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A QUEST FOR DEMOCRACY OR FOR A CONSERVATIVE SOCIAL IDEAL?
A cognitive semantics perspective on the role of Sharia concepts
in the discourse of the Egyptian Arab Spring
A. Bogomolov, PhD (Kyiv)

A. Bogomolov. A quest for democracy or for a conservative social ideal? A cognitive semantics perspective on the role of Sharia concepts in the discourse of the Egyptian Arab Spring. This paper analyzes the discourse of the Egyptian Arab Spring from a linguistic anthropology and cognitive semantics perspective aiming to uncover a native view on the Egyptian revolution of January 25, 2011. I focus on three salient concepts of the revolutionary discourse: ẒULM (*injustice, oppression, wrong*), QIṢĀṢ (*retaliation*), and FULŪL (a newly coined moniker for the enemies of the REVOLUTION). These concepts are interwoven with belief systems that shape Arab sociopolitical reality. The new Egyptians concept of REVOLUTION differs from its antecedents as modern electronic media has turned the January 25 revolution into a multimodal communication event. The discourse of the Egyptian Arab Spring appears to be far more conservative than the Western account of the revolution suggests and its key ideas have mostly been lost in translation provided by Western media.

Keywords: discourse, Egyptian Arab Spring, FULŪL, QIṢĀṢ, REVOLUTION, salient concept, ẒULM.

А. Богомолов. У пошуках демократії чи консервативного суспільного ідеалу? Когнітивно-семантичний аналіз ролі шаріатських концептів в дискурсі єгипетської арабської весни. У статті аналізується дискурс єгипетської арабської весни з точки зору лінгвістичної антропології і когнітивної семантики з метою розкрити місцеве уявлення про єгипетську революцію 25 січня 2011 року. Ми зосередилися на трьох важливих концептах революційного дискурсу: ẒULM (*несправедливість, пригнічення, кривда*), QIṢĀṢ (*відплата*), і FULŪL (*назва-неологізм для ворогів революції*). Ці поняття переплітаються з системами вірувань, які формують арабську суспільно-політичну реальність. Новий єгипетський концепт РЕВОЛЮЦІЯ віддзеркалює зміну суспільних уявлень, викликане, в першу чергу тим, що сучасні електронні ЗМІ перетворили революцію 25 січня на акт мультимодальної комунікації. Дискурс єгипетської арабської весни видається набагато консервативнішим, аніж це могли собі уявити західні коментатори революційних подій, а його основні ідеї були здебільшого загублені у перекладі західних ЗМІ.

Ключові слова: дискурс, єгипетська арабська весна, РЕВОЛЮЦІЯ, салієнтний концепт, FULŪL, QIṢĀṢ, ẒULM.

А. Богомолов. В поисках демократии или консервативного общественного идеала? Когнитивно-семантичний анализ роли шариатских концептов в дискурсе египетской арабской весны. В статье анализируется дискурс египетской арабской весны с точки зрения лингвистической антропологии и когнитивной семантики с целью раскрыть местное представление о египетской революции 25 января 2011. Мы сосредоточились на трех салиентных концептах революционного дискурса: ẒULM (несправедливость, угнетение, кривда), QIṢĀṢ (возмездие), и FULŪL (название-неологизм для врагов революции). Эти концепты переплетаются с системами верований, которые формируют арабскую общественно-политическую реальность. Новый египетский концепт РЕВОЛЮЦИЯ отражает изменение общественных представлений, вызванное, в первую очередь, тем, что современные электронные СМИ превратили революцию 25 января в акт мультимодальной коммуникации. Дискурс египетской арабской весны представляется гораздо более консервативным, чем могли бы себе представить западные комментаторы революционных событий, а его основные идеи были большей частью потеряны в переводе западных СМИ.

Ключевые слова: дискурс, египетская арабская весна, РЕВОЛЮЦИЯ, салиентный концепт, FULŪL, QIṢĀṢ, ẒULM.

1. Introduction

The recent Egyptian revolution was widely perceived as different from those of the old age, particularly, due to an innovative use of social networks and modern electronic media as instruments of empowerment and mobilization during the initial January 25 – February 11, 2011 massive sit-in rally in Cairo's Tahrir Square, which turned a street protest into a multimodal mass communication event. Egyptian revolutionaries, who picked up the torch from the successful Tunisian antecedent, had thereby inaugurated the so called Arab Spring – a series of anti-government protests and uprisings across the Arab countries. The word *spring* (rabī') of course metaphorically signified renewal and breakaway from the past. Here is a rather accurate account of how the events of the Arab Spring were perceived outside of the Arab world:

> Almost overnight, the Middle East, which prior to the uprisings had been conceived almost solely as a space of authoritarian oppression and political stagnation, or as a breeding ground of what is seen as 'Islamic fundamentalism' and international terrorism, was transformed into a laboratory of political innovation and becoming to which progressive and revolutionary subjects and movements from Latin America to New York and Tel Aviv looked for inspiration and guidance.[1]

Not only the left-leaning activists, but sober policy makers in the leading Western democracies, for all their trademark cautiousness and risk perceptions, were operating on a fundamentally similar reading of the Arab uprisings[2]. World outside the Arab Spring countries seemed to grasp immediately what was going on. Obviously, such a rapid enlightenment could only come through the medium of a TV screen. But how much of this knowledge could be accounted for by merely reading graphic images and how much of it was based on a true analysis and understanding? How does such media inspired external perspective relate to a native participant's one? Crowds of people occupying vast public spaces, shouting 'Mubarak, go!'[3], appeared to unambiguously signify nothing but a resolute popular rejection of authoritarianism. Powerful graphic images created by international media had not only profoundly influenced international public opinion, but contributed to empowering the local protesters themselves[4]. [] But when it comes to the native *verbal* discourse of the Egyptian revolution, the true language of the protest as spoken on streets of Cairo and other cities and reflected in local media coverage – most of it was lost in a cultural translation provided by international media, which tended to pick out mainly those sound bites that appeared to be consistent with the emerging image of an innovative democratic revolution, often unwittingly editing out the culturally idiosyncratic parts. However, should the enthusiastic supporters of the Egyptian revolution abroad be able to understand the native language and willing to listen, they would probably find the verbal manifestation of this highly ingenious and unusually massive protest movement astonishingly conservative, when it comes to the beliefs and knowledge bases embedded in it.

Amid the popular aspirations for change, the laudations of liberals praising the newly found national unity and precipitating the coming of democracy, it would be unfair to say that observers familiar with the local culture have totally failed to take heed of an Islamic tinge in the native concept of the revolution as opposed to how it looked from afar and what even some local parties

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[1] Laura Junka-Aikio. Late modern Palestine: the subject and representation of the second intifada. New York, NY: Routledge, 2016, p. 135.

[2] For a brief account of early EU's response to the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions, cf. Niklas Bremberg (2016) Making sense of the EU's response to the Arab uprisings: foreign policy practice at times of crisis, European Security, 25:4, 423-441, DOI: 10.1080/09662839.2016.1236019, pp. 430–432.

[3] The actual Arabic posters contained only one word *irḥal* (go) with no name mentioned.

[4] On the role of the international media in construing and promoting the January 25 protests, alongside other episodes of the Arab Spring, as a new pan-Arab democratic revolution and the role of media installations on the site of the Tahrir square protests in empowering the protesters cf. A. Bogomolov. The 18 Days that Changed Egypt: the Concept of REVOLUTION in the Egyptian Arab Spring Discourse. Skhodoznavstvo 2015, #70, pp. 11–34.

were trying to read into it. Writing only days after the downfall of Mubarak, an Egyptian-born American academic expressed serious reservation regarding the ambiguous nature and the likely outcome of the uprising:

> It is not yet clear whether the Egyptian uprising will be a Velvet Revolution, as many have hoped, or an Iranian-style Islamic Revolution, but it is clear that all has not devolved into a Tiananmen Square crackdown. At least, not yet.[5]

In 2012, another local observer, an Arab 'socialist' intellectual found it striking how central a Sharia concept – QIṢĀṢ (*retaliation*, essentially, *an eye for an eye* principle) was for the discourse of the January 25 revolution[6]. Such cautious commentaries had been, however, rather an exception contrasted to the predominantly optimistic mood shared by the religious conservatives and liberals alike[7].

A powerful role that the Islamic normative discourse, deeply rooted in its centuries old tradition, but also re-appropriated and transformed by modern days Islamists, played in shaping public discussion over the period of the Arab Spring – is not just an Egyptian, but a pan-Arab phenomenon. Similar influences may be noted in other Arab Spring countries raising a question as regards the validity of the dominant Western narratives, which tended to describe the Arab Spring as a modern democratic revolution. The particular national contexts, however, differ, and an analyst would find both commonalities and striking differences in revolutionary discourses of Tunisia, Yemen and Syria in terms of salience and sociopragmatic function of various traditional Islamic concepts[8]. Hence, for the sake of accuracy and consistency we have limited the scope of the present study to one Arab Spring country – Egypt.

January 25 protests in Tahrir square, Cairo were initiated by mostly secular left-leaning groups[9]. But media and wider public discussion[10] scarcely referred to these groups' affiliations to identify the harbingers of what was then seen as a profound sociopolitical change, preferring to describe them collectively as *šabāb aṯ-ṯawra* (revolutionary youth) or simply ŠABĀB (youth). After the downfall of Mubarak several secular political forces and personalities appeared as strong contestants for power. International pollsters predicted only a marginal portion of votes to be given to Islamists in the upcoming post-Mubarak legislative elections of 2011 – 2012[11]. According to the

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[5]   Nezar AlSayyad. Military, Money, and Motives in Egypt
http://harvardpress.typepad.com/hup_publicity/2011/02/alsayyad-cairo-military-money-and-motives-in-egypt.html

[6]   The phrase is cited in an article titled Culture of Retaliation and Revenge (*ṯaqāfat al-qiṣāṣ wa l-intiqām*) by an Egyptian journalist Rola Kharsa published by an electronic publication al-Miṣrī al-Yawm, 14.2.2012 and is attributed to an unidentified 'socialist, friend' of the author – http://m.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/52941

[7]   For a colorful description of this mood and aspirations of democratic transition soon to come in the aftermath of Mubarak's downfall see interview with Egypt's most prominent figure and 2011 presidential hopeful, Dr. Mohamed El Baradei at the opening ceremony of the Annual Conference of the International Bar Association in 2011 – http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=ee251c92-4849-4af6-875c-83f3d2380f50

[8]   For the notion of *sociopragmatics* cf. Linda R. Waugh et al. 2016. Critical Discourse Analysis: Definition, Approaches, Relation to Pragmatics, Critique, and Trends in Alessandro Capone, Jacob L. Mey (eds.), Interdisciplinary Studies in Pragmatics, Culture and Society, Springer Cham Heidelberg. NY, Dordrecht London, pp. 91–92

[9]   Most prominent among them were April 6 Youth Movement (*ḥarakat šabāb 6 ibrīl*) and a Trotskyite group called Revolutionary Socialists (*al-ištirākyūn aṯ-ṯawriyūn*).

[10] A characteristic narrative of the Revolution soon inundated major media and social networks, which for simplicity we will henceforth refer to as the discourse of the January 25 revolution in Egypt or simply the *revolutionary discourse*; this discourse dominated the Egyptian media and public discussion even after the downfall of the president Mursi in July 2013.

[11] The International Peace Institute gave 12% to the Muslim Brotherhood affiliated Freedom and Justice Party in both March 2011 and June 2011 polls and only 3% to the Muslim conservative Nour Party; secular parties led religious ones among voters expressing a voting choice 25% to 19% – https://www.ipinst.org/images/pdfs/ipi-egyptpoll-june2011.pdf

same polls, three secular figures led the presidential candidates' popularity lists with not a single Islamist figure in sight[12]. The reality, however, turned out to be quite the opposite of these predictions[13]. While Egypt's military remained in control of the state, the freely elected, but powerless and soon to be dissolved, parliament came to be dominated by Islamist groups, most prominent among the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party. The political cocktail mixing the Islamists' legitimacy with the military's hard power and economic might would not stand the test of time with Egypt's 1st democratically elected Islamist president being forcibly removed and in jail for life after just one year of in office. Young leftist revolutionaries having led both the initial January 25 – February 11, 2011 uprising and the anti-Muslim Brotherhood mass protests of summer 2013 also soon went to jail.

The circular outcome of the Egyptian revolution raises a number of questions. Was the January 25 revolution actually a democratic one? Why do we find the Egyptian society so profoundly divided by 2013 whereas in 2011 many spoke of a 'united nation'? How come the protests against autocratic government brought about an even stronger authoritarian state? The question that may give us a clue to answering these and other similar questions is the following. How an apparently democratic protest movement, characterized by an unprecedented mass mobilization that made every dormant liberal come out and speak up, initiated by not merely secular, but often staunchly atheist, activists – had ended up by bringing to power Islamists who only joined the revolution, when the fate of Mubarak was sealed? Some cite the organizational prowess, perseverance and the sheer size of Muslim Brotherhood. These assets did in fact play their role, but the true answer, in our opinion, is to be found elsewhere. It is in the very nature or the uprising, the ideas and beliefs that motivated the vast majority of the protesters and shaped their behavior through almost three years of political turmoil. These ideas had been molded and took their distinctive shape in the language of the uprising, demands and slogans, which mobilized the protesters, and the hot but enthusiastic public debate that evolved around the revolutionary events.

Conceptual framework that sustains the native narrative or revolution includes many concepts that are either overtly Islamic or, though appearing superficially lay, are in fact linked intrinsically to the religious and religiously inspired ideological discourses. Some of these superficially lay concepts also form essential part of argumentation in the Islamic normative discourse. One case in point is the concept of KARĀMA (*dignity*, but also *integrity*, including corporeal), which is part of the official motto of the January 25 revolution[14]. Other, supposedly lay, concepts, which even sound as loans from secular ideological discourses, such as the term *'adāla ijtimā'iyya* (social justice), had blended into the language of political Islam long time ago[15]. Another group appears to be at least partly coreferential with the Islamic concepts in the narrative of revolution. Such is the link between ṮUWĀR (revolutionaries) and ŠABĀB aṮ-ṮAWRA (revolutionary youth) and ŠUHĀDA' (martyrs). Others have shared frame-semantic elements[16]. Such is the case of FULŪL (a new coinage meaning members and clients of the Ancien Régime[17]), which is linked to the Islamic

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[12]   'Iṣām Šaraf – 74%, 'Amr Mūsā – 73%, Muḥammad Ṭanṭawī – 64%, according to IPI – ibid.

[13]   Muslim Brotherhood received 48% seats and the Muslim conservative Nour Party 28%, while the highest scoring among multiple secular parties had a mere 10%.

[14]   The Revolution's key 'official' motto in its full version included three value concepts *Bread, Freedom, Social Justice and Human Dignity* ('ayš, ḥurriya, 'adāla ijmā'yya, karāma insāniyya)*, in chants and on posters the slogan was often abridged to just three elements by omitting anyone of the three elements other than Freedom.*

[15]   Sayyid Qutb (1906 – 1966), one of the most prominent 20th century's Arab Islamist thinkers uses this term extensively in his writings – see Section 2. Ancien Régime as *dawlat aẓ-ẒULM* for an appropriate quotation.

[16]   This terms is used in the Fillmorean sense, cf. Fillmore, C.J. 1985. "Frames and the semantics of understanding". Quaderni di Semantica VI. 2. 222–254.

[17]   For more detail on this concept cf. Bogomolov, A. 2014. "Constructing political other in the discourse of the Egyptian Arab Spring". Scripta Neophilologica Posnaniensia XIV. 29.

concepts of QIṢĀṢ and ẒULM as we shall see below. Others, such as NIẒĀM ([Ancien] Régime) are often interpreted on the basis of Islamist political beliefs[18]. The prevalence of the Islamic element in the revolutionary discourse is by no means accidental. It is there because it is functionally necessary. Reasons for that are several: the religious concepts represent the single most commonly shared idiom of societal communication, are linked to beliefs firmly embedded in custom and reinforced through daily repetition as part of Islamic devotional and normative discourses, imperatives of the latter are widely perceived as God's commandments. In many cultures religious texts are cited with the purpose of making one's argument more convincing. The Arab Spring discourses are all saturated with the quotation from Sunna and the Quran. The difference between Arab and other cultures, however, is in that the Arab world had never been subjected to such strong influence of secularism as Europe was, and arguably never to such extent had any religion been so politicized as Islam in the 20th century. To whom the message dressed up in this peculiar religious garb had been addressed? The revolution is an argument about power and its intended primary recipient, therefore, had been the government or more broadly the elites. The interference of religious discourses, the prevalence of the Islamic or Islamist terms in the language of the revolution left its specific imprint on the actual political practice and shaped the flow of events. In Section 5 below, we shall demonstrate how they had contributed to the polarizing nature of the revolutionary discourse and, indirectly, through practice shaped by it, to deepening sociopolitical chasm that befell Egypt in the aftermath of a year-long rule of president Mursi and the ensuing military coup. In Sections 2-4 we shall illustrate the functional and broadly sociopragmatic aspects of the Islamic element in the revolutionary discourse by a brief analysis of two concepts QIṢĀṢ, ẒULM, which in our opinion function as a kind of cipher key to the underlying meanings of the native revolutionary narrative. The third concept FULŪL that we propose to analyze in Section 5 below appears to be an intersection between the former two, while its analysis will illustrate how more powerful long established concepts contribute to creating new semantic entities that both reflect and help shape an emerging social reality.

The narrative of the revolution revolves around a dozen of concepts, some of which we have already mentioned above. This narrative represents a dynamic semantic structure describing the scenario of Revolution as seen by its participants and sympathizers. The narrative represents the Revolution as purposeful forward-going movement of the Egyptian People with positive change induced by the People's Will[19], a movement directed against the Tyrant (Ṭāġiya, Ẓālim) and the State of Injustice (Dawlat aẓ-ẒULM), whose henchmen (FULŪL) are being punished and thereby the innocent Blood of the Martyrs of the Revolution (Šuhadā' at-Ṯawra) and those who suffered from the injustice before (the poor and oppressed – Maẓlūmūn) is avenged through RETALIATION (QIṢĀṢ), etc.[20] In each particular text representing what could be described as the discourse of the revolution one may find elements of this narrative with the whole variety of texts complementing each other in recreating the story of the Revolution over and over again. But although built around a narrow set of key concepts and functioning in a rather hermetic manner, this narrative is not an isolated structure; on the contrary it is built of and serves as an entry point between the political

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[18] This point will also be illustrated below.

[19] For the concept IRĀDAT aš-ŠAʿB (People's Will) in the discourse of the Egyptian revolution cf A. Bogomolov. Kontsept IRADA(t) ASH-SHAʿB (volia naroda) v diskursie "arabskoi viesny" (Concept IRĀDAT aš-ŠAʿB [people's will] in the discourse of the Arab Spring). Skhodoznavstvo 2013, No. 64, pp. 15–27.

[20] In this paper we use the following notation: concepts are marked in all capital letters, e.g. QIṢĀṢ, while other sematic units that within the narrative or Revolution appear to be lower or higher in rank we mark by capitalizing only the initial letter, e.g. Ẓālim, Ṭāġiya and Maẓlūm (pl. Maẓlūmūn) are nominations that represent elements (semantic roles) within what could be described as the frame-semantic structure of the concept ẒULM, Revolution here refers not to the concept of REVOLUTION in a more general sense, but to the narrative of January 25 Revolution as discussed above; within this narrative Šahid (pl. Šuhadā') appears to be a subset within the set that could be tagged ṮUWAR (REVOLUTIONARIES) together with another subset Šabāb at-Ṯawra (Revolutionary Youth) – both specifying different context-specific aspects in the concept of ṮUWAR.

discourse and the religious discourses (normative and predicatory ones[21]). Although not strictly overlapping in terms of shared public discussion sites and textual dimension, these two types of discourses function in counterpoint to each other as two distinct but complementary[22] modes as public commentary over the same sociopolitical reality[23] with different sets of speakers but largely the same audiences. Elements of the religious discourses also interfere with the political discourse more directly in what could be described as *citational mode*[24]. Instances of the revolutionary discourse, which come in different genres, but particularly those produced by Muslim Brotherhood sympathizers and other conservative Muslims, aside from being built on the narrative of the revolution as outlined above are also full of quotations from the Quran and Sunna, which reinforce the Islamic dimension of the above cited conceptual framework.

Before going further, it seems appropriate now to bring together a few theoretical ideas, which we use in our analysis, to complement those already referred to in the footnotes above. We have chosen *concepts* as a convenient entry point to the study of cognitive semantics aspects of political discourse. The core structure of concepts may be described as a Fillmorean frame[25], while stable collocations composed of key nominations representing a concept[26] with various modifiers may express a vast range of ideas associated with it, which may either be foregrounded, or implied, or become irrelevant depending on specific context. These ideas often include culture-specific beliefs, which an analyst may explicate in the form of propositions[27], e.g. '*retaliation* is best performed in a *speedy* manner'[28]. Stable collocations also indicate that a *conceptual metaphor* may be invoked[29]. For instance, collocations of the noun *zulm* (injustice, oppression, wrong) with the derivatives of the verb *waqa'* (to fall) and spatial prepositions, e.g. *taḥt* (under), point to a metaphoric representation of ẒULM as an *object falling from above*. The material we use in our study is based on a small corpus, which we have compiled based on the Egyptian media texts dating mainly to January 2011 – July 2013, classical Arabic dictionaries and religious texts as well works of Islamic scholars.

2. Ancien Régime as *dawlat aẓ-Ẓ*ULM

When people are doing something beyond the basic daily routine, particularly, when it comes to extraordinary events involving large groups of actors, they seek explanations, and strive to

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[21] By the latter one we mean the discourse of the Friday mosque sermons, which often appear to be related to the daily events of political and social life, and traditionally play an important role in political debate and public mobilization.

[22] The two discourses serve different but compatible functions, e.g. the religious discourse has a strong *regulatory* dimension, greater *persuasiveness*, but its referential scope is limited compared to the common political discourse – it cannot represent the political process in detail.

[23] Cf. the notion of *meta-cultural commentary* in D. Carbaugh. Cultural Discourse Analysis: Pragmatics of Social Interaction. in Alessandro Capone • Jacob L. Mey (Eds.), Interdisciplinary Studies in Pragmatics, Culture and Society p. 566

[24] The predicatory and normative religious discourses, which are not confined to oral Friday sermons and occasional legal rulings, but nowadys also include vast collections of texts posted online, display a very high level of citationality; it is the principal medium for replenishing modern Mulims' repositories of quotes from the Quran and Sunna, a gateway, through which the medieval depth of culture with its characteristic conceptual frameworks continues to blend into modernity.

[25] Cf. Fillmore, C.J. 1985. "Frames and the semantics of understanding". Quaderni di Semantica VI. 2. pp. 222–254 and FrameNet, a web-based corpus, which draws on Fillmore's frame semantics - https://framenet.icsi.berkeley.edu/fndrupal/home

[26] For instance, n. *zulm*, v. *zalam*, n. or adj. *zālim*, and synonymous units, including idioms, which we will illusrate below, in the case of ẒULM.

[27] Cf. the notion of *cultural propositions* in Donal Carbaugh, Cultural Discourse Analysis: Pragmatics of Social Interaction in Alessandro Capone, Jacob L. Mey (eds.), Interdisciplinary Studies in Pragmatics, Culture and Society, Springer Cham Heidelberg New York Dordrecht London 2016, p. 576–577.

[28] We will discuss this idea in more detail in appropriate section below.

[29] Cf. Lakoff, G. and M. Johnson. 2003. Metaphors we live by. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

provide them in order to justify their acts. In the discourse of the Egyptian revolution we find the following common explanations of why the January 25 revolution had to happen:

> (1) *ša'b ṯāra 'alā aẓ-ẓulm wa al-fasād wa al-ifqār*[30] (people rose up against ẒULM, corruption and impoverishment);
> (2) *ša'b ṯāra 'alā aẓ-ẓulm wa al-fasād wa dīktātūriyyat ḥukm al-fard*[31] (people rose up against ẒULM, corruption and dictatorship of the rule of individual);
> (3) *ša'b ṯāra 'alā aẓ-ẓulm wa al-fasād wa al-istibdād*[32] (people rose up against ẒULM, corruption and despotism);
> (4) *ša'b ṯāra 'alā aẓ-ẓulm wa aṭ-ṭuġyān*[33] (people rose up against ẒULM and tyranny)

The fact that it is ẒULM that is seen as the single most important reason behind the Egyptian revolution is evident from its syntactic position as the head term in a coordinated row. It is notable also that ẒULM appears to be a common concept for different ideological discourses: while phrases (3) and (4) on our list sound like instances of the Islamist (political Islam) discourse identifiable by its characteristic terms *istibdād* (despotism) and *ṭuġyān* (tyranny), item (1), but, particularly, item (2) are rather characteristic of leftist discourse.

The phrase *dawlat aẓ-ẓulm* (the state of ẒULM) appears to be the preferred description of the Ancien Régime in the discourse of the Egyptian revolution[34], cf.:

> tilka ad-dawla allatī taḥnuq aš-šaʿb wa tataʿālā ʿalayh ḥāra ḍiddahā aš-šaʿb al-miṣrī bi-rummatihi fī yanāyir, lam takun a ḥ-ḥawra ḍidd mubārak ša ḥsiyyan, wa lākin kānat ḍidd *dawla ẓālima* bi-jamīʿ muʾassasātihā wa ajhizatihā al-idāriyya, wa lan yuktamal intṣār a ḥ-ḥawra dūna hadm *dawlat aẓ-ẓulm* (…) ḥattā tastaṭīʿa ḥ-ḥawra an tabnī dawlatahā al-badīla…[35]
>
> That state, which strangles the people and rises above it, [which] the whole of the Egyptian people has made revolution against it in January, was not a revolution against Mubarak personally, but was against *opressive/injust* (congnate of *ẓulm* – A.B.) *state* with all its institutions and administrative bodies, and the victory of the revolution will never be complete until the ruining of the state of ẒULM (…) until the revolution will be able to build its alternative state…

Such role of ẒULM in the political discourse is by no means an innovation. According to S. Khatab, a key ideologue of modern political Islam Sayyid Qutb was using the terms 'tyranny' and 'oppression' to describe the contemporary sociopolitical order in Egypt as early as in 1925 – 1939[36]. In doing so he certainly was not alone. Much later, Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Salam Faraj, a leader and ideologue of a violent extremist group that assassinated the president Anwar as-Sadat, during his official interrogation in 1982 also referred to 'the *oppression* and the violence of the State against Sharia and against Muslims'[37] (emphasis added – *A.B.*). Qutb had effectively

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[30] From an article on oppositional website Mada Masr of 15 Feb, 2015 – http://goo.gl/YTaVp0

[31] http://www.ahram.org.eg/NewsPrint/344315.aspx

[32] http://goo.gl/FrHhEe

[33] The newly elected President Mursi's speech on the anniversary of the July 23 revolution in 2012 - http://aymanamerprees.blogspot.com/2012_07_01_archive.html

[34] It has returned about 11,500 results for the Egyptian sites, as of 25 March 2015; the 2nd most frequent synonymous nomination – *niẓām aẓ-ẓulm* (the regime of ẒULM) returned about 2,920 results on Google search and *an-niẓām aẓ-ẓālim* – about 1,970 results (as of May 6, 2016).

[35] An article titled 'The State and the Army… between ruining and construction' (ad-dawla wa al-jayš … bayn al-hadm wa al-binā'). In al-Yasār aṭ-Ṭawrī (The Revolutionary Left), January 31, 2012
https://elthawry.wordpress.com/2012/01/31

[36] Sayed Khatab. The Political Thought of Sayyid Qutb. The theory of *jāhilyyah*. Routledge. London, NY, 2006, p. 62; although Khatab does not provide Arabic equivalents for these terms, it appears to be clear that by the latter term he must have meant *ẓulm*.

[37] Sayed Khatab. The Power of Sovereignty. The political and ideological philosophy of Sayyid Qutb. Routledge. London, NY, 2006, p. 205.

developed this centuries old Islamic concept[38] into a brief theory of *power* and *state*. Here is a paragraph from Qutb's last and arguably most important book Ma'ālim fī aṭ-Ṭariq (Signposts on the Road) [39] describing an ideal society:

> … wa taṭahhar al-mujtamaʿ min aẓ-ẓulm bi-jumlatihi, wa qāma an-niẓām al-islāmī yaʿdil bi-ʿadl aḷḷāh wa yazin bi-mīzān aḷḷāh wa yarfaʿ al-ʿadāla al-ijitmāʿiyya bi-smi-llāh…[40]
>
> … and the society was purified from ẒULM in its entirety and the Islamic order had risen [which] administers justice by Allah's justice and weighs by Allah's scales and raises the social justice it the name of Allah…

There is no doubt that any member of an Islamist political organization, including the ex-president Muhammad Mursi, would endorse this ideal.

Plentiful linguistic evidence suggests that the frame-semantic structure of ẒULM in Classical Arabic represented a social transaction between *peers* rather than a powerful individual (oppressor, tyrant) and a disenfranchised common person, as one may conclude from reading modern Arabic texts. Here are some illustrations in support of this thesis. The idea of *complaining* about an act of *ẓulm* is Arabic is expressed by a group of derivatives of the same root, which in modern usage include the 5th verbal form *taẓallam* (complain/ask for redemption of injustice), and *maẓlima* (subject of complaint, item to be redeemed)[41]. Respective glosses in the classical dictionaries describe a situation, when Patient of ẒULM (*maẓlūm*) may directly approach the Agent of ẒULM (*ẓālim*) *asking* him to redeem the damage, which implies an equal power status of both parties, cf. the following gloss from Lisān al-ʿArab: *aẓ-ẓulāmat[u] wa aẓ-ẓalīmat[u] wa al-maẓlimat[u]: mā taṭlubuh[u] ʿinda aẓ-ẓālim* (the matter of complaint[42] [is] what you ask/seek from the wrongdoer)[43]. Another characteristic form, which went out of use in modern language is the 6th verbal form *taẓālama* (to wrong, do injustice *to each other*), which now may only be encountered in quotations of old religious texts (Quran and Sunna). Here is one of the most often cited texts: *yā ʿibādī innī ḥarramtu aẓ-ẓulma ʿalā nafsī wa jaʿaltuhu muḥarraman fa-lā taẓālamū* (oh my servants, I have prohibited ẒULM upon myself and made it prohibited, therefore, do not wrong each other)[44].

In modern political discourse, on the contrary, the Agent of ẒULM (Offender) is often depicted as a powerful entity and the Patient (Injured party) – as a powerless common person. When the latter semantic role is filled in with plural or collective noun, such as *šaʿb* (people), the Agent would be often specified as a despotic Ruler (Ṭāġiya, Ẓālim). Moreover, the frequent collocations of the noun *ẓulm* (injustice, oppression, wrong) with the derivatives of the verb *waqaʿ* (to fall) and such spatial prepositions as *taḥt* (under), point to a metaphoric representation of ẒULM

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[38] Derivatives of $\sqrt{ẓlm}$ root occur in the Quran about 200 times – one of the highest occurrence rates in the Muslim holy book. The authoritative collection of hadith Ṣaḥīḥ al-Buḫārī has a whole special chapter dedicated to ẒULM, titled Kitāb al-Maẓālim (the Book of Outrages/Wrongs).

[39] Gilles Kepel has called 'Ma'ālim...' 'What is to be done' of the Islamist movement (Gilles Kepel. *Jihad: expansion et déclin de l'islamisme*. Editions Gallimard, 2000; cited through Russian translation, Zhil Kepel. Dzhikhad. Moscow, Ladomir, 2004, p. 31).

[40] Sayyid Qutb. Ma'ālim fī aṭ-Ṭariq Bayrūt, al-Qāhira, Dār aš-Šurūq, 1979, p. 29.

[41] Although the idea of Complaint may be also expressed by a more generic verb *šakā/yaškū* (to complain), it appears that the native speakers give preference to the cognate verb, for instance the phrase *yaškū ẓulm* (he complains of injustice) returned 18,000 results on Google search, while the synonymous *yataẓallam* – 164,000 results (data as of 1 August, 2016).

[42] The gloss contains three synonyms, of which the 1st one is also used in the sense of the *act* of complaining.

[43] Lisān al-'arab. Beirut: Dār ⵯadir, 1955–1956, 15 vols.; vol. Ẓā'; other examples could also be found in classical dictionaries.

[44] The text represents an instance of so called *sacred* or *divine* hadith (*ḥadīṯ qudsī*), i.e. type of hadith containing a direct speech of Allah as opposed to the bulk of hadith citing acts and sayings of the prophet Muḥammad; cf. Šurūḥ al-Ḥadīṯ. Jāmiʿ al-ʿUlūm wa al-Ḥikam. Ibn Rajab al-Ḥanbalī. Mu'assasat ar-Risāla, 2001/1422 h., Ḥadīṯ # 24 - http://library.islamweb.net/newlibrary/display_book.php?idfrom=125&idto=130&bk_no=81&ID=26##

as an *object falling from sky*, i.e. an area outside of human normal scope of vision/control, which conveys an idea of INJUSTICE as an unpredictable fatal force, reflecting an extreme *power distance*[45].

The obvious tension between the notion of ẒULM as an *act of power* par excellence and as *a transaction among peers* (or equals in the face of deity, as it appears in the above cited divine hadith) has the potential of being used as a rhetorical device of discursive defiance and empowerment. The whole ideology of modern political Islam, exemplified in writings similar to the above cited passage from S. Qutb, is based on projecting the simple reality of early medieval society as reflected in classical religious texts of the Quran and Sunna on Arab modernity, deploying it as a basis for moral critique of the contemporary society.

3. QIṢĀṢ: power of the weak

As a rallying motto QIṢĀṢ comes in use at a very early phase of the uprising, it is used as part of a rhymed chant *al-qiṣāṣ al-qiṣāṣ ḍarbū iḫwatnā bi-r-raṣaṣ* (Retaliation! Retaliation! They hit our brothers with bullets). According to a witness account, the chant was first used immediately after the mass rally under the slogan *jum'at al-ġaḍab* (Friday of Wrath), on the 4th day of Tahrir square protests, when an estimated 1,000 of protestors were killed. It was then repeated in various forms at multiple protest rallies throughout Egypt.

In the narrative or revolution, particularly, in texts citing *revolutionary demands* (maṭālib aṯ-ṯawra), QIṢĀṢ often occurs in collocations with adjectives *sarī'* (speedy, fast), *'ājil* (immediate) and *nājiz* (prompt, complete). This illustrates the deeply embedded belief that QIṢĀṢ[46] should be performed as *fast as possible* once an offense has occurred. The cultural premise underlying such usage may be formulated in the form of a proposition 'justice should be performed immediately after a crime'[47]. This idea is sharply contrasted to the European notion of REVENGE as *a dish best served cold*, let alone a more complex juridical concept of *due process*. Such an apparent discrepancy in cultural premises warrants an explanation. Apparently, the idea of the immediacy of punishment for the crime stems from another firmly established belief regarding the nature of crime and punishment which is discussed in the texts on Islamic jurisprudence. This belief is encoded in the form of a few intertwined conceptual metaphors. In the Islamic normative discourse QIṢĀṢ is seen as a method of *healing* (tašaffī) for the pains of people affected by the crime, such as relatives of the victim and the community at large, and *preventing* (zajr) the crime from reoccurrence, cf:

> … wa al-qiṣāṣ huwa fi'l mujnī 'alayhi aw fi'l waliyihi bi-jānin miṯla fi'lihi aw šibhahu, *wa ḥikmatuhu at-tašaffī* wa *bard ḥarārat al-ġayẓ*, wa qad šarra'a allahu qiṣāṣ *zajran 'an al-'udwān wa istidrākan lamā fī an-nufūs*, wa iḏāqatan li-l-jānī mā aḏāqahu al-mujnī 'alayhi, wa *fīhi baqā' wa ḥayāt an-naw' al-insānī*
>
> … and QIṢĀṢ is an act of the injured party or the act of his next of kin [in respect] of the offender same as his act or similar [to] it, and its *wisdom [is] the healing and cooling the heat of anger*; and Allah has legislated QIṢĀṢ to *prevent the aggression and anticipate (forestall) what [is] in the souls*, and let the offender taste what he let taste the injured party, and in it [is] the survival and life of the human kind[48]

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[45] *Power distance* is one of the so called *dimensions of national culture*, a concept introduced by Geert H. Hofstede, defined as 'the degree to which the less powerful members of a society accept and expect that power is distributed unequally' – cf. https://geert-hofstede.com/national-culture.html cf. also Hofstede, Geert. Culture's Consequences: International Differences in Work-Related Values (2nd ed.). Beverly Hills CA: SAGE Publications,1984, pp. 92–153.

[46] Or, by extension JUSTICE ('ADĀLA) in general, for QIṢĀṢ functions as a *prototype* in the set of judicial and extra-judicial practices specifying JUSTICE.

[47] For the notion of *cultural proposition* cf. Donal Carbaugh, Cultural Discourse Analysis: Pragmatics of Social Interaction in Alessandro Capone, Jacob L. Mey (eds.), Interdisciplinary Studies in Pragmatics, Culture and Society, Springer Cham Heidelberg New York Dordrecht London 2016, p. 576–577.

[48] Ṣāliḥ bin Fawzān bin 'Abdullah al-Fawzān. al-Mulaḫḫaṣ al-Fiqhī. Dār al-'Āṣima. ar-Riyāḍ. 1423 h., part 2, p. 476 http://shamela.ws/browse.php/book-11811/page-895

Here *anger*, seen as a natural spontaneous reaction to *injury*, is metaphorically represented as a *hot* substance, possibly *fire*. Its location is identified as *nufūs* (souls). The reason we believe that underlying image schema is *fire* (other alternative could be *boiling water*) is that what is happening in the souls needs to be forestalled *quickly*, and it is the fire that needs to be extinguished as quickly as possible for its tendency to spread rapidly around. Heat may be burning not only the *souls* of but also the *hearts* of the injured party, cf.:

> kamā akkad ʿalā ḍarūrat taḥqīq al-ʿadāla wa ittiḥāḏ al-ijrāʾāt wa sann al-qawānīn al-lāzima wa as-sarīʿa fī al-qiṣāṣ *kay tabrud qulūb ahālī aš-šuhadāʾ* wa yataḥaqqaq *al-itsqrār al-manšūd*[49]
> [He] also stressed the need to implement justice and take measures and adopt the necessary and speedy laws on QIṢĀṢ *in order for the hearts of the relatives of martyrs to cool down* and the *aspired stability to be achieved*.

Heat that has engulfed the *souls* or *hearts* of the injured is presented here not as an individual but a communal concern. Retaliation is meant to ensure social peace. When it comes to society or community, the image of human collective underlying the notion of QIṢĀṢ appears to be that of a family and the latter is metaphorically conceptualized as *tree*. Below is a characteristic text again representing the Islamic normative discourse that allowed reconstructing these underlying meanings. The segment discusses one of the so called *šurūṭ al-qiṣāṣ* (conditions of QIṢĀṢ):

> allā yakūn al-qātil *aṣlan li-l-maqtūl* fa-lā yuqtaṣṣu min wālid bi-qatl waladihi, wa walad waladihi…
> so that the killer not be a *source (lit. root) of the killed*, and father shall not be retaliated against for slaying his son and the son of his son

It is from this perspective apparently that the most cited Islamic text on QIṢĀṢ needs to be understood: *wa lakum fī al-qiṣāṣ ḥayātun yā ūlī al-albāb laʿallakum tattaqūn* (and [there is] for you in QIṢĀṢ *life*, o owners of minds (i.e. intelligent or reasonable people – A. B.) may you have fear [of God])'(Quran 2:179). Life is metaphorically represented as TREE that grows from father to son, the entailment of this metaphor is that if you kill the father you will undercut the root and the tree won't grow, retaliation should be performed on an offshoot in the manner of gardener eliminating a malicious outgrowth. A common idiom describes QIṢĀṢ as *aḫḏ dam aḍ-ḍaḥāyā* (taking blood of the victims) or *aḫḏ al-ḥaqq min mujnī* (taking the rightful property from the Offender) – *blood*, which is taken from the Offender within the source domain of the metaphor LIFE as TREE corresponds to the *juices* that are returned to source when a malicious outgrowth gets undercut. Social responsibility of Retaliator within these cognitive metaphorical representations is construed as an act of natural justice, something deeply embedded in LIFE itself. Within this system of beliefs, it is not merely social but divine responsibility to avenge the victim of crime; as such it is a source of an immense empowerment for those related to the injured party and by extension to their entire community, for the matter is not seen from an individual but from a collective perspective and when performing or asking for retaliation they are observing a divine commandment, fulfilling or asking to fulfill God's will. Here is an often cited verse from the Quran, which explicitly describes QIṢĀṢ as a (source of) POWER:

> wa man qutila maẓlūman fa-qad jaʿalnā li-waliyyihi *sulṭānan* fa-lā yusrif fī al-qatli innahu kāna manṣūran (Quran 17: 33)
> And whoever is killed unjustly, we have given his next of kin *power*, but let him not exceed limits in killing. Indeed, he has been supported.

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[49] From an article on Miṣr 11 website (www.masr11.com), the quotation is attributed to a 'political analyst' Muḥsin Šalabī – http://goo.gl/8L8afM

Another issue that is often discussed in the Islamic normative tradition is the responsibility of a Muslim ruler (*ḥākim*) for ensuring a just QIṢĀṢ. From this perspective when people demanded QIṢĀṢ at a mass rally such demands represented a strong challenge to the authorities. The argument around QIṢĀṢ, a shared value for all parts of the Egyptian society, its *promptness* or *appropriateness* represented effectively a dispute for power. By calling on the authorities to submit to *people's will* and threatening with a *people's* QIṢĀṢ, the revolutionaries affectively staged a powerful symbolic offensive against the government. While QIṢĀṢ had probably been used as a political motto for the first time during the January 25 revolution, it mobilized the whole depth of culture to empower the protesters.

4. ẒULM and QIṢĀṢ – complementary concepts

The first known Arabic dictionary Kitāb al-'Ayn compiled by al-Ḫalīl ibn Aḥmad al-Farāhīdī (8th cent. AD) provides the following gloss for the noun *ẓulm*: *wa aẓ-ẓulmu aḫduka ḥaqqa ġayrika* (and *ẓulm* [is] your taking of someone else's property/right). This idea is reiterated through the whole Arab lexicographic tradition and commentaries to the *hadith*[50] up until now. The nominations representing QIṢĀṢ, on the other hand, include the following characteristic idioms: *aḫd dam aḍ-ḍaḥāyā* (taking of the victims' blood), *aḫd al-ḥaqq min* [Offender] (taking the right, i. e. a rightful property, from Offender), and, finally, the tautological *aḫd al-qiṣāṣ* (taking of QIṢĀṢ). The frame-semantic structures of the two concepts ẒULM and QIṢĀṢ appear to have an overlapping element – Theme. ẒULM appear to be construed as Taking of *right/rightful property* from the Injured party by the Offender, while QIṢĀṢ represents Taking (back) of the same Theme by the Retaliator from the Offender and Giving it to the party, which stands to inherit the *right/property* from the Injured part – i.e. the next of kin (*walī ad-dam* – i.e. lit. *the nearest in blood*).

Here is an interesting *hadith* text, which illustrates the connection between ẒULM and QIṢĀṢ even more explicitly:

> iḏā ḫalaṣa al-mu'minūna min an-nār ḥubisū bi-qanṭara bayna al-jannati wa an-nār fa-*yataqāṣṣūna maẓālima* kānat baynahum fī ad-dunyā ḥattā iḏā naqū wa huḏḏibū uḏina lahum bi-duḫūl al-janna[51]
>
> Once the Muslims escape from the fire (*i.e.* hell) they will be held at a bridge between the paradise and fire (i.e. hell – A.B.) and *retaliate to each other*[52] *wrongdoings* (a cognate of *zulm*) [that] were between them in [this] world so that when they become pure and are rectified (corrected, set right, improved), it will be permitted to them to enter the paradise…

What binds the two concepts together at the level of cultural premises embedded in them could be described as *a moral economy principle*, which appears to be similar to *debts should be repaid* principle, much and long discussed in the European books on ethics[53].

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[50] Ibn Ḥajar Al-'Asqalānī (1372 – 1449) in his commentary to Hadith 2308 of the Ṣaḥīḥ collection provides the following definition for *maẓālim* (another derivative of the root $\sqrt{ẓlm}$): *ism li-mā uḫiḏa bi-ġayr ḥaqq* (name for what was taken without right) – cf. Hadith 2308 in Aḥmad b. 'Alī b. Ḥajar al-'Asqalānī. Dār ar-Rayyān li-t-Turāṯ. 1407 h./1986 m.
http://library.islamweb.net/newlibrary/display_book.php?idfrom=4432&idto=4433&bk_no=52&ID=1549#docu

[51] Hadith 2308 in Aḥmad b. 'Alī b. Ḥajar al-'Asqalānī. Dār ar-Rayyān li-t-Turāṯ. 1407 h./1986 m. http://library.islamweb.net/newlibrary/display_book.php?idfrom=4432&idto=4433&bk_no=52&ID=1549#docu

[52] This meaning is expressed by the reciprocal 6th verbal form, cognate of *qiṣāṣ* (retaliation).

[53] See, for instance, Rosalind Hursthouse. What does the Aristotelian Phronimos know? *in* L. Jost, J. Wuerth (eds.) Perfecting Virtue. New Essays on Kantian Ethics and Virtue Ethics. Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 42, where this principle is cited in discussion of the classical Greek concept of *phronesis* (prudence, moral intelligence).

5. Enemies [that have to be] defeated: FULŪL

The Egyptian revolutionary discourse uses a broad variety of nominations in reference to enemies of the revolution, the remnants of the Ancien Régime: *baqāyā* (remainders, remnants), *ḏulūl an-niẓām as-sābiq* (tails of the Ancien Régime), *abnā' an-niẓām as-sābiq* (sons of the Ancien Régime) and *rumūz an-niẓām as-sābiq* (symbols of the Ancien Régime). It is, however, the new coinage *fulūl* that soon became the preferred term and the reason behind this choice was not that it was merely more expressive or new. We shall demonstrate that the term took prevalence and developed into a whole new concept because of functional reasons, its sociopragmatic capacity. It complemented the two powerful concepts that we described above by linking the slot(s) of Agent/Offender in the frame semantic structures of both ẒULM and QIṢĀṢ. Together the three concepts formed a complete set needed for formulating the ideas that shaped the emerging political practice of the revolutionaries, their immediate action plan.

In the revolutionary discourse FULŪL are portrayed as all those implicated in multiple acts of ẒULM committed under the auspices of the Ancien Régime (*dawlat aẓ-*ẒULM), engagement in wrongdoings (*maẓālim*) is their essential characteristic, cf.:

> al-fulūl hum man istaʿādū wa tarabbaḥū wa kasabū min ḥarām amwāl hāḏā aš-šaʿb al-miskīn, al-fulūl hum man saḥaw min nawmihim wa-ktašafū anna dawlat aẓ-ẓulm qad saqaṭat ilā ġayr rujʿa wa kānū yataʿayyašūna ʿalā aẓ-ẓulm[54]
>
> FULŪL are [those] who have sought returns and made profit and gained and robbed the forbidden property of this poor people, FULŪL are [those] who woke up from their sleep to find that the state of injustice had fallen with no [possibility of] return, while they had been feeding on injustice…

The phrase *ḥarām amwāl hāḏā aš-šaʿb* (forbidden property of this poor people) here corresponds to the *right/rightful property* as the Theme in (unlawful) Taking frame underlying the concept of ẒULM, while specifying it with more detail and thus rhetorically reinforcing it; *aš-šaʿb al-miskīn* (the poor people) is a nomination synonimous to *maẓlūmūn* (the oppressed, victims of ẒULM). But what is even more interesting about FULŪL is that this specific nomination allowed incorporating into it the scenario of *punishment* (i.e. effectively QIṢĀṢ). While Arabic dictionary glosses for *fulūl* (pl. of *fall*) begin with describing it as 'breaks, or notches in the edge of a sword, etc.', already the late 13th century Lisān al-ʿArab cites 'defeat' among the meanings of the verb *falla* and 'defeated people' – among the meanings of *fulūl* (pl.). In modern Arabic before the Egyptian revolution of 2011 the word *fulūl* would only be used in reference to 'derbies of a defeated army'[55]. The *moral economy principle* embedded in the concept of QIṢĀṢ calling for every wrong to be matched with a qualitatively equivalent counter-action (*lex talionis* principle) also finds reflection in a proverb – *lā yafullu al-ḥadīd illā al-ḥadīd (nothing but the iron notches the iron)*, which conveys a meaning similar to that of the English proverb *one nail drives out another*. The proverb, in which the verbal cognate of *fulūl* – *falla/yafullu* may be read as both 'notch' and 'defeat', was extensively cited in the Egyptian revolutionary discourse and had probably contributed to the salience of FULŪL.

While, as we have shown above, meanings associated with FULŪL had been strongly affected by those of the two other more powerful concepts, a peculiar characteristic of ẒULM appears to be of particular relevance, viz. ẒULM is always attributed to individual agency. Here is an excerpt from a sermon that characteristically depicts ẒULM as an immanent quality of human psyche:

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[54] http://www.masress.com/almessa/29168

[55] It is not a meaning provided by any modern bylingual dictionary known to us, neither by any standard Arabic dictionary, such as al-Munjid, but our own reconstruction based on corpus data that we compiled; the usage is rather infrequent and occurs mainly in texts on military history or similar matters.

… fa-inna aẓ-ẓulm^a ṭabī‘a bašariyya tanziʿu ilayhā an-nafs, wa tanḥadiru ilayhā aṭ-ṭabāʾiʿ, fa-hiya jibilla mutajaḏḏira fī nafs al-insān "wa ḥamalahā al-insān^u innahu kāna ẓalūm^{an} jahūl^{an}"[56]

… for ẒULM [is] human nature [that] the self yearns (is inclined to), and the characters roll down to it, and it is an innate quality/natural disposition[57] rooted in human self "and the man bore it, indeed he was *ẓalūm* (adjective cognate of *ẓulm* – A.B.) and ignorant" (Quran 33:72)[58]

It is notable how the language of simple physical reality is metaphorically deployed to construct human inner world, where psychological predisposition is represented as the natural downward rolling tendency of rounded objects placed on top of a slope. ẒULM, by entailment, appears to be located at the bottom of the universe of human soul[59], in respect to human nature it has an overwhelming power of a gravitational pull.

While ẒULM is construed as a paramount social evil and the notion of *dawlat aẓ-*ẒULM depicts the whole of Egypt as being under the spell of ẒULM, it is still specific individuals who are implicated in it. The State of Injustice is not conceived of as a *system* or an *arrangement*, for which the metaphor of State as Machine common to many languages could be deployed, but rather *a community of evil individuals*, those, who 'gained and robbed the forbidden property of this poor people'. Within this worldview, EVIL is always personified and, therefore, in order to eliminate it one simply has to go after the bad guys. It is in line with this perspective that pictures of FULŪL as pests or snakes became common in the Egyptian media during the revolutionary years, graphically representing the metaphor ENEMY as PEST, common to a whole family of conservative and right-wing discourses.

With these ideas embedded into the notion of political opponent a peculiar political practice took rise. In the immediate aftermath of the downfall of Mubarak a nation-wide campaign under the heading *Imsak Fulūl* (catch FULŪL) was launched by young revolutionaries aimed at 'isolating' (*'azl*) and 'marginalizing' (*iqṣā'*), i.e. effectively compiling lists of FULŪL to press for their removal from public offices at every level and ostracizing them by all possible means[60]. Scale of the practice has contributed considerably to an unprecedented polarization of the Egyptian society.

6. ẒULM/QIṢĀṢ as a cipher key to the revolutionary discourse

The material cited above may produce a false impression that it is only part of the texts containing the concepts represented explicitly that matter, and one may possibly find many other texts on the subject of the Egyptian revolution, which would be constructed around some other concepts and ideas. With a relatively large text below we will demonstrate how not only those texts

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[56] An excerpt from a *ḫuṭba* (sermon) titled Ẓulm an-Nafs (the wronging of self) by a Saudi *ḫaṭīb* (preacher) Sheikh ʿAbdullah bin ʿAbd-ul-ʿAzīz al-Mibrad – http://www.islamlight.net/index.php?option=content&task=view&id=1807

[57] An on-line dictionary www.almaany.com, which incorporates a broad range of classical and modern Arabic dictionaries cites *ḫilqa* (creation, innate peculiarity of character, natural disposition, nature etc. – H. Wehr. A dictionary of Modern Wrtten Arabic. Ed. J. Milton Cowan. Spoken Languages Inc., Ithaca, NY 1976) as an equivalent to this relatively rare word.

[58] Two metaphors are deployed in this text: ẒULM as *gravitation force* (i.e. a pull coming from outside of the Self) and ẒULM as *plant* (i.e. an entity going deep inside the Self) – the two metaphors although inconsistent appear to be coherent in Lakoffian sense as they both emphasize the power of ẒULM over individual and the innate nature of this power.

[59] *Vices* in this metaphorical model are placed at the bottom of Soul as Container, while virtues are at the top, consistent with spatial metaphors GOOD is UP and BAD is DOWN as described in Lakoff, G. and M. Johnson. 2003. Metaphors we live by. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

[60] A Google search for *qā'ima bi-asmā' fulūl […]* (the list with the names of FULŪL, the square brackets stand for any specific geographic locality) returned 5490 references. For one of the earlier lists dated 9 Nov. 2011 see an article with characteristic title *Bawwābat 25 yanā'ir tufaḍḍiḥ asmā' fulūl al-waṭanī wa al-muwālīn lahum fī rubū' miṣr baynahum iḫwānī* (the 25 January Gateway debunks names of FULŪL of the National [Democratic Party] and their loyalists throughout Egypt, among them a Muslim Brotherhood member) – http://january-25.org/post.aspx?k=47056

that explicitly foreground the two concepts, but many more texts, ultimately the entire discourse of the revolution, were infused by the powerful semantics of these concepts:

> ammā al-*qatala wa as-saffāḥīn* fa-innā nas'alu aḷḷaha 'azza wa jalla an yaj'ala hāḏihi *ad-damā' az-zakiya min aš-šuhadā'* (…) la'nat^{an} 'alayhim (…) ilā yawm al-qiyāma (…) kamā nas'alu tabāraka wa ta'ālā *an yaj'ala kull at-taḍḥiyāt* (…) min kull al-muslimīn wa al-muslimāt hiya *ḍarībatan tuḥarrir* al-umma min kull 'ubūdiya illā li-llah wa [tu'ammin? – A.B.] *ḥuṣūlahā 'alā kull ḥuqūqihā al-mašrū'a*…[61]
>
> As for the *murderers and slaughterers*, we ask Allah Almighty to make this *pure blood of the martyrs* (…) a *curse upon them* (…) until the Doomsday (…) as we ask the Most Blessed and the Highest to *make all sacrifices* (…) of all Muslims (masc. & fem.) a *tax to liberate* the nation from all bondage but that of Allah and [ensure] its *attainment of all its lawful rights*…

The text, which comes at the denouement of the revolution, differs in modality from the standard revolutionary discourse. It sounds less as promise and more as a threat and is infused with characteristic Islamist concepts, such as *'udūdiyya* (bondage, slavery). The text, however, still reproduces the same revolutionary narrative as outlined above with all its protagonists named and a progressive movement from the reign of ẒULM through QIṢĀṢ to a closure (*tašaffī*), without ever explicitly naming the two concepts. The *moral economy principle* underlying the concepts of ẒULM and QIṢĀṢ is reinstated with the help of a new metaphor, where the fiscal term *tax* stands for the *blood* of the martyrs. The rule of the qualitative equivalence of losses and gains thus remains observed and relief is granted to the Injured party in exchange for the losses it has incurred. The divine power is explicitly invoked to endorse the transaction.

7. Conclusions

Islamic concepts in the discourse of the Egyptian revolution may not be dismissed as a mere rhetoric. They are core concepts in the narrative of the revolution, which helped the protesters make sense of what was going on and informed their behavior. This narrative has emerged spontaneously from the political practice. The manner, in which this narrative emerged, may be compared to the assembling of a tilling puzzle: the best fitting elements are the ones that remained in place when the puzzle had been complete. The pattern that thus emerged was that, which would best mobilize and empower, be grounded in the most commonly shared beliefs and express the most commonly shared aspirations and goals.

Unlike ẒULM, which had long been a staple of the discourse of defiance to the autocratic regimes, the theme of QIṢĀṢ had never before been exploited in rallying chants during mass protests[62]. Such innovation raises the issue of authorship: whoever it was someone had to do it first. Creativity of anonymous activists interplayed in invoking this and other concepts that contributed to shaping the narrative of the revolution with the convention rooted in culture. During the early days of the Tahrir square uprising, the Revolutionary Socialists debated the appropriateness of the religious term QIṢĀṢ, which as convinced atheists they found rather unsettling, as a rallying motto of the protests[63]. The debate was concluded by what appeared to be then a wise decision – to go on using the term for its being part of 'the language of the masses'. This piece of unique anecdotal evidence throws light on a peculiar interplay of intention and convention in shaping the narrative of

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[61] Ummat al-ahdāf as-sāmiya wa t-taḍḥiyāt al-ġāliya. Risāla min Muḥammad al-Badī', al-muršid al-'ām li-l-iḫwān al-muslimīn. 20.08.2013 (An truncated excerpt from what appears to be the last epistle penned by supreme guide of the Muslim Brotherhood Muhammad Badi' before his incarceration titled 'The Umma of High Goals and Precious Sacrifices') – http://www.daawa-info.net/letter.php?id=437

[62] That is our observation from years of following the Egyptian and Arab news also confirmed by Egyptians in personal communications with the author.

[63] Personal communication with a witness of the debate.

January 25 revolution. What would best achieve the desired communicative goal was the language firmly grounded in convention.

The way a narrative grounded in Islamic beliefs has emerged as the ideology of the uprising is consistent with the history of a gradual decline of the secular ideas of Arab nationalism, socialism and anticolonial struggle, which informed all the previous sociopolitical transformations, and the rise of Islamism as the key discourse of political defiance. In this context, it was only natural that the most powerful Islamist force, the Muslim Brotherhood, would appear as the strongest claimant for power in the aftermath of the successful overthrow of Mubarak, even though the Islamists played a merely subsidiary role during the January 25 uprising. The Islamists claimed victory as a playwright would claim fame after the director had been applauded away from the scene. The ultimate failure of the Islamists and their defeat was also embedded in the same ideas that both guided and motivated the protesters and brought them to power. But when put in action these ideas led to practices such as the Catch Fulūl campaign, deepening the already existing divides and producing an unprecedented polarization within the Egyptian society, which resulted in another uprising, now directed against the winners of the January 25 revolution, laying grounds for a military coup and even more violence and outrage.

To conclude this paper we will come back to the issue that we raised in the Introduction, which has also bothered many analysts since 2011: was the January 25 revolution a democratic one or, to put in a milder way, an antiauthoritarian one, as many foreign observers initially believed? Our answer is this: the question appears to be beside the point. It would be fair to say that people, who participated in the uprising or identified with it in a different manner, all sought JUSTICE and felt that their country had been doing them WRONG. The 'revolutionary youth' who started the uprising and excelled in the art of public mobilization believed that the uprising was the embodiment of their, new left or Trotskyite, ideals of social justice, liberals who supported the revolution hoped that it would bring democracy to Egypt and perhaps the rest of the Arab world. But these groups soon lost their chance to lead largely because their high expectation and language they spoke had been foreign to the majority of their compatriots. Ideas, which however prevailed and guided masses of people through years of turmoil, were the ones of religiously inspired social and political conservatism. And these ideas were no antidote against authoritarianism and were grounded in the notion of JUSTICE formulated in purely moral terms. The projection of the simple world of medieval Islam as reflected in the religious normative and the political Islam's discourses did empower the protesters and discomfited their opponents at the onset of the uprising, but the pan-moralistic view of the society that they reflected proved to be inadequate when confronted with the complexities of political and social life.

Bogomolov Alexander, Ph.D. (linguistics) – Director, A.Yu. Krymsky Institute of the Oriental Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (Hrushevsky Street, 4, Kyiv, 01001), e-mail: alex28aug@gmail.com
Богомолов Александр Викторович – кандидат филологических наук, директор Института востоковедения им. А.Е. Крымского, НАН Украины (ул. Грушевского 4, Киев, 01001), e-mail: alex28aug@gmail.com