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**METAPHOR
 IN THE LIGHT OF CONCEPTUAL METAPHOR THEORY:
 A LITERATURE REVIEW
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O.V. Vakhovska. Metaphor in the light of conceptual metaphor theory: a literature review. This paper reviews some of the central insights on metaphor that come from the domain of cognitive linguistics and originate, for the most part, from the conceptual metaphor theory in its standard version. The review focuses upon the nature, origin, function, components, systematicity and types of metaphor, and upon metaphorical meaning; lays a special emphasis upon the mapping mechanism of metaphor; contrasts metaphor to metonymy and addresses the interaction and overlap of these. A large portion of this paper is a review on the issue of metaphorical creativity. Metaphorical creativity is, to the best of my knowledge, a little-studied topic in cognitive linguistics. There are some claims concerning metaphorical creativity in the review that might appear rigid, decisive and conclusive, but they are definitely not intended as such. Research on metaphorical creativity is still being launched, and numerous aspects of creative metaphorical concepts remain undisclosed so far. This, on the one hand, is reflected in the at times cursory nature of my review and, on the other, indicates a need for further investigations. In my review, I cite literature with a fundamental standing in the cognitive linguistic field mainly. The literature selection for this paper is ultimately shaped by my affiliation with the cognitive linguistic community and by my ambition to eventually formulate a conceptualization of metaphor and of creative metaphor that would lend these to computation. I introspect and comment on some of the assumptions and claims that the literature puts forward. In the review are Modern English metaphorical expressions that come from the cited literature, or are prompted by my own research and introspection; these data help support or, though scarcely, challenge the assumptions and claims. In prospect, this paper will grow into a larger-scale research on the issue of metaphorical creativity. The review might have implications for cognitive linguistic theorizing and research, and be of particular purpose for Ukrainian cognitive linguists aiming their research at the international, in particular European, scholarly community.

Key words: conceptual metaphor theory, metaphor, metaphorical creativity, metaphorical mapping, metaphorical meaning, target and source of metaphor.

О.В. Ваховська. Метафора у світлі теорії концептуальної метафори: огляд літератури. Стаття пропонує огляд деяких стрижневих поглядів на метафору, запропонованих у когнітивній лінгвістиці, а саме теорією концептуальної метафори в її (теорії) стандартній версії. В огляді висвітлено природу, виникнення, функцію та компоненти метафори, систематичність і типи метафор, метафоричне значення. Особливу увагу приділено механізму перехресного мапування, який лежить в основі метафори. Обговорено питання протиставлення метафори та метонімії та їхньої взаємодії. Значне місце в огляді посідає проблема метафоричної креативності, яка, наскільки мені відомо, є на даний момент мало вивченою у когнітивній лінгвістиці. Огляд містить окремі твердження про метафоричну креативність, які можуть здатися остаточно та категорично сформульованими, хоча такими жодною мірою не є. Вивчення метафоричної креативності тільки починається, і численні аспекти креативних метафоричних концептів залишаються недослідженими. Це, з одного боку, відбивається в дещо уривчастому характері запропонованого мною огляду, а, з іншого, свідчить про необхідність подальших розвідок у цьому напрямі. У статті я оглядаю головним чином літературу, яка є в когнітивній лінгвістиці основоположною. Вибір такої літератури визначається моєю приналежністю до лінгвокогнітивної спільноти, а також моєю дослідницькою метою запропонувати у своїх подальших роботах такий підхід до метафори та креативної метафори, який може бути

покладений в основу їхньою формалізованої моделі. Деякі з моментів, що оглядаються у статті, я дозволяю собі супроводити авторським міркуванням та коментарем. В огляді у якості доказів та, зрідка, спростувань теоретичних положень наводяться сучасні англомовні метафоричні вирази. Ці вирази цитуються згідно з літературою, з якої їх вилучено, або ж вони підказані моїми власними дослідженнями та інтроспекцією. Перспективою дослідження є глибоке вивчення проблеми метафоричної креативності. Запропонований у статті огляд може мати певну цінність для лінгвокогнітивних студій та, зокрема, бути корисним для українських лінгвістів-когнітологів, які визначають або починають визначати себе у рамках міжнародної, зокрема європейської, наукової спільноти.

Ключові слова: метафора, метафорична креативність, метафоричне значення, метафоричне мапування, референт і корелят метафори, теорія концептуальної метафори.

О.В. Ваховская. Метафора в свете теории концептуальной метафоры: обзор литературы.

Статья предлагает обзор некоторых центральных точек зрения на метафору, предложенных в когнитивной лингвистике и восходящих, преимущественно, к теории концептуальной метафоры в ее (теории) стандартной версии. В обзоре освещаются природа, происхождение, функция и компоненты метафоры, систематичность и типы метафор, метафорическое значение. Особое внимание уделяется механизму перекрестного картирования, лежащему в основе метафоры. Обсуждаются вопросы противопоставления метафоры и метонимии и их взаимодействия. Значительное место в обзоре занимает проблема метафорической креативности, которая, насколько мне известно, является на данный момент мало изученной в когнитивной лингвистике. В обзоре встречаются утверждения о метафорической креативности, которые могут показаться окончательно и категорично сформулированными, хотя таковыми ни в коей мере не являются. Изучение метафорической креативности только начинается, и многие аспекты креативных метафорических концептов остаются все еще не исследованными. Это, с одной стороны, отражается в несколько фрагментарном характере предложенного мной обзора, а, с другой, свидетельствует о необходимости дальнейших исследований в этом направлении. В статье я обозреваю главным образом литературу, являющуюся в когнитивной лингвистике основополагающей. Выбор такой литературы определяется моей принадлежностью лингвокогнитивному сообществу, а также моей исследовательской целью предложить в своих дальнейших работах такой подход к метафоре и креативной метафоре, который может быть положен в основу их формализованной модели. Некоторые из обозреваемых моментов я позволяю себе сопроводить авторским рассуждением и комментарием. В обзоре в качестве доказательств и, редко, опровержений теоретических положений приводятся современные англоязычные метафорические выражения. Эти выражения цитируются согласно обозреваемой литературе либо же подсказаны моими собственными исследованиями и интроспекцией. Перспективой исследования является глубокое изучение проблемы метафорической креативности. Предложенный в статье обзор может представлять определенную ценность для лингвокогнитивных студий и, в частности, быть полезен украинским лингвистам-когнитологам, определяющим или начинающим определять себя в рамках международного, в частности европейского, научного сообщества.

Ключевые слова: метафора, метафорическая креативность, метафорическое значение, метафорическое картирование, референт и коррелят метафоры, теория концептуальной метафоры.

1. Introduction

In mental construals, information about entities of the experiential world is reduced to prominent features, and it is ultimately these features that emerge into concepts and are exposed by linguistic meanings. On the other hand, concepts continuously expand through associations that the human mind construes between similar entities of the experiential world. These associations are metaphorical in nature. This paper **aims** to review some of the insights on metaphor that come from the domain of cognitive linguistics and that pertain mainly to the conceptual metaphor theory in its standard version. This paper is not intended as the latest version of truth with respect to conceptual metaphor, however, nor does it claim to be complete and sweeping both about metaphor and the theory. The reviewed literature is often not the most recent one, and is cited because of its fundamental standing in the field. There is ample literature that suggests alternative interpretations

of metaphor in the light of different scientific traditions; this literature remains outside of my review. The literature selection for this review is ultimately shaped by the particular scholarly community I belong to and by my ambition to formulate a conceptualization of (creative) metaphor that would lend (creative) metaphor to computation, which is a **non-trivial** task.

The review I suggest here is therefore a prerequisite for a research with a somewhat different focus, and I do not have in mind to instruct the reader with my review. I do, however, **introspect** and comment on some of the assumptions and claims that the literature puts forward, and invite the reader to do so, too. In the review are Modern English metaphorical expressions that come from the cited literature or are prompted by my own research and introspection; these **data** help support or challenge the assumptions and claims.

In **Section 1** of this paper, I address the nature, origin, function, components, systematicity and types of metaphor; metaphorical meaning; the mapping mechanism of metaphor; and metaphor in its relation to metonymy. **Section 2** is a literature review on the issue of metaphorical creativity. Cognitive linguistic literature on the issue of metaphorical creativity is, to the best of my knowledge, presently scarce. This is reflected in the nature of my review. There are some claims in the review that might appear rigid but they are definitely not intended as such. Cognitive linguistic research on metaphorical creativity is still at its dawn, and numerous aspects of creative metaphorical concepts have to be put light on and checked. There are few conclusive statements and sometimes there are few/no ready-made examples in the literature. I am just starting my own investigation on metaphorical creativity and do not dare to doubt the claims that the literature makes, neither do I provide any examples of my own when there are no examples in the literature. My review shows that the issue of metaphorical creativity is little studied indeed and that there is a need for further investigations. I give in the paper some of my intuitions on the existing claims, and hope to be able to develop my own informed perspective on metaphorical creativity in prospect [see Vakhovska 2017]. I **conclude** my paper with a summary of the review it offers.

2. Conceptual metaphor theory and the issue of metaphor

Metaphor was first brought to light by Aristotle who defined it as a specific skill of finding similarities. Since then, metaphor has attracted philosophers' attention and today remains a research topic in philosophy, in linguistics and cognitive linguistics, in philosophy of language, in semiotics, psychology, psychoanalysis, religious studies, cultural anthropology, mythology, aesthetics, poetics and cognitive poetics, the arts, philology, hermeneutics, rhetoric, stylistics, etc. The parameters along which metaphor is studied are its nature, function, components, origin, systematicity, and meaning. There has been a reperspectivization of metaphor with the emergence of the conceptual metaphor theory in the field of cognitive linguistics [see Lakoff, Johnson 1980b]. The element *conceptual* in the name of this theory suggests a departure from traditional views that confine metaphor to language and limit its function to naming and aesthetics. Traditional metaphor is a figure of speech, a fanciful and deliberate decoration and bells and whistles of a poet. Conceptual metaphor is a fundamental mechanism of the human mind. It structures human experience and automatically and unconsciously shapes human cognition, perception and action. Human thought is metaphorical in nature, and the cognitive mechanism of metaphor is manifested not in language alone but also in myth, in social rituals, in performing and visual arts, in politics, in foreign policy, in social institutions, etc. Linguistic and nonlinguistic manifestations of metaphor are the result of and the evidence for the actual being of conceptual metaphor.

Conceptual metaphor is understanding and experiencing one concept in terms of another concept. The formula of metaphorical relation is **CONCEPT A is CONCEPT B**, where CONCEPT A is the target, CONCEPT B is the source, and the link *is* stands for the mapping mechanism that results from a set of systematic correspondences between the target and the source. In a conceptual metaphor, 'the target domain A is comprehended through a source domain B. This

comprehension is based on a set of mappings that exist between elements of A and elements of B. To know a conceptual metaphor is to know this set of mappings' [Kövecses 2002: 29].

Conceptual metaphors are manifested in natural language with the help of *metaphorical expressions*. The *SINS are CRUMBS OF BREAD* metaphorical concept, for example, is manifested in modern English discourse with the help of the metaphorical expression *About the fishes who swallow human sins, and carry them away to the ocean* (BNC). One and the same conceptual metaphor often underlies a number of metaphorical expressions, each activating this metaphor in the human mind. The *SIN is AN ABYSS* conceptual metaphor, for example, is activated by the metaphorical expressions *Flaubert was joking on the edge of a sin he fears to commit*, *He prayed that Clare would not fall into mortal sin*, and *This was the intent to extricate him from the depths of sin and set him on the path of prosperity and happiness* (BNC). Linguistic manifestation of conceptual metaphor can employ similes that use the explicit connectors *like*, *as*, etc. and tend to be reserved for poetic language [Lakoff, Turner 1989]. The *SINS are CONFETTI* metaphor, for example, is manifested in English with the help of the simile *Small sins strewn around their minds like dirty confetti from a party long past* (BNC). Whereas metaphorical expressions are automatic and spontaneous and go unnoticed in discourse, similes are apparent and may be readily perceived by the understanding as instances of a peculiar character of naming.

I omit the element *conceptual* and use the term *metaphor* instead of *conceptual metaphor* henceforth, which is not intended to deny the insights on the cognitive nature of metaphor but is a common practice in cognitive linguistics where the terms *conceptual metaphor*, *cognitive metaphor* and *metaphor* are used interchangeably. Linguistic expressions that manifest conceptual metaphors are termed *metaphorical expressions*; linguistic manifestation of metaphors employs words, phrases, sentences, or (groups of) texts.

There are two major issues that are brought into consideration by the formula of metaphorical relation. These issues are, roughly, the nature of mental entities involved into metaphor and the character of their relation.

Issue 1. Mental entities involved into metaphor and their nature. The conceptual metaphor theory defines *the target and source of metaphor* as concepts that belong to different domains. Whole knowledge domains that comprise a number of individual concepts can also be associated through metaphor as long as these domains are distinct realms of conceptualization and remain separate in human thought. This extends the formula of metaphorical relation to *CONCEPT/DOMAIN A is CONCEPT/DOMAIN B* but does not transform the overall approach to metaphor because domains are in essence broad concepts offering a coherent background for semantically related concepts that are narrower in scope [see Langacker 2008]. The target and source of metaphor are conventionally explained in terms of *image schemas* that have different degrees of complexity and are abstracted by the human mind through interaction with the experiential world. Image schemas can either engage in mapping as indivisible wholes or lend to mapping their particular features and components only. The *MORE is UP* metaphor (*The price of shares is going up*, *She got a high score at her exams*), for example, makes use of most abstract schemas of fundamental human experience that are not separable into parts, while the *PEOPLE are MACHINES* metaphor (*He is a human calculator*, *He has had a nervous breakdown*) associates only specific elements of the two image schemas because people and machines are complex phenomena whose mental representations are equally intricate [Evans, Green 2006: 296]. As a rule, the schema of the source is simpler, less abstract and more clearly structured than that of the target [Grady 2007]. The source is often perceptive in nature; it is immediately given to experience and is culturally entrenched.

When literature is more specific, it argues that metaphors can be based either on (propositional) knowledge structures or on image schemas; this point is made explicit in [Lakoff, Johnson 1980b; Kövecses 2002]. In metaphors that employ knowledge structures, basic conceptual elements of the source are mapped onto the target. In metaphors that employ image schemas, basic

conceptual elements of the source image schema are mapped onto the target image schema. This distinction may appear irrelevant because (propositional) knowledge structures are generally assumed to have image schemas at their conceptual basis. As [Kövecses 2002: 37–38] puts it, ‘an interesting property of image-schemas is that they can serve as the basis of other concepts. Thus, for instance, the motion schema underlies the concept of a journey. The motion schema has the parts, initial point, movement, and end point, to which correspond in journeys the point of departure, the travel, and the destination. In this way, *most apparently nonimage-schematic concepts (such as journey) seem to have an image-schematic basis*. The target domains of many structural metaphors can then be seen as image-schematically structured by their source (such as LIFE *is* A JOURNEY)’ (italics added -- O.V.). With respect to schematicity/specificity of metaphor cf. also the latest views expressed in [Kövecses 2017].

Metaphor is a cognitive mechanism whose emergence is determined by the embodied mind but whose operation is shaped by culture [Lakoff 1993]. Metaphors that are based on bodily experience alone are **primary metaphors** [Grady 1999; Lakoff, Johnson 1999]. They are primary in that they are initial, basic, and simple. A primary metaphor is a stimulus-reaction pair where the target is a subjective reaction to a sensory stimulus represented by the source; for example, SIMILARITY *is* NEARNESS (*That color is quite close to the one on our dining-room wall*), IMPORTANCE *is* SIZE (*We’ve got a big week coming up at work*), QUANTITY *is* VERTICAL ELEVATION (*The price of shares has gone up*), DESIRE *is* HUNGER (*We are hungry for a victory*) [Evans, Green 2006: 304–305]. The target does not have an immediate perceptive basis but at the same time is not completely abstract. The source is perceptive in nature and represents properties of entities of the experiential world but not these entities themselves. Both the source and the target are simple mental representations that can not be divided into parts, which determines the **poverty of mapping** in primary metaphors. The source and the target are not imagistic; they are modeled as **primary scenes** motivated by bodily experience, for example, lifting a heavy object that is followed by muscle tension, sweet taste that causes pleasant feeling, focusing attention on bigger objects due to their potential significance as that of a menace, a reward, etc.

Primary metaphors are simplest unconscious associations between the domains of subjective and sensorimotor experience. They relate to fundamental bodily experience and due to this are cross-culturally widespread or even universal. For example, the INTIMACY *is* CLOSENESS primary metaphor (*We’ve been close for years, but we’re beginning to drift apart*) represents the primary experience of being physically close to people one is intimate with, and this is a universal physical experience; the LINEAR SCALES *are* PATHS primary metaphor (*John’s intelligence goes way beyond Bill’s*) explains the subjective judgment of degree against the sensorimotor domain of motion and represents the universal human experience of observing progress made by an object in motion.

Primary metaphors merge into **complex metaphors**, and complex metaphors, in their turn, merge into even more complex metaphors. For example, the PURPOSES *are* DESTINATIONS and ACTIONS *are* MOTIONS primary metaphors merge into the A PURPOSEFUL LIFE *is* A JOURNEY complex metaphor (*He got a head start in life, He is without direction in his life*). In complex metaphors, bodily and cultural experiences interact; cultural models can influence the mind in its construing bodily experiences, and cultural importance can be ascribed to some of the bodily processes and products, for example, to breath, birth, blood, sweat, tears, etc. [Gibbs 1999]. It is complex metaphors that incorporate cultural models and culturally determined knowledge. By virtue of this, complex metaphors are culture-specific. The THEORIES *are* BUILDINGS complex metaphor, for example, emerges into consciousness due to the universal bodily experience represented by the PERSISTING *is* REMAINING UPRIGHT and ORGANIZATION *is* PHYSICAL STRUCTURE primary metaphors. The cultural experience that shapes this metaphor is that buildings are prototypes for upright complex objects in this culture. Buildings are complex in structure and lasting and enduring in time, and these features are attributed to theories through

metaphor [Grady 1997]. Embeddedness of the conceptualizing mind into a different culture would have shaped the bodily experience of persistence differently, and theories might have been metaphorically represented as something different from buildings.

Particular aspects of metaphor allow its different classifications. A classification based on the cognitive function of metaphor distinguishes orientational, ontological and structural metaphors [Lakoff, Johnson 1980b]. ***Oriental metaphors*** organize their targets in terms of orientation in space (UP and DOWN, INSIDE and OUTSIDE, CENTER and PERIPHERY) and are based on fundamental bodily and cultural experience, cf. the orientational metaphors HAPPY *is* UP and SAD *is* DOWN, CONSCIOUS *is* UP and UNCONSCIOUS *is* DOWN, HEALTH AND LIFE *are* UP and SICKNESS AND DEATH *are* DOWN, HAVING CONTROL OR FORCE *is* UP and BEING SUBJECT TO FORCE OR CONTROL *is* DOWN, MORE *is* UP and LESS *is* DOWN, FORESEEABLE FUTURE EVENTS *are* UP (AND AHEAD), HIGH STATUS *is* UP and LOW STATUS *is* DOWN, GOOD *is* UP and BAD *is* DOWN, VIRTUE *is* UP and DEPRAVITY *is* DOWN, RATIONAL *is* UP and EMOTIONAL *is* DOWN. Orientational metaphors vary cross-culturally but are systematic within a given culture. Each orientational metaphor organizes ***an internally systematic metaphorical system***; if, for example, *I am feeling up* means *I am feeling happy* in this system, then *My spirits rose* can not mean *I became sadder*. Conversely, ***an externally systematic system*** is, for example, the one organized by the GOOD *is* UP metaphor and the HAPPY *is* UP, HEALTH AND LIFE *are* UP, HAVING CONTROL OR FORCE *is* UP metaphors as its instances. Orientational metaphors are historically stable within a given culture. The SINS *are* TO THE LEFT (*They felt all their heavy sins in a heap on their left side* (Dickens 2010)) and SIN *is* DOWNWARDS (*The sudden fissures hint at the Catholic underworld of sin* (BNC)) metaphors, for example, are diachronically invariant in English secular discourse throughout the 14th–21st centuries [Vakhovska 2011] where they associate upward movement and movement to the right with the good and downward movement and movement to the left with the bad.

Ontological metaphors explain their targets in terms of physical objects, for example, SIN *is* AN OBJECT (*Do not cast over my heart the shadow of thy sin!* (Taylor 2010)). Conceiving of their targets in terms of bounded things, orientational metaphors allow different manipulations with abstract concepts as if they were objects given to the immediate human experience. Personification metaphors whose sources are concepts for human beings and CONTAINER-metaphors where objects, substances, events, actions, states, visual scenes, etc. are organized as containers are also ontological in nature; for example, SIN *is* A HUMAN BEING (*Sin has many tools, but a lie is the handle which fits them all* (CCAÉ)) and SIN *is* A CONTAINER (*They are souls in mortal sin* (BNC)).

In ***structural metaphors***, elaborate cognitive organization of the culturally entrenched source is mapped onto the target that inherits this organization and is explained in its terms; for example, TIME *is* MONEY (*You are wasting my time, This gadget will save you hours*) and ARGUMENT *is* WAR (*Your claims are indefensible, He attacked every weak point in my argument*). Orientational, ontological and structural metaphors are not always clearly delineated divisions; they may overlap.

Issue 2. Mental entities involved into metaphor and the character of their relation. Systematic correspondences between the target and the source form ***the mapping mechanism of metaphor*** [Lakoff, Johnson 1980b]. This mechanism is better exposed from the blending theory perspective [Zhabotynska 2014]. The blending theory [see Fauconnier, Turner 2000, 2002; Fauconnier 1985; 2007; Turner 2007a; Turner, Fauconnier 2000] is concerned with ***conceptual integration*** mechanisms and introduces the notion of a mental space to explain them. Mental space is a dynamic mental representation of experience that results from interaction of a cognizing subject with the world. Conceptual integration employs four mental spaces -- two input spaces, the generic space, and the blend. Each of the input spaces can be structured as an organizing frame whose slots are connected by vital relations, for example, by the notions of time, space, transformation, cause and effect, part and whole, representation, role, analogy, anomaly, uniqueness, property, similarity,

category, intention, etc. Vital relations connect both slots inside the input spaces and the input spaces themselves. The generic space contains a conceptual structure that is shared by the input spaces. In the blend, the information that is partially borrowed from the input spaces is arranged according to the conceptual structure of the generic space. The emergent structure of the blend does not reproduce the structures of the input spaces because only some elements of these structures and their relations are highlighted and borrowed into the blend. In the blend, they are activated through mental operations of composition, completion, and elaboration, or running the blend. Composition is a mere juxtaposition of slots that belong to frame structures of input spaces and of vital relations that connect these slots. Completion brings into the blend additional structures, for example, cultural models, beliefs, opinions, theories, etc. These additional structures are further elaborated and the blend is run. As a result, the blend contains a new image that is different from the images of the input spaces.

The blending theory distinguishes the following types of emergent structures: simplex networks, mirror networks, single-scope networks, and double-scope networks. Out of these, only single- and double-scope networks result into metaphorical meanings. Their input spaces, according to [Zhabotynska 2014], correspond to the target and source of metaphor, their generic spaces are structured through a mechanism that corresponds to metaphorical mapping, and their blends correspond to metaphorical meaning.

In simplex networks, one of the input spaces contains a conventional organizing frame whose slots are biologically or socially grounded roles, while the other input space contains the entities that become the values for these slots. For example, one of the input spaces is structured by the FAMILY frame that comprises the roles of father, mother, son, daughter, etc. and the other input space has the values of Paul and Sally. These input spaces are compatible and produce the *Paul is Sally's father* blend, and this blend is not a metaphorical one. In mirror networks, the two input spaces, the generic space and the blend are structured by one and the same organizing frame. This frame comprises slots and their relations and specifies a particular event and its participants, which makes the input spaces compatible and the mapping immediate. For example, the A RECORD FOR A ONE-MILE RUN frame is shared by both the input spaces but the values for the slots of this frame are different in each space. One of the input spaces represents an event in running where a runner whose name is Johnson established a record for a one-mile run in the year of 1999. The other input space represents an event in running where a runner X established a record for a one-mile run in the year of Y. The *He has beaten Johnson's 1999 record for a one-mile run* blend borrows the A RECORD FOR A ONE-MILE RUN frame and represents an imaginary event in running where the runner Johnson and the runner X compete for a record, and the runner X wins the competition, although this competition has never taken place. Mirror networks can compress vital relations, and, in this example, the time of real events in running is not borrowed into the blend.

In **single-scope networks**, the two input spaces have different organizing frames. Only one of these frames is borrowed into the blend, while the other frame lends to the blend the values of its slots. The input space whose frame is borrowed corresponds to the source, and the other input space corresponds to the target of metaphor. For example, the *Murdoch knocked Iacocca out* (DOING BUSINESS *is* BOXING) blend borrows the BOXING frame from the source space, while the values for its slots, namely the media mogul Murdoch (agent) and the Ford executive Iacocca (patient), come from the DOING BUSINESS frame of the target space. In **double-scope networks**, the two input spaces have different organizing frames. The blend borrows from the input spaces only fragments of their frames and develops an emergent structure of its own. This structure is individual to the blend and does not replicate those of the input spaces. The *This surgeon is a butcher* (THIS SURGEON *is* A BUTCHER) blend, for example, results from integration of the source space for the job of a butcher and of the target space for the job of this surgeon. Their generic space is structured by a frame whose slots are agent, undergoer, sharp instrument, work space, and procedure (goal and means). The blend leaves some of these slots unspecified but

highlights the incompatibility of the goal of healing this surgeon has with the means of butchery he uses to achieve this goal. The emergent meaning not contained in any of the input spaces is that of this surgeon's incompetence.

Metaphor in its manifestation through metaphorical expressions may invite the assumption that occurrence of a conceptual blend is automatically detected by an integrated linguistic sign. This symmetry has been assumed, in particular, in a mathematical elaboration on conceptual blending [Gomez Ramirez 2016]. The relation between conceptual blends and integrated linguistic signs is not regular, however. An integrated linguistic sign does not necessarily activate a conceptual blend, and a conceptual blend is not necessarily manifested by an integrated linguistic sign [Zhabotynska 2012: 182]. At the lexical level of language, conceptual blends are conventionally manifested by lexical blends and by compounds. The examples below show that relations between these are not symmetric:

- a conceptual blend as a lexical blend. The lexical blend *smog* manifests the conceptual blend SMOG (SMOKE + FOG), and *smog* is neither smoke nor fog but air pollution that is a morbid mixture of smoke and fog and some other atmospheric contaminants.

- a conceptual blend as a compound. The compound *a houseboat* manifests the conceptual blend A HOUSEBOAT (A HOUSE + A BOAT), and a houseboat is a large boat equipped for use as a buoyed dwelling on water.

- not a conceptual blend as a lexical blend. At the same time, the lexical blend *gaydar* that combines *gay* and *radar* into a single word with the meaning 'a sense for assessing the sexual orientation of others that resembles a radar' has no conceptual blend of A GAYDAR (A GAY + A RADAR) behind itself. A GAYDAR is a metaphorical concept.

- not a conceptual blend as a compound. Similarly, the compound *a sabertooth* manifests the concept of the feline whose teeth resemble sabers, and this concept is not a conceptual blend as long as a sabertooth is neither a saber nor a tooth nor a combination of these into something emergent and new. A SABERTOOTH is a metaphonymic concept.

- a conceptual blend as a non-integrated linguistic sign. On the other hand, the conceptual blend A MERMAID (A WOMAN + A FISH) is manifested in Russian and German by the non-integrated nouns *русалка* and *die Nixe*, respectively, with the meaning 'a folklore marine creature that is half a woman and half a fish'; the equivalent English noun *a mermaid* is a non-integrated noun synchronically but its etymological history is that of a compound.

The interpretations for the examples are mine. Otherwise, the examples are not non-trivial and may be found elsewhere in dictionaries and in scientific literature on compounding and lexical blending.

Conceptual integration mechanisms are selective and fragmentary, and metaphorical meaning is, by virtue of this, a conceptualization (in the sense imparted to this term by [Talmy 2000; Evans, Green 2006: 467; Langacker, 2008] and others). Metaphorical meaning is shaped by cognitive **highlighting** of particular components in the conceptual structure of the target and by **utilization** of particular components in that of the source [Lakoff, Johnson 1980b; Kövecses 2002]. The JOHN *is* A LION metaphor (*John roared*), for example, structures the JOHN concept only partially; it highlights John's courage, fearlessness and some other character traits but hides the shape of his teeth and nails.

Highlighted features of the target are those that are relevant for the given cognitive and communicative purposes; hidden features do not bear upon these purposes and are not coherent with this particular metaphorical concept. The ARGUMENT *is* WAR metaphor (*He won the argument*), for example, highlights the conflicting nature of an argument hiding its orderliness, while the ARGUMENT *is* A JOURNEY metaphor (*We'll proceed in a step-by-step fashion. We have covered a lot of ground*) highlights the orderliness of an argument hiding its confrontational nature [Evans, Green 2006: 303–304]. Those features and components of the target that are hidden form **gaps** in metaphorical mapping [Grady 2000]. Similarly to partial highlighting of the target, the source is

utilized only partially as well. The metaphorical expressions *We've constructed the framework for a solid argument, If you don't support your argument with solid facts, the whole thing will collapse, You should try to buttress your argument with more facts* [Lakoff, Johnson 1980b], for example, manifest the ARGUMENT *is* A BUILDING metaphor but utilize different parts of the A BUILDING concept, and many aspects of this concept remain unutilized. The features and components of the source that are utilized in mapping are *the used part of metaphor*; the unutilized features of the source are *the unused part of metaphor*.

Background knowledge about the target and the source that is not engaged immediately into a metaphor can be inferred. These inferences are *metaphorical entailments* of a mapping [Lakoff, Johnson 1980b]. Metaphorical entailments are independent metaphors that highlight or hide and, in doing so, organize certain aspects of the target that the original metaphor does not show. In the LOVE *is* A JOURNEY metaphor (*We've hit a dead-end street, We can't turn back now*), for example, LOVE is explained in terms of A JOURNEY and the metaphorical entailments of this mapping are the LOVERS *are* TRAVELERS, A LOVE RELATIONSHIP ITSELF *is* A VEHICLE, EVENTS IN A RELATIONSHIP *are* EVENTS IN A JOURNEY, THE PROGRESS MADE *is* THE DISTANCE COVERED, DIFFICULTIES EXPERIENCED *are* OBSTACLES ENCOUNTERED, CHOICES ABOUT WHAT TO DO *are* DECISIONS ABOUT WHICH WAY TO GO, THE GOAL OF A RELATIONSHIP *is* THE DESTINATION OF A JOURNEY metaphors, etc. Metaphorical entailments have entailments of their own and, in their interrelation and complexity, expose subcategorization of concepts within a single and coherent *metaphorical system*. The TIME *is* MONEY metaphor, for example, entails the TIME *is* A LIMITED RESOURCE metaphor that, in its turn, entails the TIME *is* A VALUABLE COMMODITY metaphor in accordance with the specification relation between MONEY, A LIMITED RESOURCE and A VALUABLE COMMODITY. The most specific metaphorical concept, TIME *is* MONEY in this example, is conventionally used to refer to the entire metaphorical system it belongs to. Metaphorical systems can be rather large and complex; such systems are structured by expansive networks of entailments.

The LOVE *is* A JOURNEY and TIME *is* MONEY metaphors are instances of *congruent mapping*; in each of these metaphors and their entailments, projections of multiple sources that belong to one domain onto one and the same target result into autonomous metaphors whose targets have compatible metaphorical roles within a single cognitive event and whose entailments are equally compatible. Opposite to it is *incongruent mapping* where the autonomous metaphors have targets with incompatible metaphorical roles and incompatible inferences [Zhabotynska 2011]. Incongruent mapping represents different cognitive events and results into *a split of metaphor* as is the case, for example, in the THEORY-CONTAINER metaphorical pair that splits into THEORY *is* A CONTAINER WITH CONTENT (*This insight can contribute to the content of his theory*) and THEORY *is* CONTENT INSIDE A CONTAINER (*They squeeze their theories into the shared understanding of culture*) where THEORY is explained in terms of entities that are incompatible within a single cognitive event.

Metaphor is intrinsically pluralistic. Metaphorical targets are complex concepts that require several sources to explain their particular aspects each. The set of sources mapped onto one and the same target in a piece of discourse is *the range of metaphor* [Kövecses 2002]. The metaphorical range of SIN in the English secular discourse of the 14th–21st centuries, for example, comprises the following historically invariant and variant sources: SIN *is* DOWNWARDS / UPWARDS / INSIDE / OUTSIDE / TO THE LEFT / A BURDEN / MORTAL FLESH / A CONTAINER / WATER / A STONE / DIRT / A STAIN / A ROAD / A POINT OF DESTINATION / COMMODITY / A HUMAN BEING / AN ENEMY / A SICKNESS / A MENTAL AFFLICTION / A HUNTER / A PREY / A BAIT / A TRAP / SLAVERY / AN ANIMAL / A BEAST / A WORM / A PLANT / A WEED / INFECTION / A SPIDER'S WEB / A CAGE / A PRISON / A SLEEP / A ROCK / A SEA / A RIVAL / A CRIMINAL / A GRANDEE / A SPIDER / A SCORPION

[Vakhovska 2011]. These metaphors are a concerted characterization of the SIN concept; each of them is separate, however, in that it gives one perspective on SIN only and organizes metaphorically only one of the numerous aspects of SIN. Metaphorical sources of SIN, at the same time, can be mapped onto other targets as well. The set of targets onto which one and the same source is mapped is *the scope of metaphor* [Kövecses 2002]. The source A TRAP, for example, is mapped in modern English discourse not onto SIN alone but also onto the targets LOVE, RELATIONSHIP, A GLANCE, A SMILE, A MARRIAGE, A JOB, A FAMILY, AN INSTITUTION, A HUMAN BODY, A BUILDING, THE MIND, AN EVENT, A SOUL, AN IDEA, A NOVEL, etc.

The range and scope of metaphor hang together due to used parts of respective metaphors. In using particular components of a source, metaphorical mappings obey certain conceptual constraints that are imposed onto the image-schematic properties of this source. There are metaphorical mappings that do not use all of their potential and possible entailments. The CAUSATION OF AN EXPERIENCE *is* TRANSFER OF AN OBJECT metaphor, for example, produces the metaphorical expressions *She gave him a headache* and *She gave him a kiss* that are interpretable against the literal expression *She gave him a book*. The metaphorical entailment of having an object after it has been transferred is used in *She gave him a headache, and he still has it* but is prohibited in **She gave him a kiss, and he still has it*. In such cases, entailments are blocked by *the invariance principle* that reads: ‘given the aspect(s) that participate in a metaphorical mapping, map as much knowledge from the source onto the target as is coherent with the image-schematic properties of the target. <...> When this basic structure of the source conflicts with that of the target, we get cases of *incoherence* between the two domains. Thus, the invariance principle consists of two parts: (1) the part that says what can be mapped from the source, and (2) the part that says what cannot and why’ [Kövecses 2002: 103]. In the example, a headache is a state that is lasting in time, while a kiss is an event that is momentary. States and events have different generic-level image-schematic structures, and the image-schematic structure of an event blocks the entailment of having an object that was transferred because having is a long-term state.

The invariance principle is originally formulated in [Lakoff 1990, 1993]. Invariance is, however, not a universal principle, and many metaphorical conceptualizations can not be explained in its terms. Although the principle ‘correctly handles metaphorical cases like giving someone a kiss or idea (as opposed to the literal case of giving someone a book), it cannot handle many other metaphorical cases. As Grady and his colleagues point out, there is no logical contradiction between a building having a window and a theory having a window; theories could have a window, just as much as they have a framework. But while the latter is metaphorically acceptable, the former is not. The invariance hypothesis does not offer a solution to this and many similar cases’ [Kövecses 2002: 104].

The invariance, in my opinion, can not be a satisfactory explanation of legitimate and illegitimate metaphorical mappings, if there is a notion of illegitimacy with respect to metaphor at all. There are no boundaries on human imagination, and the mind is free to construe an infinite number of metaphorical associations between entities of whatever kind, cf. [Grady 1999: 97]. Lakoff [1993: 233 and further] observes, for example, that personification of death in English poetry employs the images of ‘drivers, coachmen, footmen; reapers, devourers and destroyers; or opponents in a struggle or game (say, a knight or a chess opponent). <...> Why these? Why isn’t death personified as a teacher or a carpenter or an ice cream salesman? Somehow, the ones that occur repeatedly seem appropriate <...>. The preservation of generic-level structure explained why death is not metaphorized in terms of teaching, or filling the bathtub, or sitting on the sofa’. But I can well imagine death filling and overflowing a bathtub, or teaching, sitting on the sofa and doing whatever else as long as my imagination reaches thus far. Or, for me, there is nothing that prevents my imagination from construing a possible world where the recipient metaphorically has a kiss for hours or days after the kiss has been given, and where a theory has a window and a windowsill. The mind can metaphorically conceptualize literally anything in terms of literally anything, and all the

invariance principle explains is certain tendencies in these conceptualizations. In light of human metaphorical productivity, the range and scope of metaphor are infinite sets. Metaphorical concepts can not be exhaustively catalogued, and a linguistic analysis exposes metaphors with their ranges and scopes in a particular piece of discourse only.

Metaphor is not solitary in type of semantic relations between entities. Another relation of this type is *metonymy*. Whereas metaphor is a semantic mapping that is based on similarity, metonymy is a semantic mapping that is based on contiguity. Metonymy is not a phenomenon of language alone; similarly to metaphor, metonymy is a mechanism of the human mind. It is systematic and structures human cognition, perception and action. Conceptual metonymy is using one concept to refer to another concept that is contiguous to it. The formula of metonymic relation is CONCEPT B for CONCEPT A where CONCEPT A is the target and CONCEPT B is the vehicle [Kövecses 2002; Dirven, Pörings 2002; Croft 2006; Barnden 2010]. Metonymy is explained not in terms of mapping as it is the case with metaphor but in terms of *mental access* to the target through the vehicle that is contiguous to it within one and the same domain [Kövecses, Radden 1998]. Conceptual metonymies are manifested in language with metonymic expressions; for example, A PART for THE WHOLE (*We don't like longhairs*), AN OBJECT USED for THE USER (*The gun he hired wanted fifty grand*), and A PLACE for THE INSTITUTION (*Hollywood isn't what it used to be*) [Lakoff, Johnson 1980b].

Metaphor and metonymy are mental mechanisms that perform a cognitive function but contribute to this function differently. If metaphor explains one entity in terms of another entity and its major function is that of providing understanding, metonymy allows one entity to substitute another entity and its major function is that of providing reference. Metaphor involves two knowledge domains, while metonymy involves one domain. Metaphorical associations are based on particular features shared by entities, while metonymic associations are based on particular relations (part-whole, space, time, causation, etc.) between entities [Warren 2002; see also Barcelona 2000, 2003; Kövecses 2002; Dirven, Pörings 2002; Croft 2006; Barnden 2010].

Metaphor and metonymy interact and overlap. Interaction between metaphor and metonymy is assumed to employ four patterns -- metaphor from metonymy, metonymy from metaphor, metonymy within metaphor, and metaphor within metonymy. Prevalent among these are metaphor from metonymy and metonymy within metaphor. The cognitive mechanism that combines features of both metaphor and metonymy is sometimes termed *metaphonymy* [Goossens 1995]. *Metaphonymic* is, for example, the mental construal that underlies the noun *a sabertooth*. This noun is a name for the feline whose teeth resemble sabers, and the naming techniques employed here are the A TOOTH is A SABER metaphor and the A PART (A TOOTH) for THE WHOLE (THE ANIMAL) metonymy in their interaction. Similarly, *metaphonymic* is the name *houndstooth* for the cloth with an ornament that resembles the teeth of a dog on it, the nouns *a bluebell*, *Snow White* etc.

Metaphorical and metonymic concepts broaden conceptual categories. For example, the concept that underlies the noun *woman* in *Take that woman away -- she is sin* is a mental construal whose metaphorical or metonymic nature is unspecified [Vakhovska 2011]. It can be a metaphor where THAT WOMAN is explained in terms of SIN due to peculiar behavioral patterns, for example, that woman is seductive and licentious and her influence on people is as if that of a sin that depraves a soul of its moral good; it can be a metonymy where THAT WOMAN substitutes SIN as a cause substitutes the consequence, and there is indeed a Biblical tradition to ascribe the original sin to Eve who was the first sinner and caused the fall of man in Eden; it can be a metaphonymy where the THAT WOMAN is SIN metaphor and the THAT WOMAN for SIN metonymy interact and overlap. Irrespective of its nature, the THAT WOMAN concept broadens the category of sins in Catholic theology, and the conceptual category for this example may look the following way:

- original sin
- actual sin
 - sin of omission, sin of commission
 - sin of thought, sin of word, sin of deed
 - sin against God, sin against oneself, sin against fellow creatures, sin against society
 - sin of malice, sin of ignorance, sin of passion or infirmity
 - venial sin, mortal sin
 - Mortal sins
 - spiritual sins
 - pride ◦ avarice ◦ sloth ◦ jealousy ◦ anger
 - carnal sins
 - gluttony ◦ lust ◦ that woman.

In cognitive semantics, there is a growing body of research on metonymy and on metonymy in its interaction and overlap with metaphor. Metonymy may be a cognitive operation that is more fundamental than metaphor. Metaphorical concepts may often prove to be the result of demetonymisation, and the metaphor-from-metonymy evidence invites a conclusion that it is metonymy that forms the basis for metaphor. For example, in the *GENERIC is SPECIFIC* metaphor [Lakoff, Turner 1989], a specific schema is mapped onto an unlimited number of other specific schemas that, together with this schema, belong to one and the same generic schema; this generic schema becomes the target of metaphor as in *RISK TAKING* (a generic concept) *is* *GAMBLING* (a specific concept) where the prototype of the category (*GAMBLING*) substitutes the whole category (*RISK TAKING*). This metaphor associates a type (source) with the kind (target) that includes this type as its prototypical member, and can well be a metonymy. Similarly, the target and source in primary metaphors belong to one and the same domain of sensory experience and are associated as different degrees of subjectivity of this experience. Primary metaphor is therefore metonymic in nature.

Various theoretical languages on metaphor and metonymy remain only positions of truth, however, while the truth, if there is one, is hardly a matter of preferred terms. Some frameworks eliminate the distinction between metaphor and metonymy altogether. Barnden [2010: 31] introduces a conception of dimensions -- ‘instead of worrying about whether some utterance is metaphorical or metonymic, or even about how far along a literal/metonymic/metaphorical continuum it is, we should often be asking instead: What degree and type of similarity does it involve, if any? What sort of contiguity does it involve, if any? <...> Considering the dimensions in themselves helps to free us from a mindset that seeks clear-cut differences between metaphor and metonymy when these may not exist’. Ritchie [2006: 11] develops a conception of interpretive connections -- ‘metaphor, and figurative language generally, is but a convenient way of identifying and discussing a widely-recognized but fuzzily defined subset of these interpretive connections’. Fauconnier [2009] sees no use in differential definitions of metaphor and metonymy. Both metaphor and metonymy have blending as their underlying mechanism but neither metaphor nor metonymy is capable to explain the operation of the human mind, and it is the mechanism of blending that provides this explanation. In sum, there is a tendency to depart from arguing about intuitiveness of terms and to focus on the nature of mental entities and operations that these terms are assumed to denote, and this nature appears to be intrinsically the same.

3. Conceptual metaphor theory and the issue of metaphorical creativity

Metaphor is an instance of maturationally controlled behavior in humans [Vosniadou 1986]. The ability to produce and understand metaphors emerges naturally by the age of five in healthy children who grow up in normal social and cultural settings, and is further promoted by biological

and psychological patterns of gaining overall maturity. Metaphorical performance develops gradually but rapidly and is assisted by continuous knowledge acquisition and improved information processing. Initially, metaphor encompasses a limited number of knowledge domains but then at a certain point comes to embrace their greater array and to augment competence in these and other domains. Whereas younger children produce and interpret conventional metaphorical expressions occasionally and in highly predictable contexts only, older children make a rapid advance in organizing their conceptual categories and are able to produce and comprehend more elaborate, context-independent and creative metaphorical expressions.

Metaphor is a mental mechanism that arises from the higher cognitive needs, primarily from the needs for exploration and abstract aesthetics (for a detailed specification of these needs, see [Maslow et al. 1987; Dörner 1999]). Exploration helps acquire confidence about a particular environment, and metaphor, by virtue of its cognitive function, is one of the instruments of this acquisition. Through abstract aesthetics, humans strive to find structure in their mental representations and to substitute current mental representations by more satisfactory, effective and elegant ones.

Metaphorical creativity in humans is ‘the production and use of conceptual metaphors and/or their linguistic manifestations that are novel or unconventional (with the understanding that novelty and unconventionality are graded concepts that range from completely new and unconventional through more or less new and unconventional to well-worn, entrenched and completely conventional cases)’ [Kövecses 2010: 656]. Creative metaphorical concepts communicate meaning and have aesthetic effect. They meet the criteria of novelty and usefulness a creative product generally has to satisfy, and shed light on those features of metaphorized entities that conventional metaphorical conceptualizations fail to capture for a variety of reasons. These features, for example, may be most difficult for comprehension and verbal report [Vakhovska 2017]. Evaluation of metaphors in terms of creativity has no hard-and-fast rules, however, as long as any evaluation is approximate and average and requires that the evaluator enter a multitude of possible worlds.

A pioneering systematic cognitive linguistic study on the issue of metaphorical creativity appeared in 1989; it was *More Than Cool Reason: A Field Guide to Poetic Metaphor* by G. Lakoff and M. Turner. Since then, there have been occasional publications on metaphorical creativity in the field, but, to the best of my knowledge, they have developed isolated frameworks only, and there are no shared comprehensive accounts of creative metaphorical concepts in terms of their nature, structure, mapping mechanisms, systematicity, and of processes that allow their emergence and understanding. Research on metaphorical creativity appears to be still at its dawn, and there is, to me, a felt immaturity about the issue.

There are two long-standing myths that surround metaphorical creativity in popular opinion. First, metaphors in ordinary and literary forms of language are expected to be different regarding their creative load. Second, metaphors are expected to liberate and boost creativity in (gifted) humans. These myths are the product of traditional approaches to metaphor as to a rhetoric device, and it is these myths that the conceptual metaphor theory has discarded so far.

Myth 1. Literary metaphors are distinct from ordinary metaphors. Contrary to this, gifted individuals (poets, writers, artists, journalists, etc.) have been shown to share with ordinary individuals the largest part of metaphors they use in their creations. These metaphors are usually conventional. *Conventional metaphors* have fixed and static mappings that bring entrenched and well-worn metaphorical expressions into a language; conventional metaphorical expressions often enter dictionaries and thesauri of this language and are not generally perceived as markers of metaphorical conceptualization by native speakers. Conventional metaphors are the background against which unconventional, or novel, metaphors are distinguished. Similarly to neologisms and words of common word stock, entering a lexicographical source might be a borderline between conventional and novel metaphors, but there is no stating this explicitly in the literature on metaphorical creativity that I have surveyed. *Novel metaphors* are (instances of) metaphorical

creativity. Novel metaphors, as a rule, are based on and made out of conventional metaphors through a number of strategies that the mind has for this purpose; there is a class of genuinely novel metaphors that do not derive from conventional metaphorical thought but these genuinely novel metaphors are rare. Novel metaphors are not a privilege of gifted individuals and may well be made and used by ordinary people in their everyday lives. It is important to emphasize that there is no denying the difference between ordinary and literary discourses as far as their metaphoricality is concerned. But the difference between these discourses is not in the conventional and novel metaphors; their difference is in the complexity and density of novel metaphors that literary discourse produces.

There are several *types of metaphorical creativity*: creativity induced by the source, by the target, and by concept integration mechanisms. *Source-induced creativity* varies between source-internal and source-external cases. In source-internal creativity, the originally unutilized components of the source become utilized to conceptualize the target. In source-external creativity, a target receives new sources, and these sources are its unconventional conceptualizations. In *target-induced creativity*, the originally hidden components of the target become highlighted, and corresponding components of the source are mapped onto them. More specifically, in target-induced creativity, ‘a particular target that is conventionally associated with a source “connects back” to the source taking further knowledge structures from it’; for example, ‘metaphorical expressions, such as *fire-exit*, are selected from the source domain of BUILDING on the basis of target domain knowledge in the EUROPE *is* A BUILDING metaphor, though they are not part of the conventional mappings’ [Kövecses 2010: 657]. In *integration-induced creativity*, the components of both the target and source are combined into an unconventional way, with the result of creative metaphorical blends [Kövecses 2010]: ‘the two inputs have different (and often clashing) organising frames, and the blend has an organising frame that receives projections from each of those organising frames. The blend also has emergent structure on its own that cannot be found in any of the inputs. Sharp differences between the organising frames of the inputs offer the possibility of rich clashes. Far from blocking the construction of the network, such clashes offer challenges to the imagination. The resulting blends can turn out to be highly imaginative’ [Turner 2007b].

Metaphorical creativity employs certain conceptual devices, or strategies, that are applied to conventional metaphors to transform them into novel ones. Among the *strategies of metaphorical creativity* are extending, elaboration, questioning, and combining [Kövecses 2002: 47–49]. Certain creative metaphorical concepts, however, fall, according to [Kövecses 2010], outside these strategies. Therefore, the list is hypothetically not complete, and there is a need for comprehensive research with bigger data: ‘My further hope is that others will join us from diverse disciplines, such as cognitive linguistics, relevance theory, cognitive poetics, cognitive psychology, cognitive anthropology, applied linguistics, multimodal communication and media studies, cognitive semiotics, and the like, in the study of figurative creativity within (and beyond) the framework proposed in the paper’ [Kövecses 2010: 686].

Extending and elaboration are instances of source-internal creativity. *Extending* a conventional metaphor is adding new, originally unutilized, elements to the source; *elaboration* is adding new unconventional detail to existing elements of the source. The LIFE *is* A JOURNEY conventional metaphor, for example, is extended by Dante in his lines *In the middle of life’s road / I found myself in a dark wood*; here, a novel fragment of knowledge about journeys, namely, that journeys may make use of roads that go through dark woods, is introduced. The ANGER *is* A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER conventional metaphor may become elaborated as ANGER *is* ACETYLENE IN A CONTAINER THAT EXPLODES [Kövecses 2002: 47–49].

In other words, conventional metaphors and novel metaphors that result from extending and elaboration are distinguished through their used and unused parts, and a conventional used part is less creative than a novel one. One and the same metaphor A THEORY *is* A BUILDING, for

example, underlies the metaphorical expressions *His theory has solid foundations* and *His theories are always baroque, He prefers massive Gothic theories covered with gargoyles, Complex theories usually have problems with the plumbing, and His theory has thousands of little rooms and long, winding corridors* (the example comes from [Lakoff, Johnson 1980a]). The target and source of this metaphor enter mapping as image schemas whose organization is that of a prototypical category with central and peripheral members. The element of a building highlighted in conventional metaphors for theories is the foundation. Highlighting architectural style, gargoyles, plumbing, and rooms and corridors is not conventional for theories, which is employed by the novel metaphorical expressions in this example. Conventional metaphors therefore recruit (elements of) sources from the centres of prototypical categories, while novel metaphors take (elements of) sources from the peripheries of these categories. Sources that are furthest to the periphery might, presumably, furnish metaphors that are most creative. Also, the closer to the periphery a chosen component is, the more cross-domain the respective metaphor. This choice of peripheral elements from the image-schematic structure of the source is observed in involuntarily creative metaphorical concepts coined by young children and by schizophrenics who, although through different reasons, do not handle conceptual categories properly and are apt to recruit wrong members out of these.

Cf.: According to [Nikitin 2007], metaphors are based on negimplications of linguistic meanings. For example, it is owing to the negimplications of meanings of the words *a tooth*, *a knife* and *an eye* that a tooth can not be attributed the property of being brave, a knife -- of being able to smile, and an eye -- of being able to drone. Attribution of incompatible and improbable semantic components detects metaphors in *Your teeth are brave*, / *Like the smile of a knife*, / *And drone, like bumblebees*, / *Golden eyes* (a line from A. Voznesenskiy's poem; rendering from Russian into English is mine) where the negimplications are used to create unusual metaphorical images intended to impress the reader more than it would have been possible with the rhyme only. Unusual images created through metaphor (and metonymy) are often more important for poetry than the rhyme and the form, provided it is not poetry of formalism where the form predominates. In a similar fashion, oxymorons *deafening silence*, *virtual reality*, etc. and paradoxes *I can resist anything except temptation* (O. Wilde), *I am a deeply superficial person* (A. Warhol), etc. rely on negimplications. In the A THEORY is A BUILDING example, having a foundation is an intensional characteristic of a building, while architectural style, decorations, planning, etc. are characteristics only implied for buildings with diverging degrees of probability. These characteristics are implicational. In this light, metaphorical concepts that employ intensional characteristics are conventional; metaphorical concepts that employ implicational characteristics are more or less conventional/novel; metaphorical concepts that employ negimplicational characteristics are novel.

Through **questioning**, conventional metaphors become cast doubt upon. For example, the A LIFETIME is A DAY and DEATH is NIGHT conventional metaphors may beg for doubts concerning the ability of death to turn into life just as if night would turn into a day. **Combining** is a conceptual strategy of evoking several conceptual metaphors through a single metaphorical expression. In the line *the twilight <...> / Which by and by black night doth take away*, for example, W. Shakespeare combines the LIFETIME is A DAY, LIFE is LIGHT, LIFE is A PRECIOUS POSSESSION, DEATH is NIGHT, and EVENTS are ACTIONS conventional metaphors [Kövecses 2002: 47–49].

Genuinely novel metaphors are scarce. They do not build upon any of conventional metaphorical conceptualizations and 'have a tendency to be noteworthy by virtue of their frequently anomalous character. Consider the following example from Gabriel García Márquez's novel *Love in the Time of Cholera* <...>. *Once he tasted some chamomile tea and sent it back, saying only, "This stuff tastes of window." Both she and the servants were surprised because they had never heard of anyone who had drunk boiled window, but when they tried the tea in an effort to understand, they understood: it did taste of window.* <...> What is tea like that tastes like window?

This is obviously an unconventional metaphor that was created by the author in order to offer a new and different perspective on an aspect of reality' [Kövecses 2002: 43]. Other examples of genuinely novel metaphors brought into consideration by the cognitive linguistic literature are CLASSICAL THEORIES are PATRIARCHS (*Classical theories are patriarchs who father many children, most of whom fight incessantly*) and LOVE is A COLLABORATIVE WORK OF ART [Lakoff, Johnson 1980a]. Creative metaphors of this kind are often ambiguous in meaning but rich in imagistic detail and interpretations. Entailments of creative metaphors may be both novel and conventional metaphorical conceptualizations that shape a fragment of reality in a peculiar way.

Humans do not rework conventional metaphorical conceptualizations into novel ones on purpose, neither do they consciously and purposely coin genuinely novel metaphors. Creative metaphors are unconscious and spontaneous; they are (often) induced in individuals by *context*. It is from various contexts that people derive novel conceptualizations when they think, speak and act metaphorically. And again there is nothing in the contextual motivation for novel metaphors that would be a privilege of gifted individuals: 'the same contextual factors that lead conceptualizers to produce unconventional and novel metaphors in everyday forms of language are also at work in poetry and literature in general' [Kövecses 2010: 657].

There are two major types of context: global contexts influence all individuals within a language community, local contexts are immediate circumstances that surround a particular individual. *Global contexts* are universal frames of experience; they range over the physical environment, social, cultural and historical factors, and values, norms and mores. *Local contexts* are varied experiences that include conceptualizers with their unique personal backgrounds and interests, their biological and physical condition, their mental state, their emotions, their immediate physical, social and cultural settings, their (subconscious) knowledge about themselves and the topic of conceptualization; the immediate linguistic context, and, presumably, some other contextual factors. Various global and local contexts seldom apply in isolation; most often, they co-occur and jointly shape metaphorical conceptualizations in real discourses. Contexts are conceived of as nested frames, 'such that the physical setting as the outermost frame includes the social frame that includes the cultural frame, where we find the speaker/conceptualizer, the hearer/conceptualizer, and the topic, as well as the diagram for the flow of discourse (functioning as the immediate linguistic context). <...> Potential resemblances between entities are legion, but what helps (triggers, prompts, etc.) us (to) choose a source domain would be some contextual factor' [Kövecses 2010: 682–686].

Myth 2. Metaphors liberate and boost human creativity. This popular belief has been shown to be only partially true, however: 'Much of our conceptualization of experience is metaphorical, which both motivates and constrains the way we think creatively. The idea that metaphor constrains creativity might seem contrary to the widely held belief that metaphor somehow liberates the mind to engage in divergent thinking' [Gibbs 1994: 7]. Metaphorical conceptualization of the world in humans is motivated and at the same time constrained, with graded strength, by embodiment and context. Kövecses [2010] suggests the term *pressure of coherence* for this latter constraining role that the human body and context have in metaphorical conceptualization of the world. This means that the human body both facilitates particular metaphorical conceptualizations and sets limits on them because humans have to be coherent with their bodies, and that context both facilitates particular metaphorical conceptualizations and sets limits on them because humans have to be coherent with the context they are in.

The body and context in their facilitating and constraining roles are equally important in metaphorical conceptualization. And whereas the embodied nature of metaphorical concepts accounts for their cultural universality and stability in time, context-induced properties of these concepts account for their variation. Kövecses [2010: 683] observes that 'many context-induced metaphorical expressions appear to be novel and unconventional. This is because the (immediate) context of discourse varies from one discourse to another, and with it the linguistic metaphors that

are based on the context will also vary'. It is therefore variation that bears on metaphorical creativity in the first place.

4. Conclusion

In this paper, I have reviewed a more or less extensive selection of publications from the field of cognitive linguistics that address from a variety of perspectives the issue of metaphor. The views expressed in these publications are generally subsumed into the conceptual metaphor theory. The theory defines metaphor as understanding and experiencing one concept/domain in terms of another concept/domain. Conceptual metaphors are manifested in natural language with the help of metaphorical expressions. The formula of metaphorical relation is CONCEPT/DOMAIN A *is* CONCEPT/DOMAIN B, where CONCEPT/DOMAIN A is the target, CONCEPT/DOMAIN B is the source, and the link *is* stands for the mapping mechanism that results from a set of systematic correspondences between the target and the source. The metaphorical target and source are (propositional) knowledge structures that may have at their basis image schemas. As a rule, the source schema is simpler, less abstract and more clearly structured than the target one; it is often perceptive, immediately experienced and culturally entrenched.

The mapping mechanism of metaphor is selective and fragmentary. Metaphorical meaning is therefore a conceptualization that is shaped by cognitive highlighting of particular components in the conceptual structure of the target and by utilization of particular components in that of the source. The features and components of the source that are utilized in mapping are the used part of metaphor; the unutilized features of the source are the unused part of metaphor. Background knowledge about the target and the source that is not engaged immediately into a mapping can be inferred. These inferences are metaphorical entailments of this mapping. Metaphorical entailments are independent metaphors that organize certain aspects of the target that the original metaphor does not show. Metaphor is intrinsically pluralistic; it has its range and its scope that hang together due to respective used parts. In using particular components of a source, metaphorical mappings obey certain conceptual constraints imposed by the invariance principle.

Particular aspects of metaphor allow its different classifications. The classification of metaphors into primary and complex ones is driven by the role that the embodied mind and culture have in them. Orientational, ontological and structural metaphors are distinguished due to peculiar cognitive functions they perform. Another classification issue with respect to metaphor is how distinct the latter is from metonymy. Metaphor and metonymy are semantic relations that may interact and overlap, and there is evidence that metaphor at its basis may well be metonymic.

Metaphor serves to satisfy in humans their need for abstract aesthetics. Metaphorical creativity is instantiated through novel conceptual metaphors. Whereas conventional metaphors have fixed and static mappings that bring entrenched and well-worn metaphorical expressions into a language, novel metaphors are the result of variation; they communicate meaning and have aesthetic effect. Novel metaphors often derive from conventional ones through the conceptual strategies of extending, elaboration, questioning, and combining. Among the types of metaphorical creativity are source- and target-induced creativity and creativity induced by concept integration mechanisms. Genuinely novel metaphors that do not build upon any of conventional metaphorical conceptualizations are infrequent occurrences. Creative metaphors are unconscious and spontaneous; they are often prompted by various global and local contexts in their interaction.

Metaphorical creativity is little-studied so far and remains an issue of favorable promise to cognitive linguistic theorizing and research. It is this issue that has particularly instigated the review; and it is this issue that sets me forth in my further research.

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