***Paweł Białynicki-Birula,***
*PhD, Assistant Professor, Department of Public Economics,*
*Cracow University of Economics,*
*Cracow, Poland*
*ORCID 0000-0002-1736-2003*

# THE EVOLUTION OF PUBLIC POLICY TOOLS: FROM TRADITIONAL ADMINISTRATION TO INTERACTIVE GOVERNANCE[1]

The text discusses the evolution of public policy tools in the context of modern administration, public policy and their development. It presents the relationships between the dominant public management paradigms and appropriate sets of tools enabling effective public action. It aims to identify premises for the emergence and use of interactive policy tools connected with a new governance era. On the grounds of public policy these tools are considered to be an effective method for achieving public goals through indirect manipulating policy processes. The text discusses the model used for the selection of procedural tools developed by M. Howlett. In conclusion Author claims that the use of interactive tools is associated with a number of specific problems and/or costs, hence they cannot be perceived in terms of one best solution. This means that the choice of specific solutions should be dictated by a given public policy context, which determines the practical applicability of a particular style of governance and, consequently, of a specific type of policy tool.
**Key words:** Public policy, interactive policy instruments, new governance.

**Introduction.** In developed countries, public governance, understood as a process of finding collective solutions to social problems and creating opportunities, prevails nowadays. The text discusses the evolution of public policy tools in the context of modern administration, public policy and their development. It aims to present the relationships between the dominant public management paradigm and appropriate sets of tools enabling effective public action. From this vantage point, the paradigms of public management should be treated as a factor that both determines and limits the choice of tools, and thus constitutes a unique toolbox. Interactive tools are particularly interesting not only due to their close association with the idea of public governance, but also in a broader context of democratisation of socio-economic life and more inclusive governance processes. They promise to offer specific ways of addressing particularly complex public policy problems, known as wicked problems, and producing those kinds of public services that require the involvement of their beneficiaries (co-production). Apparently, after a period of fascination with interactive (collaborative) instruments, a renewed interest in typically market-oriented approaches can be observed recently. They 'return to the game' as serious alternatives, but not as the only or the best possible solutions. Consequently, modern public policy consists of a variety of policy mixes, involving the simultaneous application of different types of tools, among which the interactive ones occupy their rightful place.

**1. Traditional public administration model.** The starting point for a discussion on the classification and evolution of forms of the contemporary state's influence on the social and economic sphere is the traditional public administration model, the origins of which go back to the 1920s. The theoretical foundations of the model are provided by three groups of ideas (O'Flynn 2007):

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Weberian bureaucracy, Wilsonian separation of administration from politics and Taylor's theory of scientific management.[2]

The traditional public administration model is essentially identified with legalism, which perceives it as a domain of legal regulations and procedures. As a consequence, almost all aspects of the activity of the executive are subordinated to the law (Izdebski 1997). However, when it comes to the production of public services, this approach is characterised by 'going beyond' the legalistic motives and interest in issues such as efficiency and effectiveness. In this respect, three main organisational principles are emphasised (Aucoin 1997): i) hierarchy – understood as the structuring of power with clear attribution of competence and responsibility; ii) specialisation – defining goals, missions and tasks of the state in a way that ensures competent execution of administrative duties; and iii) standardisation – the application of best practices to achieve the set goals in a fair, economic, and efficient manner.

Traditional public administration recognised the technical superiority of bureaucracy over other forms of organisation. It was founded on the belief that there were fairly simple universal rules for dealing with matters in the public sphere.[3] At the same time, it reflected the opinion that appropriate hierarchies supported by competent personnel would automatically ensure satisfactory results. In other words, it perceived results as a function of good organisation. Hence the dominance of interest in procedural issues supported by efforts to ensure a proper structure of expenditures. Weberian bureaucracy is thus characterised by a focus on a somewhat narrowly perceived issue of how to organise structures and procedures, while at the same time omitting the process-related aspects and the issue of results (Hughes 1994).

The Weberian model was undoubtedly an important achievement at the time, both in terms of the organisation of public administration and the philosophy of its operation. Although its principles are still successfully applied in numerous aspects of the public sector, they are by no means universal. The deficiencies inherent in Weberian bureaucracy surfaced in the second half of the 20th century. It turned out that bureaucratic organisations poorly cope with the rapid pace of changes in their environment. While bureaucracy tends to be effective in standardising and controlling adopted procedures, it fails in situations which demand innovation or fast decision making. Its dogmatism in observing rules often results in 'goal substitution' manifested in considering instrumental values to be the ultimate ones (Hughes 1994, as cited in Merton 1968). For that reason, bureaucracy is blamed not only for the lack of flexibility of its hierarchical structures, but also for its low efficiency. Regrettably, its focus on procedures is combined with a simultaneous neglect of the issue of results (Hausner 2002).

The traditional model of public administration, studied in a broader perspective, was part of the idea of the welfare state, also known as the supporting

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[2] The concept of Weberian bureaucracy is understood in two ways: as an 'ideal type' of government exercised by officials based on a system of rational-legal rules, and as a hierarchical form of organisation of public administration or, more broadly, state structures. The other two groups of ideas constitute a logical complement to Weberian theory. Wilson's principle of strict separation between administration and politics (1887) is founded on the belief that only qualified civil service free of political entanglements can ensure the desired continuity and professionalism of administration. On the other hand, the adaptation of scientific achievements of management, based on the ideas of standardisation and control, was supposed to ensure that administrative systems would function properly, professionally, and efficiently, in accordance with the law (Hughes 1994).

[3] The basic set of administrative functions treated as "one best way" for carrying out administrative tasks included: Planning, Organising, Staffing, Directing, Coordinating, Reporting and Budgeting (POSDCORB).

welfare state (Esping-Andersen 1990).[4] Its hallmarks were the large scale of public redistribution and discretionary spending, direct interventions in social and economic processes (including the private sector and the labour market), and mass production of social goods and services (May 1997). In the public sector, the functional equivalent of the welfare state was the so-called servicing administration, which was a specialised service provision and control apparatus (Stasikowski 2009).

In the second half of the 20th century, the development of the welfare state gradually slowed down, mainly due to its unsatisfactory effectiveness, social and economic planning failures and, above all, shrinking opportunities for economic expansion (Hughes 1994; Mayntz 1993). The then existing welfare state formula, referred to as the positive state or interventionist state, was exhausted, and the so-called regulatory state began to take shape instead. It was characterised by a departure from direct interventions (May 1997). The main function of regulation involved correcting market failures via the creation of rules of procedure rather than via taxation and direct public expenditure, which used to be the case. As a result, the public budget became an instrument for 'soft' restrictions, shifting the costs of public regulation onto the entities which were subject to it.[5]

Regulation policy is based on the idea of overseeing the activities of business entities by public administration by means of administrative and legal tools (Surdej 2006). One of the most important structural consequences of this style of governance was the emergence of new public policy actors, namely specialised agencies and commissions operating independently of the government, as well as the active involvement of the judiciary in the issues associated with administration and political processes (May 1997). The development of the state's regulatory function in its modern sense is sometimes seen as a side effect of privatisation, or as its complement of sorts (Stasikowski 2009). Regulation originally concerned mainly the area of the 'real economy' as an instrument for correcting market failures, and over time, its application was extended to numerous areas of state activity, so that today most public policies have a regulatory character (Zybała 2014). In the area of public services, these tendencies were reflected in the growing popularity of the idea of a market and managerial management, paving the way for a new paradigm called New Public Management.

**2. New Public Management.** The rejection of traditional administration came in the wake of the realisation that the production of public services is not only administrative or legal, but also – and perhaps largely – managerial (Hughes 1994). The core aspect of the emerging new paradigm known as New Public Management (NPM) was the perception of the public sector as a domain of business s activity, subject to laws and principles similar to those of the private sector. In this context, NPM was seen as a set of ideas intended to save public funds while maintaining public access guarantees. On the one hand, the aim was to increase the productivity and efficiency of the public sector, and on the other, to modernise administration with a view to making it more flexible and innovative (Lynn 2006). Hence the slogan "more for less" soon became the hallmark of the reforms implemented

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[4] The welfare state was meant to protect citizens from the risks associated with the market economy by ensuring universal access to socially important goods and services. The welfare state aimed at "the realisation of individual freedom rights through social welfare," which offered its citizens prospects for self-fulfilment. (Stasikowski 2009, p. 155).

[5] Hence the scarcity of EU funds, which are sufficient only for regulatory policy; in the absence of tax authority, the development of competences only through the development of regulatory competences (Majone 1997).

under the aegis of NPM (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011). R. Rhodes (1997) concisely encapsulated them in the so-called three "E's", i.e. economy, efficiency, and effectiveness. These ideas were to be implemented through management methods characteristic of the private sector and the promotion of market mechanisms.

In fact, NPM was moulded by two competing approaches, one of which could be described as managerial and the other as market-based (O'Flynn 2007; McLaughlin et al. 2002). The former, identified with managerialism, was associated with the belief that management methods are universal and that professional management is superior to technical skills (Hood 1991).[6] Management was therefore to be pursued in accordance with uniform and universally recognised principles, irrespective of the field of activity. Accordingly, the use of management methods with a proven track record in business (private sector) in the public sector was recommended (Kettl 1997).[7] In response to the perceived bureaucratic shortcomings, in particular the rigidity of administrative structures and the inability to promptly respond to changes, the managerial approach advocated professionalisation of management functions, standards and performance measures, as well as incentive remuneration schemes (Hughes 1994). The process of decentralising functions and dismantling hierarchical structures was also initiated; the latter were substituted by smaller and more flexible bodies (Hood 1991).

The market approach, also referred to as new contractualism, was to offer a remedy for the government's failure in the area of public service production (Alford and Hughes 1998). Inspired by new institutional economics as well as public choice and rational choice schools, it advocated a rejection of the traditional model of service organisation based on state monopoly in favour of solutions which extensively employed market mechanisms (Hood 1991). Effectiveness was to be ensured by appropriately designed sets of economic stimuli which reflected the ideas of competition, transparency, and freedom of choice. The implementation of market-oriented solutions, including the privatisation of numerous portions of the public sector, was promoted. The most important underlying principles involved the so-called quasi-markets together with contracts as the basic instruments for managing relationships (O'Flynn 2007).

These changes were intended to economise and rationalise the operation of the public sector. From this point of view, the following were particularly important (O'Flynn 2007): the market as a model for interactions in the public sector, market incentives, and deregulation. NPM focused on the following issues (Rhodes 2010): i) process-related rather than structural aspects, ii) achieving results at the expense of procedural issues, and iii) prioritising citizens' needs.

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[6] In the tradition of the international scientific management movement, managerialism is associated with the following ideas: professional management, superiority of management skills over technical competence, providing managers with discretionary power to help them achieve the desired results, development of an appropriate management culture, and active measurement of results.

[7] The literature identifies two different ways of implementing managerialism in the NPM. The first one, characteristic of countries such as Australia and Sweden, was based on the assumption of high competences and motivation of public managers and saw the then existing institutional solutions as a limitation on their initiative. It advocated strengthening the position of managers and giving them greater freedoms, while promoting the idea of 'let managers manage.' The other one, typical of e.g. Great Britain and New Zealand, was based on a fundamentally different principle, namely that by definition the monopoly typical of the public sector does not promote managerial commitment or innovation. Therefore, it championed the idea 'make the managers manage,' i.e. forcing them to manage better mainly by subjecting them to market stimuli. The establishment of independent agencies with contracts specifying the tasks and standards of operation was to serve this purpose (Kettl 1997).

**3. (New) Public Governance.** NPM-inspired reforms had serious consequences in the form of fragmentation of the public services sphere and the creation of pluralistic structures. In view of increasing social complexity, it demanded the development of new methods of coordination (Groenevelt, van de Walle 2011). The emergence of a pluralistic structure led to the dispersion of power throughout society and the loss of effectiveness of hierarchical methods of control commonly identified with the state (Jessop 1998). These developments resulted in the emergence of a new model of public sector organisation, known as public governance (Rhodes 1997; Osborne 2010).

Governments increasingly rely on private and social actors to achieve their goals (Steurer 2013). Thus, governance processes are determined by the specific features of the environment which consists of entities endowed with a certain degree of autonomy, whose independence by definition limits or even excludes the effectiveness of traditional methods of control. In this context, co-management offers a way of overcoming deadlocks by applying the ideas of cooperation and collaboration to governance processes. Thus, by manifesting a negotiating and conciliatory nature, governance offers a completely different logic from arbitrary power. It endows decision-making processes with a collective nature and creates space for indirect, soft forms of influence. In its extreme versions, it is identified with impersonal, spontaneously occurring self-organising processes with no external coordinator.[8]

The term governance raises numerous semantic controversies, but its common denominator can be identified with the idea of complex decision-making systems, characterised by loose links among relatively independent entities (Zybała 2014).[9] This term is also used to refer to the various tools for ensuring the joint execution of collective tasks. In particular, it denotes the establishment and promotion of collaborative relations between public and non-public actors in the governance process (Howlett and Ramesh 2016). According to Lynn, Heinrich and Hill (2001), governance encompasses the entirety of "regimes of laws, rules, judicial decisions, and administrative practices that constrain, prescribe, and enable the provision of publicly supported goods and services."

In the public sector, the idea of governance is usually understood in two ways, either as a specific network style of coordination or as the entirety of institutional structures serving to govern (Rhodes 1997; Mayntz 1998; Chhotray and Stoker 2010). In the former, narrower approach, it signifies a method of coordination opposed to hierarchical power, which emphasises cooperation based on indirect, soft forms of influence. In this sense, it is identified with networking as the means of direction, control, and coordination of wholly or partially autonomous individuals (Lynn et al. 2000; Rhodes 1997). In the other, broad

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[8] In this context, it is also perceived as an environment of orderly governance and collective action "which is not imposed by anyone but is the combined result of interaction" of social actors. (Stoker 1998, p. 17).

[9] Drawing on linguistic analysis, C. Offe (2012) identified its properties which permit associating it both with structures (understood as institutional order) and with the processes determined by them. In the context of public affairs, it is commonly used to describe how the state coordinates with social actors to solve collective problems. However, oscillating "between the extremes of structure and process" (with an emphasis on the former) does not mean at all that the essence of governance should be linked with formal structures, but rather with the ensuing power and the steering function associated with it. The concept of governance therefore implies the ability to structure processes and phenomena through encoding and programming appropriate mechanisms at the level of institutional rules. From this perspective, governance appears to provide an overall framework for activities in the public sphere. At the same time, it fits well with the logic of the neo-liberal narrative, which emphasises the impersonal and spontaneous nature of economic processes.

sense, it concerns all the ways of structuring social interactions, which constitute the framework of political and social processes. In this sense, governance refers to a set of institutional solutions that provide the general framework for political and social processes. Further, it becomes synonymous with social order, since it covers three basic forms of social organisation, i.e. markets, hierarchies, and networks (Jessop 1998; Offe 2012).

Due to its inclusiveness, governance implies a broader remit for public authority. It relies on steering and coordinating the activities of independent actors, both individual and collective ones, based on an institutionalised system of rules (Treib et al. 2005). Governance is perceived through the prism of institutions and institutional changes, and as a result, it is defined in terms of establishing, applying, and enforcing the rules of the game (Kjær 2009). Alternatively, it is defined as a collective decision making practice (Skoker 1998; Chhotray and Stoker 2010). D. Levy-Faur (2012) identified four uses of the term governance as: i) structures, ii) processes, iii) decision-making procedures, and iv) strategies.[10]

As the most recent public management paradigm, public governance draws intellectual inspiration from institutional and network theory. It is based on the assumption of both active participation of numerous more or less autonomous actors in the provision of public services (a plural state) and the numerous processes that permeate policy-making (a pluralist state) (Osborne 2010). In this approach, where public policies are less hierarchical, they are also more resistant to various organised interest groups operating across economic sectors. The basic assumption of NPG is that conventional government institutions cannot provide effective steering and must be supported or even superseded by social actors. The concept of governance emphasises the capacity of governance systems to adapt to the changing conditions in their environment (Salomon 2002).

The emergence of public governance can be viewed as concerted administrative reforms aimed at eliminating the shortcomings of NPM.[11] Initially, the approach was principally associated with the concept of networking, which resulted in the perception of public management systems in terms of network-based, self-organising and inter-organisational systems (Rhodes 1997; Levy-Faur 2012). This was quite quickly expanded to include a wider range of solutions within the general framework of horizontal coordination. Therefore, co-management became identified with the so-called soft forms of impact, which involved cooperation or teamwork and emphasised collectivity in setting objectives and/or their implementation (Rhodes 1997). On the other hand, the now dominant meta-governance perspective is characterised by interest in all the forms of coordination.

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[10] Thus, in the first case, the term refers to the architecture of relationships determined by all the formal and informal institutions, allowing for identifying certain typical structural solutions, such as markets, hierarchies or networks. The process category derives from the institutional capacity for steering and coordination, and captures the dynamic and interactive aspects of governance. The analytical unit here is the idea of the so-called governance mode, which includes such mechanisms as coercion, supervision, classic contracting, relational contracts, cooperation, community, and shaping of attitudes or awareness. Decision-making is comprised of five main mechanisms: monetary exchange, non-monetary exchange, management, persuasion, and solidarity. In the literature, considerable attention is paid to the principles of collective decision-making in the context of a plurality of subjects, i.e. without a formal power system (governance at a distance, governance without government). Finally, the category of strategy refers to the design of complex institutional systems (regulations) aimed at shaping social preferences and behaviours.

[11] The criticism dismissing first generation NPM reforms as efficient but insufficient (OECD 2003) and excessively fragmented (relative unimportance of efficiency/performance in product manufacturing) does not apply to NPM as a whole.

Table 1

## Factors leading to the emergence of public governance

| Factors | Description |
|---|---|
| NPM reforms | Division and externalisation of functions and tasks, creation of a pluralistic structure of empowerment in the public sector, increasing social complexity |
| Structural transformations in developed societies | The formation of a polycentric social structure as a result of: i) increasing social specialisation, ii) development of new information and communication technologies, iii) democratisation of social life, and iv) globalisation |
| Failures of conventional public policy (government failures) | Disillusionment with socio-economic planning in the 1960s led to demands for a fundamental change in the way the state exercised its political leadership[12] |
| Debate on overload of government | Launched in the mid-1970s by the Trilateral Commission in the context of a perceived gap between the growing expectations of citizens and limited capacity to meet the needs of the welfare state |
| Discussion on the crisis of governance (ungovernability of society | Inspired in the mid-1970s by Foucault in connection with the growing autonomy of society and the decline of public values |
| The crisis of the 1970s | Diminished capacity to meet social needs leading to legitimation crisis of the welfare state |
| Identification of the socalled wicked problems | Problems characteristic of complex systems (open and non-linear), which prevent effective command management |
| Participatory reforms initiated at the turn of the 1970s and 1980s | Implied citizen involvement in the implementation of public tasks, based on the assumption that the government is incapable of governing as effectively on its own as in cooperation with citizens and empowered employees |

*Source: Author's own research based on Torfing et al. 2013; Hausner 2015; Mayntz 1993*

A summary of public governance characteristics discussed so far is provided in Table 2 below.

Table 2

## Public administration paradigms

| Key dimensions | Traditional administration | New Public Management (NPM) | New Public Governance (NPG) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Theoretical underpinnings | Political science and public policy | Public choice theory and management science | Institutional theory and network theory |
| Nature of the state | Unitary | Regulatory | Pluralistic |
| Subject of interest | Political system | Organisation | Organisation in its environment |
| Pressure | Policy making and implementation | Management of organisational resources and performance | Negotiation of values, meanings and relationships |
| Resource allocation mechanism | Hierarchy | Market and classical or neoclassical contracts | Networks and relational contracts |
| Production and management of services | Professional | Manager | Shared responsibility, users, communities |
| Public policy | Planners, decision-makers | Narrow decision-making and expert bodies | Negotiated outcome of mutually interacting policy systems |
| Nature of the service system | Closed | Open rational | Open closed |

*Source: Author's own research based on Osborne 2010.*

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[12] The term *political steering* (*politische Steuerung*) is considered a direct predecessor of the concept of governance. The original term was introduced in Germany in the 1970s and directly referred to systems theory.

**4. Interactive public policy tools.** Fundamentally, public policy consists in how the state chooses to influence the socio-economic sphere with respect to the public sector and the production of public services. The implementation of public policy and production of public services are collectively known as public management; in other words, public management concerns the practical aspects of public policy implementation (Zybała 2014; Sześciło 2014). The notion of paradigm refers to the sphere of beliefs about the effectiveness and possibility of carrying out specific public actions. Assuming that public policy consists of objectives and the means to achieve them, i.e. policy tools (instruments), the latter are determined by the currently predominant paradigm. From this point of view, a given paradigm and the resulting governance style constitute a kind of public policy toolbox (Howlett 2011; Scott and Thomas 2017). As Jordan et al. (2005) argue, while state objectives have remained broadly unchanged for years, changing approaches involves using new tools. In other words, tools are the hallmark of a paradigm. A summary of the basic modes of governance is provided in the table below.

Table 3

Overview of paradigms of state influence

| Mode of governance | Source of rationality | Public policy tools | Purpose of the services provided |
|---|---|---|---|
| Interventionist | Interference | Taxes, expenditure, executive orders, economic plans, public property | Fairness |
| Procedural | Law | Rules, 'soft budgeting,' independent agencies | Universal rules |
| Corporate | Management | Organisational standards, performance measures, managerial contracts, incentive remuneration systems, business plans, performance measurement | Target groups |
| Market-based | Competition/Rivalry | Functional and legal privatisation, contracting for public services, creation of internal markets (quasi markets) and public-private partnerships (PPP) | Price |
| Networked | Culture | Coproduction | Clients |

*Source: modified after Considine and Lewis (1999).*

As regards the instruments of influence used in the traditional public administration model in the early stages of the welfare state, the distinguishing feature of public policy was the widespread use of economic and legal tools of imperative nature (taxes, executive orders, plans), as well as the performance of a variety of functions (planner, manufacturer, and employer) by the state. Public ownership, regarded both as an instrument of ad hoc control and regulation of economic processes (Mayone 1997) was of great importance. In the era of the regulatory state, legal instruments based on less direct and relatively flexible rules of operation prevailed. Privatisation, accompanied by the establishment of specialised agencies and committees operating independently of the government as well as the active involvement of judicial bodies in administration and in the political process (Surdej 2006), played a major role. Budgetary methods continued to be used, albeit in the form of soft fiscal constraints. The instruments of NPM in its first, managerial stage included the following: organisational standards, performance measures, managerial contracts, incentive remuneration systems, business plans, and performance measurement. In contrast, the market stage

saw the domination of functional and legal privatisation, contracting for public services, the creation of internal markets (quasi-markets) and public-private partnerships (PPP).

In the literature, New Public Governance is also referred to as Collaborative Governance (Ansell, Gash 2008; Tang, Muzmanian 2010), which relies heavily on a variety of tools used both in isolation and jointly in order to shape and guide collective action. These tools include various kinds of cooperation, soft forms of influence (negotiations, persuasion, and information), networking, and public-private partnerships.

Table 4

Public policy features by public management paradigm

| Criterion | Traditional public administration | New public management | New public governance |
|---|---|---|---|
| Public policy analysis unit | State body/agency | Policy programme of the unit | Public policy tools |
| Style of governance | Legal | Legal/management | Networked |
| Relations with citizens | Public vs. private | Public vs. private consumerism | Public and private |
| Tools | Command and control | | Negotiations and persuasion |
| Main public policy actors | Professionals | Contracts and supervision | Cooperation between citizens and professionals |
| Theories of state influence | Classical theories of public administration | Managers | Theories of governance |

*Source: Author's own research based on Salamon 2002.*

The science of public administration and public policy analysis is characterised by different stages of focus are regards the instruments available to the state. In the traditional administration era, the focus was on the activities of public agencies, whereas the regulatory state and new public governance usually adopt the public programme as a point of reference (Salamon 2002). The governance era, in turn, was characterised by redirecting attention to the tools and making them the main focus of analysis. A characteristic feature of these tools is their implementation through cooperation structures rather than unilateral decisions take by public agencies (Scott and Thomas 2017).

Public governance deploys public policy tools in order to achieve collective goals (Salamon 2002). *Collaborative tools* is the name given to methods of initiating and supporting inter-organisational collaboration. Managers use participation incentives, formal agreements, resource sharing, deliberative forums, and other means of shaping and stimulating collaborative actions. Thus, even if the collaborative tools conceptually differ from *policy tools* (traditionally defined as "an identifiable method through which collective action is structured to address a public problem"), it is important to note that the former term can be used in a variety of ways, such as "an identifiable method through which collective action is structured to address a public problem" (Salamon 2002, p. 19), such as government loans and regulations, public managers nevertheless use a multitude of structures and processes to support collaborative governance as a means to an end. As such, collaborative governance represents a toolbox used to solve public problems (Scott and Thomas 2017).

The governance perspective is associated with the recognition of the complex architecture of the contemporary state, blurring the boundaries amongst the various sectors, which requires power sharing and cultivating long-term relations between the state and civil society (Stoker 1998). It implies an interactive process of exercising power, since no single actor has the power or resources to unilaterally solve complex problems (Rhodes 1997). New governance as an approach recognises the collaborative nature of public policy reflected in the participation of a wide range of third parties alongside the state in addressing public problems, and that public policy requires innovative instruments to ensure participation and coherence of public action (Salamon 2002).

In terms of public policy tools, public governance is associated with the creation and evolution of procedural instruments used to indirectly steer social actors towards the goals favoured by the state. Procedural tools have an indirect impact on results through manipulating policy processes. This kind of tools is mainly used to manage interactions between the state and society to ensure support for state goals and initiatives. In this respect, it differs from more classical tools (substantive ones), which directly impact on the provision of goods and services to citizens (Howlett 2011).

A good model for the selection of procedural tools was developed by Howlett (2000). The basic assumption adopted by the author is the degree of change or manipulation of policy processes to achieve the set objectives. From this point of view, the key criterion is political trust (legitimacy) required for the government to govern. The model is based on the space for information management (information blocking and sharing), through group or institutional sector reforms to a complete restructuring of the systems. Two key variables capture important aspects of the choice of procedural policy instruments, namely the scope of existing sectoral delegitimisation and the scope of existing systemic delegitimisation. The former directly affects the scope of systemic manipulation inherent in ensuring relegitimisation; while the latter affects the capacity of individual states to use the existing networks for public deliberation (see Table 5).

Table 5

Model for the choice of procedural instruments

| *Level of systemic delegitimisation* | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| *Level of sectoral delegitimisation* | | High | Low |
| | High | Institutional (manipulation) | Funding |
| | Low | Recognition (manipulation) | Information |

*Source: Howlett 2000, p. 423.*

In the institutional model, manipulation (e.g. restructuring) occurs in the context of high levels of sectoral and systemic delegitimisation. Information manipulation occupies the opposite side of the spectrum. Indirect forms of manipulation are based on authoritative and financial resources.

**Summary.** Nowadays, interactive public policy tools constitute the basic means of state influence in the socio-economic sphere. They engage various types of social actors in efforts to achieve collective goals. The concepts of cooperation, teamwork and participation are institutionally expressed in partnerships, networks and various forms of collaboration. As the literature shows, in a complex and

diversified reality, effective goal achievement depends on specific solutions and skills that facilitate the mobilisation of social actors, creating conditions conducive to their successful operation (enabling) and activation. Collaboration, or more broadly interactive (collaborative) governance, cannot be seen as a panacea for all problems, but in situations characterised by high complexity and social dynamics it can be considered as an effective method for achieving public goals.

The use of interactive tools is associated with a number of specific problems and/or costs, hence they cannot be perceived in terms of one best solution. This means that the choice of specific solutions should be dictated by a given public policy context, which determines the practical applicability of a particular style of governance and, consequently, of a specific type of tool. It should be noted that this tide of 'tool-box' pluralism or pragmatism leads to a gradual revival of interest in hierarchical solutions, which is accompanied by restoring the reputation of the state. The emergence of the neo-Weberian model of administration in Central European countries serves as a good example of this trend. Nevertheless, it should be emphasised that networking and more broadly understood interactivity have become a permanent fixture of the landscape of the public sector, including the policies pursued by the state.

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***Бялиніцькі-Бірула П.,*** *PhD, асистент викладача кафедри публічної економіки,*
*Краківський економічний університет, м. Краків, Польща*
*ORCID 0000-0002-1736-2003*

## ЕВОЛЮЦІЯ ІНСТРУМЕНТІВ ПУБЛІЧНОЇ ПОЛІТИКИ:
## ВІД ТРАДИЦІЙНОГО АДМІНІСТРУВАННЯ ДО ІНТЕРАКТИВНОГО ВРЯДУВАННЯ

Розглянуто еволюцію інструментів публічної політики в контексті сучасної адміністрації, публічної політику та їх розвитку, представлено взаємозв'язки між домінуючими парадигмами державного управління та відповідними наборами інструментів, що дозволяють здійснювати ефективні публічну діяльність. Виявлено умови, необхідні для виникнення та використання інтерактивних інструментів політики, пов'язаних з новою епохою врядування. У сфері публічної політики ці інструменти вважаються ефективним методом досягнення суспільних цілей шляхом непрямого маніпулювання політичними процесами. Розглянуто модель, що використовується для вибору процедурних інструментів, розроблених М. Хоулеттом. Зроблено висновок, що використання інтерактивних інструментів пов'язано з низкою конкретних проблем та/або витрат, тому їх не можна сприймати як один із найкращих варіантів реалізації політики. Це означає, що вибір конкретних рішень повинен визначатись конкретним контекстом публічної політики, який визначає практичну можливість використання певного стилю врядування і, отже, конкретного набору інструментів політики.

**Ключові слова:** публічна політика, інтерактивні інструменти політики, нове врядування.