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SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PRECONDITIONS FOR REGIONAL DIVISIONS IN UKRAINE

Litovchenko Artyom – PhD (Candidate of Science) in Sociology, Ass.Professor (Docent) of Political Sociology Department, V.N.Karazin Kharkiv National University

Muradyan Olena – PhD (Candidate of Science) in Sociology, Ass.Professor (Docent) of Political Sociology Department, V.N.Karazin Kharkiv National University

The paper is devoted to sociological analysis of regional divisions in Ukraine. The social and political factors and preconditions of regional conflict are issued. The analyses of historical development of the social and political conditions of ethnic, religious, cultural, language break-ups, inartificial and constructed factors of development and deepening of these break-ups are studied. It is need to construct a consistent theory of multivariate conditionality of an Ukrainian modern social and political regional crisis and conflict. The hypothesis of inadmissibility of explanation of social and political situation over one group of factors justified and verified. Also it is incorrectly to use reduction of interregional break-ups problems in Ukraine to version of artificial political construction. It is useful to build this theory on basic concepts of «social anomie», «immoral majority», and «social madness».

Keywords: regional divisions; ethnic, religious, cultural, language, political «break-ups»; social anomie; immoral majority; social madness; social cynicism.

Статтю присвячено аналізу соціально-політичних витоків, факторів і передумов формування та розвитку регіональних розломів в Україні. Проведено аналіз історичного розвитку соціально-політичних умов регіональних розломів, природних і сконструйованих факторів їх актуалізації у сучасних умовах. Акцентовано увагу на необхідності саме соціологічного аналізу регіональних розломів як багатофакторного феномена, що не може бути зведений до суто політичних та/або технологічних пояснень. Розглядаються різні версії і типи регіональних розломів, робиться припущення про значний вплив на розвиток і поглиблення цих розломів таких факторів, як інтенсивність політичної боротьби і маскування існуючих протиріч пропагандистськими засобами. Пропонується перелік найбільш значущих розколів (насамперед етнічних, культурних, релігійних, мовних), що виступають як складові регіональних розломів. Підкреслюється, що сукупність цих розколів стає потенційним фундаментом громадянського протистояння (яке може бути як продовженням політичного, так і супроводжувати його). Висувається та обґрунтовується гіпотеза про неприпустимість пояснення соціально-політичної ситуації однією групою факторів або зведення проблематики міжрегіональних розломів в Україні до версії шуканого політичного конструювання. Робиться висновок про необхідність побудови пояснювальної соціологічної концепції регіональних розломів в Україні. Пропонується варіант такої концепції з використанням понятійних конструктів «соціальна аномія», «соціальне безумство», заснованої на теоретичних розробках Р. Інглхарта, Є. Головахи, Н. Паніної та ін.

Ключові слова: регіональні розломи; етнічні, релігійні, культурні, мовні, політичні розколи; пострадянська аномія; соціальний цинізм; соціальне безумство.

Статья посвящена исследованию социально-политических истоков, факторов и предпосылок формирования и развития региональных разломов в Украине. Проведен анализ исторического развития социально-политических условий региональных разломов, естественных и сконструированных факторов их актуализации в современных условиях. Акцентируется внимание на необходимости социологического анализа региональных разломов как многофакторного феномена, несводимого к сууго политическим и/или технологическим трактовкам. Рассматриваются различные версии и типы региональных разломов, делается предположение о значительном влиянии на развитие и углубление этих разломов таких факторов, как интенсивность политической борьбы и маскировка существующих противоречий пропагандистскими средствами. Предлагается перечень наиболее значимых расколов (прежде всего этнических, культурных, религиозных, языковых), выступающих в качестве составляющих региональных разломов. Подчеркивается, что совокупность этих расколов становится

потенциальным фундаментом гражданского противостояния (которое может быть как продолжением политического, так и сопутствовать ему). Выдвигается и обосновывается гипотеза недопустимости объяснения социально-политической ситуации одной группой факторов или сведения проблематики межрегиональных разломов в Украине к версии искусственного политического конструирования. Делается вывод о необходимости построения объяснительной социологической концепции региональных разломов в Украине. Предлагается вариант такой концепции с использованием понятийных конструктов «социальная аномия», «социальное безумие», основанной на теоретических разработках Р. Инглхарта, Е. Головахи, Н. Паниной и др.

Ключевые слова: региональные разломы; этнические, религиозные, культурные, языковые, политические расколы; постсоветская аномия; социальный цинизм; социальное безумие.

The relevance of the paper is in the sphere of the continuation of a deep and multi-layered crisis in the Ukraine. The crisis has affected not only political, but also all other spheres of life of Ukrainian society. Its scale, duration and apparent complexity of the solution lead to the inevitable assumption of its multivariate conditionality. It is necessary to analyze not only the circumstances of the crisis, but its prerequisites; we need to analyze the foundation on which this crisis emerged. There is a research question: «What made this crisis possible or inevitable?», and this question seems like a necessary step in the searching of methods and directions for overcoming the crisis. In accordance with this, the purpose of this article is to analyze the socio-political origins, factors and prerequisites for the formation and development of regional faults in the Ukraine, followed by an attempt to construct an explanatory sociological concept.

Nowadays Ukraine presents a complicated and discrepant geopolitical unit. An independent state was formed in 1991 not as a result of struggle for self-determination but as there was such will of the local party elite who understood that the USSR break-down was inevitable. The Parliament of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic proclaimed independence which was later proved by the referendum. But the results of the referendum clearly showed the ambiguity of social and political understanding at that time¹. So, the independence of Ukraine became not a logical but a technical continuation of its Soviet period. The difference between Ukraine and Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was not understood by the majority as considerable: changes in small formal details such as passports (even when there were Ukrainian passports, old Soviet passports were also still used), curriculum vitae, currency were more emphasized. As for the latter, even with establishing separate Ukrainian currency «hryvnya» many citizens of Central and South-Eastern parts of the country still call it «rubl».

From the point of view of territory and borders, administrative division and mainly from the point of view of political actors independent Ukraine repeated Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. But ideologically at the official level the source of Ukrainian state was seen not in the USSR but in the Ukrainian People's Republic². So, the blue and yellow flag of Ukrainian and Western-Ukrainian People's Republics became the flag of the independent Ukraine, and the national emblem of Ukrainian People's Republic trident became the national emblem of Ukraine. Strange to say but Ukraine which existed due to the Soviet period of state adopted the anti-Soviet period and the anti-Soviet variant of state as a role model. Historically this model had a considerable element of ethnic nationalism with different intensity. So, the three main grounds for this extreme ethnic nationalism were phobias of Russia and Poland, and anti-Semitism. As a result of later changes, fusion of extreme ethnic nationalism with anti-Soviet ideologemes of the 1980s (when anti-Soviet was the synonym of west-oriented), phobia of Poland was reduced to the «theoretical» level.

At first, the extreme nationalism which was shown in particular in the demand of limiting political, labor, communicative and other rights of representatives of not title (not Ukrainian) nationality took a rather marginal position. It was voiced only by the members of half-legal political organizations and movements or by separate representatives of legal political parties.

The public opinion was indifferent towards this ideology which was proved by sociological studies recording the high level of international tolerance [22, p.89]. It is worth mentioning that in Ukraine of that period there was no showings of state discrimination as it happened in Baltic countries (the status of no-citizen for those who are not representatives of the title nation and do not know the national language sufficiently).

¹ On December, 1, 1991 90% of people who came to the referendum voted for independence though the same year on March, 17 80% USSR citizens who came to the all-union referendum gave their vote for preserving Ukraine as a sovereign state in the Union of Soviet sovereign states (a renewed version of the USSR)

² UPR is a state unit which existed on the territory of the present central and western parts of the country in the periods between 1917 and 1918 and 1919-1920 (the second period – the Directory of Simon Petlyura in federation with Western-Ukrainian People's Republic) hostile towards the Soviet Ukraine

At the same time on the level of school education and information policy the review of historic and moral values of nationalist movement, representatives of nationalist rebels, leaders of collaborative groups of the World War II (Great Patriotic War) took place. In such way, the influence of extreme ethnic nationalist ideology was most noticeable in case of children and teenager audience. Though it was marginal in the 1990s the ideology of extreme nationalism due to education and information policy enrooted the results of which appeared already in the new century with the new generation.

The specificities of education and information policies and also the law on languages which called Ukrainian the only national language contributed to the development of negative tendencies. The factors which led to disintegration of Ukrainian society and express the most significant social break-ups include the following:

Ethnic «break-up». It has already been stated that on the first stage of independent Ukraine there was no need to speak of ethnic discrimination.

Even despite the high level of conflict potential the situation with Crimea did not influence crucially the ethnic break-ups of the continental Ukraine: in public understanding Crimea was even more autonomous than in political documents. But referring to Russians who made a considerable part of population as to the «national minority» was used more and more often and neglectful context of this term was becoming more and more asked for on the political level. Ideological Russophobia (phobia of Russians) was leaving its marginal status; political projects using different versions of ideologies based on Russophobia were becoming more and more media popular and the amount of such projects in Parliament and state institutions was increasing (though in moderate amount they were always present there)³. But even the more sharp form of ethnic break-up was represented by a so-called language problem which is though connected to only with ethnic contradictions.

Language «break-up». As nowadays this break-up turned out to be the most significant, it should be viewed in detail. In the 1980s the Canadian historian of Ukrainian origin Orest Subtelniy (whose textbook was used to teach all schoolchildren in the 1990s) predicted the break-up of Ukraine because of «language border» [3]. The modern measurement of the language break-up lies in the fact that since 1991 there exist two Ukraines – Russian-speaking and Ukrainian-speaking.

Nature of the bilingualism problematisation in Ukraine is connected **firstly** with the fact that linguistic choices have clearly-defined regional allocation. By the beginning of the two thousandth's, as research has shown⁴, the situation is as follows. Eastern and southern districts (Kharkov, Sumy, Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporozhe, Dnepropetrovsk, Nikolayev, Kherson, Odessa) are populated mainly by Russian-speaking people while western and some central districts (Lvov, Ivano-Frankovsk, Ternopol, Lutsk, Chernovtsy, partly Poltava and Kiev district but not Kiev itself) are mainly represented by Ukrainian-speaking population. Central districts are the region of relatively parity of two languages with domination of different variants of «surzhik» (the mix of Russian and Ukrainian) [24]. By the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, the situation has changed just a little. Sociologists have noted that 46% of the population of Ukraine thinking exclusively or primarily in Russian, while the Ukrainian language for the overall rate is 38%. In this case, the probability that an ethnic Russian thinking in Russian, was much higher than the probability that the Ukrainian think in Ukrainian [25; p.95].

Secondly since 1991 the state policy has been based on the principle of monolingualism; at the same time during the whole period of existence of Ukraine a tendency of exclusion of Russian language from the majority of the fields of usage has been implemented. During different years the tendency showed up with different intensity but was never set to zero. The pattern of the demonstration also varied. None of the presidents did put effort to give the Russian language official status or state, despite the obvious social demand. So, control over the usage of the language in educational process was increased after electing V. Yushchenko in 2004. Russian language was officially completely cut out from the cinema's and higher education; teachers were at risk while using it during lectures as they bore official and administrative responsibility. Higher education system documentation as well as secondary education system documentation (class registers, curricula) were to be kept in Ukrainian only.

Different formal evasions were used not to open (or preserve) schools and forms with the Russian language education. All claims to give Russian language additional courses were ignored on the wording «insufficient quantity of those who wish». Additive negative effect was given by different propagandist activities,

³ A reference point of this can be found in 2002 when in the Parliament was entered not only by national conservatives (“National Rukh of Ukraine”, “Ukrainian People’s Rukh”) but also by national radicals (UNA-UNSO, etc.) as parts of the block “Nasha Ukraina” which was headed by V. Yushchenko who later became the President of Ukraine.

⁴ «На Украине русскоязычных больше, чем украиноязычных» [Электронный ресурс] // *Демоскоп Weekly*. — 18—31 марта 2002. — № 59—60. — Режим доступа: <http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/2002/059/panorama01.php#13>; О статусе русского языка [Электронный ресурс] / База данных ФОМ. — 15.02.2002. — Режим доступа: <http://bd.fom.ru/report/map/u0202008>

encouraging people to switch to Ukrainian language in all communicative spheres and to completely abandon usage of Russian language⁵, that was the same as the higher degree of «patriotic behavior».

Also several manipulation technologies were used to implement the ideas according to which Russian-speaking citizens cannot be real patriots and Ukrainians who speak Russian are not conscious enough or «pro-Russian oriented». In particular, the known lecturer of Ukrainian from the Lviv Polytechnical University, being the member «Svoboda», in a series of publications proving that Russian-speaking citizens of Ukraine are «the Russian cattle» [23], after electing her a deputy went with «controlling visit» to a kindergarten.

The episode with adoption of the sensational law on regional languages is indicative [12]. However, actually the law only partly simplified some moments of realization of the language rights in secondary education (at the level of municipalities). For the rest the result turned out disputable. This example shows well that in language battles, as a rule, Russian-speaking citizens of Ukraine turned out to be victims – even when actions were carried out allegedly in their advantage.

Sociologists regularly made statements according to which the problem of Russian is not significant for the population of the country, however it «is artificially inflated» by media and politicians. But it is natural, any mentally normal person when ranging «safety of children» and «the status of Russian» put the first problem on a place, the first on the importance. Some sociologists constantly turned on an inefficiency of such tools [22, pp. 107-109; 8]; nevertheless, the distorted stereotypic idea of insignificance of a language problem managed to be fixed in public consciousness. Naturally, it also did not contribute to this problem; it was easier to put it aside.

3) **Cultural «break-up»**. Besides natural and therefore not critical consequences of cultural diversity – contradictions between rural and city communities, between a set of religious groups in the secular state – in Ukraine basic «break-up» between cultural and valuable preferences and orientations of the western and southeast areas is observed. In most generalized view it is possible to say that the South-East is focused on collectivist values with a historical support on the orthodox base; the values of the Soviet civilization are deeply rooted here. Among them there are not isolationist self-sufficiency; construction in a reference point of production and socially useful work, an industrial and city way of life; primacy of international communications in all spheres of the state activity; continuation of the Soviet festive and household traditions (including «ideological» holidays – the May Day, anniversary of October revolution, etc.). It is wrong to believe that it concerns only value consciousness of the senior generation; the opposite is proved by a special cult which became widespread in the 21st century among youth of southeast areas (at the same time with Russia), a peculiar cult of the USSR which central element is the victory of the Soviet state and the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War (the Soviet part of World War II).

The western areas, on the contrary, profess mainly individualistic and farmer values a support for which is the Catholicism. The major place in structure of value and standard consciousness is taken by a community with European civilization, by nationalism of various intensity, rejection of the Soviet cultural sample in all its nuances, accompanied by a high level of a cultural expansionism. Negative markers of different degree of intensity allocated significant holidays for the Soviet tradition and date, beginning from an above-mentioned Victory Day and finishing the New Year considered as an element of «Russian promotion» and at the same time «godless» influence. Specificities of city identification considerably differ: if for southeast and the majority of the central regions the city is first of all a production (or scientific, educational) organism, in the western areas the understanding of the city is more often formed in petty-bourgeois tourist coordinates.

4) **Political** (including geopolitical) «break-up». Actually political measurement of this «break-up» crowns as a formal result all division of Ukraine as a country. It is expressed in repeatability of electoral preferences: inhabitants of the southern and eastern areas vote for those political forces which make slogans and the programs focused on increase of the status of Russian, economic stability and every possible cooperation with Russia and CIS countries (from 2004th year – the countries of the Euroasian economic union, the Customs union, the Common economic space, etc.) [26; 27]. The brightest presentation of this «break» was shown at presidential election – in 1994 (the southern and eastern areas voted for promising the state status for Russian L. Kuchma, the western – for L. Kravchuk), in 1999 (the southern and east areas voted for the communist P. Simonenko, the central and western – for L. Kuchma). In 2004 the political «break-up» provoked V. Yanukovich and V. Yushchenko's sharp opposition, and after and resistance (at that time – peace) the southern and eastern areas which supported V. Yanukovich as the candidate for presidency, to revolution within the Orange Revolution project. In 2010 the southern and eastern areas voted for V. Yanukovich, western and central – for Yu. Tymoshenko. Total results of elections each time were influenced by technological nuances and local fluctuations of regional intensity, «break-up» steadily remained, and since 2004 – was articulated and warmed up during the

⁵ «Зроби подарунок Україні». Mode of access: <https://readymag.com/kis/nbb/2/>

pre-election period by political, public forces, experts and media community, and with the same intensity was suppressed during the period between elections.

Why it is necessary to speak not about ordinary political divergences, but about «break-ups»? Because the geopolitical breaks lies in its basis and at the heart of its depth and the importance. Political inheriting not USSR, but UNR and ZUNR by the independent Ukraine on 1991 critically becomes complicated because of the fact that the West Ukrainian areas became a part of USSR only in 1939, since the start of World War II. In spite of the fact that in 1939 inhabitants of the West Ukrainian areas were eager to accept the Soviet power, as eyewitnesses and historians state⁶, already at that time between the western and east areas not only economic, but also a civilization, geopolitical abyss was lying. The West Ukrainian areas long time developed as a part of Austro-Hungary, then Poland, Hungary, Romania. The characteristic ethnic nationalism for them with the powerful anti-Russian core, caused both natural historical conditions of development, and results of ideological processes of the beginning of the XX century in Eastern Europe, put insuperable barriers between them and other Ukraine. The situation became complicated because of the unitary device the inefficiency of which was leveled in huge federation of the Soviet Union, but was shown in the period of independence (in no small measure because of the Crimea which autonomy looked alien in the unitary state) [16].

The formality of «independence», its perception as especially external, technical change became the reason of prevalence of local, regional identity (with a considerable share of the «Soviet» identity) over all-Ukrainian. At that time identification of Ukrainians with the Austro-Hungarian empire (the purpose – the maximum separation of Ukrainians from Russia by means of ethnolinguistic and political methods) was its core. However such identity did not represent any interest for provinces (areas) which were the parts of Velikorossiya: Kharkov (including Sumy), Donetsk, Lugansk, Dnepropetrovsk. For these areas a peculiar local boundary identification was characteristic (Slobozhanskaya, etc.) which functioned as built in the all-Russian identity (quite so). Further much was made for formation of the Ukrainian identity in Soviet period. Such designing was carried out on similar with the above described scheme: identity as an original and self-valuable part of the all-Soviet identity was developed as national. In the independent Ukraine they tried to design nation-wide identity, however mistakenly began to design it not from scratch, and with a large-scale support on Austro-Hungarian (first of all anti-Russian) option of the Ukrainian identity, but extended to all parts of modern Ukraine including traditionally Russian regions. Naturally, the southeast regions focused on Russia could not accept the anti-Russian identity. Thus, internal discrepancy instead of permission was transferred to the conflict of civil character.

Retrospective and actual analysis of the Specificities of Post-Soviet Anomie. The radical character of the changes after 1991 did not allow predicting the duration, depth and the results of anomie in the post-Soviet societies. That is why a well-known phenomenon got the name of «post-Soviet anomie» to refer to the period which began after 1991. It is important to note some specificities of post-Soviet anomie: 1) the stable character of social instability; 2) the existence of the phenomenon of «immoral majority»; 3) alienation of the society from the state in the conditions of fusion between authorities and business (phenomenon of «state capture»); 4) the development of the phenomenon of double institutionalization; 5) the presence of the phenomenon of total corruptness.

Also it is important to note that Ukrainian society stayed in the conditions of multiple-vector anomie. It is the next step of our analysis. For studying anomie in Ukraine the scientists of the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences Nataliya Panina and Yevgeniy Golovakha used several common for the world sociology and adapted for the national realities methods (to its direct showings one can include the index of anomie, the index of social cynicism and the index of authoritarianism, to the secondary showings – the indexes of trust, the integral index of social feeling and the markers of public mood, social tension, etc). Let us look at the dynamics of the given phenomena of post-Soviet anomie through the prism of given markers using the data of monitoring of the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (1992-2012) and also some secondary data from other sources.

According to the showing of the index of anomie⁷, or the index of anomic demoralization, the population of Ukraine is still disoriented and finds itself in the condition of increased anomic demoralization (see the table further) despite the improvement of life quality since 2000. The «orange revolution» in 2005 seemed not only to fail in fulfilling the hopes but also deteriorated the condition of anomic demoralization of Ukrainians. The next recurrence happened after 2010 as a kind of new disappointment after the change in ruling elite. It turns out that illogical policy

⁶ See, for example: Гриневич В. Червона армія у війнах і військових конфліктах 1939-1940 рр.: військово-політичні, ідеологічні та соціально-психологічні аспекти / В.А. Гриневич // Проблеми історії України: факти, судження, пошуки: Міжвід. зб. наук. пр. — 2003. — Вип. 10. — С. 340-372.

⁷ This is an addition index, it consists of 9 points concerning estimation of resistance of general social norms and their own condition with a dichotomic scale of answers (“agree – 2 points, “do not know” – 1 point, “do not agree” – 0 points). The total result varies from 0 to 18 points (0 – full rejection of demoralizing action of anomie, 9 – neutral one, 18 – maximum showing of demoralization because of the society condition). The showing from 9 to 12 presupposes a high level of anomie demoralization, more than 12 points show the high level.

of authorities results in its change, and the new authorities continue this illogical line. Nevertheless, the anomic state of the Ukrainian society is fully connected to stability of the country's political system [18; 19]. Unfortunately, the position of instability, indefiniteness and absence of beliefs is characterized by negative showings of stability of social order. We can see, that instability of social area, misunderstanding of laws, disorder and overall disbelief did not change in the given period, which became the general characteristics of population of Ukraine.

Table 1.

Markers of anomic demoralization, % (Institute of Sociology, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, 1992–2012)

Opinions	Index	1992	2000	2005	2010	2012
Now everything is so unstable and anything can happen, as it seems	1	-0,75	-0,71	-0,53	-0,64	-0,70
	2	84,8	80,9	71,9	77,1	80,6
	3	5,5	8,5	9,3	9,4	9,1
Now we lack true friendship – for the whole life	1	-0,54	-0,42	-0,47	-0,45	-0,51
	2	71,6	64,6	68,2	66,6	70,2
	3	10,6	12,7	10,4	11,8	10,9
In such disorder which we have no it is difficult to understand what to believe in	1	-0,64	-0,64	-0,45	-0,56	-0,60
	2	78,5	78,3	68,4	74,0	76,1
	3	6,4	6,9	8,4	7,9	8,1
Everything changes so quickly that you cannot understand which rules to follow	1	-0,66	0,67	-0,47	-0,57	-0,62
	2	80,3	79,8	67,8	73,4	76,1
	3	4,9	7,0	10,7	9,7	10,0
Much of what our fathers believed in is now breaking	1	-0,80	-0,84	-0,66	-0,75	-0,78
	2	88,1	89,7	79,3	83,8	85,2
	3	3,8	4,3	7,6	7,6	8,0
The problem now is that most people do not believe in anything	1	-0,70	-0,80	-0,60	-0,69	-0,69
	2	81,8	87,7	76,3	80,6	80,5
	3	6,3	4,8	7,1	7,6	8,5
I often cannot understand what is going on and do not feel secured	1	-0,09	-0,18	-0,02	-0,05	-0,09
	2	49,0	51,8	43,6	45,7	46,7
	3	10,7	13,6	14,8	13,7	15,3
Some time ago people felt better as they knew how to behave correctly	1	-0,44	-0,56	-0,35	-0,44	-0,51
	2	66,3	71,9	60,9	65,6	68,8
	3	11,4	12,0	12,8	12,8	13,2
It seems to me that others understand better what is right and what is wrong	1	0,07	0,07	0,14	0,24	0,19
	2	37,0	35,4	33,5	29,4	31,8
	3	18,6	22,5	18,6	16,9	17,9
Index of anomie		13,6	13,8	12,4	12,9	13,3

Note: 1 – the factor of balance agreement/disagreement of anomic demoralization; 2 – those who agree with the statement; 3 – the answer «I do not know».

But for many Ukrainians another quality activated – it is patience. The percentage of those who became patient to difficult life circumstances increased from one third to one half, and the amount of those who vice versa cannot be patient to the circumstances decreased from two thirds to one third. In 2012 Ukrainians had the same opinion of their future as in 2000: they thought that there would be no real improvement. It is important to stress that the pessimistic opinions which can sometimes transform into disaster predictions still decreased in that period. At the same time the level of scornful attitude towards the general values is reflected by the index of social cynicism⁸, which gained critical character by 2012. The data of the years 2013-2014 can show different results as

⁸ Consists of 7 statements concerning the estimation of motives of other people and distrust to others with dichotomic scale (“agree” – 2 points, “have difficulty in answering” – 1 point, “do not agree” – 0 points). Total result varies from 0 to 14 points (0 – total absence of cynism towards others, 7 – neutral result, 14 – maximum cynicism). The result from 7 to 10 shows a high level of cynicism, 10 points presuppose its high level in the society.

we can see from the increasing of the level of volunteering nowadays. The statement of disbelief is important to stress: the primary balance which was one of two the lowest markers increased more than by one-fifth as in the situation with all other opinions with high markers of negative balance.

Table 2.

Showings of social cynicism, % (Institute of Sociology, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, 1992–2012)

Opinion	Index	1992	2005	2010	2012
You need much proof to make people believe in something	1	-0,45	-0,53	-0,49	-0,51
	2	65,8	68,7	66,9	67,9
	3	12,6	15,1	15,3	15,1
I think the majority of people are able to lie in order to get promotion	1	-0,48	-0,67	-0,64	-0,68
	2	68,0	77,1	75,2	78,3
	3	11,2	12,1	13,2	11,6
The majority of people are honest only because they are afraid of being caught lying	1	0,00	-0,11	-0,07	-0,14
	2	42,8	45,9	43,6	47,7
	3	14,0	19,0	19,8	18,7
I think the majority of people are able to make a dishonest action to get profit	1	-0,30	-0,44	-0,52	-0,55
	2	58,5	64,6	69,0	70,6
	3	12,4	14,9	13,7	13,7
The safest thing is not to trust anybody	1	-0,06	-0,16	-0,14	-0,28
	2	46,7	50,2	49,6	57,0
	3	12,3	14,9	14,1	14,0
I think the majority are able to tell a lie in order to avoid problems	1	-0,32	-0,43	-0,49	-0,49
	2	60,3	64,3	68,1	68,4
	3	11,0	14,2	13,1	12,5
The majority of people do not really like doing anything to help others	1	-0,19	-0,27	-0,28	-0,42
	2	53,2	55,6	56,1	64,1
	3	12,4	16,2	15,5	13,5
The index of social cynicism		8,8	9,6	9,6	10,1

Note: 1 – the factor of balance between agreement / disagreement of social cynicism; 2 – the amount of those who agree; 3 – the answer «I do not know».

The situation with a large amount of refugees from the area of a military conflict must have changed the data according the index of social cynicism: in the social circle of each person there is an acquaintance, a colleague, a relative who found him/herself in this situation and needs help. Nowadays refugees get more help from unofficial sources.

The Ukrainian society was not homogeneous at all according to the showings of anomic demoralization: the level of understanding the condition of the society enhances from the West to the East of the country, the least demoralization is experienced by the representatives of South-West and Kyiv, the highest is experienced by the citizens of the South-East. As the amount of Russian-speaking people increases from the West to the Centre and from the Centre to the East, and there are also ethnic groups for whom their native language is prevailing in comparison with both Ukrainian and Russian you can explain regional differences with the help of the dominating native language of the citizens of a given region. But this is not so. Language differences according to the index of cynicism are statistically considerable not between the groups of Russian- or Ukrainian-speaking citizens but between this group and other Ukrainians who speak other languages. According to the index of anomie there were no considerable differences found. The regional difference is enhanced by the connection between the type of township and the demoralized condition of its citizens (in the Western part of the country there live more rural population than in the Eastern part, and it usually experiences greater instability, lack of understanding the reality and lack of social benefits). The highest level of social feeling among city population was recorded in Kyiv in 2005 (43 points). O. Zlobina analyzing the structure of social benefits explains it with the fact that the city

population «less feel the lack of political and economic knowledge, feel more secured, self-confident in comparison with the rest of population of Ukraine» [13].

So, regional inconsistency of the demoralized Ukrainian society is the reality and shows the presence of those «border» conditions in which the country found itself. The additional proof is represented by considerable social and demographic differences. The interconnection between the age and the demoralization level of a respondent, between his/her education and the same condition is similar in strength but different in vector: the level of rejection of social reality, the feeling of alienation becomes stronger as the person becomes older, though «the higher level of education contributes to overcoming social alienation in difficult conditions of making the society democratic» [20, p.129]. The conclusion showing that the younger the age and the higher the level of education is the less is the level of anomie leading to demoralization was received by N. Panina in 1992. During 20 years the results have not changed: though the level of education improved it did not influence the demoralization of the society. So, such factor as higher education is a differential factor but it cannot decrease the level of demoralization of the Ukrainian society.

Jobs in state sector (or their total absence) are negatively reflected on the level demoralization and it probably a result of state staff reduction which took place recently. This is proved by the showings according to types of jobs: professional politicians, state servants and unemployed (including pensioners, those who have no steady income resource or recorded unemployed) influence the anomie greatly, as they are the people with opposite social status. The risk to lose it is strong in the first case and the condition in the second one is extremely risky. It is difficult to find the way in the indefinite social area for the representatives of physical labor (workers, agricultural workers). Post-anomic feelings of people are connected with their job, especially with the double institutionalization of particular state branches, which presupposes better chances for additional incomes and material benefits (backward connection);

Emphasizing the improvement of the economic situation during the period of Ukrainian independence on the one hand (yes, in comparison with the 1990s now Ukrainians definitely live better), we still cannot state that the population has experience of living in favorable conditions of market economy. As only those young people who do not know about the material problems before 2000 can gain such experience without psychological fears connected with the negative experience and these are those who are living in relatively good. According to Institute of Sociology, till nowadays there were not more than one-fifth of such people.

It should be noted, that practically after 2004 the society did not fully support any initiatives of social changes as they did not see there any opportunity to improve their personal well-being. So, the integral estimation of perceiving by each person his or her own well-being in main spheres of life (so called the integral index of social feeling) as a criterion of determining the vector (positive or negative) of social changes shows that the latter have hardly a positive vector.

In the rating of the most deficit social welfares for the Ukrainian society by the year 2012 we can find: savings which support well-being for at least one year in case of serious illness, unemployment, property losses, order in the society, secured future, following the laws of the country, opportunity to fully spend the vacation, necessary medical care, opportunity to give the children proper education, judicial assistance in preserving one's rights and interests, opportunity to eat the food according to one's tastes, opportunity to earn extra money for fulfilling extra work, etc. (more than half of population noted this).

As for the Ukrainian society before the stresses of late 2013 the following issues were rather burning: How secured does a person feel in the society? Are a person's rights as a citizen fully secured? Can such society save social capital if it turns out the most problematic areas are at the same time the most important spheres of social activity – sphere of social safety, labor sphere, recreation and cultural sphere or can it happen that such spheres will always remain such due to their significance? Nowadays these issues are actualized even more.

Empiric indicators of three main indexes in 1992 and 2000 which are the anomies of authoritarianism and social cynicism and their interrelation are analyzed by Evgeniy Golovakha in the article «Phenomenon of «immoral majority in the post-Soviet society: transformation of mass opinions about the norms of social behavior in Ukraine». The level of social cynicism as a not normative reaction to anomie since 1992 to 2000 increased, the marker of authoritarianism as a normative reaction to anomie remained unchanged. More than 10 years later the indexes of anomie and social cynicism are still on the high level. The sociologist saw in this a direct threat of breaking social capital as a main factor of public well-being and the perspective of stable development of the society, as the cynical social position turns every person into an isolated individual who loses own ability to collective resistance to the power which breaks rights and interests of individuals. Unfortunately by 2012 the situation has not changed and the society has turned out to be unable to collect any social capital.

Table 3.

**Indexes of anomie, authoritarianism and social cynicism
(Institute of Sociology, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, 1992–2012)**

	Anomie Index (scale 0–18)		Authoritarianism Index (scale 0–14)		Social Cynicism Index (scale 0–14)	
	Average Point	Standard Deviation	Average Point	Standard Deviation	Average Point	Standard Deviation
1992	13,6	3,82	8,6	2,73	8,8	3,88
2000	13,8	3,67	8,7	2,67	10,0	3,27
2012	13,3	3,59	–	–	10,1	3,28

*indexes from 1992 and 2000 cited from [9]; indexes from 2012 constructed by using the database and with the same methodic as in [9].

We cannot observe any statistically significant changes in the social cynicism index. This proves that establishing social cynicism in the society is total, contributing to the development of «immoral majority», and so in case the previous conditions and paces of development in the liberal-democratic direction do not change we still cannot speak of considerable decrease of the condition of total anomie. Besides the events taking place now hardly contribute to the stabilization of the situation in the country but change the ability to collectively resist which was not necessary before. Now the issue of the vector of such collective action becomes more vital.

Ambivalence not only of thinking but also of the way of life of the majority of people unfortunately led not only to the conflict of normative opinions but to their fusion (for example, people are against the fact that bribery and corruption are wide spread but at the first opportunity they tend to solve their problems with the help of bribes). From the other side, some part of the society is interested in reproducing the previous attitudes, some other part is tired of constant moving in the areas with double standards, and it either ignores it or tries to change something. Time will show what changes in the value-normative system would place the tragic events in the country.

So, we can see that the time bomb actualizing internal «breaks» of Ukraine the first time detonated in 2004 and next in 2014. In time of an «Orange revolution» split of the country was articulated and accepted as the fact by considerable part of the population in spite of the fact that politicians, journalists and political experts hurried to declare this «split» by «an artificial political technology». At the same time a number of sociologists noted that rather the revolution itself which did not have serious prerequisites looked like «artificial technology». The coup d'état in 2014 was not bloodless and caused in armed conflict and civil war⁹ later on. But there was a similar reason for this as in 2004; similar, but intensified by the long ignoring period.

Nowadays Ukrainian crisis has not been exhausted, the conflict in the Donbas is not completed, and the war is not stopped. It is difficult to predict any further development of the conflict due to the extremely high dynamics of events. Because of the inspired from abroad coup d'état based on ignoring the opinions of large part of the population, this has led to a war of the state against its own population. The fact that as a result of the so-called «Ukrainian crisis» was an exacerbation of similar problems in other countries, in our view, confirms our findings.

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⁹ According to the position of pro-unite (pro-Ukrainian) Donetsk activist Enrique Menendez: "Resolving conflicts – that's what government is for. If you're incapable of that, you're not a government, you're a profanation. Either from ignorance of the situation, or from understanding it full well, they were igniting a civil war." (in: Gessen K. Why not kill them all? [Electronic resource] / Keith Gessen // London Review Of Books. – Vol.36. – No.17. – 11.09.2014. – p. 18-22. – Mode of access: <http://www.lrb.co.uk/v36/n17/keith-gessen/why-not-kill-them-all>)

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