstruction, or construal [Langacker 2008; Zhabotynska 2013c], is language by which "any political action <…> is prepared, accomplished, influences and played" [Supriadi 2017:1]. Since the last decades of the previous century, the role of language used in politics has become a field of intensive research [Chomsky 1988/2004; Dijk 1988; Wodak 2009/ 2011; Wodak and Forchtner 2017 among others]. At present, this issue starts to be explored the intersection of image theory developed in International Relations field and cognitive linguistics that aims to expose mental structures underpinning language and speech.

Image theory proposes a way to arrange the study of perceptions in international relations. In this theory, typical images resemble stereotypes that allow people to act on the emotions evoked by their understanding of the relationship. Stereotypical images operate as mental models with schemata-like properties, filling in missing pieces of information and shaping the search for new information and the interpretation of what it means [Herrmann 2013]. A *conceptual schemata* is a cluster of schemas integrated in systemic ways [Herrmann et al. 1997: 404]. In cognitive science, *a schema* is understood as a non-specific mental structure that organizes information about our prior experience [Bartlett 1932; Neisser 1967]. In cognitive linguistics, this definition is extended as follows:

> Schemas in language are generalizations extracted from linguistic forms and meanings. A schema is a cognitive representation consisting of perceived similarities across many instances of usage. Schemas are essentially routinized, or cognitively entrenched, patterns of experience. They arise via repeated activation of a set of co-existing properties; once sufficiently entrenched, they can be used to produce and understand linguistic expressions. Linguistic expressions are *categorized* by schemas in production and comprehension; in other words, they are licensed to occur by those schemas. In this way, expressions are linked to the knowledge structures that produce them and make them interpretable [Kemmer 2003: 78].

In political discourse, the schemas that construct political images in social consciousness are mostly entrenched through mass media that, in their verbal and non-verbal messages, "tell the

audience 'how to think about' an issue" [Chaban and Bain 2014: 125 citing leading media research]. In this respect, media and power go hand in hand. The conceptions of power distinguish between "tangible power" associated with the use of violence or force, and "intangible power" as the ability to persuade. Media is "an example of intangible power, that is, media influence is often attributed to cultural impact (soft power), as opposed to military advancement (hard power)" [Sadri and Flammia 2014: 31].

Media's portrayal of "Self", or one's own country, and "Others", or other countries, is achieved through the language which is to a large extent metaphorical. According to Kövecses [2018: 125], "a large part of the conceptualization process in the media involves metaphor. Thus, dealing with conceptualization in the media necessarily involves metaphorical conceptualization". Mass media employs conventional metaphorical expressions that have been adapted by speakers of a particular language for describing abstract political concepts with the help of concepts with perceptual, body-related grounds. Such conventional metaphors, unlike unconventional "fresh" metaphors, belong to back-stage cognition. They do not attract the recipients' attention, but they, however, exert a covert influence on their minds and their behavior. Therefore, conventional metaphors may be considered among the evidence in favor of linguistic relativity theory that regards language as a mind-shaping device. The recent data are provided in [Feldman 2008]. As Yavorska and Bohomolov [2010: 51] put it, "political conceptual metaphors, which dovetail with the domain of political activities, are able to influence the process of decision-making, remaining beyond the conscious level of decision-makers" (the translation is mine – S. Z.). That is why metaphor might be an ideal natural laboratory where one could study linguistic effects on cognition [Katz 1998: 33].

Exploration of conventional metaphors as a cognitive phenomenon hidden behind linguistic metaphorical expressions was initiated by Lakoff and Johnson [1980], whose initial conception, known as Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT) has been further tested and elaborated in thousands of works. At present, CMT, along with a number of other key conceptions, is a constitutive part of cognitive linguistics. As Supriadi [2017: 7] aptly observes, "cognitive linguistics is an exploration of the fabric of meaning, woven thread by thread from bodily experience and embroidered by metaphor and metonymy". In the study of metaphor, CMT remains a dominant burgeoning field. "Its dominance is in large part due to the fact that CMT made contact with a variety of disciplines and approaches in the study of the human mind and human behavior" [Kövecses 2018: 124-125].

CMT is employed in the studies of diverse linguistic data, including metaphors of political language analyzed by Lakoff himself [1991; 2002; 2008 among others] and his numerous followers who apply the CMT framework to various kinds of political communication – speeches of politicians, interviews with political elites, official political documents, mass media texts, etc. The spectrum of various data viewed from a CMT standpoint is also exemplified by this Special Issue. Some of its contributions, this article included, aim to expose conceptual metaphors in the texts of Ukrainian newspapers which describe the European Union (EU), Ukraine, and their contemporary relations. Informed by CMT, this article proceeds from the assumption that "when we conceptualize an intangible or less tangible domain metaphorically as, and from the perspective of, a more tangible domain, we create a certain metaphorical reality", or a kind of "reality construction" [Kövecses 2018: 127]. In this respect, metaphors are similar to other linguistic phenomena. Just as with metaphor, ordinary language is not a mere reflection of a pre-existing reality but a construction of reality through a categorization entailing the selection of some features as critical and others as non-critical [Goaty 1997: 155]. Metaphor not only illuminates, it conceals. A good metaphor emphasized similarities and deemphasizes dissimilarities [Katz 1998: 33]. Therefore, conceptual metaphors not only shape media language (in its most general sense), but they also construct virtual realities [Kövecses 2018: 138]. Metaphorically created virtual realities may be established intertextually, because metaphors lend coherence to texts through space and time [ibid: 128], or across a variety of discourses considered both historically and simultaneously [ibid: 130]. The study of metaphors from a CMT perspective lends a cognitive dimension to the study of media communication [ibid: 138].

In this article, the discussion outline includes: characteristics of the data, theoretical framework for their analysis, the obtained findings, and the concluding discussion where these findings are considered in their diachronic and synchronic comparison with the similar studies of UKRAINE-EU RELATIONS image.

Data

The dataset is represented by 672 metaphorical expressions (ME) employed in the texts of eight popular Ukrainian newspapers – *Holos Ukrainy, Uriadovyi Kurier, Den', Dzerkalo Tyzhnya, Gazeta Po-Ukrains'ky, Segodnya*, *Ukraina Moloda,* and *Kommmentarii.* The newspapers, all of which are broadsheets with a sizable circulation, represent the positions of Ukrainian authorities (*Uriadovyi Kurier,* the paper of Ukrainian Parliament – Verkhovna Rada, *Holos Ukrainy,* the paper of the Cabinet of Ministers) and Ukrainian public with a pro-Ukrainian (*Den', Dzerkalo Tyzhnya, Gazeta Po-Ukrains'ky, Segodnya*, *Ukraina Moloda*) and a pro-Russian (*Kommmentarii*) stance. Two newspapers (*Segodnya* and *Kommmentari*) are published in Russian, the others use Ukrainian. The newspapers, published in January-June 2016, were processed on a daily basis by Ukrainian researchers (Y. Hobova, PhD, A. Kryvenko, PhD, Pshenichnykh, PhD, and V. Velivchenko, PhD) of the transnational research project "Crisis, Conflict and Critical Diplomacy: EU Perceptions in Ukraine, Israel and Palestine" (C^3EU) (2015-2018) [C^3EU, online]. The selected texts feature information about the EU, Ukraine and their relations. The metaphorical expressions used in these texts were selected by MA students of the School of Foreign Languages at Bogdan Khmelnitsky National University of Cherkasy, Ukraine, within their graduate course "New Trend in Word-Studies". The total number of newspaper texts processed by students is 1012 (Table 1). The texts vary in size (Table 2).

Table 1

Sources of metaphorical expressions (ME)

Newspaper	Number of articles	Number of ME
Голос України (*Holos Ukrainy* / *Voice of Ukraine*)	205	95
Урядовий кур'єр (*Uriadovyi Kurier* / *Government Courier*)	159	99
Сегодня (*Segodnia* / *Today*)	160	87
День[1] (*Den'* / *Day*)	140	59
Україна молода (*Ukrayina Moloda* / *Young Ukraine*)	123	73
Дзеркало тижня (*Dzerkalo Ty'zhnya* / *Week's Mirror*)	70	89
Газета по-українськи (*Gazeta Po-ukrayins'ky* / *Ukrainian-Fashion Newspaper*)	66	73
Комментарии (*Kommentarii* / *Commentaries*)	89	97
Total:	**1012**	**672**

1. The processed articles from *Den'* newspaper were published in January – March, 2016.

Table 2

Size of processed articles

Size of an article	Number of signs in an article	Number of articles
Small	1000	192
Medium	1000-3000	362
Big	3000-5000	239
Super-big	over 5000	219
Total:		**1012**

Theoretical framework

This study adopts the theoretical framework suggested in [Zhabotynskaya 2013a; 2013b; 2016] and somewhat modified for the needs of this research.

Traditionally, metaphor is understood as a naming devise or stylistic trope, where words and phrases are used figuratively on the grounds of analogy, or likeness. According to CMT [Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Lakoff 1993; Lakoff and Johnson 1999 among others], linguistic metaphors are reflections of conceptual metaphors understood as a cross-mapping of the target and source, where the source, which helps understand an abstract target, is more concrete, tangible and perceptually rooted in bodily experience. It is important that, unlike the other theories of metaphor focused on cross-mapping of individual concepts, CMT highlights cross-mapping of *conceptual domains* as coherent mental spaces constituted by a number of related concepts. Hence, conceptual metaphors are typically represented not by a single metaphorical expression, but by their sets.

In a conceptual metaphor *the target* is a concept / domain which is to be defined via comparison with another concept / domain; and *the source* is a concept / domain with which the target is compared, and which is employed in its manifestation. The cross-mapping of the source and target [Lakoff 1993: 245] means that certain characteristics of the source are mapped on the certain characteristics of the target. Such mapping includes *entailments, or inferences* [Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 47]: those constituents of the source domain which are not linguistically explicit may be inferred from the meaning of linguistic forms. For example, in the conceptual metaphor AN ARGUMENT IS A JOURNEY (*We'll proceed in a step-by-step fashion. We have covered a lot of ground*), PARTICIPANTS in the argument correspond to TRAVELLERS, the ARGUMENT itself corresponds to A JOURNEY and the PROCESS of the argument corresponds to the route taken [Evans and Green 2006: 299]. In the source domain, the source constituent TRAVELLERS, not named in the linguistic expressions, is inferred.

Selective choice of the target's properties represented via metaphor relates to the phenomenon of *highlighting / hiding*: when the target is structured in terms of a particular source, this highlights certain aspects of the target while simultaneously hiding, or leaving deactivated, its other aspects [Evans and Green 2006: 303-304]. Hence, conceptualizing of different properties of the target may require more than one source. Several sources mapped on the same target form *the range of metaphor* [Kövecses 2002: 64]. In its turn, one and the same source may interact with several targets, which form *the scope of metaphor* [Kövecses 2000: 80]. Interaction of the source and target domains may result in emergence of multiple ME numbering dozens and over. Analysis of multiple metaphorical data requires a methodology which extends CMT with new issues.

The proposed methodology for processing multiple metaphorical data obtained from a thematically homogeneous discourse represents a complex algorithm which enables a detailed analysis of the target and source conceptual spaces, as well as their cross-mapping.

1. The analysis of the ***target conceptual space*** includes exposure of its domains (thematically coherent related parts) and their structuring with the help of a network or matrix model. A matrix is defined as a network where the links of its nodes are left implicit.
2. The analysis of the ***source conceptual space*** includes thematic grouping of its concepts into thematically coherent domains.
3. The analysis of ***cross-mapping*** between the target and source conceptual spaces has such consecutive stages:

    3.1. Exposure of the general schemas of conceptual metaphors. This should take into account the factor of congruent and incongruent mapping between the source and target domains (see [Zhabotynskaya 2013a; 2013b] for details). Congruent mapping is compatible with "event structure metaphor" [Lakoff 1993: 220]. In such metaphor, one concept / domain is metaphorically structured in terms of another concept / domain [Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 14]. "Event structure metaphor" includes several constitutive metaphors and their inferences that represent one and the same event. For instance, the general metaphor LIFE IS A JOURNEY is constituted by several specific metaphors: < States are locations> (*He's at a crossroad in his life*), <Change is motion> (*He went from his forties to his fifties without a hint of a mid-life crisis*), <Causes are forces> (*He got a head start in his life*), < Purposes are destinations> (*I can't even seem to get where I want to be in life*), etc. [Evans and Green 2006: 299]. Metaphorical interaction in which the source domain represents only one event whose structure is mapped onto the target domain may be termed "congruent mapping". It yields only one general metaphorical schema.

    Meanwhile, ME, being multiple, happen to demonstrate incongruent mapping, in which projection of one and the same source domain onto the target domain exposes presence of several events (with their own structure), which necessitates coining several metaphorical schemas within a projection. Incongruent mapping occurs when:

    а) one and the same concept in the target domain relates to different concepts in the source domain, and such relations are incompatible within event. For instance, in the Russian language the metaphorical link HUMAN LIFE (target domain) is a JOURNEY (source domain) is manifested with the metaphorical expressions *его постоянно сопровождают невзгоды / 'he is constantly accompanied by mischief'* (where mischief is "a co-traveler"), and *он вынужден преодолевать невзгоды / 'he has to overcome mischief'* (where mischief is "an obstacle on the path"). Since mischief as "a co-traveler" and mischief as "an obstacle on the path" are incompatible within one and the same event, the metaphorical link HUMAN LIFE is a JOURNEY should be represented by two conceptual metaphors rendered by the general schemas HUMAN LIFE is A JOURNEY (where mischief may be "a co-traveler"), and HUMAN LIFE is OVERCOMING OBSTACLES (where mischief is "an obstacle on the path");

    б) one and the same concept in the source domain relates to different concepts in the target domain, and such relations are incompatible within one and the same event. For example, in the metaphor HUMAN LIFE is a JOURNEY the target domain HUMAN LIFE includes the concepts PROFESSION and PERSONAL RELATIONS, both of which can be thought of as a JOURNEY (Russian metaphorical expressions *они далеко ушли в своей профессии / 'they are far away in their profession'*, and *они далеко зашли в своих отношениях / ' they went far in their relationship'*). In this case, we need two general metaphorical schemas: PROFESSIONAL ACHIEVEMENTS is A JOURNEY, and PERSONAL REALTIONS is A JOURNEY.

    Incongruent mapping requires specification, or a split of the general metaphorical schema into several sub-schemas within cross-mapping of the same target and source domains.

    3.2. Compiling <u>the list of conceptual metaphors </u>(in terms of general schemas and sub-schemas) for each target domain; exposing <u>salience of these metaphors</u> (according to the number of ME, or their naming density).

    3.3. Elaboration of the general metaphorical schemas in the form of <u>schematic descriptions</u> corresponding to an "event structure" in congruent mapping.

4. The analysis of the ***target metaphorical space in its relation to the source space*** comprises: (a) exposure of the *metaphorical range* possessed by each target domain / concept (according to the number of its source domains / concepts); (b) establishment of *metaphorical salience* exhibited by each target domain / concept (according to the number of ME and the amplitude of metaphorical range).

5. The analysis of the ***source metaphorical space in its relation to the target space*** embraces: (a) exposure of the *metaphorical scope* possessed by each source domain / concept (according to the number of its target domains / concepts); (b) establishment of *metaphorical capacity* demonstrated by each source domain / concept (with regard to the number of ME and the amplitude of metaphorical scope). Metaphorical capacity of a domain / concept is culture- and discourse-dependent; the domains / concepts with a high metaphorical capacity may differ in different cultures, and in different thematically homogeneous discourses.

The above complex procedure, previously tested on the data obtained from different kinds of thematically related texts [Brovchenko 2011; Radchenko 2012; Zhabotynskaya 2016], shapes the framework of this research focused on the image of UKRAINE—EU RELATIONS which represents metaphorically created virtual reality inferred intertextually and thus providing thematic homogeneity of the studied newspaper texts. The further research has three stages.

At the f i r s t s t a g e, the concept of UKRAINE—EU RELATIONS is considered as the target conceptual space of metaphorical expressions. This space is structured, and its constituent parts are analyzed with regard to their metaphorical salience.

The s e c o n d s t a g e of the analysis provides the list of conceptual metaphors defined in terms of general metaphorical schemas. This list is reduced to the most salient conceptual metaphors manifested by the majority of ME from the dataset. The salient metaphorical schemas are viewed as the ones with different degrees of salience. Then, the metaphorical schemas are elaborated into schematic metaphorical descriptions which generalize the meanings of particular ME and tend to evolve on two levels. For example (the number in the slanted brackets shows the quantity of ME):

<div align="center">

EU and UKRAINE are PARTNERS
<u>POLITICS (EU—UKRAINE: 4 ME)</u>

</div>

• **A PARTNER** (EU) /3/ **– who is attractive /3/:** who is important for the other partner (UKRAINE) /2/: *Українці вже показали на Майдані, наскільки <u>бажають тіснішої співпраці та інтеграції з Європою</u>* (Газета по-українськи 42-1); *<u>Євросоюз — надзвичайно важливий стратегічний партнер України</u>* (Україна молода 22/01/16); on whom the other partner (UKRAINE) should not turn her back /1/: *Або ми залишаємося провідною країною в Європі, або ми взагалі зменшуємо свій вплив у світі, <u>повернувшись спиною до ЄС</u>* (Дзеркало тижня 13/02/16); **who is cooperated with /1/:** with whom the other partner (UKRAINE) has a dialogue /1/: *<u>Започаткування діалогу з ЄС</u> передбачає підвищення ефективності й відповідальності органів влади на всіх рівнях — як під час самих переговорів, так і в реалізації конкретних рішень* (Дзеркало тижня 20/02/16).

In the conceptual metaphors that portray relations, the metaphorical schemas and their elaborations are developed with regard to the relational foregrounded focus. In the above example, ME foreground the EU as a participant of Ukraine—EU relations.

The t h i r d s t a g e of the analysis is concerned with the metaphorical capacity of the source concepts employed in the most salient conceptual metaphors. These source concepts prescribe particular roles to the actors involved in Ukraine—EU relations (the EU, Ukraine, and

Russia). The prescribed roles possess different degrees of metaphorical salience that depends on the number of respective ME.

All three stages of the research include quantitative analysis which entails the conclusions as to the metaphorical salience, or prominence, of particular constituents in the target conceptual space, the actors represented here, the conceptual metaphors that result from cross-mapping of the source and target spaces, and the roles projects by the sources upon the targets. The conclusions as to the salience of a particular phenomenon testify to its "visibility" in the newspaper texts, which, in its turn, dovetails with priming. *Priming*, or the state of being "pre-programmed" for a particular conceptual response, is based on the simulation of some experience in the situational, discourse, bodily, and conceptual-cognitive context [Kövecses 2018: 134]. It means that frequent repetitions contribute to creating entrenched images, or stereotypes, which is important for politics. It is plausible to presume that priming demonstrated by conceptual metaphors employed in media texts is "double-scope". On the one hand, the frequently used metaphoric associations may be primed by the writers' environment or stance. An observation that bears on this issue is that of Supriadi [2017: 7] who notes that "metaphor is motivated by relevant information that is salient in human experience; it highlights some facts about the target domain, but hides others. The behavior of metaphor is likewise well-motivated but not entirely predictable". On the other hand, the frequently used metaphorical associations, are registered, repeated and thus made salient in the texts read by the public. Therefore, due to their salience, they become entrenched in the public consciousness. As a result, one member of the metaphorical doublet "target – source" triggers the other member. Or, as Sadri and Flammia [2014: 30] put it, "when the two cue words are constantly meshed together in a single message, many people <…>, begin to form an association" [Sadri and Flammia 2014: 30]. This study is to expose such associations pertinent to Ukraine—EU relations.

Findings

1. UKRAINE—EU RELATIONS as the target conceptual space of metaphorical expressions
UKRAINE—EU RELATIONS is a narrative-based conceptual space reconstructed from ME used in a bulk of texts. The way of structuring such conceptual spaces is proposed in [Zhabotynskaya 2017]. The analysis of data shows that the ME describe Ukraine—EU relations in two conceptual domains – those of POLITICS and ECONOMY. These domains are populated by four actors: Ukraine, the EU, Russia, and the world. The actor*s per se* and the links between them become sub-domains, or the domains' constitutive parts. The sub-domains exposed in the ME are the EU, UKRAINE, EU—UKRAINE, EU—RUSSIA, EU—UKRAINE—RUSSIA, and EU—WORLD (Table 3).

Table 3

Metaphorical targets and their salience

Target domains, metaphorical expressions (ME), conceptual metaphors (CM)	Target sub-domains	Number of ME	Number of CM
POLITICS (536 ME / 37 CM)	EU	154	8
	UKRAINE	32	7
	EU—UKRAINE	227	12
	EU—RUSSIA	10	1
	EU—UKRAINE—RUSSIA	104	4
	EU—WORLD	9	5
ECONOMY (136 ME / 23 CM)	EU	21	6
	UKRAINE	15	5
	EU—UKRAINE	100	12
Total:		**672**	**60**

According to Table 3, the domain of POLITICS has a higher metaphorical salience than the domain of ECONOMY. The number of ME naming the first domain is four times as large compared with the number of ME naming the second domain; and the number of conceptual metaphors (CM) tracked in the first domain exceed those in the second domain. Among the target

sub-domains, the salient ones are EU—UKRAINE (327 ME, and 24 CM), EU (175 ME, and 14 CM), and UKRAINE (47 ME, and 12 CM).

The data obviously emphasizes metaphorical salience, and thus primary political importance of the topic EU—UKRAINE.

2. Conceptual metaphors representing UKRAINE—EU RELATIONS

Among 60 conceptual metaphors employed for portraying UKRAINE—EU RELATIONS, 13 have sufficiently higher naming density, approximating 10 and more ME (Table 4).

Table 4

Salient conceptual metaphors

Conceptual metaphors	Domains	Number of ME	Total
1. EU is A PERSON	Politics Economy	65 14	**79**
2. UKRAINE IS A PERSON	Politics Economy	20 7	**27**
3. EU is AN AUTHORITY; UKRAINE is A SUBORDINATE	Politics	55 (EU) +24 (U)	**79**
4. EU is AN ASSISTANT; UKRAINE is AN ASSISTED PERSON	Politics Economy	55 (EU)+3 (U) 22 (EU)+2 (U)	**82**
5. EU and UKRAINE are PARTNERS	Politics Economy	4 (EU) 12 (EU)+ 1 (U)	**17**
6. EU and RUSSIA are PARTNERS	Politics	10 (EU)	**10**

7. RUSSIA is AN AGGRESSOR;
   UKRAINE is A VICTIM;
   EU is THE VICTIM'S ALLY and
   THE AGGRESSOR'S ADVERSARY
	Politics	8 (R) + 14 (U) +
		8 (EU) + 67 (EU)
			97

8. EU is a FAMILY	Politics Economy	40 3	**43**
9. EU is A BUILDING	Politics Economy	43 7	**50**
10. UKRAINE is A BUILDING	Politics Economy	9 4	**13**
11. EU is A TERRITORY	Politics Economy	12 35	**47**
12. UKRAINE is A TERRITORY	Economy	8	**8**
13. UKRAINE'S EUROPEAN INTEGRATION is A PATH	Politics Economy	58 7	**65**
Total:	Politics Economy	**495** **122**	**617**

The salient conceptual metaphors subsume 617 ME, or 91,8% of their total number (672). Therefore, the further research will focus on these metaphors.

Table 4 demonstrates that salient CM have different degrees of prominence. The most prominent are the CM of personification, where the actors of international relations (the EU, Ukraine and Russia) are conceptualized either as persons with particular characteristics or persons performing particular roles. *The first-degree prominence* is exhibited by four CM with the number of ME varying in between **79 and 97**. These CM are: (1) RUSSIA is AN AGGRESSOR; UKRAINE is A VICTIM; EU is THE VICTIM'S ALLY and THE AGGRESSOR'S ADVERSARY /97 ME/, (2) EU is AN ASSISTANT; UKRAINE is AN ASSISTED PERSON /82 ME/, and (3) EU is AN AUTHORITY; UKRAINE is A SUBORDINATE /79 ME/, and (4) EU is A PERSON /79 ME/. *The second-degree prominence* is demonstrated by the other four CM with the number of ME varying in between **41 and 65**. They are: (1) UKRAINE'S EUROPEAN INTEGRATION is A PATH /65 ME/, (2) EU is A BUILDING /50 ME/, EU is A TERRITORY /47 ME/, and (4) EU is A FAMILY /43 ME/. The five remaining conceptual metaphors, with the number of ME varying in between **8 and 27** may be defined as those having *the third degree of prominence*.

In Table 4, the conceptual metaphors are formulated in terms of metaphorical schemas. Their schematic descriptions summarizing the meaning ME, are given below. In these descriptions, the pronouns "he" and "she" in the metaphors of personification agrees with the gender of respective proper names in Ukrainian and Russian, where the EU is masculine ("he"), while Ukraine and Russia are feminine ("she").

1. EU is A PERSON /79ME/
POLITICS (EU: 56 ME)

a well-to-do person /2/: a well-to-do person who is attractive for others (REFUGEES, MIGRANTS) /2/; **an experienced person /1/:** who has learned the lessons of the past /1/; **a powerful person /22/:** who has authority /4/, who is a judge /1/, who makes decisions /3/, controls others (MEMBER STATES) /1/, gives and denies something /2/, who has an instrument (AN INFLUX OF MIGRANTS) to handle others (MEMBER-STATES) /1/, who sets the agenda /4/, and is persistent in doing something (INTERMINGLING THE NATIONS) /1/, who creates something (PROJECTS, INSTITUTIONS) /1/, encourages others to take action /1/, insists on something /1/, assumes responsibility /1/, and has to keep to his promises and commitments /1/; **a person who is not almighty /2/:** who is unable to solve the others' problems (THE WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST) [1], who cannot guarantee security of his partners (OTHER COUNTRIES) /1/; **an assistant /4/:** who helps other people (MEMBER-STATES AND OTHER COUNTRIES) /4/; **a person with faults /9/:** who may be over-egocentric and self-centred /2/, who has moral defects /1/, who may not stick to his word /1/, be forgetful about some events (THE USA'S ESPIONAGE) /1/, be blind, and not to see violations happening nearby /1/, be permanently "concerned" /1/, who is accused of hypocrisy /1/, and who responds to criticism in his address /1/; **an inconsistent person /2/:** whose confusing actions (FOREIGN POLICY) undermine his own building (NATO) /2/; **a person who has problems /4/:** who survives a crisis /2/, whose heart (BRUSSELS) is targeted at by the enemy (TERRORISM) /1/, and who has to take security measures /1/; **a person who displays emotions /4/:** who is unhappy with somebody (MEMBER STATES) /2/, who condemns something (CONFLICTS) /1/, who is shocked by something (SYRIAN REFUGEES), and who feels deep sorrow for something (DEATH OF THE SYRIAN CITY ALEPPO) /1/; **a person who is differently treated /6/:** whose friendship some people (OTHER COUNTRIES) seek /2/, some people (TURKEY) reject and look for new friends /3/, and some people (SOMALI, SUDAN) ignore /1/.

POLITICS (EU—UKRAINE: 9 ME):

a callous person /8/: who is unwilling to see the problems (POVERTY, PRISONERS OF WAR, AND BRUTALITIES IN DONBAS) of the other person (UKRAINE) /5/, whose sympathy should be aroused by the mischief of the other person (UKRAINE) /3/; **a detached person /1/:** who is not eager to embrace the other person (UKRAINE) /1/.

ECONOMY (EU: 14 ME)

an assistant /4/: who helps others (MEMBER-STATES) /4/; **a partner /3/**: who cooperates with anybody (ANY COUNTRY) if it is brings profit /2/, and who respects his own interests /1/; **a person who has financial problems /6/:** who survives a crisis /1/, who suffers losses /3/, and who has to be frugal /2/; **a person who is getting out of trouble /1/:** who increases production /1/.

2. UKRAINE is A PERSON /27 ME/
POLITICS (UKRAINE: 20 ME)

a person who created history /4/: who stood at the springhead of the river (EUROPEAN CIVILIZATION) /2/, and created the living space for others (EARLY EUROPEANS) /2/; **a person who reaps the bitter fruit sown in the past /1/:** bitter fruit (EXPERIEENCE OF THE PREVIOUS 20 YEARS) [1]; **a person who has a heavy legacy /2/:** heavy legacy (POST-TOTLITARIAN SOCIETY, CORRUPTION) [1], the history of which should be finished /1/; **a person who is now independent and self-sustained /5/:** who is independent and may choose friends (OTHER COUNTRIES) /1/, who solves her own problems /1/, and defends her independence from the other person (RUSSIA) /3/; **a conscientious person /2/:** who fulfills the assumed obligations /2/; **who is problematic /2/:** who lives in several parallel worlds (PIECE, WAR, AND POLITICIANS' CAPITALIZING ON THE NATION) /1/, who creates artificial barriers, who is looking for a particular way and, as a result, slips into the abyss /1/; **a person whose importance is underestimated /4/:** who has not become attractive for the other person (EU) /1/; who considers herself to be important for the fate of the other person (EU) /1/ whom she protects/1/, which the other person (EU) doubts /1/.

ECONOMY (UKRAINE: 7 ME)

a sick person /5/: who is suffocating in a loop (TAXES) /1/; who is clogged in the tongs (ADMINISTRATIVE CORRUPTION), who is exhausted /2/, and who exhibits signs of life, with her half-ruined blood system (BANKS) and starvation (ABSENCE OF BANK CREDITS) /1/; **a person who is to be cured /2/:** who is to be cured /1/ with medications (INVESTMENTS) /1/.

3. EU is AN ASSISTANT;
UKRAINE is AN ASSISTED PERSON /82 ME/
POLITICS (EU—UKRAINE: 58 ME)

- **AN ASSISTED PERSON** (UKRAINE) /3/ – **who is in a tight corner /3/:** who needs assistance of others (EU, THE WEST) /1/, and who is waiting for help from an assistant (EU, MEMBER-STATES) /2/.
- **AN ASSISTANT** (EU, MEMBER STATES) /55/ – **who is concerned with the assisted person /3/:** who is interested in her (UKRAINE) /1/, who will benefit from her /1/, who has plans as to her /1/; **who helps the assisted person /49/:** who supports the assisted person (UKRAINE) /2/, encourages her to carry out reforms /1/, gives her a real helping hand /43/, tends to her more than she tends to herself /1/, who is a donor giving his blood (HELP) to the assisted person with the hope of mutual benefit /1/, and whose example should be followed by others (OTHER COUNTRIES) /1/; **who praises the assisted person /1/:** who applauds the assisted person (UKRAINE) for carrying out reforms /1/; **who is tired of the assisted person /2/:** who, being tired of the assisted person /1/, lingers with his support /1/.

ECONOMY (EU—UKRAINE: 24 ME)

- **AN ASSISTED PERSON** (UKRAINE) /2/ – **who asks for help /2/:** who keeps asking the assistant for money /2/.
- **AN ASSISTANT** (EU, MEMBER-STATES) /22/ – **who helps the assisted person /21/:** who gives her a real helping hand /21/, who is a donor giving his blood (FINANCIAL SUPPORT) to the assisted person /1/.

4. EU is AN AUTHORITY;
UKRAINE is A SUBORDINATE /79 ME/
<u>POLITICS (EU—UKRAINE: 79 ME)</u>

- **AN AUTHORITY** (EU) /55/ **– who cooperates with the subordinate /8/:** who assumes obligations as to the subordinate (UKRAINE) **/**1/, who shapes her worldview /1/, who is ready to wait for a positive response from the subordinate /1/; who closely watches the subordinate /2/, assesses her work /1/, approves of it /1/, and believes in the subordinate's success /1/; **who directs the subordinate's actions /7/:** who consults the subordinate (UKRAINIAN AUTHORITIES) /2/, supervises the subordinate (UKRAINIAN AUTHORITIES), controls her doings (UKRAINE'S POLITICS) /3/, induces and compels the subordinate to acts (INTRODUCE REFORMS) /2/; **who is demanding [15]:** who requires something (REFORMS, DEMOCRATIC RULE) of a subordinate /4/; who insists on the subordinate's fulfillment of her obligations to introduce reforms /11/; **who is tough with the subordinate /3/:** who puts pressure on the subordinate (UKRAINIAN AUTHORITIES) using an instrument (VISA-FREE TRAVEL FOR UKRAINE) /2/, and who is twisting the subordinate's arms /1/; **who exceeds his authority /1/:** who interferes in the subordinate's own life /1/; **who does not satisfy the subordinate's wishes /7/:** who refuses something (VISA-FREE TRAVEL), makes vague promises /6/, and ignores the subordinate's desires /1/; **who is dissatisfied with the subordinate /8/:** who is frustrated and annoyed by the subordinate (UKRAINIAN AUTHORITIES) because of her inertness (ABSENCE OR INAFFICIENCY OF REFORMS) /6/, and who criticizes the subordinate (UKRAINIAN AUTHORITIES) /2/; **who disrespects the subordinate /6/:** who treats the subordinate (UKRAINIAN AUTHORITIES) negatively /3/, disposes of the subordinate (UKRAINE) and mistreats her /1/.

- **A SUBORDINATE** (UKRAINE) /24/ **– who is attractive for the authority /1/:** who has always been attractive for the authority (EU) /1/; **who obeys the authority /10/:** who wants to please him /1/, who fulfills his tasks and requirements /8/, who pleads the authority to be softer /1/; **who wants to be like the authority /6/:** who tries to share his values /3/, but gets dissatisfied with them /1/, who senselessly tries to copy the authority /1/, and who is hard on those who disagree /1/; **who aspires for the authority's approval /4/:** who, having met the authority's requirements, is waiting for his concessions /4/; **who gets the authority's ambiguous assessment /2/:** who makes him both pleased and displeased /2/]; **who should not appease the authority in everything /1/:** who should not be afraid to violate the authority's comfort zone /1/.

5. EU and UKRAINE are PARTNERS /17 ME/
<u>POLITICS (EU—UKRAINE: 4 ME)</u>

- **A PARTNER** (EU) /3/ **– who is attractive /3/:** who is important for the other partner (UKRAINE) /2/, on whom the other partner (UKRAINE) should not turn her back /1/; **who is cooperated with /1/:** with whom the other partner (UKRAINE) has a dialogue /1/.
<u>ECONOMY (EU—UKRAINE: 13 ME)</u>

- **A PARTNER** (EU) /12/ **– who is attractive /3/:** who is important for the other partner (UKRAINE) /3/; **who is cooperated with /2/:** with whom the other partner (UKRAINE) cooperates /2/; **who is problematic /7/:** who is disadvantageous for the other partner (UKRAINE) /7/;

- **A PARTNER** (UKRAINE) /2/ **– who is advantageous /1]:** who has a potential for cooperation with another partner (EU) /1/.

6. EU and RUSSIA are PARTNERS (10 ME)
<u>POLITICS (EU—RUSSIA: 10 ME)</u>

- **A PARTNER** (EU, MEMBER-STATES) /10/ **– who tolerates the other partner /8/:** who tries to maintain normal relations with the other partner (RUSSIA) /1/, who tries to understand the other partner /1/, who continues cooperation with her /6/; **who does not see a threat posed by the other partner /2/:** who is not afraid of the other partner /1/, who recklessly neglects the threats posed by the other partner /1/.

7. RUSSIA is AN AGGRESSOR; UKRAINE is A VICTIM;
EU is THE VICTIM'S ALLY and THE AGGRESSOR'S ADVERSARY /97 ME/
POLITICS (EU—UKRAINE—RUSSIA: 97 ME)

• **AN AGGRESSOR** (RUSSIA) /8/ – **who wages a war /5/:** who is at war with others (THE CIVILIZED WORLD) /2/, who fights for the prey (PEOPLE'S MINDS) /2/, who treats others (ITS OWN CITIZENS AND EUROPEANS) with poison (LIES) /1/; **who must be opposed /2/:** whose activities (SPREADING LIES) must be shut out /2/; **who has a weakness /1/:** who has a weakness (ECONOMY) /1/.

• **A VICTIM** (UKRAINE) /14/ – **the aggressor's victim /5/:** a person (UKRAINE) who together with others (MOLDOVA and GEORGIA) are victims of the aggressor (RUSSIA) /1/, who resists the aggressor /2/, who declares the aggressor's actions illegal /2/; **who withstands the aggressor's pressure /3/:** on whom the aggressor exerts pressure (MSLITARY OPERATIONS AND DIPLOMACY) /1/ held back with the life-saving equipment (MINSK AGREEMENTS) /1/ that is fragile /1/; **who suffers from the aggressor /3/:** who has been struck by the aggressor /1/, who has been inflicted heavy losses /1/, and who is in a post-shock state after the aggressor's attacks /1/; **who tries to overcome the aggressor /3/:** who repairs damages (AFTERMATHS OF THE HYBRID WAR) /1/, who looks for the ways to reach out to the seized territories (SEPARATIST REGIONS) /1/, and who asks for help from the assistant (OSCE) /1/.

• **THE VICTIM'S ALLY** (EU) /8/ – **who is influential /1/:** who influences the course of events /1/**; who assists the victim** /7/ who helps the victim (UKRAINE) /2/, proposes her to conduct a dialogue with the aggressor (RUSSIA) /2/, and tries to save her and his own face at the negotiations with the aggressor /1/.

• **THE AGGRESSOR'S ADVERSARY** (EU) /67/ – **who condemns the aggressor /7/:** who condemns the aggressor's (RUSSIA'S) actions /4/, and demands their cessation /3/; **who fights with the aggressor /45/:** who exerts pressure on the aggressor /2/, uses weapons (SANCTIONS) /31/ that are self-destructive for the aggressor's adversary /7/ and therefore can be readily withdrawn /1/, which, however, may strengthen the aggressor and weaken her adversary /4/; **who has a weakness /1/:** who has a weakness (POLITICS) /1/; **who underestimates the aggressor's threats /9/:** who is not fully aware of the aggressor's danger /2/, who has to understand that the aggressor aspires to move the war (POLITICAL CONFRONTATION) to the adversary's territory /4/, to use a dangerous weapon (INTERFERENCE INTO DOMESTIC AFFAIRS OF THE EU MEMBER- STATES) against the adversary /2/, to contaminate the adversary's environment with viruses (SELF-DISCREDITING) as a bacteriological weapon /1/; **who must respond to the aggressor's threats /5/:** who demonstrates a weak response to the use of the aggressor's weapon (INTERFERENCE INTO DOMESTIC AFFAIRS OF THE EU MEMBER- STATES) /2/, who has finally started to defend himself against the aggressor /3/.

•

8. EU is A FAMILY /43 ME/
POLITICS (EU: 35 ME)

a family which is united /2/: which acts as a whole /1/, which must be integrated and strong /1/; **a family which has values /5/:** the family values of which (DEMOCRACY) /3/ are endangered by the actions of the old family members /1/, and not eagerly shared by all new family members (MIGRANTS, REGUGEES) /1/; **a family which is in crisis /6/**: which permanently survives crises and difficult times **/**1/, which has its own problems /3/, which cannot cope with some of these problems (TERRORISM, RADICAL MOODS) /2/; **a family the parents of which choose the wrong line of behavior /2/:** the parents (EU AUTHORITIES) of which give birth to unwanted children (THE RIGHT-WING POPULIST MOVEMENTS) /1/ who have food (MIGRATION CRISIS) to feed on /1/; **a family the members of which lack unity /6/:** the members of which (MEMBER-STATES) have stressed relations /1/, cannot achieve an agreement /2/, show discontent with something (SANCTIONS AGAINST RUSSIA, MIGRATION POLICY) /2/ and happen to be unable to take care of themselves, which makes the family suffer /1/; **a family one member of**

which intends to leave it /12/: a family member (BRITAIN) who is weary of being a donor for the others (OTHER MEMBER-STATES) /1/, who no longer wants to slave for the family /1/, who is eager to leave it ignoring the privileges granted by the family in exchange to obligations /3/, who has doubts as to leaving the family /2/, whose intention to leave worries the other family members /2/ that want the leaver to stay /3/; **a family which is important as a united team of players /2/:** on which the fan (THE USA) places a bet in the game (POLITICAL ACTIVITIES) /2/.

<div align="center">POLITICS (EU—UKRAINE: 5 ME)</div>

a family which another family wants to join / **3/:** which another family (UKRAINE) wants to join as an equal member /2/, but acquires the status of a visitor so far /1/; **a family which does not want to feed a poor relative /2/:** which does not want to feed a poor relative (UKRAINE) /1/, who is late for the family dinner (ADMISSION OF THE NEW EU MEMBERS) /1/.

<div align="center">ECONOMY (EU: 3 ME)</div>

a family which takes care of itself /1/: the interests of which have priority over the interests of family members (MEMBER-STATES) **/1/;** **a family which rules its members /2/:** which is dissatisfied with the state (ECONOMICS) of one of its members (ITALY) **/1/,** a family which is accused by one of its members (BRITAIN) of giving groundless preferences to the poorer family members (POORER EU COUNTRIES), as compared with the well-off family members (RICHER EU COUNTRIES) /1/.

<div align="center">

9. EU is A BUILDING /50 ME/

POLITICS (EU: 40 ME)
</div>

a building which houses the dwellers /1/: in which the dwellers (EU MEMBER- STATES) should learn to live together /1/; **a building which is not safe /8/:** which may be ruined /1/, which is already being ruined /2/, the foundation of which has been cracked by one of the dwellers (GERMANY) /1/, which is being ruined by another dweller (BRITAIN) /2/, which can be ruined with an authorized mechanism (THE LEGAL RIGHT TO EXIT THE EU) employed by the dwellers /1/, a building which is seen by the observer (RUSSIA) as the one that is cracking and will soon fall apart /1/; **a building the future of which is unknown /4/:** which some of its dwellers (EUROSCEPTICS) want to dismantle /1/, which its managers (EU AUTHORITIES) want to save /2/, and which undergoes changes /1/; **a building which is left open /5/:** the doors of which are open for new dwellers (OTHER COUNTRIES) /2/, to where a new potential poor dweller (BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA) is on the way /1/, asking to let her in /2/; **a building from which one of its dweller wants to move out /5/:** the dweller (BRITAIN) who is not quite sure, however, whether she should do that /5/; **a building which gives shelter to the homeless /15/:** near the door of which there are millions of the homeless (REFUGEES AND MIGRANTS), who have come to the building by secret paths /1/, who are pleading for a shelter /3/, and who get it /2/, but then vandalize their new home, being neglected by its managers (EU AUTHORITIES) /1/ who now try to stop the newcomers by locking the building for the homeless /7/, and granting them temporary residence only in some parts of the building (IN SOME OF THE EU COUNTRIES) /1/; **a building in which the homeless may knock down a support /2/:** a support (THE EU CITIZENS' RIGHT TO FREE TRAVEL WITHIN THE EU) that may be knocked down by the homeless (REFUGEES AND MIGRANTS) /1/, and cause destruction of the building /1/.

<div align="center">POLITICS (EU—UKRAINE—RUSSIA: 3 ME)</div>

a building which is threatened by the aggressor /3/: which is loosened, destabilized by the aggressor (RUSSIA) /2/, the supports of which (UNITY OF THE EU COUNTRIES, THE RULE OF LAW) are attempted to be ruined by the aggressor /1/.

<div align="center">ECONOMY (EU—UKRAINE: 7 ME)</div>

a building which somebody wants to enter /3/: a building which is closed for a person (UKRAINE) /2/, and should be opened /1/; **a building which is opened for somebody /4/:** which

has opened its doors for a person (UKRAINE) /3/, which the person opens with a key (EU—UKRAINE AGREEMENT ON FREE TRADE) /1/.

10. UKRAINE is A BUILDING /13 ME/
POLITICS (UKRAINE: 7 ME)

a building which must have a solid foundation /2/: which lacks a solid foundation (DEMOCRACY) /1/, the foundation (DEMOCRACY) of which should be strong and stable /1/; **a building which is being built and remodeled /5/:** which the people who live in it (UKRAINIAN CITIZENS) build together, with the building's managers (UKRAINIAN AUTHORITIES) not involved /2/, which is being built according to the model of another building (EU) /1/, the building a part of which (UKRAINE'S HOME POLICY) is being built on the foundation (EUROPEAN PRINCIPLES AND LAWS) with the help of instruments (REGULATORY ACTS) /1/, and another part of which (UKRAINE'S FOREIGN POLICY) is being repaired and remodeled /1/.
POLITICS (EU—UKRAINE—RUSSIA: 2 ME)

a building which the aggressor attempts to ruin /2/: which the aggressor (RUSSIA) will keep shaking /1/, expecting that it will collapse, and its external defenders (EU, USA) will capitulate /1/.
ECONOMY (UKRAINE: 4 ME)

a building which is shaky /2/: which sinks due to one of its architects (NATIONAL BANK OF UKRAINE) /1/, which collapses because of the fall of its support (RAW MATERIAL PRICES) /1/; **a building which the aggressor attempts to ruin /1/:** which the aggressor (RUSSIA) attempts to ruin with weapons (SANCTIONS) /1/; **a building which should be built anew /1/:** which should be built anew according to the model prompted by the situation of crisis /1/.

11. EU is A TERRITORY /47 ME/
POLITICS (EU: 9 ME)

a territory which has external borders /2/: which has permeable borders /1/ with a barrier (TURKEY) that stops the newcomers /1/; **a territory which is being contaminated with poison [1]:** which is being thrived with poisonous mushrooms (ULTRA-RIGHT PARTIES) /1/; **a territory which is badly flooded /5/:** the flood (MIGRATION) that is dangerous /3/, that can cause a catastrophe /2/; **a territory which can be ruined /1/:** which can undergo tectonic changes due to a natural disaster (TERRORISM) /1/.
POLITICS (EU—UKRAINE: 3 ME)

a territory which somebody wants to enter /2/: which the person (UKRAINE) wants to enter /1/ through a bridge (LITHUANIA) /1/; **a territory which has values /1/:** from which the person (UKRAINE) wants to take out values (DEMOCRACY) /1/.
ECONOMY (EU—UKRAINE: 35 ME)

a territory which somebody enters /25/: to which the person (UKRAINE) is granted an access /3/, which is new for the person /1/, which the person enters, and on which she freely moves /21/; **a territory the access to which is important /5/:** a free access to which is important for the person -/5/; **the access to which is restricted /5/:** which is guarded by the owner (EU) from the other person (UKRAINE) /1/, the access to which requires observing regulations (EU RULES) /1/, and is limited for the person, who lacks funds /1/, and who has mostly one-way contacts with the territory /1/, the trust in which the person should regain /1/.

12. UKRAINE is A TERRITORY /8 ME/
ECONOMY (EU—UKRAINE: 8 ME)

a territory which joins the bigger territory /3/: which joins the bigger territory (EU ECONOMY / MARKET) /2/, remaining its outskirts /1/; **a territory which is open for the bigger territory /5/:** which is attractive for the bigger territory (EU ECONOMY / MARKET) /1/, opened for it /2/, and not safe from expansion of its goods /2/.

13. UKRAINE'S EUROPEAN INTEGRATION is A PATH /65ME/

<u>POLITICS (EU—UKRAINE: 58 ME)</u>

a path which had been taken by others [4]: which had been previously taken by other people (NEW MEMBER-STATES) /2/ who were helped by assistants (OLD MEMBER- STATES) /2/; **a path which has been chosen by the person /16/:** which has been chosen by the person (UKRAINE) who had got out of a swamp (POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY) /1/ and clearly defined the direction of her movement to the goal (EU) /6/, the path chosen instead of another path (EUROASIAN INTEGRATION) /1/, the path which the person has already had an intention to take /2/, the path which must be taken /1/, which somebody (ONE PART OF UKRAINE) wants and somebody (ANOTHER PART OF UKRAINE) does not want to take /2/, path-taking which the person (UKRAINIAN AUTHORITIES) demonstrates to somebody (THE WESTERN WORLD) /2/, path-taking which has a road map (UKRAINE—EU ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT) /1/; **a difficult path /2/:** the path which for the person (UKRAINE) may be long and thorny /2/; **a path on which the movement to the goal has already started /3/:** on which the person (UKRAINE) has started to actively move towards the goal (EU) /2/, being now only at the beginning of the path /1/; **a path by which the person moves forward /10/:** by which the person (UKRAINE) moves forward /4/ taking steps /DECOMMUNIZATION AND DESTALINIZATION, ADOPTION OF EUROPEAN NORMS, AND IMPLEMENTATION OF REFORMS) /4/, including the small ones (EVERYDAY CHANGES) /1/, and guided, because of her weakness, by the others (EU, USA, IMF) /1/; **a path which has milestones /1/:** the path which has milestones (CASES OF UKRAINE'S SUCCESS) /1/; **a path where the person's movement slows down /8/:** where the person's (UKRAINE's) movement slows down because of the obstacles (RESISTANCE OF BUSINESS CLANS, FOREIGN POLICY FACTORS, THE WAR IN DONBAS, VIOLATION OF DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN UKRAINE, INCOMPATIBILITY OF UKRAINIAN AND EUROPEAN STANDARDS) /5/, because the person takes undesirable directions (POLITICS IN DONBAS) /1/, staggers in one place, moves backward, and not forward /2/; **a path where the person's movement should be accelerated /2/:** where the person (UKRAINE) should accelerate her movement /1/ by changing the guide (UKRAINIAN AUTHORITIES) /1/; **a path which brings the person closer to the goal /9/:** the person (UKRAINE) who wants to feel closer to the goal (EU) /1/, who approaches the goal (COMPATIBILITY OF EU AND UKRAINIAN LEGISLATIONS) /4/, whose movement to the goal is now most successful /1/, with the light (VISA-FREE TRAVEL FOR UKRAINE) at the end of tunnel /1/, with the green light shown to the person by her assistant (EU) /1/ who gives her directions as to the further movement /1/; **a path which is correct /3/:** the path which has been correctly chosen be the person (UKRAINE) who is taking it /1/, and who cannot be stopped by the other person (RUSSIA), irrespective of the latter's desire /2/.

<u>ECONOMY (EU—UKRAINE: 7 ME)</u>

a new and perspective path /3/: which the person (UKRAINE) paves in new terrain (COOPERATION WITH NEW COUNTRIES) /1/, the path which brings the person (UKRAINE) to a higher level /1/ and closer to the goal (PROGRESS) /1/; **a difficult path which leads the person forward [2]:** on which the person (UKRAINE) has made steps /1/, being helped by other people (EU COUNTRIES) /1/; **a path on which the person slows down her movement /2/:** the movement which the person (UKRAINE) declares but practically not performs /1/, and which is being performed more successfully by another person (MOLDOVA) /1/.

14. Metaphorical capacity of the source concepts

The source concepts mapped upon the target metaphorical space, are: PERSON (with its variations – Person, Assistant, Assisted Person, Authority, Subordinate, Partner, Aggressor, Victim, Victim's Ally, and Aggressor's Adversary), FAMILY, BUILDING, TERRITORY and PATH. These sources have different degrees of metaphorical capacity shown in Table 5, which displays the expected highest metaphorical potential of personification. A noteworthy finding is that among the

PERSON'S roles the most conspicuous ones are Assistant, Aggressor's Adversary and Authority, all of which are associated with the European Union.

Table 5

Prominence of sources in salient conceptual metaphors

Metaphorical sources	Metaphorical targets	Number of ME	Total
1. PERSON			**391**
Person	EU (Politics, Economy) UKRAINE (Politics, Economy)	79 27	106
Assistant	EU (Politics, Economy)	77	77
Aggressor's adversary	EU (Politics)	67	67
Authority	EU (Politics)	55	55
Partner	EU (Politics, Economy) UKRAINE (Economy)	26 1	27
Subordinate	UKRAINE (Politics)	24	24
Victim	UKRAINE (Politics)	14	14
Victim's ally	EU (Politics)	8	8
Aggressor	RUSSIA (Politics)	8	8
Assisted person	UKRAINE (Politics, Economy)	5	5
2. PATH	UKRAINE'S EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (Politics, Economy)	65	**65**
3. BUILDING	EU (Politics, Economy) UKRAINE (Politics, Economy)	50 13	**63**
4. TERRITORY	EU (Politics, Economy) UKRAINE (Economy)	47 8	**55**
5. FAMILY	EU (Politics, Economy) UKRAINE (Politics)	42 1	**43**
			617

In the salient conceptual metaphors, the sources are most often mapped on such constituents of the target space as EU—UKRAINE, EU, and EU—RUSSIA (Table 6). On the whole, the actors involved in EU—Ukraine relations are metaphorically foregrounded in the following way (see the figures in Table 4): the EU – 452 ME (73, 3%), Ukraine – 157 ME (25,4%), and Russia – 8 ME (1,3%), which makes the EU the "key actor" on the metaphorical "stage" of Ukrainian media.

Table 6

Prominence of targets in salient conceptual metaphors

Targets	Number of ME	%
1. EU—UKRAINE	318	51,5
2. EU	157	25,4
3. EU—RUSSIA	80	13,0
4. UKRAINE	38	6,2
5. UKRAINE—RUSSIA	16	2,6
6. RUSSIA	8	1,3
	617	100

The prominence of "roles" played by the actors in EU—Ukraine relations is demonstrated in Table 7 that presents the number of ME for each source mapped upon a particular foregrounded target.

Table 7

**Prominence sources mapped upon the targets
in salient conceptual metaphors**

Targets	Sources	Number of ME		Total
1. EUROPEAN UNION	PERSON		**312**	
	Person	79		
	Assistant	77		
	Aggressor's adversary	67		
	Authority	55		
	Partner	26		**452**
	Victim's ally	8		**(73, 3%)**
	BUILDING		**50**	
	TERRITORY		**47**	
	FAMILY		**43**	
2. UKRAINE	PERSON		**71**	
	Person	27		
	Subordinate	24		
	Victim	14		
	Assisted person	5		92
	Partner	1		(14,9%)
	BUILDING		**13**	
	TERRITORY		**8**	
3. UKRAINE'S EUROPEAN INTEGRATION	PATH		**65**	65 (10,5%)
				157 (25,4%)
4. RUSSIA	PERSON		**8**	**8**
	Aggressor	8		**(1, 3%)**
				617 (100%)

The findings given in Table 7 feature the typical metaphorical associations triggered by the targets, and vice versa. These associations become more precise, being supplied with the frequent extensions that elaborate the metaphorical schemas. The typical associations that construct the image of EU—UKRAINE RELATIONS are delivered in such conceptual metaphors:

- **EU is A PERSON** /79ME/: <u>POLITICS</u> – a powerful person who has authority and sets the agenda /22/, who has faults /9/, and who is differently treated by others (OTHER COUNTRIES) /6/; who is callous and unwilling to see the problems (POVERTY, PRISONERS OF WAR, AND BRUTALITIES IN DONBAS) of the other person (UKRAINE) /8/. <u>ECONOMY</u> – a person who has financial problems /6/. **EU is AN ASSISTANT /**77ME/: <u>POLITICS</u> – an assistant who helps the assisted person (UKRAINE), who gives her a real helping hand /49/. <u>ECONOMY</u> – an assistant who helps the assisted person (UKRAINE), who gives her a real helping hand /43/. **EU is THE AGGRESSOR'S ADVERSARY** /67 ME/: <u>POLITICS</u> – the aggressor's adversary who condemns the aggressor (RUSSIA) /7/, who fights with the aggressor using weapons (SANCTIONS) /45/, who underestimates the aggressor's threats /9/, who must respond to them /5/. **EU is AN AUTHORITY** /55 ME/ <u>POLITICS</u> – an authority who cooperates with the subordinate (UKRAINE) /8/: who directs the subordinate's actions /7/: who is demanding, and who insists on the subordinate's fulfillment of her obligations to introduce reforms /15/, who does not satisfy the subordinate's wishes /7/, who is dissatisfied with the subordinate /8/, who disregards her /6/. **EU is A PARTNER** /10 ME/: <u>POLITICS</u> – a partner who tolerates the other partner (RUSSIA) and continues cooperation with her /8/. <u>ECONOMY</u> – a partner who is problematic for another partner (UKRAINE) /7/.

- **EU is A BUILDING** /50 ME/: <u>POLITICS</u> – a building which is shaky and not safe /8/, which gives shelter to the homeless (REFUGEES AND MIGRANTS) who cause problems /15/.

- **EU is A TERRITORY /**47 ME/: <u>ECONOMY</u> – a territory which the person (UKRAINE) enters /25/, the access to which is important /5/ but restricted /5/.

- **EU is A FAMILY** /43 ME/: <u>POLITICS</u> – a family which is in crisis /6/, the members of which (MEMBER-STATES) lack unity /6/, with one member (BRITAIN) intending to leave her relatives /12/.

- **UKRAINE is A PERSON** /27 ME/: <u>POLITICS</u> – a person who created history /4/, who is now independent and self-sustained /5/, whose importance is underestimated /4/. <u>ECONOMY</u> – a sick person /5/.

- **UKRAINE is A SUBORDINATE** /24 ME/: <u>POLITICS</u> – a subordinate who obeys the authority (EU) /10/, who wants to be like the authority /6/, who aspires for the authority's approval /4/.

- **UKRAINE is A VICTIM** /14 ME/: <u>POLITICS</u> – a victim of the aggressor (RUSSIA) /5/.

- **UKRAINE is A BUILDING** /13 ME/: <u>POLITICS</u> – a building which is being built and remodeled /5/.

- **UKRAINE'S EUROPEAN INTEGRATION is A PATH** /65ME/ <u>POLITICS</u> – a path which has been chosen by the person (UKRAINE) /16/, by which the person moves forward /10/, on which the person's movement slows down /8/, which brings the person closer to the goal (EU) /9/.

- **RUSSIA is AN AGGRESSOR** /8 ME/ – <u>POLITICS</u> – an aggressor who wages a war against others (UKRAINE AND THE WORLD) /5/.

Concluding discussion

This study of ME employed by Ukrainian popular newspapers in the first half of 2016 has enabled exposure of the system of conceptual metaphors that represent Ukraine—EU relations that develop against the background of Russia—Ukraine confrontation. As a system, the reconstructed conceptual metaphors form an intertextual "meta-narrative" with its referential and relational coherence.

In the target metaphorical space, referential coherence is provided by iteration of the referents – the EU, Ukraine and Russia; and relational coherence is realized through the links between them. In the source metaphorical space, referential is created through iteration of a limited number of source concepts evolving in-depth. Their relations render the image which is easily recognizable by the human mind: *"There are PERSONS (who belong to three FAMILIES) who live in their own BUILDINGS located on some TERRITORIES. One of these persons wants to get rid of the influence of the Eastern neighbor and takes the PATH which leads to the territory of the Western neighbor who sympathizes with the person and helps her. The Eastern neighbor gets infuriated and starts to exert pressure on the traveler, so as to make her stop and go back".* This naïve image, typical of everyday life, overlaps with the cultural image entrenched in Ukrainians' mentality:

> …whilst the West is freedom, aspiration for sovereignty, and the rule of law, the East (including the Eastern Europe) is tyranny, acquiescence, and submission to despotism; whilst the West is dynamics, activity, and development; the East is inaction and stagnation; the West is logical thinking and rational institutions, and the East is illogical thinking and traditional institutions; in the West reason governs emotions, while in the East emotions are the king; finally, the West is an incarnation of masculinity, and the East incarnates femininity. These identities are accounted for rather by post-colonial than geographical space [Yavorska and Bogomolov 2010: 37] (the translation is mine – S.Z.).

The coherent schematic image maintained in the source metaphorical space serves as a "sketch" for the metaphorical narrative "canvas" and makes it easy to read. The system of sources imposes the referents' roles and explains who is who. The metaphorical narrative about Ukraine—EU relations, being relatively invariable due to the system of source concepts entrenched in the languages of politics, may, however, undergo diachronic and synchronic changes.

Diachronic changes of the metaphorical system depicting Ukraine—EU relations become evident when the findings of this research are compared with the findings of a similar study [Yavorska and Bogomolov 2010] aimed to reconstruct the system of conceptual metaphors employed by Ukrainian press for portraying the relations between Ukraine and Europe in 2001-2007. Then, Ukrainian media featured *Europe* as a well-off PERSON with ambivalent traits [ibid: 58], as a Teacher who controls the Student (Ukraine) [ibid: 58], as an Authority who superintends the Subordinate (Ukraine) [ibid: 62], and as a FAMILY that has old and new members [ibid: 58]. *Ukraine's integration with Europe* was described as a JOURNEY where the emphasis was placed on the initial stage of this journey, and the identified direction of the route [ibid: 80-84]. *Russia* was presented as a dangerous and aggressive PERSON whose irritation the West tries to avoid [ibid: 80-84].

In the respective conceptual metaphors of 2016, their general schemas are maintained, but their elaboration is different. *Europe (the EU)* has become a much more agreeable PERSON who is Ukraine's Assistant and Partner, and whose function of the Authority is less annoying. In the data of 2016, the metaphor Teacher-Student is practically absent; it is represented only in 2 ME, where Ukraine, as a Student, does her home assignment and gets the grades from the Teacher. The image of the EU as a FAMILY acquires new details concerned with the stressed relations between the EU Member-States, and the migration crisis. The concept of the PATH (analogous to JOURNEY), mapped upon *Ukraine's integration with Europe*, retains prominence of the same ideas of the chosen route, and (slowly) moving ahead. This movement, however, becomes more goal-oriented and defined with regard to its means. Russia's image as an Aggressive person grows into an Aggressor who wages a real war.

Synchronic changes of the metaphorical system portraying Ukraine—EU relations may be caused by the change of the narrator, which is obvious from the study of Chaban and Elgström contributed to this Special Issue. The authors consider the conceptual metaphors that shape perceptions of the EU—Ukraine relations from the standpoint of the EU. The ME, obtained from the EU official documents and interviews with the EU practitioners dealing with Ukraine, expose

the roles of the EU as a capable PERSON, NURTURER, CATALYSER, skilful ARCHITECT / CONSTRUCTOR, attractive, non-imposing and committed PARTNER / COMPANION, supporting, caring, imposing and dictating AUTHORITY and TEACHER. Russia is painted as a CHALLENGER to the EU's security and as a FORCE / IMPACT that destabilizes Ukraine. These roles, which partially overlap with those tracked in Ukrainian newspapers, demonstrate a partial mismatch in the perceptions of the EU by "Self" and "Others".

The above brief outline of similarities and differences in in the systems of conceptual metaphors creating the image of UKRAINE—EU RELATIONS may be developed into an autonomous study that deserves its own publication. The key issue of the present study – the methodology for analysing a system of conceptual metaphors tracked in multiple linguistic data obtained from thematically homogeneous texts – has obvious implications for a comparative study of variable political images that serve as a latent foundation for shaping ideologies and directing decision-making in politics. The results of this study may be of particular interest to the EU practitioners who deal with Ukraine, and whose image of UKRAINE—EU RELATIONS turns out to be somewhat different from this image possessed by the other party.

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UDC 81'42

THE INFLUENCE OF CONTEXT ON THE METAPHORIC FRAMING
OF THE EUROPEAN UNION IN UKRAINIAN MASS MEDIA

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Olena Morozova. The influence of context on the metaphoric framing of the European Union in Ukrainian mass media. This paper aims to explore how conceptual metaphors that underlie metaphoric expressions used by Ukrainian newspapers frame the image of the European Union in Ukraine. The study is informed by conceptual metaphor theory [Lakoff & Johnson 1980, 1999], discourse metaphor theory [Musolff 2004; Cameron & Deignan 2006; Semino 2008; Musolff & Zinken 2009] and interactional narratology [Bruner 2002, 2004]. In the focus of attention are metaphoric expressions that refer to the European Union. It is argued that the metaphors under study have a powerful framing potential realized in discourse. In particular, it is maintained that in their discourse use the metaphors suggest specific metaphoric scenarios [Musolff 2006, 2016a, 2017] and in such a way articulate narratives with a certain stance. Accordingly, framing the European Union through metaphoric scenarios depends on the stance that media product creator (Ukrainian print media) takes towards the European Union, imposing it on the readership. Framing through "domesticated" metaphors provides for their better fit with the narratives circulating in the Ukrainian society in January-June 2016.

Key words: conceptual metaphor, narrative, metaphoric scenario, the image of the European Union, Ukrainian print media.

Олена Морозова. Вплив контексту на метафоричний фреймінг Європейського Союзу в українських ЗМІ. Метою статті є виявлення того, як концептуальні метафори, що є підґрунтям значення метафоричних мовних одиниць, уживаних українськими газетами, формують імідж Європейського Союзу в Україні. Дослідження базується на положеннях теорії концептуальної метафори [Lakoff & Johnson 1980, 1999], дискурсивної теорії метафори [Musolff 2004; Cameron & Deignan 2006; Semino 2008; Musolff & Zinken 2009] та інтеракційної наратології [Bruner 2002, 2004]. Увагу зосереджено на метафоричних одиницях, референтом яких є Європейський Союз. Продемонстровано, що аналізовані метафори мають значний фреймотвірний потенціал, який реалізується під час їхнього дискурсного функціонування. Зокрема, підтверджено, що у дискурсі ці метафори відсилають до певних метафоричних сценаріїв [Musolff 2006, 2016а, 2017], актуалізуючи у такий спосіб наративи, що виражають позицію суб'єкта дискурсивної діяльності. Відповідно, фреймотворення за посередництва метафоричних сценаріїв відбиває ставлення виробника медійного продукту (українські друковані ЗМІ) до Європейського Союзу, яке передається читачеві. Фреймотворення за допомогою "культурно адаптованих" метафор дозволяє краще пристосувати концептуальні метафори до наративів, поширених в українському суспільстві у досліджуваний проміжок часу (січень-червень 2016 р.)

Ключові слова: концептуальна метафора, наратив, метафоричний сценарій, образ Європейського Союзу, українські друковані ЗМІ.

Елена Морозова. Влияние контекста на метафорический фрейминг Европейского Союза в украинских СМИ. Цель статьи состоит в выявлении того, как концептуальные метафоры, лежащие в основе значения метафорических единиц, функционирующих в текстах украинских газет, формируют образ Европейского Союза в Украине. Основу исследования составляют положения теории концептуальной метафоры [Lakoff & Johnson 1980, 1999], дискурсивной теории метафоры [Musolff 2004; Cameron & Deignan 2006; Semino 2008; Musolff & Zinken 2009] и интеракционной нарратологии [Bruner 2002, 2004]. Внимание сосредоточено на метафорических единицах, референтом которых является Европейский Союз. Показано, что анализируемым метафорам присущ высокий фреймообразующий

потенциал, который реализуется в дискурсе. В частности, подтверждено, что в дискурсе эти метафоры отсылают к определенным метафорическим сценариям [Musolff 2006, 2016a, 2017], актуализируя таким образом нарративы, которые выражают определенную позицию субъекта дискурсивной деятельности. Соответственно, фрейминг Европейского Союза при помощи метафорических сценариев отражает отношение производителя медийного продукта (украинские печатные СМИ) к Европейскому Союзу, которое передается читателю. Фреймообразование посредством "культурно адаптированных" метафор позволяет обеспечить оптимальное соответствие концептуальных метафор нарративам, актуальным для украинского общества в анализируемый период (январь-июнь 2016 г.)

Ключевые слова: концептуальная метафора, нарратив, метафорический сценарий, образ Европейского Союза, украинские печатные СМИ.

1. Introduction

This paper investigates how Ukrainian newspapers shape their stance towards the European Union (the EU) by using metaphoric expressions contextually – in their own right, as mini-narratives [Gibbs 2011a: 122] or as components of newspaper accounts of 'tellable' [Ryan 2005] events. In order to achieve this end, the study synergizes methods of cognitive linguistics (cognitive metaphor theory [Lakoff & Johnson 1980; 1999], in particular, one of its modern versions – discourse metaphor theory [Musolff 2004, 2018; Cameron & Deignan 2006; Semino 2008; Musolff & Zinken 2009]) and narratology, more specifically, its dynamic version ([Bruner 2002; 2004]).

Scholarly research into metaphor in use is rather representative (to name but a few [Arutiunova 1990; Charteris-Black 2004; Kövecses 2004, 2018; Musolff 2004, 2006, 2016a, 2016b; 2017; Semino 2008; Zinken, Hellsten, & Nerlich 2008; Musolff & Zinken 2009; Ritchie 2010; Gibbs 2011; Hanne 2014; Deignan 2017]). Metaphors referential to the EU have also been extensively researched [Musolff, 2000, 2004, 2017; Danilet, 2017; Morozova 2017; Zhabotynska 2018, etc.]. Yet, no attempt has been made so far to consider from the cognitive-discursive perspective how metaphors referring to the EU and functioning in Ukrainian newspapers imply microstories that merge into coherent wholes, thus revealing the writers' political dispositions and preferences. This paper argues that integration of discursive and narrative strains of inquiry into conceptual metaphor is epistemologically feasible and can be fruitful, in particular, for the study of metaphors used in media texts. This accounts for the innovative contribution this paper makes to theorisation and empirical study of media discourse metaphors referential to the EU.

Theoretically, the paper departs from the concept of frame as defined by Goffman [1980] and maintains that framing refers not so much to the propositional content of the utterance, but to its perception by discourse participants, which is known as stance, evaluation, attitude, viewpoint, etc. Further, the paper elaborates the discourse-metaphorical theoretical model by bringing in the narrative perspective. The resulting cognitive-discursive framework is applied to investigate how conceptual metaphors referential to the EU imply microstories woven into coherent scenarios which, in their turn, consolidate into memorable frames.

Structurally, the paper consists of six parts: (1) introduction, (2) theoretical prerequisites, (3) data and methods, (4) results, (5) discussion and (6) conclusion. The introductory part provides an overview of the paper, specifying the theoretical context of the research, its aim and giving arguments for its relevance. The theoretical part dwells on the key concepts used in the paper (framing, conceptual metaphor, discourse metaphor, narrative). The methodological part describes the data and methods of studying discourse metaphors of the EU. Part four presents the results, part five discusses methodological and theoretical implications and part six sums up the results and outlines prospects for further research.

The results of this study can be of interest not only to linguists, but also to specialists working in the neighbouring disciplines as well as for practitioners concerned with the EU's perception in the world.

2. Theoretical prerequisites

The main theoretical concepts used in this study are a frame, metaphor, discourse and narrative. We start this section with Goffman's [1980] definition of a frame, moving on to Lakoff and Johnson's [1980; 1999] cognitive metaphor theory and characterizing one of the directions in which it is being developed today – discourse metaphor theory [Musolff 2004, 2006, 2016a,2016b; Cameron & Deignan 2006; Semino 2008; Musolff & Zinken 2009; Hampe 2017; Hanne 2014, etc.]. Further, we consider the ways the conception of narrative is interpreted in the XXIst century humanities. Finally, with the aim of providing an adequate explanatory framework for investigating figurative scenarios of the EU, we consider the shared and distinctive features of metaphor and narrative and come up with some generalizations on the issue.

The term "**frame**" appeared as a metaphoric extension of the non-terminological meaning of the word *frame* (a border that surrounds and supports a picture, door, window, etc.). Google search gives over 2 billion hits for the word *frame*. It is obvious that it would be hard to differentiate its terminological and non-terminological uses "manually". Yet it is important to note that the frequency of its terminological use increased about 200 times in the 1970s [The Wordnik Online Dictionary], which was the time when seminal works of two notable American scientists were published. These scientists are Marvin Minsky [1974], a mathematician concerned with the problem of knowledge representation in artificial intelligence systems, and Ervin Goffman [1974], a sociologist who endeavoured to explain society by considering everyday interactions of people.

Today the sphere of usage of the term "frame" covers an impressive number of approaches and methods. However, all of them root in the distinction between the "ground" (the existential environment of an object) and the "figure" (the object itself). As an instrument of cognition, a frame structures reality as perceived by the observer, making some of its fragments more prominent than others. For a cognitive linguist, the ability of a frame to structure mental spaces is of particular importance.

A frame can structure not only the perceived object proper (the ontological function of a frame), but also the way the object is viewed by the observer (its gnoseological function). This distinction results in different understanding of the term "frame" by cognitive linguists and communication researchers. The former, proceeding from Minski's understanding of a frame, focus on the stable meanings of linguistic expressions that belong to the system of language (see, for example, [Zhabotynskaya 2013a, 2013b]). Scholars concerned with communication processes (see, for example, [Chaban & Bain 2014]), in contrast, rely on Goffman's views, treating a frame as a structure of experience that an individual has at a particular moment of his life. It is not a "universal" mental picture of a fragment of reality, a stable entity, but the structure of "a particular person's current world" [Goffman 1986: 3] – fluid and variable.

These approaches to understanding the content of the term "frame" correlate with the static (representational) and dynamic (constructionist) styles of scientific thinking. In the representational paradigm, frames are treated as knowledge structures according to which utterances are built, i.e. they are taken to precede discourse production. From the constructionist point of view, frames emerge in discourse as patterns of language use, i.e. they are constructed in discourse. In other words, from the constructionist point of view, framing is a function of context. Accordingly, if a situation is framed differently by different people, "the facts are the same and remain clear, but emotional resonances differ" [Cataldo 2017: 7].

Static and dynamic styles of thinking manifest themselves in variable understanding of quite a number of operative terms of present-day linguistics, the most vivid example here being **discourse**. In East-European linguistics, discourse is usually treated in a representational vein – as an array of texts characterized by some common features, for example, belonging to one and the same thematic field, having the same communicative intention, possessing similar formal features, etc. Understanding the nature of discourse in this way goes back to the functional style theory. A different approach to discourse regards it a contextualized speech event, which may be

considered as a type or token. This approach is pursued by the French school of discourse studies. In this paper, discourse is understood both as an array of texts sharing some features and as contextualized speech, depending on the purpose the term serves. Thus, discourse is considered as an array of texts when the print media environment of metaphors is meant; discourse is regarded as contextualized speech when the term refers to text fragments in context, the latter including co-text, intertextual links, cultural and political context, etc.

Another concept that demonstrates variation in its interpretation is **conceptual metaphor**, which in its "classic" version is defined as understanding one conceptual entity (called "the target") in terms of another (called "the source") [Lakoff & Johnson 1980]. Due to their ability to present abstract and complex phenomena as concrete and simple, conceptual metaphors play a central role in defining people's everyday realities [Lakoff & Johnson 1980: 3].

The mental entities brought together in a conceptual metaphor can be of different kind: concepts, image schemas or domains. Langacker [1987: 488] defines a **domain** as a coherent area of conceptualization (JOURNEY, BODY, and BUILDING illustrate the case) relative to which **concepts** are characterized. **Image schemas** are directly meaningful preconceptual structures, analogue patterns that have an internal structure that is not very complex, for example, PATH, CONTAINER, OBJECT [Johnson 1987; Lakoff 1987]. Unlike image schemas, domains are propositional structures. In comparison with concepts, they are quite abstract, though more information-rich than image schemas.

Conceptual structures of the source domain are mapped onto conceptual structures of the target domain, bringing with them a range of metaphoric **entailments** [Lakoff & Johnson 1999: 47], or inferences, additional rich knowledge about the source that is mapped onto the target. Introducing new conceptual elements into the source domain is also known as extending a conceptual metaphor [Kövecses 2010: 47]).

In the XXIst century, scholars [Semino 2008; El Rafaie 2014; Hanne 2014; Hampe 2017, etc.] started to point out that conceptual metaphor theory in its original version presents a static picture of the world, which suggests "a universality and permanency that does not exist" [Deignan 2017: 203]. An alternative – **discursive** – approach to the study of metaphor in real-life contexts is still in the process of its formation, yet its basic postulates have already been established. In the framework of discourse approach, metaphors are considered to be not as enduring as cognitive metaphor theory takes them to be: metaphor is quite a dynamic phenomenon, "soft-assembled" [Gibbs & Cameron 2008: 70; Gibbs 2011a: 122] in discourse situations. Metaphor "assemblage" is influenced by such factors of social context as gender, age, culture [El Rafai 2014], genre and register [Deignan 2013], etc. The contextual variables characteristic of this research are the discourse type, which is media discourse, and the nationality of the author and reader, which is Ukrainian.

In order to capture the specificity of metaphor-in-use, its adjustment to discourse it is immersed into and the socio-cultural norms and values it suggests, Musolff introduces the term "metaphor scenario" [Musolff 2006, 2016a, 2017], which is an analogue of entailment in cognitive metaphor theory. The scholar justifies the necessity of introducing this term by practical considerations:

> While the categorization of conceptual specifications […] as "extensions" of general mappings that underlie a whole domain may be unproblematic from the point of view of theoretical coherence, it raises important questions for the analysis of discourse data, that is, metaphors in (documented) use. Are all conceivable aspects of a source domain to be thought of as being implicit in all uses or only a specific subset? If the latter is the case, how can its scope be delimited? How rich is the ontological structure of the subset of source concepts? Can one domain include contrastive conceptualizations? [Musolff 2006: 25]

Deignan [2017: 22] shares Musolff's presumption that metaphors in use manifest their evaluative properties more eloquently in series of thematically bound metaphors than in single

metaphors in context. The conceptual entity that underlies such series is called a metaphor scenario, which Musolff defines in the following way:

> […] a set of assumptions made by competent members of a discourse community about "typical" aspects of a source-situation, for example, its participants and their roles, the "dramatic" storylines and outcomes, and conventional evaluations of whether they count as successful or unsuccessful, normal or abnormal, permissible or illegitimate, etc. [Musolff 2006: 28]

As can be deduced from this definition, a scenario is an "enriched" set of conceptual mappings that includes "narrative-cum-normative" assumptions [ibid.]. This links the study of discourse metaphor with narratology since the notion of metaphor scenario is based on the premise that metaphors can impose a narrative sequence on a topic [ibid.] (in cognitive-linguistic terms, a domain or concept).

In order to clarify this statement, it is necessary to specify the content of the term "**narrative**", which can be viewed through different theoretical and methodological optics. Some scholars draw a distinction between "stories" (what people actually tell) and "narratives" (or ways of structuring stories). For the purposes of this study, we do not differentiate between the terms "story", "narrative" and "account", using them interchangeably in a broad sense as "spates of talk [and text] that are taken to describe or explain matters of concern to participants" [Gubruim & Holstein 2009: xviii].

Importantly, when viewed from the constructionist perspective, narrative is a specific way of perceiving and describing reality by people: it stands in contrast to capturing the world scientifically with the aim of discovering general laws that regulate telling stories. Appealing not only to reason, but also to emotions and the subconscious, narratives connect the referent situation to numerous contexts that form a nation's culture and history. Hence, a narrative includes not only representation of a series of events, but also senses associated with them (an evaluative, subjective component, or a stance).

An important distinction that we follow in this paper is the one between structural narrative analysis, the proponents of which analyze texts in order to bring to light their compositional features, and discursive narrative analysis which focuses on how discourse participants construe and employ mental entities (in particular, metaphors) in their talk [Bruner 2002, 2004]. In line with the above theoretical premises, we take the discursive narrative position.

Metaphor and narrative considered from a constructionist perspective are in complex relationship. Both of them are interpretive tools used to frame people's views, attitudes, intentions, pictures of the world, etc. Both of them involve a subjective, relative understanding, and in this, they stand in contrast to logical reasoning. Both of them take a certain amount of cognitive effort to process the information they convey, and in this, they contrast with visual images.

Yet there are significant differences between them, which are best captured by the following metaphoric comparison of a visual image, a metaphor and a narrative. All the three can be treated as different ways of perceiving the same "object" (referent): visually – as a gestalt, at a momentary glance, metaphorically – as if changing one's location in space in order to have a look at the object at a different angle, narratively – as if moving through a situation that develops in time (the latter distinction has been investigated by Ricoeur [1979]).

Thus, within the framework of discursive approach to the study of metaphor and narrative, both are viewed as cognitive tools by which people structure their experience, giving sense to it. The present study lies within this research line, focusing on discourse metaphors as mini-narratives.

3. Data and methods

The sample (514 tokens) has been obtained from 27 articles selected from 23 issues of the newspaper *Dzerkalo Tyzhnia* (January-June 2016) according to the following criterion: the article should contain at least two linguistic expressions referring to the European Union. They were such

expressions as "the European Union", "the EU", "Europe", "Brussels", names of the EU institutions and political actors, the EU Member-States, their capitals, institutions and officials.

Most of the tokens are used by journalists as primary authors, while about one eighth of the tokens belong to those used by public persons or by other media. The stance expressed by quotes, as a rule, is clearly positive or negative; stancetaking means are contained in the co-text. Together with the non-quotative uses of metaphor, they "constitute a dense, intertextual ensemble that builds up to a "virtual conversation" [Musolff 2017: 27].

Dzerkalo Tyzhnia targets at Ukrainian- and/or Russian-speaking audience since the newspaper is published both in Ukrainian and in Russian. The results of six-month monitoring of the newspaper coverage done in the framework of the project "Crisis, Conflict and Critical Diplomacy: EU Perceptions in Ukraine, Israel and Palestine" show that the outlet takes a middle position between the most European-friendly newspaper *Holos Ukraiiny* (a governmental edition) and the most European-unfriendly newspaper *Kommentarii* (a pro-Russian/pro-Soviet outlet) [C^{3}EU].

The methodology combines conceptual metaphor theory [Lakoff & Johnson 1980; 1999] with the metaphor-in-use theory [Musolff 2000, 2004, 2016b; Gibbs & Cameron 2008; Semino 2008; Zinken, Hellsten & Nerlich 2008; Musolff & Zinken 2009; Gibbs 2011a, 2011b; Deignan, Littlemore & Semino 2013; El Rafaie 2014; Deignan 2017; Hampe 2017; Kövecses 2018]. This means employment of both the domain correspondences and metaphoric scenarios [Musolff 2006; 2016a, 2017], which provides for reconstruction of both the EU's schematic perception of Ukraine, and the context of this perception.

4. Results

Relations between metaphor and narrative, which could be quite complex, are provisionally classified into three types: (1) a story contains a few unrelated metaphors; (2) a story contains a few metaphors underpinned with a common image schema; (3) a story is built around an unconventional metaphor.

1) A story contains a few metaphors with different source concepts. This type of relationship is compatible with such functional type of metaphors as combining [Kövecses 2010: 49]. As a rule, such metaphors are entrenched in the narrative and thus are perceived as clichés. Metaphors of this type in our sample are register and genre specific, and thus they constitute a feature of media discourse or of a particular journalist's idiostyle. What makes them work together with other axiologically tinted linguistic expressions contained in the co-text is the author's stance towards the situation described in the story. The stance can be neutral, positive or negative.

In the extract below, the **positive** stance of the journalist towards Brexit is rendered quotatively, by giving half of the metaphoric expressions in quotation marks. This suggests that the stance of the person whose words are quoted does not necessarily coincide with the stance of the journalist. In this case, one can suspect the journalist's desire not to be held responsible for the truth of the respective propositions.

(1) *Майбутнє [Великої Британії – О.М.] буде прекрасним: <u>звільнена від влади Брюсселя</u> країна знову стане «<u>маяком свободи</u>» у світі, <u>бізнес бурхливо зростатиме</u>, лондонський <u>Сіті процвітатиме</u>, а британці «ніколи більше <u>не будуть рабами ЄС</u>».* (Zahoruyko 2016)

[The future [of the UK – O.M.] is going to be wonderful: <u>liberated</u> from <u>the power of Brussels</u>, the country is going to regain its status of "<u>the beacon of freedom</u>" in the world, business <u>is going to thrive</u>, the <u>City of London is going to flourish</u>, and the British "shall never again be <u>the EU's slaves</u>"] (here and further on the translation is mine – O.M.)

In our sample, the **negative** stance is most representative in comparison with the positive and the neutral ones. Though this research stage does not apply quantitative analysis, a rough estimate shows that the proportion of the negative stance in metaphoric stories that contain metaphors with unrelated source domains makes about two thirds of all tokens analyzed.

(2) *Британський референдум 23 червня може мати <u>досить неприємні наслідки</u> для України. Але <u>нічого критичного</u> ні завтра, ні післязавтра не станеться. [...] <u>Критичним</u> є можливий <u>кумулятивний ефект</u> накопичуваних у Європі проблем. Результати референдуму про Brexit є, швидше, <u>індикатором</u> того, наскільки <u>глибокі ці проблеми</u> і чи можуть вони бути <u>подолані тактичними рішеннями</u> – чи необхідний <u>стратегічний перегляд моделей інтеграції</u>.* (Yizhak 2016)

[The British referendum on June 23 may have <u>rather unpleasant implications</u> for Ukraine. Yet <u>nothing critical</u> is going to happen either tomorrow or the day after. […] Only <u>the cumulative effect</u> of <u>the problems piling up</u> in Europe may be <u>critical</u>. Rather, the results of the Brexit referendum are <u>indicative</u> of <u>the depth of the problems</u> and whether <u>it is possible to overcome them by tactical decisions</u> or whether <u>a strategic reconsideration of the models of integration</u> is needed.

The **neutral / balanced / ambiguous** stance of metaphoric stories is a "mixed bag" where all the cases where the journalist's stance is neither clearly positive nor negative belong. It is illustrated by the text fragment to follow.

(3) *Але <u>динаміка змін</u> <u>поширюється</u> на <u>негативні для України</u> чинники так само, як і на <u>позитивні</u>. Тому <u>нинішні проблеми європейської інтеграції</u> не слід сприймати як <u>статичні</u>. Інакше можна не помітити <u>нових можливостей, здатних відкритися</u> навіть під впливом таких <u>негативних чинників, як Brexit</u>.* (Yizhak 2016)

[However, the <u>dynamics of change</u> <u>expands onto</u> the factors that may be either <u>negative</u> or <u>positive for Ukraine</u>. This is why <u>the present-day problems of European integration</u> should not be taken as <u>static</u>. Otherwise, one may overlook <u>new opportunities that may open</u> even under the influence of such <u>negative factors as Brexit</u>.]

2) A newspaper account contains a few metaphors underpinned with a common image schema. The constituent metaphors of such stories lend themselves to complex reasoning. They form a metaphoric scenario that unites extended, enriched metaphors into a figurative narrative.

To become part of such a narrative, each constituent metaphor is to interact with some other metaphor(s) based on the same logic. Fragments (4) and (5) adopt the logic of the PERSON image schema.

(4) *(a) Мабуть, недооціненим в Україні виявився <u>внутрішній страх</u> європейських країн перед міграцією, причому не обов'язково пов'язаною із сирійською кризою. (b) Трудова міграція в рамках ЄС також викликає <u>значну напругу</u> в багатших країнах. (c) <u>Бажання зупинити проникнення мігрантів</u> стало одним із основних мотивів для Brexit.* (Yizhak 2016)

[(a) The European countries' <u>inner fear</u> of migration may have turned out to be underestimated in Ukraine, and not only the one connected with the Syrian crisis. (b) Labor migration in the EU also causes <u>great tension</u> in richer countries. (c) <u>The desire to stop migrants' penetration</u> has become one of the main motives for Brexit]

Each of the sentences in this fragment provides an appropriate "static" extension of the conceptual metaphor A NATION/STATE is A PERSON: sentence (a) – THE PERSON experiences FEAR; sentence (b) – THE PERSON feels TENSION; sentence (c) – THE PERSON has A DESIRE (to stop migrants' penetration).

(5) *(a) Україна <u>пожертвувала</u> багато чим задля європейської перспективи, (b) але тепер може наштовхнутися на те, що під тягарем власних проблем ЄС <u>відкладатиме виконання даних раніше обіцянок</u>, (c) <u>посилаючись</u> при цьому на проблеми України.* (Yizhak 2016)

[(a) Ukraine <u>has sacrificed</u> a lot for the European prospect, (b) but now it may face the situation that the EU, burdened with its own problems, will be <u>postponing the fulfillment of the promises</u> it <u>has earlier given,</u> (c) <u>using the problems of Ukraine as a pretext</u>]

In this extract, propositions underlying (a-c) present "dynamic" extensions of the conceptual metaphor A NATION/STATE is A PERSON, namely, where THE PERSON by their own will is engaged in PERFORMING the following ACTIONS: (a) (Ukraine) has sacrificed many things for the European prospect; (b) (the EU) will be postponing the fulfillment of the promises it has given earlier; (c) (the EU) will be using pretexts.

Example (6) is underpinned with the image schemas PERSON, PATH and CONTAINER, which combine into the following metaphoric scenario: CHANGE OF A PERSON'S STATE is MOVING ALONG A PATH into A CONTAINER (a); DIFFUCLIES THAT THE PERSON EXPERIENCES are OBSTACLES ON THE PATH (b, c, d)

(6) *(a) Поки що Україна сприймається як країна, громадяни якої готові <u>ринути в ЄС</u>, (b) щойно буде <u>прибрано перепони на шляху</u> безвізового режиму. (c) Режим цей, здавалося б, уже вийшов на фінішну пряму, але можуть з'явитися <u>нові, несподівані перешкоди</u>. [...](d) <u>Пригальмовуючи</u> безвізовий режим, ЄС захищається не так від України, як від власних проблем.* (Yizhak 2016)

[(a) So far Ukraine has been perceived as a country, the citizens of which are ready <u>to rush into the EU</u> (b) as soon as <u>the obstacles on the way to the visa-free regime are removed</u>. (c) This regime seems to have entered the home stretch, yet <u>new and unexpected obstacles</u> may appear. […] (d) <u>Slowing down on</u> visa liberalization, the EU is protecting itself not so much from Ukraine as from its own problems]

Fragment (7) is based on the OBJECT image schema extended into a rather elaborate figurative scenario. THE EU is AN OBJECT which is BIG / HEAVY and thus it has A GREAT MASS; conventionally, A BIG / HEAVY OBJECT has GREAT INTERTIA (a), thus THE BIG / HEAVY OBJECT, which is the EU, cannot change its TRAJECTORY OF DEVELOPMENT, which is its POLICY, FAST ENOUGH, even in case it is influenced by ANOTHER BIG / HEAVY OBJECT, which is BREXIT.

(7) *(a) Європейська політика <u>має досить велику інерцію</u>, (b) що не дозволяє <u>моментально змінити траєкторію розвитку</u> (c) навіть <u>під впливом такої великої події</u>, як Brexit.* (Yizhak 2016)

[(a) European policy's <u>inertia is great enough</u>, (b) which does not allow it to <u>change the trajectory of its development in an instant</u> (c) even <u>under the influence of such a great event</u> as Brexit]

Our sample also contains metaphoric scenarios that stand in contrast to the static one considered above. Thus, THE EU may be conceptualized as A DYNAMIC/ TURBULENT CURRENT (8).

(8) *[...] ЄС <u>динамічний</u>, навіть <u>турбулентний</u>. Українська політика, яка за довгі роки ввібрала <u>ідею євроінтеграції як константу</u>, часто неусвідомлену, далеко не завжди встигає за <u>європейською динамікою</u>.* (Yizhak 2016)

[… The EU is <u>dynamic</u>, even <u>turbulent</u>. Ukrainian politics, which for years has been absorbing <u>the idea – often subconscious – of eurointegration as a constant</u>, by no means always keeps pace with <u>the European dynamics</u>]

3) A story is built around a situational metaphor. The latter is a variety of a structural metaphor that involves complex reasoning in several correspondences (Ruiz de Mendosa Ibáñez & Pérez Hernándes 2011: 11). The situational metaphor is not woven into the story (as the image-schematic metaphor is): it is an analogue of the narrative "coda" (an expositive interpretive comment, which is "outside" the story). It may precede a story (9) or conclude it (10).

The passage below (9) illustrates the former case.

(9) <u>**Вони зійшлися – хвиля й камінь…**</u>

[...] за посаду президента (a) <u>боролися</u> два євроскептики – один (b) <u>колишній і один вічний</u>. [...] переможцем першого туру став Хофер – з відривом, якого не передбачав жоден соціолог. (c) <u>"Фактурою" (сивиною, досвідом) 72-річний Ван дер Беллен</u>, звісно ж, більше підходив на посаду президента, ніж <u>45-річний Хофер</u>.

Президент – це (d) батько нації, людина поза політикою й кон'юнктурою. Однак часи змінюються. Очільник Партії свободи Хайнц-Крістіан Штрахе ризикнув і (е) пустив у гонку відносно молодого кандидата – і (f) (з погляду виборів) (g) не прогадав. Та ось (h) із погляду внутріпартійного життя, можливо, (і) створив собі конкурента. (Shcherba, 2016)

They got together – wave and stone…

[…] two eurosceptics (a) <u>fought</u> for the presidential post – (b) <u>the former one and the enduring one</u>. […] Hofer came winner in the first round – with a margin that no sociologist could have foreseen. Obviously, due to his (c) <u>"texture"</u> (grey hair, experience), the 72-year-old Van der Bellen, was better suited for the presidential post than <u>the 45-year-old</u> Hofer. The president is (d) <u>the father of the nation</u>, a person beyond politics or situation. Yet times change. Heinz Christian Strache, leader of the Freedom Party of Austria, took a risk and (e) <u>put a relatively young candidate on the electoral race</u> – and (f) (<u>electionwise</u>) his (g) <u>calculations were right</u>. Yet maybe (h) <u>from the point of view of the inner-party life</u>, he (i) <u>created a competitor for himself</u>]

The metaphoric expression that serves as a coda of the narrative is contained in the title "They got together – wave and stone", which is a well-known quote from Pushkin's verse novel "Eugene Onegin", a classical piece of Russian literature. Its meaning is based on antithesis. The quote itself is widely used in the East-European culture to render contrasts figuratively. Such contrasting lines are drawn in the extract under consideration in (a), (b), (c), (d-e), (f-h), (g-i), and the quote as if brings these diverse threads together in the story's united whole.

The metaphoric coda that precedes a narrative may be underpinned with a single scenario, as in the following fragment.

(10) ***Гірко!***

[...] Ми зі своїм єврооптимізмом для них – <u>наче гості, що спізнилися на весілля. Дуже спізнилися. Молодята вже ледь не розлучаються, а ми кричимо "гірко". Молодята ділять майно, а ми говоримо про любов та взаємодопомогу.</u> (Shcherba, 2016)

[**Bitter**!

… with our euro-optimism, for them we are all <u>like guests who have been late for the wedding. Very late. The newlyweds are already on the verge of divorce,</u> and <u>we are shouting "Bitter!" The newlyweds are dividing their property,</u> and <u>we are talking about love and mutual support</u>]

This extract is underpinned with the real scenario of a typical Slavic wedding, a traditional element of which is for the quests to shout "Bitter!" at the festive dinner and for the newlyweds to kiss in front of the guests. The tradition looks quirky to foreigners, and yet the author of the article choses it in order to render some "domestic" colouring in this way, making the contrast clearer to Ukrainian readership – and probably, imparting a sarcastic tonality to the situation.

A metaphoric coda at the end of a story serves not so much to organize it (though this function may also be present), but rather to draw a moralizing conclusion, as in the following fragment.

(11) *Нещодавно Сенат Франції проголосував за резолюцію про (a) <u>поступове послаблення санкцій</u> [проти Росії – О.М.]. Подібне рішення прийняла одна з провінцій Італії. Росія, зрозуміло, самими лише заявами не обходиться. (b) <u>Тут пущено в хід щупальця</u>, які (c) <u>приводять в рух механізми</u>, що стимулюють подібні заяви та рішення, озвучені голосами європейських політиків і парламентарів. Витрати ж на ці зусилля йдуть такі, що їх вже варто порівнювати з втратами від санкцій. І все це (d) <u>оповито піар-політичними міфами</u>. Тим часом статистика вже дає достатньо даних, аби з'ясувати характер впливу цих **санкцій** та зрештою (e) <u>відділити, як кажуть, "зерна від плевел"</u>* (Gaidutskiy 2016).

[Not long ago, the French Senate voted for the resolution on (a) <u>gradual lifting of the sanctions </u>(against Russia – O.M.). One of Italian provinces took a similar decision. It is obvious that Russia does not limit itself to declarations of the kind. It (b) <u>has pulled out its tentacles</u> that (c) <u>activate the mechanisms</u> stimulating declarations of the kind and decisions voiced by European politicians and parliamentarians. The expenses to stimulate such efforts are so great that they are comparable with the losses from sanctions. And all that is in (d) <u>enveloped by PR-political myths</u>. Meanwhile, statistics is already giving enough data to clarify the nature of the sanctions' impact and further on (e) <u>to separate, </u>as they say,<u> the wheat from the chaff.</u>]

The story presents Russia as an octopus spreading its tentacles (b) in order to activate the mechanisms (c) that stimulate the EU member states to voice the opinion that sanctions against Russia are to be lifted (a). This metaphor with its obvious negative connotations expresses an affective stance, which does not exhaust the message of the story. The "octopus" metaphor is further counterbalanced with the metaphoric coda (e) *to separate wheat from chaff.* Yet the moral contained in it is not only rational: it also allows the reader to draw inferences about the negative affective colouring of the story as well.

As can be seen in extract (11), the types of metaphor-narrative correlation in newspaper accounts can combine: here we see a combination of types 1 and 3. Yet all three types of correlation between metaphors and stories may also come together, as in fragment (12) below, where linguistic expression relating to type 1 are underscored with a dashed line, of type 2 – with a straight line, and type 3 – with a bold line.

(12) *Саме в ході проекту (a) <u>розширення ЄС</u> (b) <u>Австрії вдалося</u> те, (c) <u>про що Україна тільки мріє</u>, – вона стала (d) <u>справжнім мостом між Сходом і Заходом.</u> (e) <u>Бути мостом</u> – це (f) <u>правильна мрія</u>, якщо (g) <u>твердо знаєш, хто ти такий і чого прагнеш у житті</u>. (h) <u>Австрія знала</u>. З одного боку, (i) <u>ця країна знала</u>, що вона (j) <u>плоть від плоті</u> найсправжнісінька "європейська Європа". Західний комфорт, краса, культура. З другого – (k) <u>австрійський нейтралітет</u>, зручне розташування (Відень географічно розташований значно ближче до сходу, ніж та ж Прага) і (l) <u>природна торговельна жилка</u> роблять Австрію (m) <u>привабливим партнером</u> для Сходу. Передусім для нас, слов'ян. Перефразовуючи Гребєнщикова, (n) <u>Австрія готова</u> (o) "<u>принимать форму того, с кем она</u>". (Shcherba, 2016)*

[It is in the course of the project of (a) <u>the EU expansion</u> that (b) <u>Austria managed to do</u> what (c) <u>Ukraine is only dreaming of</u> – it (d) <u>became a real bridge between the East and the West</u>. (e) <u>Being a bridge</u> is the right kind of (f) <u>dream</u>, (g) <u>if one knows for sure who they are and what they really want in life</u>. (h) <u>Austria knew it</u>. On the one hand, (i) <u>the country knew</u> that it truly is (j) <u>Europe's flesh and blood</u>, the "European Europe". Western comfort, beauty, culture. On the other hand, it is (k) <u>Austrian neutrality</u>, convenient location (geographically, Vienna is located much closer to the East than that same Prague) and (l) <u>a natural commercial vein</u> make Austria (m) <u>an attractive partner</u> for the East. In the first place, for us, Slavic people. Paraphrasing Grebenshchikov, (n) <u>Austria is ready</u> (o) "<u>to take the shape of the one who she's with</u>"]

The main device that holds the metaphoricity of this extract together is the image schema A NATION/STATE (Austria, Ukraine) is A PERSON. However, the extract contains a few metaphors that are not related to it, forming a "side-scenario" THE EU is AN OBJECT that EXPANDS (a, d, e). The rest of metaphors are divided between two figurative sub-scenarios of the metaphor A NATION/STATE is A PERSON: "the physical body scenario" which is instantiated in (j, l, o) and "the thinking/social being scenario" (c, f, g, h, i, k, m, n). The metaphor scenario in (o) A NATION/STATE (Austria) is A PERSON who IS READY TO TAKE THE SHAPE OF WHATEVER PARTNER IT HAS is triggered by a quote (in Russian) from Grebenshchikov's song "Who are you now?". Boris Grebenshchikov is the frontman of a Russian rock-group "Aquarium",

which has been popular on the Soviet and post-Soviet space since 1970s. The metaphoric scenario that the quote triggers serves as a conclusion to the story about the place that Austria occupies in Europe. Yet the stance of the writer cannot be said to be definitely positive: on the one hand, it is good for a country to be adaptable to changing circumstances, on the other hand, the metaphoric scenario suggests promiscuity (it is important to stress that the author of the article mentions that the quote is "paraphrased" (we might say "reframed" since it is used in the context which is somewhat different from that of the song).

5. Discussion

Combining conceptual metaphor theory in its dynamic version with the narrative theory has proved to be productive since it helps to bring to light the mechanisms of framing the image of the EU in a Ukrainian newspaper (*Dzerkalo Tyzhnia).* The analysis that was carried out is qualitatively oriented; it helped us to trace some tendencies in using metaphors in media discourse.

We depart from the traditional conceptual metaphor analytical scheme, attempting to find structural correlations between the source and target domains and taking into account the types of mapped conceptual entities and entrenchment of metaphoric tokens in the English language.

According to their influence on the architecture of the semantic/conceptual space of the story, metaphors are not all of the same kind. There are three major types of framing the EU with the help of metaphors in use, and each of the types presupposes metaphors of a specific type and a specific way of using them. The first type is represented by a number of metaphors with different source domains; such metaphors share only the writer's stance. The second type embraces cases when a series of metaphors in use are underpinned with the same image schema expanded into a metaphoric scenario. The third type includes cases when a narrative is built around a situational metaphor.

A situational metaphor is capable of serving a 'center of gravity' for a number of other metaphors, attracting them and thus bending the conceptual/semantic space of the text like Einstein's proverbial 'marble on a trampoline'. Distinct from the case of the image-schematic metaphors, situational metaphors are based on rich images capable of evoking an emotional response from the reader, which testifies to the metaphor's strong 'gravitational pull'.

The three types of metaphor-narrative correlation can combine within a single story, creating an intricate, unique conceptual space which is not "even", but stretched in some places and curved to a different degree in others.

6. Conclusion

This study is a part of the transnational research project "Crisis, conflict and critical diplomacy: EU perceptions in Ukraine and Israel/Palestine (C^{3}EU)" (2015-2018) supported by Jean Monnet Programme of the European Commission [C^{3}EU]. According to the project's results, Ukraine has a tendency to look at the world through the prism of its own interests, and this has conditioned the specificity of its perception of the EU. This image is not wholly positive, and yet it is altogether sensible.

The evidence obtained in this study is consistent with the general findings. For the EU, the time span under study (January-June 2016) was crowded with events, Brexit being the most significant among them. This accounts for the attention *Dzerkalo Tyzhnia* paid to covering different aspects of the EU's life. In their descriptions of the EU, Ukrainian journalists tend to quote verbatim when commenting on the events the outcome of which is uncertain. Reframing Umberto Eco's saying that "quotes are like testimony in a trial" [Eco 2015: 162], we can presume that Ukrainian journalists tend "to be on the safe side" in their predictions. Their accounts of events in the past demonstrate a clearer stance. In order to make the events in the EU more explicable to Ukrainian readers, journalists, while using metaphoric language, are prone to utilizing the tactic of

"domestication", which is demonstrated primarily by situational metaphors used as a coda to a newspaper story.

Understanding the framings of the EU provided by the Ukrainian media outlet could be of use in informing foreign political actors and serve as a reasonable starting point for improving their communication efforts with Ukrainian audiences. The prospects for further research lie in applying quantitative methods that emphasize mathematical analysis of data collection.

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GUIDELINES FOR CONTRIBUTORS

Article formats: Research Article, Book Review.

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Papers should be reasonably divided into numbered SECTIONS and, if necessary, sub-sections.

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(Affiliation: City, Country)
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Name & Surname. Title of the article (bald). An abstract is a brief, comprehensive summary of the contents of the article; it allows readers to survey the contents of an article quickly. The abstract should normally be a single paragraph *between 200 and 250 words*. A good abstract is accurate, nonevaluative, coherent and readable, clear and concise. It uses verbs rather than their noun equivalents and the active rather than the passive voice; uses the present tense to describe conclusions drawn or results with continuing applicability; uses the past tense to describe specific variables manipulated or outcomes measured. An abstract for *a theory-oriented paper* should describe: how the theory or model works and/or the principles on which it is based and what phenomena the theory or model accounts for and linkages to empirical results. An abstract for a *methodological paper* should comprise the general class of methods being discussed; the essential features of the proposed method; and the range of application of the proposed method. Given the small amount of words allowed, each word and sentence included in your abstract needs to be meaningful. In addition, all the information contained in the abstract must be discussed in the main body of the paper.

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1. Introduction

The body of a manuscript opens with an introduction that presents the specific problem under study and describes the research strategy. The structure of the introduction should necessarily comprise the author's aims / tasks / objectives, the subject-matter and the material of the study.

Exploring the importance of the problem the article should state how it is related to previous work in the area. If other aspects of this study have been reported previously, how does this report differ from, and build on, the earlier report?

Describe relevant related literature. This section should review studies to establish the general area, and then move towards studies that more specifically define or are more specifically related to

the research you are conducting. Your literature review must not be a series of quotations strung together; instead it needs to provide a critical analysis of previous work.

State hypotheses and objectives, their correspondence to research. The statement of the hypothesis should logically follow on from your literature review and you may want to make an explicit link between the variables you are manipulating or measuring in your study and previous research. The present tense is used to state your hypotheses and objectives.

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A good paragraph should contain at least the following four elements: transition, topic sentence, specific evidence and analysis, and a brief concluding sentence. A transition sentence acts as a transition from one idea to the next. A topic sentence tells the reader what you will be discussing in the paragraph. Specific evidence and analysis support your claims that provide a deeper level of detail than your topic sentence. A concluding sentence tells the reader how and why this information supports the paper's thesis.

2. Method

The Method section describes in detail how the study was conducted, including conceptual and operational definitions of the variables used in the study. It also permits experienced investigators to replicate the study.

The method section should be written in paragraph form with as little repetition as possible. This section will often be broken down into subsections such as participants, materials and procedure. The subsections you use will depend on what is useful to help describe and explain your experiment.

In the method section of the paper you should use the past tense since you are describing what you did; for example, e.g. *An experiment was performed…, The participants were instructed to ... .*

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If you are presenting statistical results, place descriptive statistics first (means and standard deviations) followed by the results of any inferential statistical tests you performed. Indicate any transformations to the data you are reporting; for example, you may report percentage correct scores rather than straight scores. Raw data and lengthy whole transcripts of qualitative data should be put in the appendices, only excerpts (descriptive statistics or illustrative highlights of lengthy qualitative data) should be included in the results section.

In the results section you will need to use both the past tense and the present tense. The past tense is used to describe results and analyses; for example, *The knowledge scores were analyzed ..., The results indicated ... .*

The present tense is used with results that the reader can see such as means, tables and figures; for example, *The means show that ..., The weekly growth rate illustrated in Table 3 illustrates how ... .*

Authors should refer in the text to all tables and figures used and explain what the reader should look for when using the table or figure. Focus only on the important point the reader should draw from them, and leave the details for the reader to examine on her own. Each table and figure

must be intelligible without reference to the text, so be sure to include an explanation of every abbreviation (except the standard statistical symbols and abbreviations).

Give titles to all tables and figures number all tables sequentially as you refer to them in the text (Table 1, Table 2, etc.), likewise for figures (Figure 1, Figure 2, etc.).

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If necessary an article may have more sections and subsections.

All examples are italisized. One word or word-combination examples are given within the body of a paragraph.

Sentence or textual examples, preferably numbered through the article, are given in separate paragraphs in italics with indentation 1,25 cm for the whole paragraph and separated from the previous / following text by one blank line. Example:

(1) *"I'm Prendergast," said the newcomer. "Have some port?"*
"Thank you, I'd love to." [Waugh 1980:46]

5. Conclusions

This section simply states what the researcher thinks the data mean, and, as such, should relate directly back to the problem/question stated in the introduction. By looking at only the Introduction and Conclusions sections, a reader should have a good idea of what the researcher has investigated and discovered even though the specific details of how the work was done would not be known. After moving from general to specific information in the introduction and body paragraphs, your conclusion should restate the main points of your argument.

Conclusions should finish up with an overview of future possible research.

Acknowledgments (not obligatory and not numbered paragraph). Identify grants or other financial support (and the source, if appropriate) for your study. Next, acknowledge colleagues who assisted in conducting the study or critiquing the manuscript. End this paragraph with thanks for personal assistance, such as in manuscript preparation.

In-text citations. If you are directly quoting from a work and the author is not named in a signal phrase, you will need to include the author, year of publication, and the page number for the reference: [Почепцов 1976: 15; Leech 1985: 373].

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For materials in Ukrainian or Russian:

Articles:

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E-materials:

Zagurenko, A.A. (2002). Ekonomicheskaya optimizatsia [Economic optimization]. *Neftyanoe khozyaistvo – Oil Industry, 11*. Available from: http://www.opus

Conference papers:

Zagurenko, A.A. (2002). Osobennosti proektirovaniya [Features of design]. Trudy 6 Mezhdunarodnogo Simpoziuma: *Novye tekhnologii* – Proceedings from 6th Int. Symposium: *New technologies.* Kyiv, 267-272 (in Russian).

Books:

Zagurenko, A.A. (2002). *Ekonomicheskaya optimizatsia [Economic optimization]*. Kyiv: Nauka Publ.

Dissertations:

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