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SUBJECTIVITY IN METAPHOR TRANSLATION: A CASE FOR RUSSIAN TRANSLATION OF ENGLISH METAPHORS OF DEPRESSIVE EMOTIONS

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Abstract
This paper focuses on the theoretical concept of subjectivity in the translation of metaphors of depressive emotions in Styron's *Darkness visible: A memoir of madness* into Russian. In the memoir, the author interprets his emotions and names them via metaphors; these interpretations are driven by images in the author's mind. The hypothesis of this paper is that metaphor translation is substantiated by metaphor interpretations driven by the translator's mental images.

An image-driven interpretation in translation is a creative act of giving a meaning to a word in the source language and of finding in the target language a word to capture this meaning. This act is driven by images "drawn" in the translator's mind. Mental images are non-propositional objects in the mind but languages are devised to have propositional thought at their basis, which entails semantic losses to translation. These losses must be minimized by finding words in the target language that make optimal descriptions for mental images described by words in the source language first. In this paper, the subjectivity argument is used to show that these mental images are the translator's but not the author's. Subjectivity locks the translator into their own experiences only and overrides expectations of the translator's and the author's shared phenomenal consciousness.

This paper analyses Menikov's translation of Styron's metaphors. The pivot in this analysis is metaphorical creativity, with Menikov's translation shown to be discrepant with the majority of Styron's creative metaphors in terms of the images that drive the translator's interpretations. The author's many creative images prove transformed or lost in translation, which endorses subjectivity in metaphor translation and makes it possible to conclude that Menikov's translation distorts many of W. Styron's metaphors.

Key words: conceptual metaphor, interpretation, mental image, subjectivity, translation.

Words are like the film on deep water
L. Wittgenstein

1. Introduction

This paper focuses on the theoretical concept of subjectivity in metaphor translation and presents a case study of metaphors of depressive emotions in Styron's *Darkness visible: A memoir of madness* translated into Russian. This paper treats the memoir as the author's first-person verbal report, with acts of the author's interpretation of his emotions followed by acts of him naming these emotions via metaphors. This paper assumes that interpretation of this kind is an image-like representation in the author's mind and argues that image-driven interpretations make the core in metaphor translation.

In translation, an image-driven interpretation is a creative act (and the result of this act) of giving a meaning to a word in the source language (henceforth, SL) and of finding in the target language (henceforth, TL) the word to capture this meaning, which is driven by images 'drawn' in the translator's mind by virtue of the mind's representational content. An interpretation in translation rests on image-like mental representations converted into word meanings, and vice versa. In this conversion, the translator via the author's words with their meanings 'sees' with the eye of their (the translator's) mind the images that depict the author's emotion and select in the target language the words that describe these images. In translation, therefore the content of the translator's mind must be converted from phenomenal experience into propositional thought.

Mental images as visual objects in the mind are of no propositional structure, while natural languages are devised to have propositional thought at their basis (Chalmers, 2004; Kosslyn et al., 2006), which entails semantic costs to verbal communication and equally to translation as to communication with words across cultures. A translator is expected to use their imagination to minimize these costs by finding words in the target language that give mental images their optimal descriptions (Hubscher-Davidson, 2020). This paper adopts the subjectivity argument from Nagel (1974) and aims to show by means of a thought experiment that these images are available only to the translator who is a conscious subject, whose mind's eye is able to 'see' the images. The eye of the translator's mind is not alienable into that of the author to 'see' the images there.

Whereas a good translator might generally be able to take the author's mental or experiential point of view and imagine what it is like to be this author, what it is like for this author/authors to be themselves will remain beyond the translator's reach. Even if the translator metamorphosed gradually into the author, his mind still would not be innately wired as that of the author. This locks the translator into his subjective experiences only and overrides expectations of shared phenomenal consciousness in translation: a translator can only know what it is like to be himself. Knowledge of this kind comes as nature and nurture whose interplay in the translation of metaphors is discussed in this paper with reference to conceptual metaphor theory. In this paper, the optimality assumption resonates with the seminal approaches to metaphor translation proposed in the field (Kovalenko & Martynyuk, 2021; Schäffner, 2004).

This paper is a case study of Menikov's translation of Styron's metaphors of depressive emotions into Russian. The pivot in this present analysis as compared to other translation studies is the concept of metaphorical creativity (Kövecses, 2010); and the distinction between the author's creative vs. conventional metaphors (Vakhovska, 2017c) will frame the discussion that follows. I hypothesize that Menikov's translation of the author's metaphors is discrepant in terms of the images that drive the translator's vs. the author's interpretations. The majority of the author's creative images prove to be transformed or lost in translation, which makes it possible for this paper to speculate upon the translator's metaphorical re-creativity as non-derivable from the creativity of the author.

The research agenda of this paper is interdisciplinary and bridges the domains of cognitive translation studies (Ahrens & Say, 1999; Rebrii & Tashchenko, 2019), cognitive linguistics (Kövecses, 2010; 2014; Shevchenko & Shastalo, 2021), and philosophy of mind. The focus on creative metaphors of depressive emotions in Styron's memoir is intended to amplify the subjectivity conditions that this paper examines: (creative) metaphors with their notorious semantic vagueness and emotions as intrinsic phenomenal states of the human mind make good picks for the purposes of this paper. As Styron puts it, "Depression is a disorder of mood, so mysteriously painful and elusive in the way it becomes known to the self – to the mediating intellect – as to verge close to being beyond description" (Styron, 1992, p. 5).

This paper's epigraph is a non-trivial metaphorical conceptualization of the mind in terms of deep water with words as a film on it. Words are the 'film' that coats the mind's content. Shape and form of this film are suggestive of those of the content but never disclose the depths. In psychotherapeutic dream interpretation, deep water stands for the unconsciousness. Something stirs

this water from within for the author's depressed mind, and words are suggestive of this pathological condition. In this paper, I aim to answer the question of how deep the translator is able to 'go' into this water by shedding light on the problem of subjectivity in metaphor translation.

2. Emotions in depression and their intrinsic phenomenal properties

In popular opinion, depression is often understood as a disorder that involves solely a pathological amplification of negative emotions and a suppression of positive ones. For scientists, however, depression is a disorder that holds a variety of heterogeneous pathological subjective experiences, ***depressive emotion experience***, identified with alterations and disturbances in fundamental human emotions, being only one of them (Ratcliffe, 2015). Equally meaningful for depression are transformed conceptualizations of time, of other people, of agency and free will, and some others.

In depression, the orderly and stable mind with its rationality, ability for reflection, embeddedness in the world, appropriate and proportionate emotions, and intact deliberation and decision making is replaced by the disorderly and unstable mind with its irrationality, conflicting motives and needs, disturbances of reality, social isolation, pathological emotion, and biased reasoning. Depression is a type of mental disorders with specific subjectively experienced changes in one's entire existence. These changes shape a different perception of the world and of oneself; they permeate the whole experience of the depression sufferer who is powerless to dissociate himself from them (Bathina et al., 2021). Figure 1 below shows emotion experience of depression in its relation to other phenomena of the kind:


Figure 1. Emotion experience of depression among other subjective experiences

With Figure 1, I intend to capture the essential generic core of the many assorted views on emotion experience of depression found in scientific literature (see Vakhovska, 2017b, pp. 6-27 for an overview). This figure reads upwards:

- emotion experience of depression is not solitary in type of pathological emotion experiences; the other experiences of this type are, for example, emotion alterations and disturbances associated with schizophrenia, autism, and obsessive compulsive disorder. Pathology of emotion in depression is qualitatively distinct from that in the other mental disorders;

- classifying emotion as pathological is only possible against the background of healthy emotion. The relation of pathological, in particular depressive, vs. healthy emotion experience is that of two opposite poles within a single semantic continuum organized around human emotion;
- emotion is conceptualized as a distinct experience. It integrates into an individual's subjective experience as one of its varied instances and inherits its properties. Depressive emotion is an idiosyncratic, nonstative, heterogeneous, manifold, and indivisible experience (Bathina et al., 2021). It is ineffable in the sense that it is of no propositional structure, is difficult to verbally report on, and lends itself best to metaphorical description. First-person verbal reports on emotion experiences of depression are normally either raw accounts given by ordinary people or literary memoirs written by professional authors. This paper focuses on Styron's memoir (1992), whose metaphorical abundance makes it a good candidate for research.

3. Metaphor translation: mental images in one's minds' eyes

Emotions are inherently conscious representational states of the mind that have phenomenal, or what-it's-like, features: there is always something it is like to feel fear, to have a fit of anxiety, to experience joy, etc. (Nagel, 1974; Chalmers, 2004). This is phenomenal consciousness (Block, 2008).

First-person verbal reports on emotions are acts of awareness followed by acts of naming. Awareness allows a particular emotion to emerge into consciousness as a distinct and coherent experience available to the interpretive mind. Awareness transforms the emotion and lets its salient features only emerge into emotion concepts: emotion is "a sort of experience-in-itself that cannot normally be captured except through awareness, which forms and shapes it and therefore changes it" (Charland, 2005, p. 246). Emotion names with their meanings expose only salient features in the emotion concepts and thus transform the emotion further (Vakhovska, 2017a).

Despite this, first-person verbal reports remain "the most reliable and possibly only window that researchers have on conscious, subjective, emotional experience" (Barrett, 1996, p. 47). A first-person verbal report is always integral to the emoter's experience; he cannot take his emotion experience apart from his awareness and interpretation of this experience. In (Vakhovska, 2017c), I showed that this interpretation is driven by metaphorical images. In this paper, I rely on insights from (Vakhovska & Jusuk, 2021) and argue that image-driven interpretations make the core in metaphor translation.

An image-driven interpretation in translation is a creative act (and the result of this act) of giving a meaning to a word in the SL and of finding in the TL the word to capture this meaning, which is driven by images "drawn" in the translator's mind by virtue of their mind's representational content (cf. 'images' in (Morgan, 2018)). An interpretation in translation rests on image-like mental representations converted into word meanings and vice versa. In this conversion, the translator via the author's words with their meanings must see with the translator's mind's 'eye' the images that depict the author's emotion and select in the TL the words that describe these images: in translation, the content of the translator's mind is converted from phenomenal experience into propositional thought, cf. the experience of seeing that this page is white vs. the thought that this page is white.

Whereas mental images as visual objects in the mind are of no propositional structure, natural languages are devised to have propositional thought at their basis, which entails semantic costs to verbal communication and equally to translation as to communication with words across cultures. A good translator will minimize these costs by finding words in the TL that make for mental images their optimal descriptions. Translator's art is Aesopian in nature and requires acumen, wisdom, and sapience in professional matters so that interpretations in translation capture the spirit of the content and transfer this spirit cross-culturally via words of the SL and the TL.

There is a question: whose emotion do the images that the translator sees with his mind's eye depict? And in whose mind does he 'see' these images? The fact that this is translation, i.e. a re-

creative activity, makes one presume that these are the author's mind and emotion but to accept this presumption is to claim that the eye of the translator's mind is alienable from his into the author's mind, which is very counterintuitive. The subjectivity argument holds that any phenomenal experience is available only to this conscious subject who experiences it: Nagel (1974) shows that whereas humans might generally be able to take the bat's mental or experiential point of view and imagine what it is like to be a bat, what it is like for a bat to be a bat will remain beyond human reach. Even if a human metamorphosed gradually into a bat, their form and nature still would not be innately wired as those of bats: they would only be able to experience bats' behaviors but not the bat's mode of consciousness, not the workings of the bats' mind.

As a rule, translators of fiction are individuals with well-developed imaginations (Susam-Saraeva, 2021). Whereas a good translator might generally be able to take the author's mental or experiential point of view and imagine what it is like to be this author, what it is like for this author to be himself will remain beyond the translator's reach. Even if the translator metamorphosed gradually into the author, his mind still would not be innately wired as that of the author: he would only be able to experience the author's behavior but not the workings of the author's mind. This locks the translator into his subjective experiences only and overrides expectations of shared phenomenal consciousness in translation: the translator can only know what it is like to be himself. Knowledge of this kind comes as nature and nurture whose interplay in metaphor translation is discussed below.

4. What makes metaphor translation difficult?

A conceptual metaphor is comprehending the target domain A through a source domain B, which is based on the set of mappings between elements of A and elements of B (Kövecses, 2014). To know a conceptual metaphor means to know this set of mappings.

Theoretically, in metaphor translation the mappings, individually and in the set, are substantiated with precision in the cross-cultural transfer. Practically, however, metaphor translation proves the rule of thumb and notorious case-by-case heuristics. This is explained by the sophisticated interplay of universal and variable factors in metaphor generation, interpretation, and use. The figure below captures these factors.

Conceptual metaphors are coherent with

the embodied mind,   the context,

which explains their (near-)**universality**   which explains their **variation** = metaphorical creativity

metaphor variation has dimensions   metaphor variation has causes

cross-cultural
within-cultural
individual
&   differential experience and its   differential cognitive styles,
ontogenetic   subcases   or how construal operations
phylogenetic   are used

differential memory
differential concerns and interests
awareness of context
          physical
          social
          cultural
          immediate communicative
   &
          global
          local

Figure 2. Universals and variables that shape metaphor translation

Figure 2 is based on Kövecses' (2014) assumptions that metaphorical concepts are motivated and at the same time constrained by the human embodiment and by the context. On this wise, metaphors, though their nature is highly emergent, are always under the varying pressure of coherence. Tenably, the embodied mind explains cultural (near-)universality of certain metaphorical concepts that prove easy to translate. Conversely, various contexts make one enter a multitude of possible worlds, which causes systematic difficulties in metaphor translation. Metaphor variation relates to metaphorical creativity; hypothetically, amounts of metaphorical creativity are proportional to amounts of difficulty in metaphor translation.

The overriding factors introduced into metaphor translation by contexts prevail. This makes it hardly possible to generalize over more or less prescriptive principles of metaphor translation. In my discussion in particular the theoretical concept of accuracy is postponed because of its flavour of perfection, cf. *accurate* "free from error or defect; consistent with a standard, rule, or model; precise; exact" (*Roget's 21ˢᵗ century dictionary and thesaurus*, n.d.). Hypothetically, an accurate metaphor translation would require that certain conditions match perfectly:

- the use of the same source and target domains characterized by exactly the same set of mappings, with the implication that the metaphorical entailments, the metaphorical range and scope also match and obey similar conceptual constraints imposed on this metaphor by the invariance principle;
- the use of the same literal and figurative meaning;
- the use of the same or a similar cultural background (Kövecses, 2014).

I believe that only a few cases, if any, will sit on this match and that the theoretical locution must be that of an optimal vs. suboptimal metaphor translation instead of an accurate vs. inaccurate

one, with the understanding that optimality is a graded concept that ranges from completely optimal through more or less optimal to suboptimal cases.

5. Metaphors and approaches to their translation: heuristic virtues made of necessity

The optimality assumptions I make resonate with the seminal solution-focused approaches to metaphor translation discussed by theorists and practitioners in the field (Bassnett, 1991; Larson 1984; Newmark, 1988). These approaches are:

(A) Metaphor → Metaphor. The original metaphor is preserved in translation. This direct translation is the case with metaphors that are exactly equivalent both in the SL and TL. They have the same intended meanings and evoke the same mental images (Bassnett, 1991). They are often (near-)universal metaphors, which makes them natural in both cultures with the same interpretation therein (Larson, 1984). A non-metaphorical expression can sometimes accompany such metaphors in order to explain and support their intended meaning (Newmark, 1988). *You are my sun*, for example, is a metaphorical expression whose translation is effortless because of the universal embodiment in humans.

However, in the view that "potential resemblances between entities are legion, but what helps (triggers, prompts, etc.) us (to) choose a source domain would be some contextual factor" (Kövecses, 2010, p. 682), a presumably universal metaphor might acquire a non-universal interpretation that needs cognitive effort. Indeed, *Juliet is the sun* in W. Shakespeare's *Romeo and Juliet* might steer a modern male to the interpretation *She is sexually hot*, which is altogether legitimate, though based on an overriding contextual factor. Similarly, *The sun will rise at 9* might mean the time of a terrorist attack, provided the peculiar context (Prof. Dr. K.-U. Kühnberger, personal communication, September 2019). This train of thought brings case-by-case heuristics into the otherwise straightforward approach to metaphor translation.

(B) Metaphor $_1$ → Metaphor$_2$. In approach (B), the original metaphor is substituted with a different metaphor in translation. This substitution causes no cultural clash (Newmark, 1988) and occurs when no equivalent metaphor is found in the TL. The metaphorical image is substituted by an image that delivers the same or a similar interpretation (Bassnett, 1991). Sometimes, a non-metaphorical expression accompanies the metaphor to support its interpretation (Larson, 1984).

In translation, metaphor might well be substituted by a simile that, although less emotive than the metaphor, preserves both the original image and the intended interpretation, cf. *She is a bee* and *She is as busy as a bee*. The mapping of conceptual domains is absent in similes, and I choose to exclude them from the data set in this paper.

(C) Metaphor → non-Metaphor. In approach (C), the metaphor in translation is substituted with a literal non-metaphorical paraphrase that describes the image and explains the meaning of the metaphor. In metaphors, metaphor paraphrases expose their grounds. In a paraphrase, the metaphorical image is lost, and what actually is translated is the intended meanings but not the metaphor (Larson, 1984; Newmark, 1988; Bassnett, 1991). A paraphrase is never meaning-neutral with respect to the original metaphor (see Searle, 1979). It loses some part in the intended meaning and robs the metaphor of its image and rich interpretation, cf. *He is a fox* vs. *He is cunning and sly* (Ahrens & Say, 1999).

Under this approach, metaphors in translation can sometimes be altogether omitted as untranslatable or redundant, which seems to be a borderline case.

6. Styron's metaphors in their Russian translation

In this section, I suggest an analysis of how metaphors of depressive emotions from Styron (1992) are translated by Menikov into Russian in (Stayron, 2013). The pivot in this analysis is metaphorical (re-)creativity that sustains my belief that interpretations in translation are driven by mental images the translator 'sees' with his mind's eye. Metaphors of emotions in Styron (1992) include conventional and creative concepts (Vakhovska, 2017b, pp. 69-77), and I use this distinction to

frame my analysis. This is the standpoint of the possible world I am in now, and my evaluation of metaphorical concepts for amounts of their creativity and for the translation approaches to them cannot be, and is not intended as, the last and exhaustive word of truth.

Out of the total eighty-seven metaphorical concepts in Styron (1992), two are completely unconventional, twenty-six are more or less unconventional, and fifty-nine are completely conventional[1] (see Vakhovska, 2017b for definitions and a literature review on metaphorical creativity). Below, there is an account of these concepts with reference to the particular approach used by Menikov to translate the linguistic manifestations of each concept from English into Russian. For each of the emotion concepts in my data, I suggest a narrative that describes the mental image 'I' (a watcher-researcher) 'see' with my mind's eye in my interpretation of this fragment in the memoir.

Altogether, there are three images for each fragment that my account is intended to join: one is that 'seen' by Styron as the author who describes his phenomenal states via metaphors, and the other two are Menikov's and mine (a watcher-researcher's) as the translators who via the author's words take his experiential point of view and imagine what it is like to be an author − depression sufferer. As translators, we are locked into our subjective experiences and can only know what it is like to be ourselves. Our interpretations of Styron's phenomenal states described in metaphors are our best guesses; and from our experiential points of view, we use Russian words to describe to the Russian reader of the memoir what it feels like for Styron to experience these states. The mental images would not fail to vary since there are eyes of three different minds that 'see' them.

The narratives come with relevant citations from (Styron, 1992) and from (Stayron, 2013), and on this wise I set out to answer two major questions: (1) if Menikov preserves Styron's images in metaphor translation; (2) what approaches Menikov uses to translate Styron's metaphors.

The SL text comprises completely unconventional, more or less unconventional metaphors, and completely conventional ones.[1]

The two ***completely unconventional metaphors*** are integration-induced. They are the DESPERATION *is* A CONTAINER and DESPERATION *is* CONTENT INSIDE A CONTAINER conceptual metaphors that the *despair beyond despair* metaphorical expression evokes, with DESPERATION defined metaphorically and within a single cognitive event in terms of both a container and the content inside this container. DESPERATION is a container that contains itself, which is very non-trivial. Cf. *пустота, отраженная в пустоте* by the Russian postmodern poet, philosopher, and literary critic K.A. Kedrov with the same mechanism of metaphorical integration: EMPTINESS is both a mirror and a reflection in this mirror, it is a mirror that reflects itself. Interestingly, the word *despair* ascends to Proto-Indo-European **spes-/*speh-* 'get full' (*Online Etymology Dictionary* (n.d.) that in combination with *de-* 'without' pictures despair as emptiness, which I assume has archetypal roots and suggests that Styron's despair is an emptiness that has gone beyond emptiness.

- **DESPERATION *is* A CONTAINER**. In this metaphor, a deep container (DESPERATION) is filled with content (THE SUFFERER'S MIND) but can also be filled with its own self. When DESPERATION is filled with DESPERATION, the content overflows the container. The sufferer falls into DESPERATION, although he thought he had acquired a steady walk MEDICATION to prevent himself from falling.

- **DESPERATION *is* CONTENT INSIDE A CONTAINER**. DESPERATION is content that fills different containers HOURS, STATES OF THE MIND. DESPERATION can get condensed inside its containers. When DESPERATION fills DESPERATION, it overflows itself (examples 1, 2):

(1)   ... a curious inner convulsion that I can describe only as <u>despair beyond despair</u> (Styron, 1992, p. 36).
... странное душевное содрогание, которое могу описать лишь как <u>отчаяние, превосходящее границы всякого отчаяния</u> (Stayron, 2013, p. 294-295).

Metaphor translation (1) does not preserve the image, although the metaphor in translation preserves the original image of going beyond an entity, it does not conceive of this entity as of a boundless emptiness, which is central for the metaphor: emptiness gone beyond emptiness, with neither foothold nor boundaries. In this case, the approach to metaphor translation is (A) 'Metaphor → Metaphor' but the original metaphor is richer in interpretation.

(2)   ... this may be indemnity enough for having endured the <u>despair beyond despair</u> (Styron, 1992, p. 48).
... быть может, это достаточная компенсация за то <u>отчаяние</u>, которое им пришлось вынести (Stayron, 2013, p. 316).

In translation (2), the original metaphor is omitted and the image is lost. This is (C) 'Metaphor → non-Metaphor' approach to metaphor translation.

In the text, there are twenty-six ***more or less unconventional metaphors***, that are instances of source-induced creativity. There are fourteen *source-internal metaphors*: FEAR *is* SIEGE, FEAR *is* RIVETS, FEAR *is* TOXIC FOG, FEAR *is* A FOGBOUND SHIP, FEAR *is* A PRISONER, FEAR *is* DRIZZLE, ANXIETY *is* DEMONS, ANXIETY *is* A PRISONER, ANXIETY *is* A STRANGER, SADNESS *is* AN ENGULFING TIDE, SADNESS *is* A SNARE, SADNESS *is* A SPASM, DESPERATION *is* A PRISON, and DESPERATION *is* A BED OF NAILS. These are specific-level metaphors that elaborate and inherit the structure of their generic-level conventional counterparts. Most frequently, Styron uses specific-level images of various confinements. These elaborations are context-induced and might be motivated by his interests in American slavery, Nazi concentration camps, and by his social background.

- **FEAR *is* SIEGE**. FEAR is a torture of confinement for the sufferer's brain that deprives him of the powers of the mind and body:

(3)   … my brain had begun <u>to endure its familiar siege: panic</u> and dislocation (Styron, 1992, p. 10).
... на мое сознание <u>началась привычная атака: паника</u>, растерянность (Stayron, 2013, p. 245).

In metaphor translation (3), the image is not preserved; the original metaphor is substituted in translation and with it the image of fear as of an emotion stretchable in time is lost; whereas a siege is lasting, an attack is momentary. This is an example of approach B ($M_1 \to M_2$) to metaphor translation: FEAR *is* SIEGE → FEAR *is* AN ATTACK.

- **FEAR *is* RIVETS**. FEAR is metal pins that fasten the sufferer tightly making no escape possible.

(4)   … the flight of birds caused me to stop, <u>riveted with fear, and I stood stranded there, helpless, shivering</u> (Styron, 1992, p. 27).
... при виде пролетающих птиц я замер, <u>скованный ужасом, и стоял там потерянный, беспомощный, испытывая лихорадочный озноб</u> (Stayron, 2013, p. 276).

In metaphor translation (4), the image of rivets is substituted with that of shackles, and with it the idea of

the crucifying pain caused to the sufferer by his emotion of fear is lost. This (B) approach ($M_1 \rightarrow M_{2)}$ to metaphor translation explains the metaphor FEAR *is* RIVETS → FEAR *is* SHACKLES.

- **FEAR** *is* **TOXIC FOG**. Clouds of toxic fog (FEAR) surround the sufferer and make him lethargic, agonizing, and crippled.

(5)   ... I'd feel the horror, like some <u>poisonous fog bank, roll in upon my mind</u>, forcing me into bed. There I would lie for as long as six hours, <u>stuporous and virtually paralyzed</u>, gazing at the ceiling and waiting for that moment of evening when, mysteriously, <u>the crucifixion would ease up</u> (Styron, 1992, p. 33).
... я чувствовал, как ужас, подобно <u>ядовитой полосе тумана, заволакивает мой разум</u>, принуждая меня лечь в постель. Там я оставался на протяжении шести часов, <u>в оцепенении, буквально парализованный</u>, уставившись в потолок и дожидаясь наступления вечера, когда мои <u>муки таинственным образом ослабевали</u> (Stayron, 2013, p. 290).

Metaphor translation (5) uses A approach (M → M) to metaphor translation and preserves the original image.

- **FEAR** *is* **A FOGBOUND SHIP**. The sufferer is on board a ship /FEAR/ unable to navigate because of a heavy fog.

(6)   ... what I knew would be indistinguishable ordeals of <u>fogbound horror</u> (Styron, 1992, p. 36).
... я знал, что в любом случае меня ждет один и тот же <u>кошмар, ужас и мрак</u> (Stayron, 2013, p. 294).

In (6), the original metaphor is omitted in TL and the image is altogether lost. The translator used approach C (M → non-M) to metaphor translation.

- **ANXIETY** *is* **A PRISONER**. In one of the cells inside a torture chamber (DUNGEONS OF SPIRIT) is a prisoner (ANXIETY) / **FEAR** *is* **A PRISONER**.

(7)   ... incipient <u>dread that I had hidden away for so long somewhere in the dungeons of my spirit</u> (Styron, 1992, p. 23).
... зачатки <u>ужаса, столь долго скрываемые где-то в дальних башнях рассудка</u> (Stayron, 2013, p. 270).

In (7), neither the original metaphor is preserved in TL, nor the image of a dungeon, which is the underworld, or the unconscious mind. On the contrary, the word *башня* 'a tower' in translation captures the opposite interpretation of 'rising up'. This is A (M → M) approach to metaphor translation, but the metaphor in TL does not highlight the roots of fear in the unconscious mind.

- **FEAR** *is* **DRIZZLE**. The drizzle (FEAR) that surrounds the sufferer feels dismal and monotonous /GRAY COLOUR/ and is intensifying his pain.

(8)   ... the <u>gray drizzle of horror</u> induced by depression takes on the quality of physical pain (Styron, 1992, p. 29).
... <u>серая изморось ужаса</u>, вызываемого депрессией, понемногу переходит в физическую боль (Stayron, 2013, p. 281).

Metaphor translation (8) preserves the SL image and serves an example of A (M → M) approach to metaphor translation.

- ANXIETY *is* **DEMONS**. A supernatural force (ANXIETY) comes in multitudes (DEMONS) from the underworld (UNCONSCIOUSNESS) and throngs and overruns the sufferer's mind.

(9)   *... <u>anxiety</u> <...> those <u>demons</u> from beginning to <u>swarm through the subconscious</u>* (Styron, 1992, p. 25).
    ... <u>тревоги</u> <...> ничто уже не мешало этим <u>демонам роем устремиться в мое подсознание</u> (Stayron, 2013, p. 273).

In example (9), the SL image is not preserved in metaphor translation. The original metaphor uses the image of small insects swarming within the subconscious mind: they have already landed, while the metaphor in translation shows these insects just taking off into the mind. Though this is approach A to metaphor translation (M → M), the interpretation is blurred.

-ANXIETY *is* **A STRANGER**. A stranger (ANXIETY) comes out of the darkness of a cold night.

(10)   *... It <u>came out of the cold night</u>; I did not think such <u>anguish</u> possible* (Styron, 1992, p. 36).
    ... Оно <u>пришло из ночного холода</u>; я не подозревал, что такая <u>тревога</u> возможна (Stayron, 2013, p. 294).

In (10), the original image is not preserved since another subject – *оно* – is introduced into translation, with this co-reference not resolved by the context: in the original metaphor, anxiety is explained in terms of a stranger but in translation *оно* (it) substitutes anxiety in this explanation, which is also marked as a change in the grammatical gender. The translator used approach C (M → non-M) to metaphor translation.

- SADNESS *is* **AN ENGULFING TIDE**. A tide of toxic waters (SADNESS) engulfs the sufferer who is drowning and unable to see the land (JOY) of salvation.

(11)   *… a sense that my thought processes were being <u>engulfed by a toxic and unnameable tide that obliterated any enjoyable response</u> to the living world* (Styron, 1992, p. 10).
    ... ощущение, что мой разум <u>накрыла ядовитая и неотвратимая волна, препятствовавшая мне испытывать хоть какую-нибудь радость</u> от окружающей действительности (Stayron, 2013, p. 245).

The original image (11) is that of the sun (JOY) obliterated by sadness (AN ENGULFING TIDE): the sufferer is drowning and strives to see the sun but is unable to because of the waves. The TL does not preserve this SL image; and alongside with approach A to metaphor translation (M → M) the image detail is lost in translation.

- SADNESS *is* **A SNARE**. The sufferer gets caught in a chokehold snare (SADNESS) set by DARKNESS.

(12)   *... The fading evening light <...> had none of its familiar autumnal loveliness, but <u>ensnared me in a suffocating gloom</u>* (Styron, 1992, p. 26).
    ... Тающий вечерний свет <...> полностью утратил свое прежнее осеннее очарование, <u>заманивая меня в область удушливого сумрака</u> (Stayron, 2013, p. 276).

In (12), the original image of a snare is substituted in translation with that of hunting lands where the sufferer is the prey, which corresponds to approach B ($M_1 \rightarrow M_2$) to metaphor translation: SADNESS *is* A SNARE → SADNESS *is* HUNTING LANDS.

- SADNESS *is* A SPASM. The sufferer is taken by a violent spasm /SADNESS/.

(13)   … middle-aged males and females in the <u>throes of melancholia</u> of a suicidal complexion, then one can assume a fairly laughterless environment (Styron, 1992, p. 41).
… мужчин и женщин средних лет, находящихся <u>во власти меланхолии с суицидальным уклоном</u>, то можно представить, что за невеселая обстановка там царила (Stayron, 2013, p. 304).

In (13), the original image of bodily agony is substituted with that of a powerful force. This is approach B to metaphor translation ($M_1 \rightarrow M_{2)}$: SADNESS *is* A SPASM → SADNESS *is* A FORCE.

- DESPERATION *is* A PRISON. The sufferer is locked in a sultry and overheated prison cell /DESPERATION/ from where there is no escape.

(14)   … <u>despair</u>, owing to some evil trick played upon the sick brain by the inhabiting psyche, comes to resemble the diabolical discomfort of being <u>imprisoned in a fiercely overheated room</u>. And because no breeze stirs this caldron, because there is no escape from this smothering confinement, it is entirely natural that the victim begins to think ceaselessly of oblivion (Styron, 1992, p. 29).
… <u>отчаяние</u>, в силу некой злой шутки, которую сыграла над больным мозгом душа, начинало походить на адское ощущение, испытываемое человеком, <u>запертым в комнате, где царит нестерпимый жар</u>. И так как даже легкий ветерок не остужает эту жаровню, а выхода из этого гнетущего заточения не существует, совершенно естественно, что жертва начинает беспрестанно думать о помиловании (Stayron, 2013, p. 281).

In translation (14), the original image of a suicide is substituted by that of one seeking to remove his penalty. Moreover, the word *царит* 'reigns' introduces unwarranted images by associations, for example, those of a good atmosphere and peace, cf. *царит мир*, *царит атмосфера взаимопонимания*. Here, approach B to metaphor translation (M → M) does not save the SL image of a suicide in TL.

- DESPERATION *is* A BED OF NAILS. The sufferer is fastened to a bed of nails /DESPERATION/.

(15)   … It is <u>hopelessness</u> even more than pain that crushes the soul. <…> <u>One does not abandon, even briefly, one's bed of nails</u>, but is attached to it wherever one goes (Styron, 1992, p. 35).
… <u>Безнадежность</u> в большей степени, чем боль, разрушает душу. <…> <u>Человек даже на короткое время не покидает свое ложе с гвоздями</u>, он прикован к нему, куда бы ни пошел (Stayron, 2013, p. 293).

In (Stayron, 2013), metaphor translation (15) is a rare example of translation approach A to metaphor (M → M) that preserves the original image.
In Styron's memoir, there are twelve ***source-external metaphors*** that employ new more or less unconventional sources: FEAR *is* A CORROSIVE, ANXIETY *is* A CORROSIVE, ANXIETY *is* A PREDATOR, SADNESS *is* SEEDS OF A PLANT, SADNESS *is* AN EVIL SPIRIT, DESPERATION *is* A DEEP FREE FALL, ANGER *is* SEEDS OF A PLANT, TENSION/STRESS

is A CORROSIVE, DISGUST *is* A BADGE, SHAME/GUILT *is* SEEDS OF A PLANT, HOPE *is* A GOOD SPIRIT, and EMOTION *is* ARMOR.

- FEAR *is* A CORROSIVE / **ANXIETY *is* A CORROSIVE**. The sufferer has an intact and solid object (EMOTION) that is slowly and continually being destroyed, worn and eaten into and away by the action of a corrosive (FEAR).

(16)   ... began the rhythmic daily <u>erosion of my mood</u> – <...> <u>unfocused dread</u> (Styron, 1992, p. 26).
    ... мое душевное состояние снова не начало ежедневно и ритмично <u>рушиться: опять появились</u> <...> <u>неопределенный страх</u> (Stayron, 2013, p. 275).

In (16), the image of erosion in SL is substituted by that of ruining in TL, with the idea of fear's slow destructive action lost in translation. Approach B to metaphor translation ($M_1 \rightarrow M_2$) explicates the following: FEAR *is* A CORROSIVE $\rightarrow$ FEAR *is* A RUINING AGENT.

- ANXIETY *is* A PREDATOR, it swallows voraciously and devours the sufferer's brain.

(17)   ... the <u>anguish devouring his brain</u> (Styron, 1992, p. 36).
    ... <u>тревогу, поглощающую его мозг</u> (Stayron, 2013, p. 294).

The original image (17) of a predator swallowing up the sufferer's brain ravenously is lost in translation. In this example of approach B to metaphor translation (M $\rightarrow$ M), the richness in interpretation is lost.

- SADNESS *is* SEEDS OF A PLANT. There are seeds (SADNESS) inside the sufferer's mind that grow into a poisonous plant (SUICIDE).

(18)   ... The danger is especially apparent if the young person is affected by what has been termed 'incomplete mourning' – has, in effect, been unable to achieve the catharsis of grief, and so carries within himself through later years an insufferable burden of which rage and guilt, and not only dammed-up <u>sorrow</u>, are a part, and become the <u>potential seeds of self-destruction</u> (Styron, 1992, p. 45).
    ... Опасность особенно актуальна, если юноша или девушка переживает так называемую «незавершенную скорбь» – то есть на самом деле им не удается достигнуть катарсиса в своей печали, поэтому они сквозь годы тащат на себе невыносимое бремя, частью которого являются, помимо самого заблокированного <u>горя</u>, ярость, чувство вины, и оно может стать в дальнейшем <u>источником стремления к саморазрушению</u> (Stayron, 2013, pp. 311-312).

In (18), the original metaphor is omitted in translation and with it the image is lost. This is approach C to metaphor translation (M $\rightarrow$ non-M).

- SADNESS *is* AN EVIL SPIRIT. There is an evil spirit (SADNESS) that causes ruinous damage to the sufferer who tries to appease and conjure (SADNESS) with words. There is a good spirit (HOPE) who opposes (SADNESS), and there are other words to appeal to (HOPE).

(19)   ... One can be sure that these <u>words have been more than once employed to conjure the ravages of melancholia</u>, but their somber foreboding has often overshadowed the last lines of the best-known part of that poem, with their <u>evocation of hope</u> (Styron, 1992, p. 47).

… Можно не сомневаться в том, что эти <u>слова не раз звучали для выражения разрушительного действия меланхолии</u>, но содержащееся в них зловещее пророчество часто затмевало собой последние строки самой знаменитой части поэмы, в которых <u>воскресает надежда</u> (Stayron, 2013, p. 315).

In translation, the original image (19) of an evil spirit conjured by the sufferer is lost. This is approach B to metaphor translation (M₁ → M₂): SADNESS *is* AN EVIL SPIRIT → SADNESS *is* A RUINING FORCE.

- DESPERATION *is* A DEEP FREE FALL. The sufferer is falling in a spiral course downwards (DESPERATION) into an abyss (DEPRESSION).

(20)   … The morbid condition proceeded, I have come to believe, from my beginning years – from my father, who battled the gorgon for much of his lifetime, and had been hospitalized in my boyhood after <u>a despondent spiraling downward</u> that in retrospect I saw greatly resembled mine (Styron, 1992, p. 45).
… Я пришел к выводу, что болезнь уходила корнями в мое детство – я унаследовал ее от отца, который сражался с горгоной на протяжении большей части своей жизни; его душа <u>опускалась во мрак по спирали</u>, и маршрут этот, как я впоследствии увидел, весьма походил на мой собственный (Stayron, 2013, p. 311).

In (20), the original image of a sufferer spiraling down into depression is substituted by the image of his soul spiraling down therein. In this example of approach A to metaphor translation (M → M), the image detail is lost.

- ANGER *is* SEEDS OF A PLANT / GUILT *is* SEEDS OF A PLANT. There are seeds (ANGER/ **GUILT**) inside the sufferer's mind that grow into a poisonous plant (SUICIDE)..

(21)   … <u>rage</u> and guilt, and not only dammed-up sorrow, are a part, and become the <u>potential seeds of self-destruction</u> (Styron, 1992, p. 45).
… <u>ярость</u>, чувство вины, и оно может стать в дальнейшем <u>источником стремления к саморазрушению</u> (Stayron, 2013, pp. 311-312).

The original metaphor (21) is omitted in translation and with it the image is lost (approach C to metaphor translation (M → non-M)).

- DISGUST *is* A BADGE. Here, (DISGUST) is a badge (SYMPTOM) worn by the sufferer.

(22)   … offshoot of that self-loathing (<u>depression's premier badge</u>) by which I was persuaded that I could not be worthy of the prize, that I was in fact not worthy of any of the recognition that had come my way in the past few years (Styron, 1992, p. 12).
… проявлением того отвращения к себе (<u>оно является первым признаком депрессии</u>), которое говорило мне, что я недостоин награды, что я, в сущности, вообще недостоин того признания, какое мне оказывали в последние годы (Stayron, 2013, p. 248).

The original metaphor (22) is omitted in translation and with it the image is lost in this example of approach C to metaphor translation (M → non-M).

- HOPE *is* A GOOD SPIRIT. There is a good spirit (HOPE) who the sufferer appeals to with

words.

(23)   *... One can be sure that these* <u>*words have been more than once employed to conjure the*</u>
       <u>*ravages of melancholia,*</u> *but their somber foreboding has often overshadowed the last lines of*
       the best-known part of that poem, with their <u>*evocation of hope*</u> (Styron, 1992, p. 47).
       ... Можно не сомневаться в том, что эти <u>*слова не раз звучали для выражения*</u>
       <u>*разрушительного действия меланхолии,*</u> *но содержащееся в них зловещее пророчество*
       часто затмевало собой последние строки самой знаменитой части поэмы, в которых
       <u>*воскресает надежда*</u> (Stayron, 2013, p. 315).

The original image (23) of hope as of a good spirit that the sufferer evocates, in translation, is
substituted with that of hope that is resurrecting. This is approach B to metaphor translation ($M_1 \rightarrow$
M_2): HOPE *is* A GOOD SPIRIT → HOPE *is* A LIVING BEING.

- **EMOTION *is* ARMOR**. The sufferer has a shield (EMOTION) that protects him against
DEPRESSION; it falls off and makes him open to attack.

(24)   *...* <u>*I was emotionally naked, vulnerable as I had never been before*</u> (Styron, 1992, p. 25).
       ... я стоял перед ними <u>*эмоционально голым, уязвимым, как никогда прежде*</u> (Stayron,
       2013, p. 273).

In (24), approach A to metaphor translation (M → M) preserves the original image in metaphor
translation.

7. Results and conclusions
The results of this analysis of metaphor translation in (Stayron, 2013) are summarized in Table 1 for
the creative metaphors of depressive emotions and in Table 2 for the conventional ones.

Table 1

Approaches to metaphor translation in (Stayron, 2013):
completely unconventional and more or less unconventional metaphors

Approach	M → M	$M_1 \rightarrow M_2$	M → non-M
the **image** is preserved	4	-	-
the **image** is transformed or lost	8	9	7

Total: 28 creative metaphors (= 28 creative metaphorical images)

Table 2

Approaches to metaphor translation in (Stayron, 2013):
completely conventional metaphors

Approach	M → M	$M_1 \rightarrow M_2$	M → non-M
the **image** is preserved	23	-	-
the **image** is transformed or lost	9	10	17

Total: 59 conventional metaphors (= 59 conventional metaphorical images)

These two tables reveal the discrepancy that creative and conventional metaphors show in translation in terms of the images that drive the translator's interpretations. The shared regularity is that both Metaphor$_1$ → Metaphor$_2$ and Metaphor → non-Metaphor cases transform or lose the author's images in translation. The difference is with Metaphor → Metaphor cases: on the one hand, they tend to transform or lose the author's creative images (here, eight out of twelve creative images are transformed or lost) but, on the other, they tend to preserve the author's conventional images (here, twenty-three out of thirty-two conventional images are preserved). This confirms the hypothesis in Section 4 of this paper: creativity as novelty has higher cognitive and affective costs to translation than conventionality, which could have opened to the translator doors to richer (re-)interpretations but he did not 'go' there.

The findings of this study show that Menikov's translation of metaphors in the memoir is far from perfection since it changes the author's images and deprives them of the original interpretive depth. The memoir is shallowed in translation and pictorially destructed. For example, *despair beyond despair*, the metaphor that holds the memoir together, is translated only once as *отчаяние, превосходящее границы всякого отчаяния* and then is omitted altogether. This cuts the metaphor off its archetypal roots and distorts the symbolic cloth of the memoir. Moreover, translation of idiomatic SL, such as *despair beyond despair*, seems problematic and, tentatively, *отчаяние, выходящее за границы всякого отчаяния* or *отчаяние, перешедшее границы всякого отчаяния* would be a more correct but still not an optimal translation of this metaphor. There are other discrepancies such as *башни рассудка* for *dungeons of the spirit*, *скованный ужасом* for *riveted with fear*, etc. where metaphors seem to be distorted and, respectively, Styron's phenomenal states partially misrepresented in translation.

On the whole, this paper has offered but a crescent view of its subject matter and the massive body in metaphor translation has remained hidden from sight. The results obtained open up a way for a discussion of metaphorical (re-)creativity framed by the theoretical concepts of creativity vs. re-creativity, or derived creativity, in translation. It necessarily follows that the tentative and as yet incomplete conclusions made here will undergo further development and modification.

Abbreviations
M – metaphor;
SL – source language;
TL – target language.

Notes
[1] For considerations of space, I included into my analysis but excluded from this paper completely conventional metaphors in Styron (1992) because of their triviality and of the triviality of their translation in (Stayron, 2013), for example, *He was in fear* (FEAR is A CONTAINER) – *Он чувствовал страх*: a trite conceptualization approached as M → non-M by the translator.

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СУБ'ЄКТИВНІСТЬ У ПЕРЕКЛАДІ МЕТАФОР: РОСІЙСЬКОМОВНИЙ ПЕРЕКЛАД АНГЛІЙСЬКИХ МЕТАФОР ДЕПРЕСИВНИХ ЕМОЦІЙ

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Анотація

У статті розглядається поняття суб'єктивності перекладу метафор депресивних емоцій у *Darkness visible: A memoir of madness* – спогадах Стайрона, перекладених російською мовою. Автор спогадів тлумачить свої емоцій та дає їм метафоричні найменування; ці тлумачення скеровуються образами, які виникають у мисленні автора. У статті висувається гіпотеза, що основою перекладу метафор є тлумачення метафор, кероване образами, які виникають у мисленні перекладача. Кероване ментальними образами тлумачення у перекладі є творчим актом, у якому слово вихідної мови отримує значення й слово для цього значення підбирається у мові перекладу. Здійснюється цей акт на основі образів, що їх 'малює' мислення перекладача. Ментальні образи, які за своєю природою є непропозиційними, при перекладі мають бути обернені у слова мови, яка базується на пропозиційних структурах мислення. Це призводить до семантичних втрат, які при перекладі мають бути мінімізовані шляхом знаходження таких слів у мові перекладу, які будуть оптимальним описом для ментальних образів, що їх спочатку описано словами вихідної мови. У статті за використання філософського аргументу суб'єктивності показується, що у перекладі образи ці належать мисленню саме перекладача, але ніяк не автора: лише суб'єктивність 'малює' світ перекладача як мислячого суб'єкта, й не можна очікувати у перекладі феноменальної свідомості спільної для перекладача і для автора.

У статті аналізується переклад Мєніковим метафор Стайрона. Стрижнем цього аналізу обирається поняття метафоричної креативності й показується, що переклад Мєнікова часто не зберігає саме ті образи, які покладені автором в основу креативних метафор: тлумачення перекладача постає як таке, що скеровується іншими образами, достатньо відмінними від авторських, а деякі авторські образи в перекладі відсутні взагалі. Це підтверджує суб'єктивність перекладу метафор й дозволяє дійти висновків, що перекладач у перекладі викривив численні метафори автора.

Ключові слова: концептуальна метафора, ментальний образ, переклад, суб'єктивність, тлумачення.

СУБЪЕКТИВНОСТЬ В ПЕРЕВОДЕ МЕТАФОР: РУССКОЯЗЫЧНЫЙ ПЕРЕВОД АНГЛИЙСКИХ МЕТАФОР ДЕПРЕССИВНЫХ ЭМОЦИЙ

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Аннотация

В статье рассматривается понятие субъективности перевода метафор депрессивных эмоций в *Darkness visible: A memoir of madness* – воспоминаниях Стайрона, переведённых на русский язык. Автор воспоминаний толкует свои эмоции и даёт им метафорические наименования; эти толкования направляются образами, возникающими в мышлении автора. В статье выдвигается гипотеза, что

основой перевода метафор есть толкование метафор, направляемое образами, возникающими в мышлении переводчика.

Направляемое ментальными образами толкование при переводе есть творческий акт, в котором слово исходного языка получает значение и слово для этого значения подбирается в языке перевода. Осуществляется этот акт на основе образов, 'рисуемых' в мышлении переводчика. Ментальные образы, которые в сути своей непропозициональны, при переводе должны быть обращены в слова языка, который основывается на пропозициональных структурах мышления. Это приводит к семантическим потерям, которые при переводе должны быть минимизированы путём нахождения таких слов в языке перевода, которые будут оптимальным описанием для ментальных образов, изначально описанных словами языка исходного. В статье с использованием философского довода субъективности показывается, что в переводе образы эти принадлежат мышлению переводчика, но никак не автора: субъективность единственно 'рисует' мир переводчика как мыслящего субъекта, и напрасно в переводе ожидать феноменального сознания общего для переводчика и для автора.

В статье анализируется перевод Мениковым метафор Стайрона. Стержнем этого анализа избирается понятие метафорической креативности и показывается, что перевод Меникова часто не сохраняет именно те образы, которые положены автором в основу креативных метафор: толкование переводчика представляется направленным иными образами, весьма отличными от авторских, а некоторые авторские образы в переводе отсутствуют и вовсе. Это подтверждает субъективность в переводе метафор и позволяет сделать вывод, что переводчик в переводе исказил многие метафоры автора.

Ключевые слова: концептуальная метафора, ментальный образ, перевод, субъективность, толкование.