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**THE INFLUENCE OF ANXIETY:  
 POETRY AS A THEORY OF MIND**  
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**Margaret H. Freeman. The influence of anxiety: poetry as a theory of mind.** Cognitive researchers are increasingly turning to an examination of the role nonrational elements, like sensations and emotions, play in cognitive processing. Unlike normal language use, poetic language does not simply represent emotions and sensations, it evokes them. Understanding how it does so contributes to understanding the cognitive workings of the mind. Since schemata operate at the intersection of the nonrational preconscious and conscious awareness, a theoretical model that explains how the interrelations of conceptual and emotion schemata in poetry both motivate and convey emotional-sensory feelings can shed light on how those feelings participate in cognition. To show how such a theoretical model works, I conclude with an analysis of a poem by Wallace Stevens, "Domination of Black."

**Keywords:** cognition, emotion, schema, poetry, Stevens.

**Маргарет Х. Фримен. Воздействие тревоги: поэзия как теория сознания.** Когнитологи все чаще обращаются к изучению роли, которую играют нерациональные элементы, такие как ощущения и эмоции, в когнитивной обработке информации. В отличие от обычного использования языка, поэтический язык не просто представляет эмоции и ощущения, а пробуждает их. Понимание того, как это происходит, помогает раскрыть когнитивные аспекты работы мышления, и – шире – психики. Учитывая то, что схемы функционируют на пересечении нерационального неосознанного (предшествующего сознательному) и осознанного осмысления действительности, теоретическая модель, объясняющая, как взаимодействие концептуальных и эмоциональных структур в поэзии одновременно и мотивирует, и передает чувства, вызванные сенсорными ощущениями и эмоциями, может пролить свет на то, каким образом эти чувства участвуют в когнитивных процессах. Чтобы показать, как работает такая теоретическая модель, в конце статьи дан анализ стихотворения Уоллеса Стивенса "Доминирование черного".

**Ключевые слова:** когниция, поэзия, Стивенс, схема, эмоция.

**Маргарет Х. Фримен. Вплив тривоги: поезія як теорія свідомості.** Когнітологи все частіше звертаються до вивчення ролі, яку відіграють нерациональні елементи, такі як відчуття й емоції, у когнітивній обробці інформації. На відміну від звичайного використання мови, поетична мова не просто репрезентує емоції і відчуття, а пробуджує їх. Розуміння того, як це відбувається, допомагає розкрити когнітивні аспекти роботи мислення, і – ширше – психики. Зважаючи на те, що схеми функціонують на перетині нерационального неусвідомленого (того, що передує свідомому) й усвідомленого осмислення дійсності, теоретична модель, котра пояснює, як взаємодія концептуальних й емоційних структур у поезії одночасно й мотивує, і передає почуття, викликані сенсорними відчуттями й емоціями, може сприяти з'ясуванню того, в який спосіб ці почуття беруть участь у когнітивних процесах. Щоб показати, як працює ця теоретична модель, наприкінці статті надано аналіз вірша Уоллеса Стівенса "Домінування чорного".

**Ключові слова:** емоція, когниція, поезія, Стівенс, схема.

One of the challenges for researchers in cognitive poetics is to develop a theoretical model that explains how artistic forms are both motivated by and convey emotional-sensory feelings that arise from interactions with the external world. These interactions occur at both the conscious, conceptual level and the nonrational—that is, the subliminal, precategory, and visceral—levels of the embodied mind. Damasio [Damasio 1999: 69] has hypothesized that two distinct pathways link physiological changes in the body to the brain that “reads” them as emotions, which, when brought to conscious awareness, become feelings. Damasio calls these two pathways the “body loop” and the “as if body loop.”<sup>i</sup> The former accounts for emotional changes as a result of encountering aspects of the external world: when we see a snake we may experience fear. The “as if body loop” accounts for the fact that we can feel emotions through imaginative representations of external stimuli: imagining an encounter with a snake could trigger a fear response. It is this “as if body loop” pathway that enables us to experience the feelings of an emotion through reading its imaginative expression in poetry. We respond emotionally to poetry because poetic language plays upon schematic structures that lie at the intersection of the preconscious nonrational and conscious awareness.

In discussing the cognitive structure of the emotions, psychologists have on the whole restricted their research to categorizing emotions or exploring their effects on motivation and cognition [Ortony, Clore, Collins 1980; Masmoudi, Dai, Naceur 2012]. Neuroscientists have focused on evidence from neuroimaging studies [Damasio et al. 2000; LeDoux 1996; Barrett, Wager 2006]. Linguists have explored the metaphorical structures in conceptualizing emotions [Kövecses 2000; Maalej 2007]. What has not been explored to any extent is precisely how works of art, especially the literary arts, convey emotion through their various forms (but see [Langer 1953, 1967] and [Tsur 2008] extensive work over the past several decades).

The question I raise in developing a theory of poetic affect is in a way very simple: How does the poet achieve emotional affect in a poem, and how do we as readers feel that affect? The answer is by no means simple.<sup>ii</sup> We conceptualize our feelings of embodiment through imaginative schemata [Johnson 1987]. Schemata connect the elements of the external world to the physiological, conceptual, and emotion networks of our cognitive processes. In other words, I suggest that there is no connection between consciousness and world except through schemata. Existing at the intersection of preconceptual experiential stimuli and cognitive awareness, schemata like *PATH*, *CONTAINER*, *MOTION*, or *CYCLE* are neutral in themselves. They acquire value through the force dynamics of emotion schemata. Cognitive linguists are interested in the way we conceptualize schemata in our linguistic representations. My concern is different. In focusing on poetic expression as opposed to everyday discourse, I am not so much interested in the representation of conceptual and emotional schemata as I am in the way these schemata function to convey sentient, emotional, conceptual, and possibly physiological effects. Poetic language breaks through the conceptualizing tendencies of normal language use that obstruct the nonrational sensory and emotional feelings, feelings that Wallace

Stevens [Stevens 1957: 221] recognizes as “the true subject” of art.<sup>iii</sup> Emotions, unlike concepts, lie at the preconscious levels of our cognitive processes. The theoretical model I propose attempts to explain how emotion schemata interact with conceptual schemata to create poetic language. I conclude with an analysis of Wallace Stevens’ poem “Domination of Black” to show how such schemata interrelate in creating the poem and feeling its emotional affect.

### **Schema theory and the structure of emotions**

Just as there are sensory schemata that reflect the mind’s embodiment, so there are emotion schemata that have internal structure. Mark Johnson [Johnson 1987: 153] defines a schema as “*the structure of a schematizing activity of imagination in time*” (original emphasis). He explores the Kantian notion that it is through schematism that “categories (as pure concepts) can apply to sensible intuitions (as empirical)” [Ibid.: 152]. In summing up the role of the imagination in this process, Johnson notes: “Kant is saying that there is a preconceptual activity in which imagination freely grasps something of the meaning and significance of an object or experience, even though there is no conceptual way to express this insight” [Ibid.: 163].

In his discussion of the superimposition of schemata on each other, Johnson claims that it is by virtue of these superimpositions that “our world begins to take shape as a highly structured, value-laden, and personalized realm in which we feel the pull of our desires, pursue our ends, cope with our frustrations, and celebrate our joys” [Ibid.: 125–126]. I propose that schemata operate at the intersection between preconscious experience and conscious awareness to link the sentient, the emotional, and the rational. Such a suggestion is supported if it can be shown that nonrational activities also are structured. And if it is indeed schemata that enable us to both express and share sentient and emotional experiences as well as conceptual meanings, then exploring the nature and function of imaginative schemata through the expressive forms of poetry would further our understanding of the workings of these cognitive processes.

One schema that Johnson finds central to human experience is SCALE, a more-or-less structure that is both quantitative and qualitative [Ibid.: 121–124]. Emotion schemata tend to be scalar, as in the case of anxiety. That is, when we speak of being overanxious, filled with anxiety, in a continual state of anxiety, we see anxiety negatively. At this end of the scale, anxiety is closely associated with fear. However, at the other end of the scale, anxiety is an emotion that is closely linked in its schematic structure to anticipation, expectation, apprehension, all related to the conative, to motivation. The emotion schema that anxiety shares with these related nodes in its semantic network is future-oriented, directed toward what is and isn’t there. Anxiety has the effect of focusing attention on the task at hand, to the exclusion of what other elements might be present in the immediate environment [Fox 1993: 207]. It can be directed to something as simple as crossing a busy road [Frühholz, Grandjean 2012: 19] or as complex as creating an architectural masterpiece. It structures one’s intimate self, is both conscious and unconscious. In discussing how

he wrote "Owl's Clover", Stevens notes that "it is what I wanted it to be without knowing before it was written what I wanted it to be, even though I knew before it was written what I wanted it to do" [Stevens 1957: 220]. What he had in mind was "the effect of the depression [*sic*] on the interest in art. I wanted a confronting of the world as it had been imagined in art and as it was then in fact. If I dropped into a gallery I found I had no interest in what I saw. The air was charged with anxieties and tensions" [Ibid.: 219]. The result was the creation of "The Old Woman and the Statue," with the woman a symbol of those who suffered during the Great Depression and the statue a symbol of art. For Stevens, the embodiment of anxiety about the Great Depression he felt in the gallery was metaphorically fused with the motivation that triggered the poem. This fusion is captured in Stevens' use of the word "depression" in lowercase form, thus punning on both the actual Great Depression and the emotional state of depression.

"The Old Woman and the Statue" speaks not only to the emotions that motivated Stevens in writing the poem, but also speaks to the emotions that motivate the various ways audiences respond to art. As Stevens notes, one manifestation of the irrational (or emotional) element in a poem "is the disclosure of the individuality of the poet" [Ibid.: 219]. Although "[i]t is unlikely that this disclosure is ever visible as plainly to anyone as to the poet himself" [Ibid.: 219], it *is* manifest, and a reader attuned to the irrational dimensions of a poem may capture something of the emotion(s) that motivated the poet as well as responding to the affective qualities of the text itself.

### **The force dynamics of emotional schemata**

The schema system of force dynamics is connected to the kinesthetic and is closely related to causation [Talmy 2000: 409–470]. It consists basically of an entity that has an intrinsic force tendency either toward action/motion or toward inaction/rest. When two entities come into relation with each other, the force of one can be either stronger or weaker than the other, thus affecting whether the intrinsic tendency of the focal point entity, the "agonist," is inhibited or enabled by the strength of the force element, the "antagonist," that opposes or stands apart from it. These physical force interactions extend metaphorically to the psychological, both within the self (intrapsychological) and in the social interactions of sentient entities (interpsychological).<sup>iv</sup> In his poetry, Stevens takes the further step of interrelating the force dynamics of the physical and psychological, as we shall see.

Although the ANXIETY and FEAR schemata share certain structures, such as scalarity, and effects, such as focusing attention, they differ in intensity. Anxiety is more generalized in its focus, which can be directed to both negative and positive outcomes, whereas fear is always negative. The FEAR schema is determined by the possibility of harm to one's physical body, one's emotional state, or one's goals. As such, it is pre-eminently force-dynamic, in that it always involves two entities: the self as agonist and an antagonist, which could be another person, another sentient being, external object, or an event, like fear of falling or fear of flying. In each case,

the danger to the self's homeostasis is the possibility of stronger force in its antagonist. In Stevens' poem, as we shall see, the structures of the FEAR schema predominate.

### **The emotional affect of a poem: Stevens' "Domination of Black"**

In a 1928 letter to L.W. Payne Jr. who had included a couple of Stevens' poems in his 1927 "American Literature Anthology", and who had apparently sent the poet notes on several poems, Stevens [Stevens 1996: 251] comments: "*Domination of Black*: I am sorry that a poem of this sort has to contain any ideas at all, because its sole purpose is to fill the mind with the images & sounds that it contains. A mind that examines such a poem for its prose contents gets absolutely nothing from it. You are supposed to get heavens full of the colors and full of sounds, and you are supposed to feel as you would feel if you actually got all this".

The force dynamics of Stevens' poem are expressed in a kaleidoscope of sight and sound through repeated juxtapositions of physical sensations and sensibilities with cognitive reactions and memories that fuse into the emotion of fear. It is noticeable – even startlingly – that there are no named colors or descriptions of sound in the poem itself, it simply refers to them. Just as the poem's title conveys absence of color, so does the poem itself only intimate the possibility of colors in the fallen leaves, the peacocks' tails, and the flames of the fire. Stevens' comment reflects a focus on experiencing rather than interpreting the poem. It is precisely its sounds and its images that create its emotional affect.

#### **Domination of Black**

- 1 At night, by the fire,
- 2 The colors of the bushes
- 3 And of the fallen leaves,
- 4 Repeating themselves,
- 5 Turned in the room,
- 6 Like the leaves themselves
- 7 Turning in the wind.
- 8 Yes: but the color of the heavy hemlocks
- 9 Came striding.
- 10 And I remembered the cry of the peacocks.
- 11 The colors of their tails
- 12 Were like the leaves themselves
- 13 Turning in the wind,
- 14 In the twilight wind.
- 15 They swept over the room,
- 16 Just as they flew from the boughs of the hemlocks
- 17 Down to the ground.
- 18 I heard them cry—the peacocks.
- 19 Was it a cry against the twilight

20 Or against the leaves themselves  
 21 Turning in the wind,  
 22 Turning as the flames  
 23 Turned in the fire,  
 24 Turning as the tails of the peacocks  
 25 Turned in the loud fire,  
 26 Loud as the hemlocks  
 27 Full of the cry of the peacocks?  
 28 Or was it a cry against the hemlocks?  
 29 Out of the window,  
 30 I saw how the planets gathered  
 31 Like the leaves themselves  
 32 Turning in the wind.  
 33 I saw how the night came,  
 34 Came striding like the color of the heavy hemlocks  
 35 I felt afraid.  
 36 And I remembered the cry of the peacocks.

The linguist John Robert (Háj) Ross (n.d.) has made an extensive and intensive linguistic analysis of Stevens' poem. In discussing its structure, he notes that it contains "a hidden stanza" in lines 19-28: if Stevens had provided a stanza break after line 18, the poem would have taken a conventional stanzaic form of 10-8-10-8 lines. Ross provides a wealth of evidence for the existence of this hidden stanza as the deep or immanent structure underlying the poem's surface or typographical form. The question then arises why Stevens fuses the two central stanzas into one.

The organization of three stanzas in a poem creates a situation in which the middle stanza may be seen as framed by the outer two. In Stevens' poem, this framing is metaphorically supported by the schematic structures of CONTAINER and CYCLE. The structure of the CONTAINER schema has an IN-OUT orientation: in Stevens' poem, the first and last stanzas juxtapose the boundaries of being inside the room and looking out of the window with the movements of colors both inside and out. The interior-exterior interplay indicates that the poem's overall conceptual schematic structure is that of CONTAINER, in which the middle stanza is contained within the frame of the outer two. Superimposed upon this schema is the CYCLE, whose structure is "multiple, overlapping, and sequential" [Johnson 1987: 121]. It has a circular, temporal motion that returns to its original state: the many repetitions of sound and image cycle throughout the poem's three stanzas, with the last stanza repeating the imagery of the first.

Both schemata share the interior structures of a MOTION schema—IN-OUT in the case of the former, and CIRCULARITY in the latter—and a BOUNDARY schema, where the force dynamics of obstructing or enabling movement across boundaries may be exerted.<sup>v</sup> The scene is one of interior and exterior: the observer is inside the room by the light of the fire, while the bushes, the fallen leaves, the wind, the planets, and the hemlocks are located outside in the encroaching darkness. The

opening lines of the first stanza ostensibly maintain this division, with the colors of the bushes and leaves being seen in the flickering flames of the fire, while the fallen leaves themselves are turning in the wind outside. However, the “Yes: but” of line 8 creates a preliminary opposition to this separation. As Talmy [Talmy 2000: 452] notes, the *yes but* construction is a rhetorical force-dynamic element in argumentative discourse that roughly indicates “the statement I just made is true as far as it goes but there is a more important issue at stake which I will now make.” Stevens is using the *yes but* construction to establish a greater force by acknowledging the existential truth of the opening lines, but blocking it momentarily by introducing something made more important: the two elements of sight and sound—“the color of the heavy hemlocks” and “the cry of the peacocks”—that are foregrounded by the *yes but* construction.<sup>vi</sup> These two elements culminate at the poem’s end with the expressed emotion of fear.

Stevens’ title introduces the major force-dynamic structure of the poem. The title juxtaposes two otherwise incompatible elements: agency and the absence of color. The word *domination* contains within itself the antagonistic notion of one entity exercising force over another. As Ross notes, the title is ambiguous. Does black dominate, or does some other entity dominate black? The tension that results from the ambiguity of the title reflects the tensions underlying the interaction between external reality and internal sensibility that is the subject of this poem. The title sets up at the outset a scenario in which force elements are operating. There are five force-dynamic levels of containment in Stevens’ poem. The outermost level is that of reader and poem, the innermost is that of internal memory and internal emotion. The poem moves in cyclical repetition among the various levels through an agonist-antagonist structure, as follows:

### **Agonist**

*internal memory*: the cry of the peacocks  
*internal sensibility*: remembering, hearing, seeing, feeling  
*self*: poetic persona  
  
*external elements*: colors, leaves, tails, planets  
*reader*

### **Antagonist**

*internal emotion*: fear of death symbols  
*external stimuli*: sights and sounds  
  
*external elements*: physical surroundings  
*external elements*: wind, fire, night  
  
*poem*

### **internal memory – internal emotion**

The middle stanza contains the *interior memory – interior emotion* level that is the innermost and most central of the five levels. This innermost level is enclosed within the level at which internal sensibility is affected by external sight and sound. The final line of the first stanza, “And I remembered the cry of the peacocks,” introduces the long middle stanza which focuses on the peacocks, as the self’s past

experience of hearing the peacocks is reconstituted into the present scene. The sound of the peacocks' cry is not actually present: it resides in the internal memory of the self. As Joseph LeDoux [LeDoux 1996: 179–224] notes, emotional resonance results from memories of past events that awaken similar responses in the present. The only sound conveyed is the “cry,” not a plural “cries” as one would imagine from the actual experience of hearing peacocks, but an abstraction to a mental experience remembered from the peacocks' sound. It is no accident that the colors, mentioned throughout the poem as referring to the leaves and the peacocks' tails, are singularized when it comes to the hemlocks. The hemlocks' “color” is an abstract mental representation, reflecting the poet's sensibility in reacting emotionally to their presence, not the actual colors of the trees.

The word *cry* is used only once as a verb, and it is notable that it occurs after “I heard” in the line immediately preceding Ross's hidden stanza: “I heard them cry—the peacocks.” As Ross notes, “Using *cry* verbally this way ‘unlocks’ the auditory component of the memory which is the focus of C [the hidden stanza], and indeed of the poem itself.” As the poetic self recounts his memory of the peacocks, they enter his imagination in such a way that their cry becomes his cry as he imagines it agonistically uttered *against* the antagonistic force of the twilight, the fallen leaves, or the hemlocks, metaphorically indicative of approaching night, winter, and death.

### **internal sensibility – external stimuli**

The sights and sounds represented in the poem invoke an EMISSION schema, which Pagán Cánovas (2010) associates with emotion causation. The structure of this schema is that an agent *A* emits *x* outward. All sensory impressions, like sight and sound, are structured by this schema.<sup>vii</sup> The EMISSION schema is closely associated with two force-dynamic schemata: what I will call an INTAKE or INCEPTION schema, whose structure includes receptor *B* taking in *x*, and a RESISTANCE schema when *B* prevents *x* from being taken in.<sup>viii</sup> The emotions aroused in *B* depend on the nature of emission *x* and the effects caused by whether *B* takes in or resists *x*. In this way, these three schemata interact with the FEAR schema, when emission *x* is always bad and succeeds in making *B* take it in, despite *B*'s resistance. The OUT-IN structure of these schemata interacts with the CONTAINER schema, with *A* and *B* perceived as containers. Throughout the poem the self is in the position of agonist *B*, even when it is in subject position. That is, the expressions “I remembered/heard/saw” all place the self in the position of receiving sight and sound emissions from external stimuli. They pierce the boundary of the integrated self to cause an emotional reaction that is characterized by the climactic “I felt afraid” (line 35). Although the self identifies with the peacocks' cry in its resistance *against* the encroaching of twilight, fallen leaves, or the hemlocks, by virtue of the EMISSION and INCEPTION schemata, it cannot resist taking in the sights and sounds that produce the emotional reaction of fear.



### **poetic self – external elements**

Schematically, the poem sets up a situation in which the poetic self, facing the great unknown of nature, takes in the sensory perceptions of the external world at the same time as it attempts to resist the significance it attaches to them, a significance which is carried into the poet's—and the reader's—mind from centuries of cultural troping: night as death, the end of autumn and the onset of winter as death, the hemlock that Socrates drinks to his death. At the agonist-antagonist level, the force dynamics of the external elements approach and invade the boundary between outer and inner, both physically and emotionally. The self's homeostasis is reflected through the CONTAINER schema: the self is inside the room, by the fire, presumably still. Everything outside is in continual motion—colors, fire, leaves, wind, planets, hemlocks, peacocks—which, brought inside, disturb the stability of the self's sensations and emotions.

The description of the peacocks' tails and the flight of the peacocks from the hemlocks in the first part of the middle stanza reconstructs the actual presence of the peacocks as external elements in the scene being described. The result is a fusion of time: the poetic self is describing an event in the self's past, with the entire poem in past tense. But the last line of the first stanza invokes a time previous, “And I remembered the cry of the peacocks.” Was the cry one that occurred at the same time as the colors of their tails turning and their flight from the hemlocks, or on an earlier occasion? As the poetic self recounts the tails of the peacocks turning in the “loud fire” and the hemlocks loud with their cry (lines 24-27), there is a confusion of sight and sound and time.<sup>ix</sup> The effect is destabilizing.

### **external elements – external elements**

The phrases “in the room,” “in the wind,” and “in the fire” indicate the location of the colors and the leaves inside a CONTAINER schematic structure, but they are working very differently according to their force-dynamic schemata. The inherent force-dynamic tendency of “fallen leaves” as agonist is toward inertia, rest, whereas the wind, as stronger antagonist, causes them to move in circular motion. Both are external elements, outside the room. The vivid colors of the fallen leaves are also an external element, but they are brought inside the room, as are the colors of the peacocks' tails, reflecting the OUT-IN movement of the CONTAINER schema. The turning of their colors is caused by the force-dynamics of the flickering fire (inside), and by extension the forces of nature that cause the turning of the leaves in autumn (outside). Like the fusion of sight and sound and time, the penetration of the external elements into the container of the room also destabilizes the self's need for coherence and order. The continual repetitions of words and phrases, especially with the frequent turnings, create a circular motion, so that the linear movement of the hemlocks as their color “came striding” forcefully intersects across the circular motion. This superimposition of the PATH schema onto the CYCLE schema further destabilizes the self's homeostasis.

The color of the hemlocks, and the hemlocks themselves, unlike the interiorization of memory that identifies the poetic self with the cry of the peacocks, remain exterior, thus posing, like the encroaching night, the ultimate threat of fear. The repetitions of the first and last stanzas create a further cyclical movement as the poem ends where it began, with the color of the hemlocks and the cry of the peacocks. As Eleanor Cook (1988: 43) notes: “The poem circles and recircles around its topos [of fallen leaves], with the incantatory circles broken, then resumed, broken, then resumed around the break, then finally broken.

### **reader – poem**

In experiencing the poem, the reader becomes agonist to the poem’s antagonist, at the outermost level of force-dynamic interaction in the poem. The feeling of emotional resonance in a reader arises from a combination of factors in poetic expression: the sounds of words, their repetition, meter and rhythm, syntactic constructions, line and stanza breaks, imagery, among others. The movement of Stevens’ poem is reflected in the metrical rhythms of the lines that loosely conform to Germanic stress-timed meter, with main stress falling on only two positions in each of the short lines. Of the poem’s 36 lines, fully 22 (more than half) are short, two-stress lines. Three lines (19, 20, 28) promote a third stress on what would otherwise be two-stress lines on the word that encapsulates the force dynamics of resistance: *against*. This metrical pattern conveys the sense of relentless movement, reinforced by the remarkable number of word repetitions, 85% of the total, and by the repeated *turnings*, all after the turn of the verse line that cause the reader to continually re-turn in moving through the poem. And like the poetic self, the reader, too, in taking in the poem’s force-dynamics of the FEAR schema’s structure of homeostasis disruption, feels a similar emotional reaction.

Emotional tension, as Charles Rosen (1987) remarked many years ago in discussing Chopin’s piano technique, can arise from the very awkwardnesses induced by obstructing what would normally be smooth performance of our bodily movements: “The performer literally feels the sentiment in the muscles of his hand.” As Claiborne Rice [Rice 2012: 186-187] has noted in discussing Damasio’s somatic-marker theory in which “emotion, feeling, and consciousness are strongly body-involved,” the muscular actions involved in repeating sound patterns, whether read silently or aloud, indicate “that a body is acting and reacting in response to environmental stimuli.” The longer lines, with their increase in stress number, stand out against the background of the shorter lines, so that more weight is placed upon them. The last three lines of the first stanza, with the short line “came striding” inside its surrounding longer lines repeats in the last lines of the final stanza, with the short line this time becoming “I felt afraid” as night descends. This parallel placement has the effect of bringing them together. The linear movement of “came striding” carries the additional force of imminent harm to the poetic self’s homeostasis, already destabilized by the repeated turnings.

Emotional resonance from the recollection of past experience for the poet includes that which arises from past readings too [Bloom 1973]. Literary critics have noted the way in which Stevens' poem recalls and sometimes echoes passages from previous poets, such as Shelley's leaves in "Ode to the West Wind"; Wordsworth's evocative description in lines 378-98 of "The Prelude" of "a huge peak, black and huge" that "strode after" the speaker; the "horrid strides" of Milton's Satan in "Paradise Lost", lines 666-79, when "black it stood as Night" [Cook 1988: 45-46]. I do not know if Stevens had consciously in mind Shakespeare's "Macbeth" when he composed his poem. The emotions that are aroused in Shakespeare's drama are all associated with omens of darkness and death, with "thick night," the croak of the raven," the howling wolf that moves toward his prey "with Tarquin's ravishing strides," "the obscure bird" that "clamour'd the livelong night," and of course Macbeth's recollection of the witches' prophecy: "'Fear not, till Birnham wood / Do come to Dunsinane.'"<sup>x</sup> All these associations are activated in the poem for a reader versed in cultural and literary history.

My focus on the poem's underlying schemata are attempts to explain, not what the poem means, but what the poem is doing. Note that Stevens does not talk of *writing* poetry but of *achieving* it: always an ongoing attempt to capture the emotional-sentient element that is "the transaction between reality and the sensibility of the poet" [Stevens 1957: 217]. In "Domination of Black," that transaction is captured in the fear of the unknown and the resistance needed not to succumb to that fear. The ambiguity of the poem's title shows that the poem works both ways. It is precisely an expression of what Stevens meant in his statement in choosing this poem in 1942 as his best that "the themes of life are the themes of poetry."

By showing the workings of schematism at the intersection of the experienced and its conceptualization, and the way emotion schemata like ANXIETY and FEAR interact with conceptual schemata like CONTAINER and CYCLE, I suggest that it is at this level that we can best develop a theoretical model of emotional affect, both in poetry and in life. The elements of this schematism include the following:

1. schemata operate at the intersection between the preconceptual level of experience and our cognition of it;
2. creative imagination involves activities that are nonrational (i.e. nonconceptual), but not unstructured;
3. emotion schemata endow conceptual schemata with the scalar significance of force dynamics;
4. schemata enable us to both create and share experiences in common arising from creative, nonconceptual activity.

In her theory of art as a theory of mind, the American philosopher Susanne K. Langer [Langer 1967: 64] notes: "...who has a naïve but intimate and expert knowledge of feeling? Who knows what feeling is like? Above all, probably, the people who make its image—artists, whose entire work is the making of forms which express the nature of feeling. Feeling is *like* the dynamic and rhythmic structures created by artists; artistic form is always the form of felt life, whether of

impression, emotion, overt action, thought, dream or even the obscure organic process rising to a high level and going into psychical phase, perhaps acutely, perhaps barely and vaguely".

By exploring the way poetry articulates feeling through its forms, we can begin to understand the mind's hidden complexities in the way the nonrational elements of our preconceptual experiences both motivate and shape our human reasoning and behavior.

## Notes

<sup>i</sup> Damasio (2005) clarifies the distinction he draws between emotion and feeling as follows: "In everyday language we often use the terms interchangeably. This shows how closely connected emotions are with feelings. But for neuroscience, emotions are more or less the complex reactions the body has to certain stimuli. ... This emotional reaction occurs automatically and unconsciously. Feelings occur after we become aware in our brain of such physical changes; only then do we experience the feeling of fear." From the perspective of his "as if body loop" hypothesis, it may be that the physiological emotions are bypassed in emotional responses to art. This is what enables us to recognize the role of the emotions in nondiscursive, literary language (Freeman 2009: 178).

<sup>ii</sup> The second part of the question lends itself to empirical investigation (Burke 2011; Claassen 2012; Miall 2006; van Peer et al. 2012).

<sup>iii</sup> All citations to Stevens are taken from "The Irrational Element in Poetry," unless otherwise noted.

<sup>iv</sup> Zoltán Kövesces (2000) shows that references to emotion in language are structured by the FORCE schema. In this later study, Kövesces recasts his earlier work on the CONTAINER schema as specifically representing emotion into a force-dynamic one.

<sup>v</sup> Zouhair Maalej (2007) discusses several conceptual schemata involved in linguistic expressions of the FEAR schema, all of which involve movement.

<sup>vi</sup> Both Bloom (1977: 404) and Cook (1988: 47-48) see the disjunctive thinking expressed by the poem's "Yes: but" as raising the question of the poet's vocation.

<sup>vii</sup> My discussion of the schemata here depends upon modern scientific explanations of sensory perception. As humans, we are able to see a world of color, because our brains are adapted to register the wave spectrums that exist in the world around us (Jacobs and Nathans 2009). The ability to hear a range of sounds results from the properties that create sound waves, the environmental conditions that regulate their transmission, and the receptivity of the brain's aural system. See M.H. Freeman (2011) for more detailed discussion.

<sup>viii</sup> This formulation refines Pagán Cánovas's (2010) initial description of the emission schema as one in which *A* emits *x* to *B* who then receives it, and undergoes a change as a result.

<sup>ix</sup> Stevens is opportunistically taking advantage of the semantic networks of the two words, *repeating* and *loud* that contribute to the fusion of sight and sound in the

poem. Both are prototypically words that indicate sound, as in “Repeat after me” and “That music is too loud.” But “repeat” also means repetition, which we will see is a major theme in the poem, and “loud” also can refer to color.

<sup>x</sup> See D.C. Freeman (1995) for a detailed discussion of the PATH schema in “Macbeth”.

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